相對於意識傳統為了滿足知識全知的條件，將身體的隱而未顯視為有缺陷的模糊，現象學重回日常生活世界裡的原初知覺經驗領域，身體作為缺席的模糊不再是認知的障礙，反倒作為潛在的背景是認知得以成立的必要條件。梅洛龐蒂強調完全還原的不可能，將理論重新寓居於身體，身體與世界交錯糾結無法分別，無法外於身體一語道破，只能夠不斷的描述身體與世界的關聯，使得不斷說明成為模糊效能的延續以堆疊出逸離的身體。 為了追求身體最大程度的逸離，本文還必須繼續借道拉崗精神分析，潛意識作為超出主體言說意圖，指向不可見、自我與他人外的他者，連串的取代系列圍繞在缺席旁作離心的循環。於是拉崗認定部分的身體作為象徵的身體才能發揮效能，始終處於異化的過程，但是並不是迷惑在身體的諸種表象中，或者以斷裂確保真實的身體，而是對身體的想像成為身體的不斷延續，身體的諸種表象就是身體的實質存在，使得回歸身體也是逸離身體。 / On contrary to the western philosophical tradition , to set consciousness as priority, builds transparent knowledge. It regard the ambiguity character of body as fault. Phenomenology summons us to go back to primary field of lifeworld. Body is no more the barrier of cognition, instead body become the potential background as necessary condition of cognition. Merleau-Ponty stresses the impossibility of complete reduction. The consciousness inhabit in body in motion. Body is interwined with world and hard to divide. We can’t explore body as objective observer as if we were outside the world. What we can do is to descript the relationship between body and world. Make the descriptions to become the parts of invisible body. In order to catch the character of body’s exceed, we need to have aid of Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Lacan develop that unconsciousness is like the structure of language. It designates the subjectivity speaks beyond what he intend. People desire the lost Other outside the self and other as the third term, instead people used to series of substitutes around the absence as decentered circulation. Lacan identify people is in process of alienation, even in the initial stage. The real body which is fragmented could have effects as symbol. It’s not what people confused with imaginary images, but what people imagine is to continune body. The different body images is body’s substantial existence.

Some of the attributes of a perfect being (e.g. first cause, necessary being, intelligent creator) are established on the basis of theological arguments such as the cosmological and the teleological. At the deepest level, these theological arguments are based on principles of rational psychology such as simplicity and sufficient reason. Moreover, belief that the perfect being is the moral omnipotent God is an act of trust and thus based on the rational psychology of trust. Theists in the Abrahamic tradition subscribe to first cause/necessary being/intelligent creator theology and must therefore remain faithful to any psychological principles (simplicity, sufficient reason, trust) that are the rational grounds for believing in the existence of their God. But such faithfulness results in a deep tension within Judeo-Christian theism. For example, a Christian theist who believes in the Trinity must at the same time remain faithful to the principle of simplicity that rejects the Trinity. Because simplicity is the rational basis for the deeply cherished attributes of the Christian God (first cause/necessary being/intelligent creator), it is argued that faithfulness to psychological principles such as simplicity discipline Christian theistic belief, in particular the belief in the Trinity. Examples of this nature offer a framework for a similar disciplining of Islamic hermeneutics on the basis of rational psychology. Muslim interpreters tend not to systematically engage in the philosophy of religion, and for this reason do not explicitly articulate the psychological principles that gave them their theistic Muslim identity. As a result, they deviate from such principles when it comes time to interpret the original sources of Islam (Quran and Sunna). Consistency is one of the demands of rationality, and it is inconsistent to assume principles in arriving at a theistic Muslim identity and then subsequently fail to apply those principles consistently to the task of textual interpretation.

Une traduction française des "Thèses sur le besoin" de Theodor W. Adorno accompagne la thèse (annexe). / La présente thèse analyse et contraste les positions de G.W.F. Hegel et de T. W. Adorno sur la nature de la pensée rationnelle et le sens de la pratique philosophique. Notre démarche consiste en une interprétation critique d’une idée que partagent Hegel et Adorno mais qu’ils développent différemment, selon laquelle la pensée rationnelle obéit à un certain besoin (Bedürfnis) qui lui est à la fois spécifique et universel. Hegel a parlé d’un « besoin de la philosophie ». L’expression est ambiguë : elle vise à décrire la nature générale de la pensée rationnelle mais aussi à exprimer la pertinence historique de la raison, c’est-à-dire sa capacité à assouvir des besoins concrets. Je démontre dans les cinq premiers chapitres que Hegel tente de réconcilier ces deux besoins en soutenant que l’identification par le concept est précisément ce qui permet d’appaiser la souffrance concrète que génère la division de l’histoire avec elle-même. La solution est en effet trouvée dans l’idée du savoir absolu, une posture de la pensée rationnelle tout aussi fondée dans la nature de la pensée elle-même que dans les aspirations de son autre, c’est-à-dire de l’histoire. Le savoir absolu est le point où chez Hegel coïncident la nature de la raison en général et la nécessité d’exprimer les besoins universels de l’histoire. Les chapitres six à neuf situent ensuite le déplacement épistémologique que propose la dialectique négative d’Adorno par rapport à cette conclusion de Hegel. Nous prenons soin de montrer qu’Adorno ne la juge pas fausse mais unilatérale. Il conçoit qu’exprimer et assouvir les souffrances historiques revient au concept mais il soutient en même temps que celui-ci échoue à cette tâche tant qu’on ne nuance pas la portée et la signification de sa « compulsion à identifier ». Nous démontrons que si cette dernière est d’après Adorno à la fois inévitable et fautive, c’est parce que le besoin qui motive la pensée rationnelle n’est pas d’abord la nécessité de concevoir l’unité dans la division mais celui de réaliser les conditions de la survie et du bonheur de l’organisme vivant qui soutient la pensée. Or pour Adorno, la société capitaliste bloque les pratiques émancipatrices qui s’attachent à combler ce besoin matériel parce qu’elle absolutise le principe d’identité. Nous soutenons que, dans ce contexte, l’approche adornienne de la philosophie comme relevant de l’essai (Essay) et développant des concepts discontinus orientés vers le non-identique n’est pas moins, mais plus rationnelle que la posture hégélienne qui considère la philosophie comme une science absolue. / This thesis analyzes and contrasts G. W. F. Hegel’s and T. W. Adorno’s positions on the nature of rationality and the task of philosophy. Its central aim is to offer a critical interpretation of a thought shared but interpreted differently by both thinkers, namely, that philosophy proceeds from a certain need (Bedürfnis) that is both specific and universal. Hegel spoke of a « need of philosophy ». The expression is ambiguous: it is meant to describe the general nature of rational thinking, but also to express how reason or philosophy can justify their historical relevance and satisfy concrete needs. I argue in chapters one to five that Hegel tries to reconcile these two needs, in order to show why identifying with concepts is the key to appeasing the concrete suffering caused by history’s own division within itself. The answer is given in absolute knowledge, grounded and justified in respect of thought itself as well as thought’s other, i.e., history. Absolute knowledge is point of equilibrium between reason in general and reason as the adequate expression of history’s universal needs. Chapters six to nine then interpret Adorno’s negative dialectics as a critical reworking of this dialectical problem of framing normativity in historical terms. Adorno agrees with Hegel that the most relevant and satisfying expression of historical suffering is conceptual, yet he also contends that the « compulsion to identity » as such fails to satisfy the need that motivates philosophical thinking. I argue that this is because striving for survival and happiness is not reducible to thought’s obsession with identity. For Adorno, happiness and “right life” are blocked in contemporary society because capitalism hypostasizes the identity principle inherent in conceptual thinking. In this context, I argue that Adorno’s view of philosophy as essay (Essay) is more, not less, rational than Hegel’s understanding of philosophy as an absolute science.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

The intention of this diploma work is based on legacy of Master Peter de Letovic which is till now unknown. He worked at Prague University before initiation of the Hussite Revolution. The thesis proceed from his question Utrum cuiuslibet spiritus rationalis eadem essentia sit substantialiter ratio memoria et voluntas which gave him Master Matthew de Knin at quodlibet in the year 1409. The principal part of the thesis deal with a critic transcription and translation of manuscript from the codex UK Praha X H 18. The author, furthermore, attempt to interpret the question in a commentary and classify it in the context of philosophical thoughts at Prague University. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

This Thesis deals with the philosophy and ethics of St.Thomas Aquinas and of St. Augustine. At first I characterize the time period then I am focusing on each cathegory concerning moral life of human being in the world such as God, soul, will, goodness, evil and happiness as well. My goal is to show the real purpose of human existence and to show how both philosophers understand individual topics, what is the same and different in their opinion.

The area of bullying has been quite well mapped, although it would appear that the research into this field has been done mainly in quantitative form. The aim of this thesis is to approach the issue from a different angle and to explore the students' point of view of the reasons for the occurence of bullying while using the qualitative form of research. For this purpose, individual interviews with sixteen seventh grade students from a basic school in Prague were conducted and subsequently analysed with the use of the open coding method. The results show that students themselves perceive bullying as a considerably individual concept. The students define bullying in terms of various negative events which are common among peers but in addition they discuss other conditions, such as recurrence, permanency and notably the feeling of being a victim, a key aspect in the definition of bullying and the use of the term itself. Various reasons for the occurence of bullying are presented in the interviews and can be divided into three categories based on whom the inception of bullying can be attributed to. As for the agressor, the explanations arise from a bad relationship with the victim, envy, revenge, satisfaction, a social status struggle or family and personal problems. The victim's reasons mentioned are...

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Computing and Information Sciences / Xinming Ou / Intrusion analysis, i.e., the process of combing through Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alerts and audit logs to identify true successful and attempted attacks, remains a difficult problem in practical network security defense. The primary cause of this problem is the high false positive rate in IDS system sensors used to detect malicious activity. This high false positive rate is attributed to an inability to differentiate nearly certain attacks from those that are merely possible. This inefficacy has created high uncertainty in intrusion analysis and consequently causing an overwhelming amount of work for security analysts. As a solution, practitioners typically resort to a specific IDS-rules set that precisely captures specific attacks. However, this results in failure to discern other forms of the targeted attack because an attack’s polymorphism reflects human intelligence. Alternatively, the addition of generic rules so that an activity with remote indication of an attack will trigger an alert, requires the security analyst to discern true alerts from a multitude of false alerts, thus perpetuating the original problem. The perpetuity of this trade-off issue is a dilemma that has puzzled the cyber-security community for years. A solution to this dilemma includes reducing uncertainty in intrusion analysis by making IDS-nearly-certain alerts prominently discernible. Therefore, I propose alerts prioritization, which can be attained by integrating multiple methods. I use IDS alerts correlation by building attack scenarios in a ground-up manner. In addition, I use Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST), a non-traditional theory to quantify uncertainty, and I propose a new method for fusing non-independent alerts in an attack scenario. Finally, I propose usage of semi-supervised learning to capture an organization’s contextual knowledge, consequently improving prioritization. Evaluation of these approaches was conducted using multiple datasets. Evaluation results strongly indicate that the ranking provided by the approaches gives good prioritization of IDS alerts based on their likelihood of indicating true attacks.

La philosophie de Husserl est guidée par la volonté d'atteindre une connaissance objective du monde. La description de l'expérience de la conscience qu'elle propose porte en effet d'abord sur l'expérience des vécus par lesquels nous prenons connaissance du monde et sur les différences qu'il existe entre une connaissance authentique et une simple présomption, une croyance ou une illusion. Mais cette priorité de la connaissance objective dans l'ordre de la méthode ne doit pas occulter l'antériorité, dans l'ordre réel, de l'expérience non-conceptuelle et inobjective des biens. En effet, le monde se donne à nous d'abord comme un monde de biens et comme la manifestation sensible de certaines valeurs. Nous voyons de beaux objets, nous trouvons l'espace utile ou pratique, nous sommes attirés par un bruit, gênés par une lumière, etc. Comment concilier ces deux exigences, celle de la méthode et celle de l'expérience ? Cette question porte sur les conditions de possibilité de la phénoménologie elle-même, puisque cette méthode, pour intégrer le nouveau genre de problèmes que posent les valeurs, dans l'ordre esthétique ou éthique, doit s'amender en permanence. Les valeurs touchent en effet aux limites de la description des actes objectivants, car elles relèvent d'une dimension qui n'est pas assimilable à celle de la nature objective des choses. Les valeurs éthiques, plus précisément, touchent aux limites de l'exigence phénoménologique de l'unité de la raison et du strict parallélisme entre les différents types d'actes correspondant aux divers registres de l'expérience (théorique, axiologique et pratique). Ainsi, l'injustice ou la vertu ne se donnent pas à la manière dont se donnent les choses dans la perception sensible et ne sauraient faire l'objet d'une « constitution intentionnelle » depuis les prestations subjectives. Le sens d'une valeur ne dépasse-t-il pas toujours et par principe les possibilités constitutives du sujet ? En d'autres termes, peut-on penser les valeurs éthiques comme des « analoga » des propriétés empiriques des objets, dont il faudrait rendre compte et qu'il faudrait parvenir à connaître de manière objective, ou bien n'y a-t-il pas là un ordre qui échappe à la description, voire au rêve husserlien d'une science de tous les phénomènes et d'une description pure de tous les types d'expérience ? Pour répondre à cette question, nous procédons en deux temps. Le premier s'interroge sur les conditions de possibilité d'une théorie des valeurs élaborée au fil de la méthode phénoménologique, c'est-à-dire au moyen d'un double réquisit – analogique et transcendantal. Le second montre comment la compréhension du sens des valeurs éthiques implique des glissements et des réélaborations de cette méthode qui ont pour fonction de révéler, à la racine des actes d'évaluation et de volition qui se rapportent aux valeurs, la vie et l'œuvre du sujet éthique. / Husserl's philosophy is an attempt to obtain objective knowledge on the world, which offers a description of the cognitive consciousness, in order to distinguish a presumptive or an illusory belief and an authentic knowledge. However, such a methodological precedence of the objective knowledge should not hide the actual priority of a non-objective and pre-predicative experience of the world. Indeed, the world first appears to us as a practical and valuable world. We can see beautiful objects, useful tools, pleasant landscapes. One is drawn by a sound or disturbed by a light. How are these two points of view to be reconciled? May we conciliate the methodological priority of theoretical consciousness and the empirical precedence of values and goods? This question deals with the possibility of phenomenology itself, because this philosophical method has to transform itself in order to take into account the idiosyncratic kinds of problems that raise the experience of values. Values reach the limits of the “objectifying consciousness's” possibilities. Because they do not belong to the realm of nature, values are not one of the empirical properties of things. More precisely, ethical values query the need of unity in Reason and the need of a strict parallelism between different intentional acts. May injustice or virtue appear as do so colours or shapes in the sensible world? Can these values be intentionally constituted? Does the meaning of values ever exceed the constitutive capabilities in the subject? In order to answer these questions, two fields shall be developed. The first one questions the possibility of a value theory, which is brought by the phenomenological method, that is to say, through a demand of analogy and a demand of transcendental constitution. The second one indicates how the understanding of ethical values implies some shifting and new elaborations in the methodology itself, in order to show, behind the rationality of emotional and volitional acts, the life and work of the ethical subject.

Il est courant de reconnaître en Hume un philosophe empiriste et un critique de la raison. Cette étude s’attache à examiner le lien unissant ces deux caractérisations, et à mettre en évidence le geste d’extension de l’empirisme par lequel, sous la plume de Hume, l’entendement en vient à être pensé selon un modèle empirico-sceptique. Contrairement à l’idée reçue qui voudrait que la théorie humienne de la raison s’énonce à l’encontre de conceptions «métaphysiques» ou «rationalistes» de cette dernière, il s’agit de montrer que c’est à des auteurs couramment désignés comme empiristes que Hume se confronte lorsqu’il prend la raison pour objet, en tant que ces auteurs seraient restés prisonniers d’une compréhension superficielle de l’expérience. En explorant différents champs (connaissance, passions, morale, histoire, sciences constituées, telle la mécanique), cette étude souligne que la critique humienne de la raison naît d’un approfondissement de l’empirisme, approfondissement qui vient interroger l’idée traditionnelle d’une continuité vis-à-vis des philosophes «empiristes» (notamment Locke et Hutcheson) et d’une mise à distance des auteurs «rationalistes» (notamment Leibniz et Malebranche). Ces positionnements à première vue surprenants s’enracinent dans une exigence d’analyse de l’expérience : c’est seulement en analysant l’expérience immédiate et ordinaire que nous faisons de notre raison qu’il est possible de parvenir à une juste idée de ses pouvoirs, et de poser à nouveaux frais la question de sa légitimité à gouverner notre croyance. / Hume is commonly seen as an empiricist philosopher and as a critic of reason. The project of this thesis is to examine the relation between these two characterizations, and to highlight the way that Hume expands empiricism into the faculty of reason, resulting in a new conception of the understanding, which is both empirical and skeptical. In opposition to the generally accepted idea, which states that Hume's theory of reason is set against "metaphysical" or "rationalist" conceptions of this faculty, the thesis argues that, in his account of reason, Hume mainly critiques "empiricist" philosophers. These thinkers are critiqued for being confined to a superficial view of experience. Through an exploration of several fields (theory of experience, theory of the passions, theory of morals, history, contemporary sciences, such as mechanics), it is shown that Hume's critique of reason stems from an extension and intensification of empiricism. This demonstration challenges the traditional view of Hume, as the heir to the "empiricist" tradition (particularly Locke and Hutcheson) and as a mere critic of the "rationalist" philosophers (particularly Leibniz and Malebranche). These positions, which seem at first sight surprising, are rooted in the demand that experience be analysed : it is only through analysing the immediate and ordinary experience we have of our reasoning that we can arrive at a true account of the powers of reason, and give new ground to the question of the legitimacy of reason to govern our beliefs.