Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-03T16:15:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 GV.pdf: 711772 bytes, checksum: 9f6618b178d2e978cca03003011043ad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This research intends to study the meaning and educational reaching in two different objects: the virtues of prudentia and the telling art of mashalim. The specif intention is to elaborate some sort of anthology that helps to rescue the relationship between prudentia/ the formation of our teachers at fundamental and medium levels - but also it is to capacitate the professors with some material that allows them to build up his own repertoire. The material hereby presented is a selection - with both philosofical and pedagogic thinking - to help understand the antropological values on it. For that to happen, we concentrate on classical Thomas of Aquino, especially his studies on virtues (Thomas of Aquino, 2005); and also his contemporary interpreters: Josef Pieper and Jean Launand. Besides that, my personal experience as story teller based on psychodramatist Moreno, byologist Maturana and another theorethicals was really crucial. Scholars who have written works referring to writing and reading as a tool to broaden dialogue with professors. / Essa pesquisa tem por objetivo estudar o significado e o alcance educativos, por um lado da virtude da prudentia e, por outro, da arte de contar mashalim. O objetivo específico é elaborar uma coletânea que ajude a resgatar a relação prudentia / narrativas na formação de professores de ensino fundamental e médio e também dotar o docente de um material que sirva para que ele mesmo elabore o seu próprio repertório nesse campo. O material aqui apresentado é uma coletânea acompanhada de reflexões filosóficas e pedagógicas, que ajudaram a compreender os valores antropológicos das situações envolvidas. Para isso, apoiamo-nos no referencial teórico clássico de Tomás de Aquino, especialmente em seus estudos sobre essa virtude (Tomás de Aquino, 2005), e em seus intérpretes contemporâneos: Josef Pieper e Jean Lauand. Além disso, foi central a minha experiência pessoal como contadora de histórias que se baseia no psicodramatista Moreno, no biólogo Maturana e em teóricos que têm desenvolvido trabalhos referentes à leitura e escrita para ampliar o diálogo com os professores.

As Catilinárias são compostas por quatro discursos, sendo o primeiro e quarto proferidos no Senado, e o segundo e terceiro, na assembleia popular, entre os dias oito de novembro e cinco de dezembro de 63 a.C., ano do consulado de Cícero. Nosso trabalho se divide em duas partes: a primeira apresenta a tradução completa da obra e a segunda consiste em uma análise retórica, examinando os discursos individualmente por temáticas. No primeiro, tratamos da invectiva no Senado; no segundo, da invectiva a Catilina; no terceiro, da autopromoção ciceroniana e, no quarto, da prudentia no tribunal estabelecido pelo cônsul no Senado. / The Catilinarians are composed of four speeches; the first and fourth were delivered to the Senate, and the second and third were delivered to the popular assembly, between November 8 and December 5 of 63 BC, the year of Cicero\'s consulate. This dissertation is divided into two parts: the first part presents the complete translation into portuguese and the second part consists of a rhetorical analysis, examining the speeches individually by theme. In the first speech, we consider the use of invective in general within the Senate; in the second speech, we concentrate on invective towards Catiline; in the third speech, we observe the Ciceronian self-promotion and, in the fourth speech, we consider the use of prudentia in the \"senate court\" established by the consul.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T21:02:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 30 / Milton Valente / A presente pesquisa tem por objetivo legitimar o conceito de forma como belo em Lima Vaz. Principio de legitimidade filosófica que escapa a forma do belo, e é justamente por isso, por se encontrar nas dimensões da eternidade é que podemos falar da forma do belo em Lima Vaz. Forma é ser. Ou melhor, sendo formas o ser está enquanto “ens”. Assim, sendo-no-mundo a forma é aquilo que recebe tal condição do ser (Esse). Há, portanto, uma humildade ontológica da forma em receber e uma generosidade do ser em dar. Dizemos que a Forma não é ser, mas antes, “habens esse”, i. é, portadora do existir. Enquanto são portadoras do existir ou Esse, as formas são substâncias separadas. Constituídas por matéria que as individualiza e forma, i. é, o que assegura a substância ser o que ela é. Doravante, a substância - “algo que é” – é numa infinitude sensível, não o sensível meramente dos sentidos, mas anterior a este numa “unidade ontológica concreta” com o Esse. Sensível é perceber essa unidade concreta do ser. Dizer o “homem ex / This research aims to legitimize the concept os shape as beautiful in Lima Vaz. Philosophical principle of legitimacy that escapes the shape of beautiful, and is precisely why, because it was the size of eternity we can talk about the beautiful shape in Lima Vaz. Shape is to be. Or better, Shape as to be is “ens”. Therefore, being in the world as shape it´s receiving such a condition of being (Esse). There´s, thus a shape of ontological humility in receiving and a generosity in giving to be. We say that shape is not to be, but rather, “habens esse”, is the carrier exist. While there are carriers of to be or Esse, the shapes are separates substances. Consist of matters that individually and shapes, is what provides the substance is what it´s. Henceforth, the substance – “somethings that to be” – is an infinit sensitive, sensitive not only of the senses, but prior to that in a “concrete ontological unity” with this. Sensitive realize is that unit´s be concret. . Sayng the “man exist” is considering this singu

La iuris prudentia ou « prudence du droit » désignait le savoir des jurisconsultes romains. Bien que son importance soit capitale pour l’histoire de notre droit, nous n’en connaissons qu’une seule et unique définition inscrite aux Institutes et au Digeste de l’empereur Justinien. L’auteur originaire en serait Ulpien qui définit cette « jurisprudence » comme « la connaissance des choses divines et humaines, la science du juste et de l’injuste » (iuris prudentia est diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Face à cette définition, les commentateurs ont souvent considéré que seul le second élément (« la science du juste et de l’injuste ») formait le véritable critère épistémologique de la science juridique en cause, diminuant ainsi la fonction de la connaissance des choses divines et humaines (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). Or, nous pensons qu’au contraire cette rerum notitia n’est pas un simple accessoire rhétorique mais qu’elle réfère à une forme éminente du savoir antique : la sagesse. Forme suprême de l’intelligence et du vécu antique, elle n’est pas le fruit particulier d’une école philosophique ou d’une pensée religieuse. Relative à un savoir générique, la référence à la « sagesse » dans la définition de la iuris prudentia désigne la pensée même du jurisconsulte. Car comment abstraire les règles (regulae) depuis les cas (res) sans une médiation intellective entre les choses et le droit ? Comment opérer le choix entre le juste et l’injuste sans une forme de savoir conceptuel ? Toute science a besoin d’une théorie de la connaissance pour fonder sa méthode. Toutefois, la iuris prudentia dont l’objet était le droit d’une cité devenu empire, ne pouvait faire reposer sa pensée sur une doctrine philosophique déterminée. De même, léguée par les jurisconsultes païens aux princes législateurs chrétiens, elle ne pouvait se définir à travers le prisme d’une religion particulière. Or, la référence à la sagesse, but suprême de la connaissance, permet de neutraliser les différences dogmatiques pour faire ainsi de la « prudence du droit » la seule connaissance antique véritablement universelle. Ce qui explique selon nous que cette fameuse iuris prudentia connaîtra une longue postérité qui fera la fortune historique de la sagesse du droit d’origine romaine dont nous ressentons encore aujourd’hui les échos dans notre propre système juridique. / The iuris prudentia or wisdom in matters of law referred to Roman jurists’ knowledge. Even though its importance was primordial for the history of our law, we only know one and unique definition written in the Institutes and inside Emperor Justinian’s Digest. The original author could be Ulpian who defines this jurisprudence as “the awareness of divine and human things, knowledge of what is just or unjust” (iuris prudentia is diuinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia). Faced with this definition, many critics have often considered that only the second element (knowledge of what is just and unjust) formed the genuine epistemic criteria of the legal science in question, thus decreasing the duty of the knowledge in divine and human things (diuinarum atque humanarum notitia). On the contrary, we believe that this rerum notitia is not only a simple rhetorical accessory but it refers to an eminent antique knowledge: wisdom. As the ultimate form of the antique intelligence and background, it is not the particular result of a philosophical school or a religious thought. Relating to a generic knowledge, reference to “wisdom” in the definition of iuris prudentia refers to Roman jurist real thinking. Indeed how to allow for abstract rules (regulae) for cases (res) without a spiritual mediation between things and the law? How to operate a choice between just and unjust without a kind of ideational knowledge? Every science needs a theory of knowledge to have a basis for its method. Nevertheless, the iuris prudentia (whose purpose was the law of a city-state which became an empire) was not able to base its way of thinking on a determined philosophical doctrine. Likewise, bequeathed by pagan Roman jurists to Christian Imperators, it could not define itself through the prism of a particular religion. Yet reference to wisdom, the ultimate goal of knowledge, allows neutralizing dogmatic differences. Wisdom in matters of law is the only truly universal antique knowledge. This therefore makes it clear to us why iuris prudentia will continue to have such an influence in posterity and why we still hear echos today of a legal system established by the Romans. [Tr. PHILIPPE JULLIEN]