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Within the body of scholarly interpretation of the British Civil Wars (1642-1651), there is an absence of research into the politicisation of rituals of power and the struggle between monarchy, parliament, and the army to command these symbolic forms of authority. My thesis examines the performances of rituals as the methodical enforcement of political authority during the First Civil War (1642-1646). In synthesising notions of court culture and performances of political discourse, it traces the constriction of royal ritual, parliamentary subversion of monarchical rituals, and the rise of politico-military ritual, culminating with Charles I’s surrender on 5 May 1646. Situated within existing interdisciplinary research that explores the communication and image of power, this thesis examines (1) the battle to control symbols of political power, (2) polemical interpretations of the conflicting use and ownership of these performatives, (3) the efficacy of these performative acts among a divided public. It highlights the ways in which such performances limited the public to the role of audience, despite the apparent inclusiveness of many ritualised events. This enables a close reading of ritual performances and the subsequent literature produced around the events. It also calls upon the close reading of literary and non-literary texts that can be described as ‘virtual performances’ of ritual, most notably Charles’ royal entry into London (1641), and the funeral of the third Earl of Essex (1646).

Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

Many political theorists agree that an equal distribution of certain goods is a requirement of justice. However, they disagree about the types of agents that possess these distributive obligations, and about the range of agents who owe these obligations to each other. Are states primarily responsible for ensuring a just distribution of income? Or, is distributive justice also the responsibility of private individuals? Do agents – whether states or individuals – possess distributive obligations to foreigners? Or, is distributive justice only a requirement within national borders? I argue that the primary subject of distributive justice is the state’s relation to its citizens. States, and not private individuals, possess distributive obligations; and states only possess these obligations to their citizens, not to foreigners. I argue first that the state possesses distinctive distributive obligations to its citizens because of the way in which it exercises political authority over them. To exercise its political authority legitimately, that is, in a way that is consistent with the free and equal nature of its citizens, I argue, the state must secure a just distribution of civil liberties, political rights, income, and opportunities. I argue second that the subject of distributive justice does not extend beyond the state’s relation to its citizens. I argue first that principles of distributive justice do not apply to the private choices of citizens on the grounds that justice demands that citizens be free to decide what to do with their lives on the basis of their own conception of the good, and not on the basis of what is best for others. I argue second that because international organizations do not exercise political authority in the same way that states do, equality is not a demand of global justice.

In this paper, I will argue that given a choice between a global epistocracy and a global democracy, we ought to choose epistocracy. The reason for this is the need for stopping the ongoing climatic change that will cause a massive amount of suffering and death. Accordingly, I will demonstrate why the democratic process is inadequate in preventing the future climate disaster, and why an epistocracy have a better chance to succeed in this endeavour. My argumentation relies on four steps. First, I shall start with some initial housekeeping that explains why the outcome of continuing climate change is so repugnant. Secondly, I will demonstrate why implementing policies that halt climate change is something we ought to do and why it takes priority over other political concerns. Thirdly, I will argue that given psychological barriers coupled with the Condorcet Jury Theorem we have reason to believe a global democracy will fail to implement these necessary policies. Finally, I shall defend some fundamental claims that the epistocratic method relies on. This I do for two reasons: first, to give some moral credence to the epistocratic method and as a consequent close the door to radical authoritarianism. I do this because even if our priority is to prevent the impending climate disaster, we need to safeguard against a decision-making process that possibly could enact morally repugnant policies (perhaps in other political areas), e.g., bestow only one person with all political power.  Secondly, the defence of epistocracy will demonstrate why a proceduralist argumentation for democracy does not yield a great moral advantage vis-à-vis the epistocratic method.

No description available.

Servant de titre à notre travail, la distance entre Reims, terre de sacre royal, et Varennes, village où Louis XVI et sa famille ont été pris en flagrant délit de fuite, est une métaphore de l’érosion du langage de l’autorité politique (notamment, le droit divin des rois) au cours du XVIIIe siècle et de la concurrence entre les discours de résistance aux autorités traditionnelles et ceux qui proposèrent un nouvel ordre politique sur la base des fondements théoriques et abstraits de la France du dix-septième siècle (le constitutionnalisme, le contractualisme, entre autres discours). Nous mettons en lumière pamphlets, brochures, actes parlementaires et documents administratifs et de gouvernement, écrits à l’occasion du sacre et du procès engendré par la fuite du Roi, ceux-ci n’étant pas à strictement parler, des œuvres classiques de la théorie politique. Toutefois, systématiquement analysées sans omettre de les articuler aux travaux de philosophie politique de l’époque largement connus, de telles sources permettent d’observer la dynamique de l’autorité politique, tout comme les disputes relatives à la définition de la nature et aux limites du (corps) souverain, portées par différents langages politiques de l’histoire. En réalité, dans la présente recherche, l’autorité politique est, pour paraphraser John Pocock, une activité discursivement constituée. Loin d’affirmer que de tels discours auraient été intronisés seulement au moment de la rupture, c’est-à-dire pendant les évènements qui marquèrent la Révolution Française de 1789, dans notre travail nous soutenons qu’au regard des écrits des auteurs analysés, les langages politiques gardent une forte ressemblance avec ceux qui étaient déjà en circulation et avaient pour but de contester l’ordre en vigueur, utilisés au cours des décennies antérieures à la période révolutionnaire, dès l’Ancien Régime. En réalité, notre hypothèse interprétative indique autant les effets de la rupture qu’une certaine continuité des langages dans un contexte particulier de l’histoire. / Providing the title of our thesis, it is the distance from Rheims to Varennes (the first being the land of the royal consecration and the last the place where Louis XVI and his family were caught fleeing), that provides the metaphor both for the erosion of the language of political authority (especially, the king’s divine right) during the 18th century and for the competition between political discourses of resistance to traditional authorities and those which proposed a new political order, based on theoretical and abstract foundations (notably the constitutionalism, the contractualism, among other discourses). We want to analyse the dynamics of political authority in that period by shedding some light on pamphlets, brochures, parliamentary minutes and administrative documents written during the consecration and the process engendered by the royal flight. Even though such documents may not be considered canonical works in political theory, closer analysis and their articulation with the philosophical works of that period allow us to observe the disputes over the definition of the nature and the limits of the sovereign’s body based on political languages of history. Indeed, this research takes political authority as a discursively constituted activity, to paraphrase John Pocock. Far from arguing that such discourses would have been constituted only at the moment of rupture, during the noticeable events of the French Revolution, in 1789, In this work we sought to sustain that the political languages coming from the pen of our authors keep a strong resemblance to those already in circulation and contesting that current order. In fact, this repertory was forged in the decades before the revolutionary period – specifically during the last ordination of the Ancien Régime, in Rheims. Accordingly, the thesis' interpretative hypothesis takes into account both the effects of rupture and the continuity in certain languages that held the legitimate political authority in a particular context in history.

This essay will discuss the unusual rise to power of don Bartolomé Cortés y Mendoza Axaycatzin, who was appointed by viceroy Cadereita to serve as governor of Mexico Tenochtitlan in 1636 without mandate from the community. He had previously served as governor in Puebla de los Angeles—the most Spanish city in seventeenth century Mexico, which had no original native communities before the arrival of Europeans. The paper will explore the problem of native jurisdiction at times when tribute collections fell. It will also explore how names can signify political authority. Axayacatzin, Cortés, Bartolomé, and Mendoza all signified political status for Europeans and perhaps were assumed to connote authority and status to Tenochca and other native peoples resident in Mexico Tenochtitlan at a time when the city’s indigenous population was becoming increasingly diverse. / Este ensayo discutirá el inusual ascenso al poder de don Bartolomé Cortés y Mendoza Axaycatzin, que fue designado por el virrey Cadereita para servir como gobernador de México Tenochtitlan en 1636 sin el mandato de la comunidad. Él había servido previamente como gobernador en Puebla de los Ángeles —la ciudad más española en México del siglo XVII que no contaba con comunidades nativas originales anteriores a la llegada de los europeos—. En el artículo se explorará el problema de la jurisdicción indígena en momentos en que las colectas tributarias decayeron. También se explorará cómo los nombres pueden significar autoridad política. Axayacatzin, Cortés, Bartolomé y Mendoza indicaban una condición política para los europeos, y quizás se asumió que connotaban autoridad y estatus para los tenochcas y otros pueblos nativos de México Tenochtitlan en una época en la cual población indígena de la ciudad se diversificaba cada vez más.

本論文各章內容如下： 第一章：前言。敘述本論文寫作的動機，研究的架構與重點。 第二章：地理環境與歷史背景。分別敘述新加坡的地理位置、地形、資源及新加坡之 由古代以迄近代自治獨立的歷史過程。 第三章：國家認同與政治權威的問題。計分兩節。第一節多元種族社會的國家認同。 分別探討多元種族社會之成立及其早期的發展；認同觀念的轉變；認同感的建立。第 二節政治權威的合法性。探討政治穩定的獲致；權威的本質；權威的承續。本章主要 偏重於政治文化層面之討論。 第四章：政治參與、行政能力及經濟發展的問題。本章則落實於制度與績效層面之探 討。亦分兩節。第一節行政能力政治參與。討論文官的動員；政府的地方基層組織， 諸如人民協會，公民諮詢委員會及居民委員會；行政角色與政治角色的不平衡。第二 節則就新加坡的經濟發展所造成的問題為探討。 第五章：穩定與變遷。乃本文之結論，除總結前述各章節，並提出對新加坡未來前途 之看法。

A pesquisa tem como objetivo geral defender uma interpretação específica do valor da igualdade. Contra teorias que não reconhecem a igualdade como um valor moral intrínseco - como as teorias libertarianas, instrumentalistas e suficientaristas da justiça -, e contra a visão distributivista da igualdade - encontrada, por exemplo, no chamado igualitarismo de fortuna - a tese formula e avalia com base em argumentos normativos uma interpretação relacional do valor da igualdade denominada de igualitarismo social. A especificidade do igualitarismo social encontra-se em seu fundamento: um ideal de respeito mútuo responsável por governar as relações interpessoais entre pessoas livres e iguais. Ao defender a plausibilidade de concepções relacionais de igualdade, espera-se demonstrar que a igualdade social é capaz fornecer uma base (i) coerente, (ii) moralmente relevante, e (iii) distributivamente determinada para a justiça igualitária. Para isso, a tese argumenta, em primeiro lugar, que o uso da coerção coletiva entre iguais em autoridade demanda uma forma especifica de justificação intrapessoal uma atitude que denominarei de respeito deliberativo. Com base na noção de respeito deliberativo é possível ressaltar a existência de um tipo determinado de desrespeito igualitário, qual seja: o desrespeito performativo na reivindicação de direitos. A ideia de respeito deliberativo pode ser formulada com base nas contribuições filosóficas recentes de uma moralidade de segunda de pessoa, tal como formulada por Stephen Darwall, isto é, como um tipo de justificação normativa fundada na responsabilização mútua entre agentes morais. Finalmente, a tese argumenta que o igualitarismo social é compatível com princípios gerais de justiça social. Dois desses princípios são apresentados e analisados: (i) o princípio de mínimo cívico e (ii) o princípio de participação na riqueza social. De um ponto de vista igualitário, atender às exigências de ambos os princípios deve ser compreendido como uma condição de necessidade para uma cidadania democrática justa. / The work holds that the value of equality is best understood in a determined way. Against nonegalitarian theories such as libertarian, instrumentalist and sufficentarian theories - on one side, and distributive-based theories such as the luck egalitarianism - on the other, the thesis offers and evaluate, based on normative arguments, a relational interpretation of egalitarianism to be called social egalitarianism. What makes social egalitarianism a distinctive type of theory is its normative foundation: an ideal of mutual respect responsible for governing the interpersonal relations between free and equal persons. The work intends to show that a relational interpretation of equality is able to provide the basis for a (i) coherent, (ii) morally relevant, and (iii) distributive determined ground for egalitarian theories of justice. In order to stablish all that, it shows, first, how the legitimate exercise of political coercion among equals in authority brings about a particular kind of interpersonal attitude, called deliberative respect. Next, it is argued that the notion of deliberative respect allows us to conceptualize a particular instance of disrespect among equals, namely, the performative disrespect against a right-holder, and showing why respectful relations among equals in authority should be framed in a secondperson standpoint morality a morality according to each people are mutually accountable to each other - as the idea has been developed by Stephen Darwall. Finally, the work argues for the conceptual compatibility between social egalitarianism, on one hand, and distributive principles of justice, on the other. Two principles of justice are considered: (i) the principle of the civic minimum and (ii) the principle of participation in social wealth. From an egalitarian standpoint, both principles are required in order to bring about a just democratic citizenship.