In various parts of Ethics, Spinoza explains both the existence and the necessity of the existence of things, like God, through their perfection(Proofs and Scholium to theorem 11 of part 1 and Scholium 2 for Theorem 33 of part 1). In this paper I attempt to elaborate on the suggestion made by Don Garrett, in Spinoza's Necessitariansim (2018), that Spinoza might have thought that no other world is possible but the one that expresses the greatest possible perfection. I will show that Spinoza's understanding of perfection is intimately connected with "Spinoza's PSR" and his understanding of casuality, to make Garrett's suggestion more probable. The paper is motivated by Koistinen's concerns, in Spinoza's Proof of Necessitarianism (2003), that Garrett's suggestion is too weak to entail necessitarianism. I'll show that Koistinens presented concerns can be rebutted and that the explication for the perfection of the world or "system of finite modes" that he ascribes to Garrett is flawed because it doesn't reflect how Spinoza uses the notion of perfection in Ethics. / <p>Höstterminen 2023</p>

Notre recherche a pour objectif d’analyser systématiquement les réflexions cartésiennes sur la foi et la raison ; le parallèle que Descartes établit entre la foi et la raison fait en sorte qu’il s’agit de deux vérités distinctes, voire opposées, mais qui ne sauraient toutefois se contredire. En réalité, Descartes semble même soutenir, à certains endroits, des points de liaison entre les deux types de vérités. Il faudra prendre en considération, d’une part, les définitions qu’il donne de ces deux sources de connaissance et, d’autre part, la manière dont une articulation est possible malgré leur séparation assez stricte. L’approche du mémoire sera proprement historique dans l’analyse des réflexions philosophiques de Descartes sur la religion et exigera notamment de contextualiser les conflits théologiques qu’il a eus avec les penseurs de la scolastique. La première partie du mémoire aura pour objectifs de relever les principaux passages où Descartes traite de cette question en se basant sur l’édition de référence d’Adam et Tannery (1969). La deuxième partie visera à analyser les positions que Descartes défend pour penser la séparation entre foi et raison. Évidemment, le rapport entre foi et raison devra être achevé par des études parallèles sur les réflexions cartésiennes quant au rapport entre la théologie et la philosophie. C’est ici que les discussions avec la scolastique seront examinées. La dernière partie visera à comprendre si, d’après Descartes relativement à certains points de doctrine et malgré leur séparation fondamentale, foi et raison sont réconciliables. Il semble pour lui clair qu’une complémentarité est possible, car « une vérité ne peut jamais être contraire à une autre vérité » (Épître au P. Dinet). / Our research aims to systematically analyze Cartesian reflections on faith and reason; the parallelism that Descartes establishes between faith and reason means that these are two distinct, even opposite truths, but which cannot, however, contradict each other. Descartes even seems to support in some places the points of connection between the two types of truths. It will be necessary to take into consideration, on the one hand, the definitions that he gives of these two sources of knowledge, on the other hand, the way in which an articulation is possible despite their rather strict separation. The approach of the thesis will be properly historical in the analysis of the philosophical reflections of Descartes on religion and will require to contextualize the theological conflicts that he had with the thinkers of scholasticism. The first part of the thesis will aim to identify the main passages where Descartes deals with this question, taking as a basis of reference to the edition of Adam and Tannery (1969). The second part will aim to analyze the positions that Descartes defends there to think about the separation between faith and reason. Obviously, the relationship between faith and reason should be complemented by a parallel study of Cartesian reflections on the relationship between theology and philosophy. It is here that the discussions with the scholastic will be examined. The last part will aim to understand if, despite their fundamental separation, faith and reason would be reconcilable according to Descartes with respect to certain points of doctrine. It seems clear to him that the complementarity is possible, because “one truth can never be contrary to another truth” (Letter to P. Dinet).

The use of reason appears to lead to divergent conclusions for what is right and what is good in human action. While reason is a central feature in ethical theory, there is a problem when that central feature does not lead to consistent conclusions about how to act in a given situation. Several philosophers have attempted to combine previous moral theories in order to provide a better template for human action. I contend that the use of reason is of vital import when determining the foundation for moral action and that moral theories, to be consistent with reason, should incorporate aspects of both non-consequentialist and consequentialist ethical theories. I argue that there is a unifying foundation presupposed by the moral theories of both Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Through the use of reason the theories of Kant and Mill can be reconciled to show that these theories can be combined when understanding the basic foundation that they share.

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O objetivo central proposto nesta dissertação é investigar como a recepção da primeira edição da Crítica da razão pura ressoa no corpus dos textos dedicados à preparar o leitor para a compreensão da obra, ou seja, como Kant reconstitui seu discurso propedêutico em relação à Crítica da razão pura a partir dos referenciais oferecidos pelos juízos do público sobre a obra publicada em 1781. O corpus, portanto, está delimitado aos três textos cuja tarefa propedêutica ou seja, a referida preparação prévia do leitor é claramente influenciada pela recepção da Crítica da razão pura. São eles: Prolegômenos a toda metafísica futura que queira apresentar-se como ciência; a Introdução à Crítica da razão pura em sua segunda edição; o Prefácio à segunda edição desta mesma obra. Esta problemática aparentemente técnica é tomada como mote para a realização de uma leitura da posição de Kant frente a acontecimentos marcantes no contexto filosófico e político dos anos seguintes à publicação da primeira edição da Crítica da razão pura marcadamente, a Pantheismusstreit e a mudança no trono prussiano em 1786, a qual, frequentemente, é tomada como causa da suposta recaída no dogmatismo, que seria observada na segunda edição da Crítica da razão pura. Não obstante, a interpretação de algumas das questões centrais para a fortuna crítica da filosofia kantiana, em particular, o estatuto do idealismo transcendental, a autonomia que deve caracterizar o uso público da razão e a elucidação do projeto de uma Crítica da razão pura também fazem parte do escopo da problemática proposta nesta dissertação. Sobretudo, importa valorizar o discurso propedêutico de Kant e as mudanças nele introduzidas, sem as quais as tentativas de compreensão de sua obra seriam inócuas, senão impossíveis de realizar-se objetivamente. / The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate how the reception of the first edition of the Critique of pure reason echoes in the text corpus devoted to prepare the reader to understand this book. In other words, how does Kant reconstitute his introductory speech in relation to the references and judgments given by the readers of the first edition, which was published in 1781? Thus, the text corpus comprises three texts where the propaedeutic task - the prior preparation of the reader - is clearly influenced by the reception of the Critique of Pure Reason. These texts are: the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, which presents itself as science, the second edition of the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason and the Preface of the latter. Moreover, these changes could be analyzed in Kant\'s position about remarkable events in the philosophical and political context of the years following the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. They were mainly the Pantheismusstreit and the change in the Prussian throne in 1786, which is often taken as the cause of the alleged \"return into dogmatism\" that was noticed in the second edition of the Critique of pure reason. On the same note, the interpretation of some of the nodal questions in the critical fortune of the Kantian philosophy, especially the status of transcendental idealism, the autonomy that must characterize the public use of reason and the elucidation of the project of a Critique of Pure Reason also compose important points for this dissertations investigation. All in all, it is crucial to valorize the introductory speech of Kant and the changes made by the author as an overall attempt to understand his work. Without it, our comprehension of such important texts would be innocuous or even impossible to occur objectively.