數十年來，中國共產黨對於儒家主義的文化價值產生巨變。不似四十年前的革命，當時共產黨欲拔除儒道深植的價值，孔夫子成為國家反革命的代表形象。相反的，近年來黨內開始重塑孔夫子的地位，藉由每年慶祝孔子誕辰，立孔子像以彰顯他的貢獻，塑造成中國偉大的聖人。這大膽假設過去以馬克思主義的基本意識形態可能在改變，產生共鳴的對象從馬克思主義蛻變成儒家主義。另外一說：中國共產黨意圖採用普世的儒家價值來合理化其作為。因此我們應如何看待這個黨與過去其眼中的「魔」共舞？黨對於儒家主義的真正意圖為合？本文研究重點將解釋以上問題。 首先，本文將透過理論去探討儒家主義如何合理化政治行為。接著將透過重要的歷史背景因素證明一開始的中國共產黨對儒家主義的深惡痛絕。其後將透過第一手的文件和歷史文獻佐證在1980年代儒家主義復甦以後，黨轉變為尋找與大眾價值的共識──與儒家主義共存的立場。儒家主義的再次興起帶來了民族尊嚴，進而使黨更容易透過國家主義統一整個國家。另一方面，中國共產黨也試著傳播精心塑造的儒家主義，去蕪存菁的挑選出最利於黨的儒家元素架構。後段將提到中國共產黨如何選擇性的篩選儒家主義元素來支持獨裁統治，向國際營造中國穩定社會的形象；而非摒棄過去基本意識形態──馬克思主義卻選擇西化。最後駁斥某些立場：如中國共產黨正準備脫離現下的基本意識進而靠攏儒家主義。 因此，儘管過去中國共產黨批評儒家主義是製造階級化的淵藪，但現在卻一步步採用同樣思想，合理化獨裁統治。這種五十步笑百步的行為，挑選了利於黨的儒家元素，將存在中國兩千年的儒家主義的這甕舊酒，裝到中國共產黨統治下的這個新瓶裡。 / Over the last few decades, the Chinese Communist Party’s attitude towards the most profound determinant of the traditional Chinese culture – Confucianism – changed significantly. Not even 40 years ago, Confucius was represented as an anti-revolutionary enemy of the state, while the party tried to root out every sprout of Confucianism amongst the population. Contrarily, nowadays, the party seems to have re-instated Confucius to the position of ‘great Chinese sage’, for which it organizes his annual birthday parties, raises statues for him and praises his contributions to humanity. This leads some observers to the bold conclusion that the party might even be prepared to change its ideological basis from Marxism – which lost its resonance amongst the population anyways – to Confucianism. Others disagree, and argue that the party is just widening its legitimacy basis in a populist way by using all kinds of means, amongst which Confucianism. Thus, how should we assess the party’s dance with the former devil? What is actually the party’s plan with Confucianism? Giving an answer to the latter question is the main purpose of this research. First of all, as most authors relate this phenomenon to the party’s quest for political legitimacy, a basic theoretical overview will be given, showing possible causality between Confucianism and political legitimacy. Secondly, the most essential historical background will be provided in order to explain why the party was initially so malicious towards Confucianism. Subsequently, based on literature, and based on an analysis of primary sources, it will be argued that the party, after witnessing a popular revival of Confucianism in the 1980s, on the one hand sought consensus with the population by co-opting this revival – a revival which led to national pride, enabling the party to capitalize on its nationalist legacy as unifier of the country – while it on the other hand tried to channel this development into a meticulously constructed form of Confucianism – by selecting some elements and discarding others – that would benefit the party. The latter refers to a fragmented version of Confucianism which supports authoritarian rule, enhances social stability, shows a gentler face of China to the outside world, presents an attractive cultural alternative to Westernization, but - most importantly - doesn’t present an ideological alternative to Marxism. The latter refutes the claim that the CCP is preparing to depart from its current ideological base towards Confucianism. Concluding, despite the fact that the party previously vigorously blamed Confucianism for having facilitated the subjugation of the population, it now more or less uses Confucianism in a similar manner. The pot seems to have called the kettle black. Therefore, the role of Confucianism in the CCP’s legitimacy strategy is old wine – symbolizing the way in which dynastical China has used a selection of Confucian teachings to enhance its authoritarian rule for two millennia – in a new socialist bottle.

L’origine des revendications de la Couronne d’Aragon sur la Corse remontent à 1297 lorsque le pape Boniface VIII, qui veut se concilier l’alliance du roi d’Aragon Jacques II, lui donne en fief le royaume de Sardaigne et de Corse, constitué pour l’occasion. Il revient au roi de transformer cette inféodation nominale en domination effective. Durant la première moitié du XIVe siècle, les Catalano-aragonais concentrent leurs efforts sur la Sardaigne mais peinent à s’imposer en Corse où la Commune de Gênes dispose déjà de points d’appui puissants. Les Corses, pris dans ce conflit entre grandes puissances méditerranéennes, ne s’engagent que prudemment pour l’un ou l’autre parti. Les seigneurs insulaires tissent d’abord des liens entre ces suzerains antagonistes, pour tenter de favoriser leurs propres seigneuries. La situation change radicalement après 1358. Les peuples de Corse mènent une vaste révolte anti-seigneuriale et obtiennent l’aide de la Commune de Gênes, qui prend le contrôle du nord de l’île devenu Terra del Comune. Rejetant cette légitimité populaire et génoise, des barons Cinarchesi du sud parviennent à reconstituer leurs seigneuries avec l’aide du roi d’Aragon, ennemi de Gênes et suzerain féodal légitime. L’alliance aragonaise change alors de nature : née d’une convention diplomatique entre puissances extérieures, elle devient un enjeu interne à la Corse. Des seigneurs corses, comme Arrigo della Rocca ou Vincentello d’Istria, s’imposent comme chefs d’un parti royal opposé à Gênes et bénéficient de l’aide de leur suzerain. Pour eux cette l’alliance est aussi un atout dans leur projet de se constituer une seigneurie unique de Corse. L’île devient le champ d’affrontement de projets politiques concurrents, par lesquels chaque protagoniste, local ou extérieur, affirme sa légitimité à gouverner. Étudier les liens qui se sont tissés, du XIIIe au XVe siècle, entre les Corses et la Couronne d’Aragon revient à associer deux grilles d’analyse : une grille méditerranéenne, qui intègre la Corse dans le vaste conflit entre Gênes et l’Aragon, avec pour objectif de comprendre la nature du projet politique de la Couronne d’Aragon en Corse, et une grille locale qui se préoccupe de la façon dont les Corses ont intégrés le fait aragonais. On peut alors appréhender les particularismes et les évolutions de la culture politique corse, autour des thèmes de la légitimité du pouvoir et sa représentation. Mes recherches s’appuient essentiellement sur le fonds de l’Archivo de la Corona de Aragón à Barcelone, encore peu exploité pour la Corse, et particulièrement sur les registres de la Cancilleria real. Les documents aragonais sont confrontés aux chroniques corses, italiennes et catalanes, ainsi qu’aux documents de l’Archivio di Stato di Genova, afin de multiplier les angles d’approche et les échelles d’analyse. / The claims of the Crown of Aragon on Corsica go back to 1297, the year Pope Boniface VIII, eager to form an alliance with King James II of Aragon, bestowed on him the opportunely-created Kingdom of Sardinia and Corsica. It was for the King to turn this theoretical allegiance into an effective domination. During the first half of the XIV Century, the Catalan-Aragonese concentrated their efforts on Sardinia but found it hard to impose their rule on Corsica, where the Commune of Genoa already had many strongholds. Corsicans, caught in the midst of this conflict opposing two great Mediterranean powers, were careful not to choose sides hastily. The lords of the island first made alliances with those rival suzerains, in an attempt to favour their own seigneuries. The situation changed radically after 1358, when the Corsican peoples rebelled against their lords and obtained the help of the Commune of Genoa, which then took the control of Northern Corsica, now “Terra del Commune”.Rejecting this popular – and Genovese- legitimacy, some “Cinarchesi” barons succeeded in reconquering their Southern seigneuries, with the help of the King of Aragon, the enemy of Genoa and lawful suzerain. This changed the very nature of the Aragonese alliance – initially meant as a diplomatic covenant between two foreign powers, it now became a major issue inside Corsican society. Corsican lords, such as Arrigo della Rocca or Vincentellod’Istria, emerged as leaders of a royalist party, opposed to Genoa and benefitting from the help of the Crown of Aragon. For them, the alliance was also an asset in their own plan to turn Corsica into one single seigneury. The island became the scene of many a clash between competitive political agendas, in which each player – both local and foreign, tried to assert its claim to rule Corsica.Studying the ties formed between Corsicans and the Crown of Aragon from the XIII Century to the XV Century amounts to analyzing the situation from two perspectives – a Mediterranean one, which comprehends Corsica in the vast conflict between Genoa and Aragon and aims to understand the nature of the political plan of the Crown of Aragon as regarded Corsica, and a local one, which focuses on the extent to which Corsicans absorbed the Aragonese reality. The latter perspective highlights the specificities and evolutions of Corsican political culture and, in particular, issues such as the legitimacy of power and its representation.My research is, for the most part, based on documents from theArchivo de la Corona de Aragón in Barcelona, so far hardly exploited as regards Corsica, and in particular on the registers of the Cancilleria Real. Aragonese sources are confronted with Corsican, Italian and Catalan chronicles, as well as with the documents from the Archivio di Stato di Genova, in order to present as many different perspectives and axes of study as possible.

Joseph Raz has developed a concept of authority based on the special relationship between reasons and action. While the view is very complex and subtle, it can be summed up by saying that authorities are authorities insofar as they can mediate between the reasons that happen to bind their subjects and the subjects’ actions. Authorities do this by providing special reasons via directives to their subjects. These special reasons are what Raz calls “protected reasons.” Protected reasons are both first-order reasons for action and second-order “exclusionary reasons” that exclude the subject from considering some reasons in the balance of reasons for or against any action. I first make clear what Raz’s view of authority is, and I then defend this view from some contemporary critics.

Values have been identified as important factors that guide decision-making and influence preferences in water governance. Comparing the values reflected in water governance decisions with the values held by stakeholders and the general public may inform the debate on the political legitimacy of water governance. The research presented in this PhD thesis draws on multiple research traditions on values, ranging from ecological economics and political ecology to social and environmental psychology, to investigate the value base of water governance in the Upper Paraguay River Basin, in the state of Mato Grosso, Brazil. It first introduces a novel conceptual framework that integrates these various research traditions and suggests that water governance is closely related to the fundamental values, governance-related values, and assigned values of stakeholders and actors in water governance more generally. These different types of values vary in their level of abstractness, as well as in their ‘locus’, i.e. where the valuing person locates them, and are hypothesised to be closely interrelated in a hierarchical structure, with fundamental values being the most abstract type of values. Water governance, in turn, is defined as the synthesis of water policy (the ‘content’ of decisionmaking), water politics (the ‘power play’ between actors) and water polity (the institutional framework). The thesis then proceeds to apply this novel conceptual framework in a case study on stakeholders’ values in the Upper Paraguay River Basin, and investigates the relationship of their values with their preferences regarding the construction of the Paraguay-Paraná Waterway through the Pantanal wetland, in the south of Mato Grosso. This water infrastructure project has a long history of conflict attached to it, as it might impact the hydrology and ecology of the Pantanal, the world’s largest tropical freshwater wetland and UNESCO biosphere reserve, while at the same time benefitting Mato Grosso’s rapidly growing agribusiness sector by lowering the cost of soybean exports. Based on 24 semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders, it was found that supporters and opponents possess different, clashing ‘value landscapes’ (i.e. groups of related values), which may explain the protracted nature of the conflict around the construction of the waterway, while at the same time highlighting political legitimacy deficits of the project. This research was followed up by a quantitative study with members of the general public (n=1067), which sought to measure and test the assumption that we can empirically identify such clashing value landscapes, and their relationship with preferences for or against the Paraguay-Paraná Waterway. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), statistically significant links between people’s values and their preferences in water governance could indeed be found, as well as between different types of values, which formed two contrasting value landscapes. This suggests that water governance conflicts may in part be explained by the presence of different value landscapes among involved actors, which may include even the most abstract level of fundamental values. The research presented in this thesis thus contributes to interdisciplinary debates on the role of values for water governance from multiple conceptual, as well as methodological perspectives. Additionally, through its application to a concrete case study, it highlights the policy relevance of such research, as addressing conflicts in water governance and examining alternative policy options may require a more explicit consideration of the values of the actors involved.

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This paper aims to investigate the grounds of political legitimacy on which Vladimir Putin relied and still relies to sustain his popularity and remain in power today. Special emphasis is placed on the period after the opposition protests in 2011-2012 and demonstrations on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. These protests had a dramatic effect on the Russian regime and showed that there is opposition to Putin's leadership, at least among a segment of Russian society. This study is based on Max Weber's three ideal types of legitimacy: civil-legal, traditional, and charismatic, which will be used to investigate, how Vladimir Putin has been able to stay in power for more than 20 years. This requires investigation of grounds for legitimacy that Vladimir Putin successfully exploited during his 2000-2008 period in the presidency that made him so popular among the majority of Russian citizens. It also means the investigation of the grounds for legitimacy that Putin began to exploit after the protests on the Bolotnaya Square 2011-2012, namely during the 2012-2020 period, to stay in power despite the dissatisfaction of some citizens with his rule. This study will use qualitative analysis to examine the corresponding empirical and analytical data related to the two periods investigated in this study. In addition, data from the currently disenfranchised Levada Center will be used to follow the development and changes in approval and disapproval of Putin's leadership. / Denna undersökning har målet att analysera grunderna för den politiska legitimitet som Vladimir Putin utnyttjat och fortfarande utnyttjar för att underhålla sin popularitet och förbli vid makten fram till i dag, särskilt efter det oppositionella utbrottet 2011-2012. Det senare är centralt, eftersom protesterna på Bolotnajatorget i Moskva hade en chockartad effect på den ryska regimen och visade att det finns missnöje med Putins ledarskap, åtminstone bland en del av den ryska befolkningen. Denna undersökning utgår från Max Webers tre ideala typer av politiska legitimitet som kommer att användas för att begripa hur Vladimir Putin kunde förbli vid makten under mer än 20 år. Det krävs därför en analys av grunderna för den politiska legitimitet som Putin framgångsrikt utnyttjade under 2000-2008 års presidentperiod och som gjorde honom så populär bland de flesta ryska medborgarna. Det blir också nödvändigt med en analys av grunderna för den politiska legitimitet som Putin började använda efter protesterna, nämligen under 2012-2020 års presidentperiod för att förbli vid makten trots missnöjet med hans ledarskap. Denna undersökning ämnar använda en kvalitativ textanalys för att gå genom motsvarande empiriskt och analytiskt material som anknyts till de två tidsperioderna som undersöks i denna studie. Dessutom kommer undersökningen att använda sig av de statistiska data från Levada Center för att vidare följa förändringar i godkännandet eller icke-godkännandet av Putins ledarskap. / Данное исследование ставит своей целью изучение основ политической легитимности Владимира Путина, способствовавших его популярности среди большинства российских граждан и позволивших ему оставаться у власти более 20 лет. Анализ основывается на теории Макса Вебера о трех идеальных видах легитимности: гражданско-правовом, традиционном и харизматичном. Исследование предусматривает изучение основ легитимности в период с 2000 по 2008 годы и в период с 2012 по 2020 годы. Уделяется внимание протестам 2011-2012 года на Болотной площади в Москве, показавшим недовольство части населения правлением Путина и ставшим переломным моментом в политике Путина. Для проведения данного исследования используется квалитативный анализ с целью изучения эмпирических и аналитических данных, относящихся к выбранным периодам. Основываясь на статистических данных Левада Центра, исследование анализирует позитивное и негативное отношение россиян к правлению Путина.

This is a study of how knowledge producing actors, like professors of economics, ecological economics and investigators at public institutions, portray the monetary system in general and fractional reserve banking specifically. The methodology of Political Discourse Analysis, with focus on argumentation and legitimisation, is used to identify and compare how different actors portray the monetary system. The outcome shows that there exist competing knowledge discourses that are diametrically different in how they define keywords and describe the relation between the monetary system, societal power relations and environmental impact. Some important concepts under academic debate include the origin of money, which actor (the state or commercial banks) controls the money supply and seigniorage (money issuer’s revenue), if private banks really are intermediaries and multiply central bank money, and if interest-bearing money is a cause of socioecological unsustainability. By critically analysing the moral norms within knowledge discourses that otherwise might be naturalised as portraying ‘facts’ or ‘truth’, this thesis helps identify needs for further research – especially regarding how the financial system can be better adapted for socioecological sustainability.

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 135-150) / It is increasingly becoming apparent that elections, as component parts of democratic processes, do not always guarantee a smooth transfer of power and stable democratic cultures in many contemporary polities. Whenever election outcomes are disputed, Governments of National Unity (GNU) are presented as strategic conflict prevention and resolution models. Yet, the GNU’s ability to nurture democracy in situations where it remains weak or non-existent is extremely limited. This dissertation therefore uses Zimbabwe’s case study to examine how its recent internal political turmoil had overwhelming implications for its legitimacy and democracy. Through qualitative research, the study reveals that despite partially reconciling Zimbabwe’s political protagonists, the GNU neither permanently resolved the crisis nor addressed significant related issues; thus, creating a paradox of legitimacy for the country. The dissertation concludes with recommendations for further research on matters of legitimacy in power-sharing scenarios such as Zimbabwe’s. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International politics)

La démocratie représentative souffre de nombreuses lacunes qui remettent en question la légitimité même des gouvernements démocratiques modernes. Tandis que la représentation directe pourrait théoriquement éliminer ces incongruités, elle a jusqu'à présent été considérée comme irréalisable en raison de limitations spatio-temporelles. Cette thèse adresse ces problèmes en introduisant le concept de Démocratie Internet - distinct de l’e-démocratie et de l’e-gouvernement existant. La Démocratie Internet consiste à cerner la représentation démocratique de telle manière qu’elle puisse être opérationnalisée par le biais de l’informatique. Pour ce faire, cette thèse remonte d'abord aux problèmes de la démocratie et de la représentation indirecte dans ses principes premiers, et propose une nouvelle approche (structurelle symbiotique) à l'application de l'Internet pour la démocratie. Ensuite, elle montre que la Démocratie Internet peut fonctionner grâce à l'analyse des données collectées passivement sur l'accès et la production de l’information. Enfin, elle offre de nombreuses contributions à l’informatique, qui jusqu’alors était limitée dans la précision de l'analyse des sentiments. La thèse développe une Proposition d’Opinion Asymétrique (AOP) et l’applique à un nouveau concept de ‘Espace des Sentiments’; elle développe également la première base de données assez nuancée pour l'analyse des sentiments; et elle utilise l'Espace de Sentiment afin de développer la méthode de calcul originale «Split-Fit » qui accroît la précision de l’apprentissage automatique. / Representative democracy suffers from numerous shortcomings that are so significant they bring into question the very legitimacy of modern democratic governments. While direct representation might theoretically eliminate these multiple defects, it has until now been considered unworkable due to limitations of space and of time. This thesis addresses these deficiencies by introducing Internet Democracy, which is distinct from existing e-democracy and e-government. Internet Democracy is an operational, computational formulation of democratic representation. To support this contribution, this thesis first derives the problems of democracy and indirect representation from first principles. It then proposes a new approach (the symbiotic structural approach) which applies the Internet to democracy. It then supports the proposition that Internet Democracy can operate through the analysis of passively collected data on information access and on information production (for instance, using sentiment analysis). Finally, it makes numerous topical contributions to computer science based on the observation that sentiment analysis hits a ceiling of accuracy which cannot currently be transcended. These contributions range from suggesting an Asymmetric Opinion Proposition (AOP) and applying this to a Sentiment Space describing the computational structure of sentiment; developing the first extremely fine-grained dataset for sentiment analysis; and applying Sentiment Space to develop the original ‘Split-Fit’ computing method which increases the accuracy of machine learning based Sentiment Analysis.