Un corps humain n’est pas le réceptacle passif d’impressions. Il n’est condamné à aucun « réel » qui s’imposerait à lui. Tout au contraire crée-t-il, continûment et spontanément, des images singulières de la réalité. Cette faculté d’imaginisation est le sujet de la présente thèse, ainsi que la conséquence qui s’ensuit, pour chaque individu, de ne pouvoir que croire en une réalité toujours déjà imaginisée. L’imaginisation sera envisagée selon une double visée :en tant que faculté (laquelle produit des effets concrets, historisants), et en tant que qualité originelle de l’être humain.<p>Poser que l’imaginisation est la qualité qui définit l’appartenance à l’humanité induit entre autres que la raison est renvoyée à un statut second :elle est un choix possible à l’intérieur d’une création incessante d’images-réalités, par où se constitue singulièrement une fiction enveloppante de la vie. Notre objectif n’est pas de déprécier le choix en faveur de la raison en indiquant qu’il serait, à tout coup, contraint et réducteur. Mais ne plus être en mesure – parce que l’être humain est d’emblée appréhendé en tant qu’être de raison (ens rationis) – de penser que la raison requiert un choix et qu’elle ne « va » pas de soi, c’est se couper de tout accès à la question :« Qu’est-ce que l’homme ?».<p>Nous voulons considérer l’être humain en tant qu’il imaginise le réel en y adjoignant une part fictive qui, à la fois, précède, intègre et outrepasse la « simple » raison. Fiction enveloppante forcément ignorée par le rationalisme positiviste, alors qu’elle est attachée de façon indissoluble à la vie de chacune et de chacun ;tous étant les acteurs individuels d’une histoire personnelle et collective.<p>Avant d’être un être de raison, l’homme est un être vivant qui imaginise singulièrement les choses, les situations, les évènements, ses semblables… Il en résulte une complexité telle qu’aucun échange, aucune relation, aucune cohabitation, ne peuvent à priori être déterminés rationnellement. Dès lors, si les présentes recherches ne portent pas directement sur le politique, celui-ci en constitue l’horizon, voire la finalité ultime. L’expérience nous apprend en effet que pour qu’une philosophie politique puisse être politiquement pertinente et utile, il faut qu’elle soit fondée non pas sur ce que l’on voudrait que les hommes soient, mais sur ce qu’ils sont. Non pas sur les hommes rationnels que la théorie souhaiterait qu’ils fussent, mais sur des êtres ayant un corps fait de mémoire, de peurs et de rêves. <p>En ce sens, nous partageons le questionnement quant à la nécessité d’une approche qui prendrait en compte « la totalité des dimensions de la vie humaine, le mythe comme la raison, le religieux comme le juridique, non pour les confondre, mais pour les articuler ensemble » .Notre plaidoyer est double, mais non contradictoire :il s’agit de penser une plus grande complexification du politique que celle définie par la raison identitaire – héritée de l’ère moderne et des Lumières – et qui est factuellement dépassée par le monde/mondialisé qui constitue désormais le territoire de toute politique. Cela n’est possible qu’en affrontant le fait que les hommes ne sont pas que raison, mais sont avant tout des imaginaires singuliers. Fonder, en ce sens, une politique requiert préalablement la définition de ce que l’on entend par imaginaires singuliers, et impose d’en repérer les modes d’agir, non plus seulement au niveau de l’histoire, ni même d’une histoire culturelle, mais d’une génésie culturelle :tel est l’objectif des recherches que l’on va lire. Celles-ci sont illustrées principalement par deux exemples paradigmatiques :la mythologie chrétienne, et le cinéma en tant qu’art de l’univers mytho-technique.<p> / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis / The goal of this thesis is to understand the relationship between the evolving representations of African American women in post-Civil Rights era films about the Transatlantic slave trade; the portraits these images present of black women and their history; and how these films approach the issues of difficult heritage and re-presenting atrocity in entertainment. Film shapes the ways in which we understand the past, leaving a lifelong impression about historical events and the groups involved. By analyzing the stories, directorial processes, and the public responses to four films of 20th and 21st centuries focused on the controversial historical topic of American chattel slavery and its representation of the most underrepresented and misunderstood victims of the Peculiar Institution, this work will argue that, when supplemented with historiography and criticism rooted in historical thinking, cinematic depictions of the past make history more accessible to the public and serve as a form of public memory, shaping the way the public thinks about our collective past.

How should we, Americans, confront our complicity in reproducing the Shoah? For complicit we are, if consumerism is any metric: Steven Spielbergs 1993 film Schindlers List had grossed $321 million as of 2012; more than 40 million people have made the pilgrimage to the sacred US Holocaust Museum; at last count, The Diary of Anne Frank had sold 30 million copies. These numbers are stale staples in the debate over the ethics of Shoah representation, of course, but they bear out the skepticism of critics who have questioned American Holocaust consumer culture. And consumerism is only the first of many such ethical quandaries, which include how to deal with the trauma that audiences experience upon viewing Holocaust films and what happens when secondary witnesses overidentify with Holocaust victims.This paper takes up an unusual form of Holocaust art: misrepresentative film. I discuss two films, Quentin Tarantinos Inglourious Basterds and Wes Andersons The Grand Budapest Hotel, to argue that intentional misrepresentations not only call attention to the pitfalls of traditional representation but also encourage audiences to work through the transhistorical trauma of the Shoah. Released in 2009, Tarantinos was perhaps unique in cinema for its radical alteration of history, intended to give audiences the sheer pleasure of seeing the Nazi regime go up, literally, in flames. Though the film is undoubtedly a revenge fantasy that, using Dominick LaCapras terms, embodies acting out€ in response to historical trauma, it does so by flipping the traditional narrative: unlike most depictions of the Shoah, it complicates the victim-perpetrator binary, identifies audiences with the transgressors, and constantly calls attention to its own fictionality. Movies like The Grand Budapest Hotel are evidence that Tarantino really did shatter the constraints of the genre. Basterds certainly makes no effort toward historical accuracy, but since its appeal depends on the audiences awareness of its inaccuracies, Tarantino is still elbow-deep in real history. Anderson is not. Budapest is a troubled film, haunted by invasions, wars, arrests, and displays of arbitrary power, many of which recall the Third Reich. The function of these ominous forces, however, is not to offer commentary on the Shoah but simply to recreate the illusory world of Stefan Zweig, on whose writings it was based. In producing a movie about Nazi-occupied Europe in which the troubles of the period are relegated mostly to the background, Anderson furthers the deconstruction of the Holocaust film genre, raising the possibility that such films can be historically serious without being bound by restrictive rules.

How should we, Americans, confront our complicity in reproducing the Shoah? For complicit we are, if consumerism is any metric: Steven Spielbergs 1993 film Schindlers List had grossed $321 million as of 2012; more than 40 million people have made the pilgrimage to the sacred US Holocaust Museum; at last count, The Diary of Anne Frank had sold 30 million copies. These numbers are stale staples in the debate over the ethics of Shoah representation, of course, but they bear out the skepticism of critics who have questioned American Holocaust consumer culture. And consumerism is only the first of many such ethical quandaries, which include how to deal with the trauma that audiences experience upon viewing Holocaust films and what happens when secondary witnesses overidentify with Holocaust victims.This paper takes up an unusual form of Holocaust art: misrepresentative film. I discuss two films, Quentin Tarantinos Inglourious Basterds and Wes Andersons The Grand Budapest Hotel, to argue that intentional misrepresentations not only call attention to the pitfalls of traditional representation but also encourage audiences to work through the transhistorical trauma of the Shoah. Released in 2009, Tarantinos was perhaps unique in cinema for its radical alteration of history, intended to give audiences the sheer pleasure of seeing the Nazi regime go up, literally, in flames. Though the film is undoubtedly a revenge fantasy that, using Dominick LaCapras terms, embodies œacting out in response to historical trauma, it does so by flipping the traditional narrative: unlike most depictions of the Shoah, it complicates the victim-perpetrator binary, identifies audiences with the transgressors, and constantly calls attention to its own fictionality. Movies like The Grand Budapest Hotel are evidence that Tarantino really did shatter the constraints of the genre. Basterds certainly makes no effort toward historical accuracy, but since its appeal depends on the audiences awareness of its inaccuracies, Tarantino is still elbow-deep in real history. Anderson is not. Budapest is a troubled film, haunted by invasions, wars, arrests, and displays of arbitrary power, many of which recall the Third Reich. The function of these ominous forces, however, is not to offer commentary on the Shoah but simply to recreate the illusory world of Stefan Zweig, on whose writings it was based. In producing a movie about Nazi-occupied Europe in which the troubles of the period are relegated mostly to the background, Anderson furthers the deconstruction of the Holocaust film genre, raising the possibility that such films can be historically serious without being bound by restrictive rules.

La presente tesis se ocupa de la obra del filósofo francés Quentin Meillassoux, quien plantea una fuerte crítica a la filosofía pos-kantiana de tradición continental y cuestiona su rechazo hacia la reflexión ontológica, entendida esta como la búsqueda de verdades independientes de la subjetividad humana. El argumento de Meillassoux se encarga de refutar dicha tendencia, denominada por él “correlacionismo” y de plantear un principio ontológico: la necesidad de la contingencia, el cual permitirá construir una nueva ontología, el materialismo especulativo, que resultará inmune a las críticas correlacionistas de inspiración kantiana. Nuestro trabajo consiste en analizar detalladamente dicho argumento en sus dos aspectos fundamentales: en tanto crítica del correlacionismo y en tanto propuesta ontológica, para luego plantear nuestra propia interpretación del mismo y, en ese sentido, evaluar sus posibles aciertos y desaciertos. En un primer momento, nos encargaremos de dar una versión lo más precisa posible del argumento analizando las tesis que el filósofo pone en debate: realismo, subjetalismo y correlacionismo, así como el modo como, a partir de esta discusión. presenta su propia posición: el materialismo especulativo, la cual refutaría a las demás y constituiría una nueva ontología. A continuación, cuestionamos el modo de proceder del materialista especulativo y mostramos, a partir de un análisis de las modalidades lógicas empleadas en él, que, si bien su intento de refutación es sostenible, este lo lleva a conclusiones que, en principio, parece no estar dispuesto a aceptar, tales como la aceptación del carácter defendible de las tesis ontológicas, aspecto ya criticado por el propio correlacionismo.

Text in English / This study aims to apply the biopolitical theories of Giorgio Agamben on homo sacer to the stereotypical representation of the violent woman. Using feminist methodologies for dismantling and exposing social stereotypes, this research explores the relationship between femininity, violence and the representation of these. By focussing on the influence of traditional narratives as found in ancient mythology and fairy tales, the study investigates the contemporary portrayal of the stereotypical violent woman using acts of dismemberment and dispossession in the work of Quentin Tarantino and Nathalie Djurberg, which serve as examples of the controversial relationship between real and filmic violence. / Art History, Visual Arts & Musicology / M.A. (Art History)

Le port de Paris ne correspond pas à la définition traditionnelle du terme. On doit observer tout d'abord qu'il s'agit d'un port fluvial. La difficulté de définir le port de Paris tient au fait qu'il consiste en plusieurs types d'installations: canaux, ports à darses, ports sur berges (quais droits et ports de tirage) et donc à des réalités protéiformes. Certains auteurs préfèrent l'expression« ports de Paris», pour en souligner le caractère hétéroclite. Au XIXe siècle, on parlait également des «ports de Paris», c'est-à-dire des installations sur la Seine, par opposition aux canaux. Le port de Paris correspond donc à un ensemble bordé par une soixantaine de kilomètres de rives, dont une partie destinée à la batellerie. La thèse débute à une époque durant laquelle le transport fluvial se trouve confronté aux effets de la concurrence des chemins de fer. Il lui faudra plusieurs décennies pour s'adapter et revêtir une nouvelle fonction, à savoir celle quasi exclusive de pourvoyeuse de pondéreux. Cette conversion s'est opérée essentiellement à travers l'amélioration des infrastructures fluviales. La modernisation portuaire revêtait deux volets, à savoir l'amélioration de l'outillage en vue d'optimiser le conditionnement des marchandises, et celle appartenant à une vision plus globale de la fonction du port de Paris, voire de Paris lui-même. Paris port de mer appartient à cette dernière. On peut avancer l'idée d'une opposition entre un «port réel» et un port «mythique», à savoir une voie alternative visant à transformer la vocation portuaire de la capitale. Des tentatives de réconciliation entre les deux visions se manifestent à travers la création du port d’Ivry, des commissions entre 1911 et 1914 sur la modernisation de l'outillage portuaire. / The Port of Paris does not correspond to the traditional definition of the term. It should first be noted that this is a river port. The difficulty of defining the port of Paris stems from the fact that it consists of several types of installations: canals, ports at docks, ports on banks (straight wharves and pull ports) and therefore protean realities. Some authors prefer the term "ports of Paris" to emphasize its heterogeneous character. In the 19th century, we also talked about the "ports of Paris", that is to designate installations on the Seine, as opposed to canals. The port of Paris thus corresponds to an ensemble bordered by some sixty kilometers of shore, including a part intended for inland navigation This thesis begins at a time when river transport is confronted with the effects of competition from the railways. It will take several decades to adapt and take on a new function, namely the almost exclusive role of provider of weighty. This conversion was mainly achieved through the improvement of river infrastructures. Port modernization had two aspects: improving tooling to optimize the packaging of goods, and integrating a more global vision of the function of the port of Paris, and even of Paris itself. "Paris sea port" belongs to the latter. One can put forward the idea of an opposition between a "real port" and a "mythical" port, an alternative way of transforming the port's vocation to the capital. Attempts at reconciliation between these two visions are manifested through the creation of the port of Ivry, commissions between 1911 and 1914 on the modernization of port equipment.

Text in English / This study aims to apply the biopolitical theories of Giorgio Agamben on homo sacer to the stereotypical representation of the violent woman. Using feminist methodologies for dismantling and exposing social stereotypes, this research explores the relationship between femininity, violence and the representation of these. By focussing on the influence of traditional narratives as found in ancient mythology and fairy tales, the study investigates the contemporary portrayal of the stereotypical violent woman using acts of dismemberment and dispossession in the work of Quentin Tarantino and Nathalie Djurberg, which serve as examples of the controversial relationship between real and filmic violence. / Art History, Visual Arts and Musicology / M. A. (Art History)

This dissertation examines two films directed by Quentin Tarantino, whom I have situated as a postmodern film director, within the theoretical context of the philosophies of two postmodern philosophers: Jean Baudrillard and Jean-François Lyotard. I argue that the major institutions of society, such as the family and religion, are viewed as grand narratives, in Lyotard’s sense of the term, which Tarantino repeatedly subverts. Overlapping with this intersection of Lyotard’s philosophy in Tarantino’s films is the Baudrillardian loss of the real, which manifests as hyperreality in many scenes. I suggest that Tarantino makes a conscious effort to create such hyperreality with the creation of playful signifiers in his films. I examine selected scenes to find Baudrillard’s “successive phases of the image” (Baudrillard 2010:6) that lead to the creation of a simulacrum. The compelling intersections between the creation of Baudrillardian simulacra and the subversion of Lyotard’s grand narratives are explored within selected scenes which are deconstructed by means of film narratology, semiotic analysis and narrative analysis. The combination of the various methods of media research in this thesis enables what Jane Stokes calls “a more textured understanding” (2008:27) of the films under discussion. A close reading from a semiotic point of view facilitates a deconstruction of some obscure elements, such as the embedded meaning in lyrics and dialogue or the messages implicit in the mise en scène. / English Studies / M. A.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Autor no autoriza el acceso a texto completo de su documento / En el presente ensayo se realiza una exposición crítica de cinco aportes relacionados al concepto de libertad. Como texto base de la discusión moderna tal concepto, se analiza “Two Concepts of Liberty” de Isaiah Berlin. Se argumenta que la definición de libertad negativa de Berlin no atiende exclusivamente a la ausencia de interferencias, sino más bien a la existencia de un área de alternativas, y que la definición positiva, relacionada a la idea de “ser dueño de sí”, sólo cae en las consecuencias totalitarias que Berlin le atribuye producto de una diferencia en el nivel de análisis, mas no por la estructura propia del concepto. A continuación se revisan cuatro críticas a este texto. (1) “Negative and Positive Freedom”, de Gerald MacCallum, donde se presenta la tesis de un concepto unitario de libertad. Se argumentará que tal concepto sólo constituye una versión ampliada del concepto negativo de Berlin, no logrando incorporar el concepto positivo. (2) “A Third Concept of Liberty”, de Quentin Skinner, quien agrega a la discusión el concepto republicano de libertad. Se argumentará que para introducir tal concepto Skinner redujo el sentido del concepto positivo, no incorporando por tanto un concepto ajeno a los introducidos por Berlin. (3) “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty”, de Charles Taylor, quien critica la libertad negativa Hobbesiano como un concepto insuficiente (crudo). Se argumenta que para llegar a las conclusiones que Taylor sostiene, no se requiere la introducción de la noción de autorrealización dentro del concepto negativo. (4) “Freedom as an Ideal”, de Raymond Geuss, quien junto con evidenciar la existencia de más conceptos de libertad, realiza la distinción de la libertad en sentidos interno y externo. En las conclusiones, esta distinción es tomada para sostener una clasificación de la libertad en seis variables (positiva, negativa; interna, externa; individual, colectiva). / 27/12/2019