<p>Fusionernas antal och storlek har ökat för varje år, och företagsvärlden har präglats av en fusionsyra som är frapperande. Det faktum att fusioner förekommer i så stor utsträckning samtidigt som det påvisas att en majoritet av företagsaffärerna misslyckas förefaller oss vara en paradox. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån ekonomisk teori studera de motiv och drivkrafter som ligger bakom företagsfusioner, och diskutera de olika aktörernas medverkan i fusionsprocessen. I uppsatsen diskuteras också i viss mån vilket utfallet av en fusion blir beroende på vilka motiv och drivkrafter som föreligger. De teorier som används är dels teorier avseende motiv och drivkrafter bakom fusioner, dels appliceras public choice teorin och principal-agent teorin på fusionsprocessen och dess aktörer.Detta beroende på att teorierna behandlar den enskilda individens nyttomaximering och problemet med informationsasymmetri. Motivbilden är mångfasetterad. Den består både av uttalade/officiella och dolda/inofficiella motiv. Företagens uttalade motiv är ofta att uppnå kostnadsbesparingar och samordningsvinster via synergieffekter. De dolda motiven och drivkrafterna utgörs dels av personliga motiv där aktörerna försöker maximera den egna nyttan, dels av yttre psykologiska drivkrafter såsom flockbeteende, hybris och påtryckningar från finansiella rådgivare. Vi har dragit slutsatsen att det föreligger incitament och möjlighet för individuell nyttomaximering hos vissa aktörer, beroende på att en fusion för dessa innebär en rad fördelar. De består främst av ökad prestige och högre löner. Att handla opportunistiskt möjliggörs delvis av den informationsasymmetri som föreligger mellan exempelvis aktieägare och företagsledning.</p>

<p>Studien syftar till att sätta den svenska skolan i ett marknadsperspektiv och ställer frågan om en eventuell marknadsanpassning av skolväsendet lett till ett närmande mellan offentligt ägda och privat ägda skolor. Tio gymnasieskolors</p><p>Internetbaserade marknadsföring från fem kommuner, i syfte att vara representativt för hela Sverige, undersöks. Resultatet visar att politiska omstruktureringar ökat marknadsinslaget i den svenska skolan, särskilt tydligt genom den ”peng” som följer till de gymnasieskolor som aktivt väljs av elever, en summa som går förlorad för de skolor som väljs av färre elever. Resultaten visar ytterligare att det är via reklam denna tävlan sker – något som inte skiljer offentligt ägda eller privat ägda skolor åt. Slutsatsen är att det har skett en marknadsanpassning av skolan och att det går att tala om en svensk ”skolmarknad” där offentliga som privata skolor ”tävlar” om eleverna.</p>

Fusionernas antal och storlek har ökat för varje år, och företagsvärlden har präglats av en fusionsyra som är frapperande. Det faktum att fusioner förekommer i så stor utsträckning samtidigt som det påvisas att en majoritet av företagsaffärerna misslyckas förefaller oss vara en paradox. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån ekonomisk teori studera de motiv och drivkrafter som ligger bakom företagsfusioner, och diskutera de olika aktörernas medverkan i fusionsprocessen. I uppsatsen diskuteras också i viss mån vilket utfallet av en fusion blir beroende på vilka motiv och drivkrafter som föreligger. De teorier som används är dels teorier avseende motiv och drivkrafter bakom fusioner, dels appliceras public choice teorin och principal-agent teorin på fusionsprocessen och dess aktörer.Detta beroende på att teorierna behandlar den enskilda individens nyttomaximering och problemet med informationsasymmetri. Motivbilden är mångfasetterad. Den består både av uttalade/officiella och dolda/inofficiella motiv. Företagens uttalade motiv är ofta att uppnå kostnadsbesparingar och samordningsvinster via synergieffekter. De dolda motiven och drivkrafterna utgörs dels av personliga motiv där aktörerna försöker maximera den egna nyttan, dels av yttre psykologiska drivkrafter såsom flockbeteende, hybris och påtryckningar från finansiella rådgivare. Vi har dragit slutsatsen att det föreligger incitament och möjlighet för individuell nyttomaximering hos vissa aktörer, beroende på att en fusion för dessa innebär en rad fördelar. De består främst av ökad prestige och högre löner. Att handla opportunistiskt möjliggörs delvis av den informationsasymmetri som föreligger mellan exempelvis aktieägare och företagsledning.

Studien syftar till att sätta den svenska skolan i ett marknadsperspektiv och ställer frågan om en eventuell marknadsanpassning av skolväsendet lett till ett närmande mellan offentligt ägda och privat ägda skolor. Tio gymnasieskolors Internetbaserade marknadsföring från fem kommuner, i syfte att vara representativt för hela Sverige, undersöks. Resultatet visar att politiska omstruktureringar ökat marknadsinslaget i den svenska skolan, särskilt tydligt genom den ”peng” som följer till de gymnasieskolor som aktivt väljs av elever, en summa som går förlorad för de skolor som väljs av färre elever. Resultaten visar ytterligare att det är via reklam denna tävlan sker – något som inte skiljer offentligt ägda eller privat ägda skolor åt. Slutsatsen är att det har skett en marknadsanpassning av skolan och att det går att tala om en svensk ”skolmarknad” där offentliga som privata skolor ”tävlar” om eleverna.

Conventions are social institutions that solve recurrent coordination problems. Many of the written and unwritten rules that make up a modern market society may be said to have the coordinative property. This dissertation uses a game-theoretical framework to discuss the emergence and functioning of conventions of communication, private property rights, money, and the firm. In each case the anlysis provides new insigts for these classical areas of economic inquiry. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1990</p>

Los Angeles has had the worst traffic for the longest time out of any American city with many of its residents commuting for over an hour to and from work. The solution to this problem has existed for over 50 years but political forces have stopped its implementation. With the funding problems California—and the nation—faces, it is hard to convince politicians to build new roads, especially when they won’t see results for almost 20 years, long after they have left office. This funding gap is where the private sector can play a role. Using “congestion pricing,” a concept introduced in 1952 by Nobel Prize-winning economist William Vickrey, a private company can recoup its costs from road construction and turn a profit; a procedure that encourages further road construction by moving transportation decisions from bureaucrats to entrepreneurs. As we shall see, these two groups have vastly different incentives that lead to very different policies.

Zugl.: Hamburg, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Diss., 2009.

Aims: The main aims of this research are to provide more empirical evidences for theory of property rights and public choice theory and to test these theories in a new environment i.e. banking sector of Pakistan. This research compares performance of public and private banks in Pakistan on the basis of four performance measures, profitability, liquidity, solvency and efficiency. It also studies the effect of politics on public banks. Method: Mainly quantitative approach is utilized in this thesis to compare performance of public and private banks in Pakistan in terms of profitability, liquidity, solvency and efficiency. Ratio analysis is used for this purpose. Qualitative analysis is based on qualitative study of empirical findings of quantitative analysis with respect to elections and observing lending behavior of public and private banks along with study of net interest margin during election years. Major Findings: The theory of property rights and public choice literature support private ownership for superior performance as compared to public ownership. From empirical findings, very weak support is found for both theories. Out of twelve ratios used in ratio analysis, ten ratios support public ownership for superior performance as compared to private ownership and only two ratios quote that private ownership is superior in performance than public ownership. From empirical findings it can be concluded that performance of public banks is superior to private banks in Pakistan in terms of profitability, liquidity, solvency and efficiency. Similarly, out of twelve ratios, only six ratios provided evidence of effect of elections on performance of public ownership which is a weak support for public choice theory. Moreover, lending behavior of public and private banks along with study of net interest margin has totally ruled out the presence of political influence on public banks. It can be concluded from these empirical findings that either political influence on public banks is minimized or political influence is affecting both sectors of banks in Pakistan. As banking sector in Pakistan is highly competitive now due to introduction of financial reforms in Pakistan, it can be concluded that theory of property rights and public choice theory do not work well in competitive markets especially Pakistan. It can also be concluded from empirical findings that privatization is not the only solution to poor performance of public ownership. The introduction of competition can substantially improve performance of public ownership. / mobile: +92-333-8102302

Questions on the optimal size of government always provoke intense political debate. At the center of this is the public goods problem, where certain goods and services are “under-provided” by the market due to problems with rivalry and excludability. These goods are usually provided by the public sector and financed through taxes. Questions emerge over the optimal level of provision, as different individuals value these goods differently. This dissertation consists of two studies which address preferences for the size of government from different perspectives. The first study provides a method that can be used to estimate demand for changes in levels of public provision. Using individual level Census data on migration from 1990 and 2000, I demonstrate how preferences are revealed through migration responses. Though policy convergence precludes the estimation of optimal levels for different demographic groups, I find that balanced-budget increases in education expenditures tend to attract most demographic groups while other expenditures tend to repel most individuals. Young, college educated, relatively high-income individuals tend to be more responsive to, and therefore appear to have higher preference intensity for, fiscal changes. This is true even when controlling for their increased propensity to migrate. Evidence inconsistent with welfare migration is found, suggesting that policies intended to address the race-to-the-bottom in welfare benefits may be counterproductive. In addition, the ability of the Tiebout migration process to homogenize a jurisdiction is limited by relatively small fiscal changes among jurisdictions and similar migration responses among demographic groups. The second study empirically explores the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on government size for countries throughout the world. In the developed world, heterogeneity is found to reduce the size of budgetary government, consistent with previous studies and predictions in the literature. In the undeveloped world, however, heterogeneity is found to increase the size of non-budgetary government and may increase the overall size of government.

<p>This dissertation critically examines predominant political-economic theories of public credit and public debt in light of the origins, development, and recent record expansion in such debt. Using a "history of thought" approach, I focus on those aspects of theory, from three main schools of thought - Classical, Keynesian, and Public Choice - which seek to explain the evolution of public debt, its political-economic causes and effects, the meaning of sustainability in public debt burdens, and the conditions under which governments are likely to monetize or repudiate their debts. For empirical context, I also provide three centuries of data on public debt for major nations, relative to their national income, and government bond-yield data for more recent decades.</p><p>There is value in classifying the major political economists who have examined public credit and public debt since 1700 as "pessimists," "optimists" or "realists." </p><p>Public debt pessimists argue that government provides no truly productive services, that its taxing and borrowing detract from the private economy, while unfairly burdening future generations, and that high and rising public leverage ratios are unsustainable and will likely cause national insolvency and long-term economic ruin. When public debts become excessive or un-payable, pessimists advise explicit default or deliberate repudiation. Public debt pessimists also believe financiers in general and public bondholders in particular are unproductive. Pessimists usually endorse smaller-sized governments and free markets. With few exceptions, most public debt pessimists appear in the Classical or Public Choice schools of thought. Among prominent public debt pessimists, the most representative are David Hume and Adam Smith.</p><p>Public debt optimists believe that government provides not only productive services, such as infrastructure and social insurance, but means to mitigate what they perceived to be "market failures," including savings gluts, economic depressions, inflation, and secular stagnation. Optimists contend that deficit-spending and public debt accumulation can stimulate or sustain economy activity and ensure full employment, without burdening present or future generation. To the extent public debts become excessive or un-payable, optimists tend to advise implicit default, by official and deliberate debasement of the national currency (inflation). As do pessimists, public debt optimists view financiers and bondholders as essentially unproductive. Optimists also defend a relatively larger economic role for the state. Almost without exception, optimists reside in the Keynesian school of political-economic thought. Among the leading optimists, the most representative are Alvin Hansen and Abba Lerner.</p><p>Public debt realists contend that government can and should provide certain productive services, mainly national defense, police protection, courts of justice, and basic infrastructure, but that social and redistributive schemes tend to undermine national prosperity. Realists say public debt should fund only services and projects that help a free economy maximize its potential, and that analysis must be contextualized - i.e., related to a nation's credit capacity, productivity, and taxable capacity. According to realists, public leverage is neither inevitably harmful, as pessimists say, nor infinite, as optimists say. Realists view financiers as productive and insist that sovereigns redeem their public debts in full, on time, and in sound money. Realists favor constitutionally-limited yet energetic governments that help promote robust markets. They appear mainly in the Classical era of political-economic thought. The most representative and renowned of the public debt realists are Sir James Steuart and Alexander Hamilton.</p><p>My main thesis is that public debt realists provide the most persuasive theories of public credit and public debt, and thus the most plausible interpretations of the long, fascinating history of public debt. Moreover, certain puzzles and paradoxes arising in contemporary public debt experience, among developed nations - including the recent, multi-decade trend of simultaneously rising public-leverage ratios and declining public debt yields - is explicable primarily in realist terms. In contrast, public debt pessimists and optimists alike offer unbalanced, inadequate accounts of public debt experience. Whereas pessimists are too often confused or mistaken in foreseeing an alleged "inevitable" ruin from public debt, optimists more often than not are confused and mistaken about the alleged "stimulus" attainable by large-scale deficit-spending and debt build-ups. Looking ahead, the realist perspective is likely to provide superior guideposts for maximally-accurate interpretations of public debt policies and trends.</p> / Dissertation