This thesis asks how manifestation of religious belief by religious individuals can best be protected in English law. It is particularly concerned with the protection available to religious individuals in the public sphere. This thesis assesses the current state of protection under religious freedom and religious discrimination models, before considering the potential for increasing protection by reconceptualising the right to manifest religious belief as an aspect of freedom of expression. This thesis asks whether the practical and conceptual limitations of a religious freedom model, and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in particular, can be overcome by reliance on alternative modes of protection, namely religious discrimination protections in domestic, Convention, and EU law, or through litigating religious manifestation claims as freedom of expression cases under Article 10 of the ECHR. The difficulty of communicating the harm in being denied the ability to manifest religious beliefs publicly is a key limitation of both religious freedom and religious discrimination models. Similarly, this thesis highlights the difficulty in assessing what weight should be attributed to such religious harm within a proportionality exercise balancing the rights of religious individuals with the rights and interests of other parties. The analysis in this thesis draws primarily upon the sources of law which shape domestic English law in this area, namely the ECHR and European Union law. However, this thesis also considers foreign precedent and case law from the United States in particular. This thesis contends that no one model can address the range of cases where manifestation of religious beliefs arise, and that litigants should be able to draw from religious freedom, religious discrimination, and freedom of expression protections depending on the nature of their case.

Freedom of Religion or Belief in the Context of European and International Law This PhD dissertation focuses on selected aspects of freedom of religion or belief in Europe. It aims to introduce the legal framework in which religious freedom has to operate, and to place this essential freedom into a broader cultural, religious and human rights context. The contextualisation emphasised throughout this dissertation is based on an assumption that it is not possible to establish a pure legal notion of religious freedom that would not bear any imprint of the societal, legal, cultural and religious context of its authors; in reality, each person's understanding of religious freedom is rooted in his culture, religion and experience. This should not lead, however, to a complete rejection of the possibility of a common understanding and universal protection of religious freedom. On the contrary, it should motivate each interpreter and law-maker in the area of religious freedom to study the understandings of all persons and entities involved in a particular case or situation. Having thoroughly studied all presented claims rooted in religious freedom and having taken into consideration all other rights, principles and interests involved, it should be possible for the decision-makers to resolve the case in a...

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Josias Jacintho de Souza.pdf: 2462194 bytes, checksum: 6a0fcd8dd5a9036f7946574bc1c8f6e4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-14 / The aim of this work is to analyze the historical and contemporary relationship between Religion, Law and State and the problems due to that relationship: temporary or permanent problems? If in the past the purpose of the union between Religion and State was to bring peace among people, and in modern times it s spoken about total separation also to bring peace, which is then the ideal form of relationship between Religion and State: united or separate? The theory-ideology of the union or separation between Religion and State would be a utopia? What s the importance of Law in that relationship? This research brings a proposal of terminological adaptation of the current polarity, Religious State or Lay State, by another terminology: Plural State. With the current need to think and rethink the relationship between political and religious power, the hypothesis of a Plural State represents as much the maintenance as the globalization of the cultural, political and religious diversities. A Plural State contemplates everything and everybody; as much the globalized as the regionalized State; as much the religious as the lay State. It also contemplates those who believe and disbelieve in the humanity's future divine restoration, preached by religions. Aristotle affirmed that the human being is naturally a political animal. Just political? The human being is naturally also a believing animal, not necessarily or only in the doctrines and dogmas of the religions, but in the discovered and hidden mysteries of life, in their mysteries with rational and irrational answers. During the life, everybody influences and is influenced by habits, concepts and cultural and religious truths. Therefore, trying to unite or juridically separate all cultural and religious diversities is utopia. In spite of that, the fair Law is the only means able to reasonably balance the relationships between Religion and State. There s no other way. If the ideal of a perfect society in the earth is humanly impossible, the Christianity assures that what is impossible for the men is possible for God. Thus, only He could give answers for all of the human inquiries and provide solutions for all the problems of the world. Therefore, it s only with the destruction of the utopia of the human ideals and with the effectiveness of the ideals preached by the religions that the world would be transformed. When? There s no predetermined time by the religions and neither by the planners of the utopian ideals. The utopia is similar to the horizon. When we walk towards it, it moves away from us. When we keep walking, it moves away more than before. The utopia is like this: we will never reach it. And if it s so, what s it for? To make us walk. Even being utopia the ideas and the ideals of the union or separation between Religion and State, it makes us think in a new ideal: adaptation of the historical and neomodern reality of Religious State and Lay State to Plural State. One more utopia? The utopia makes us walk. As much the political as the religious life produce ideas and ideals, united or separately: the political life intends to produce new happy life in the earth; the religious life intends to produce new happy life begun in the earth and perpetuated in the beyond, in heaven, where there s justice . Utopian ideas and or ideals as much of the political life as of the religious life? The utopia makes us walk / O objetivo da tese é analisar a relação histórica e contemporânea entre Religião, Direito e Estado e os problemas decorrentes dessa relação: problemas temporários ou permanentes? Se no passado o propósito da união entre Religião e Estado era de fazer reinar a paz entre os povos, e na modernidade fala-se em total separação para também fazer reinar a paz, qual é então, a forma ideal de relação entre Religião e Estado: unidos ou separados? A teoria-ideologia da união ou da separação entre Religião e Estado seria uma utopia? Qual a importância do Direito nessa relação? O trabalho traz uma proposta de adequação terminológica da atual polaridade entre Estado Religioso e Estado Laico para outra terminologia: Estado Plural. Com a necessidade atual de pensar e repensar a relação entre poder político e poder religioso, a hipótese de um Estado Plural representa tanto a manutenção como a globalização das diversidades culturais, políticas e religiosas. Um Estado Plural contempla tudo e todos; tanto o Estado globalizado como o Estado regionalizado ; tanto o Estado religioso como o Estado laico . Também contempla aqueles que crêem e descrêem na futura restauração divina da humanidade, pregada pelas religiões. Aristóteles afirmou que o ser humano é naturalmente um animal político. Apenas político? O ser humano é naturalmente também um animal que crê. Crente não necessariamente ou somente nas doutrinas e dogmas das religiões, mas nos mistérios descobertos e encobertos da vida, nos seus mistérios com respostas racionais e irracionais. Durante a vida, todos influenciam e são influenciados por costumes, conceitos e verdades culturais e religiosas. Portanto, tentar unir ou separar juridicamente todas as diversidades culturais e religiosas é utopia. Apesar disso, o Direito justo é o único meio capaz de equilibrar razoavelmente as relações entre Religião e Estado. Não há outro caminho. Se o ideal de uma sociedade perfeita na terra é humanamente impossível, o cristianismo assegura que o que é impossível para os homens é possível para Deus. Assim, somente Ele poderia dar respostas para todas as indagações humanas e proporcionar soluções para todos os problemas do mundo. Portanto, somente com a desconstituição da utopia dos ideais das pessoas e com a efetivação dos ideais pregados pelas religiões é que o mundo seria transformado. Quando? Não há um tempo pré-determinado pelas religiões e nem pelos projetistas dos ideais utópicos. A utopia é semelhante ao horizonte. Quando caminhamos em direção a ele, ele se afasta de nós. Quando caminhamos mais um tanto, ele se afasta outro tanto dobrado. A utopia é assim: nunca a alcançaremos. E se é assim, para que serve? Para nos fazer caminhar. Mesmo sendo uma utopia as idéias e os ideais da união ou da separação entre Religião e Estado, a utopia nos faz pensar num novo ideal: a adequação da realidade histórica e neomoderna de Estado Religioso e Estado Laico para Estado Plural. Mais uma utopia? A utopia nos faz caminhar. Tanto a vida política como a vida religiosa produzem idéias e ideais, conjunta ou separadamente: a vida política se propõe a produzir nova vida feliz na terra; a vida religiosa se propõe a produzir nova vida feliz a começar na terra e a perpetuar no além, no céu, onde habita justiça . Idéias e ou ideais utópicos tanto da vida política como da vida religiosa? A utopia nos faz caminhar

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-04T18:35:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre Boratti Favretto.pdf: 1462966 bytes, checksum: 2774d239d8fde01cc11abc3047907b7e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-16 / The Declaration Dignitatis humanae of Second Vatican Council doctrinally introduces the concept of religious freedom founded on the dignity of the human person. Stands out, in the interim, the anthropological foundation, which unfolds the theological and doctrinal, setting up religious freedom as the apogee of all freedoms. The goal of this work is develop the theme process of genesis, establish the conceptual definition and present the discussion about religious freedom. This, through a phenomenological analysis that ends at the historical and theological hermeneutic of the conciliar periods before Preparatory, Preparatory and of the four Sessions of Vatican II and the Magisterium of the documents of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which treated theme. The text is structured in a systematic way in four chapters. The first constitutes status quaestionis by presenting the context of religious freedom theme of development in magisterial documents prior to Dignitatis humanae, as well as the positioning of the Magisterium ecclesiastic, that of religious intolerance, passes to tolerance and affirmation of the right to freedom religious. The second and third chapters cover the doctrinal content of this Declaration in their immediate environment, the Second Vatican Council. They present the process of genesis of religious conception of freedom expressed in the text of the Declaration Dignitatis humanae, exposing and already analyzing the several thematic stages and redaction until it reaches the final version of the Declaration and the conception of the right to religious freedom. The fourth chapter presents the legal ramifications, theological, anthropological and ethical prospective to Dignitatis humanae. Framework that enables our understanding of the phenomenon of religious plurality in terms of a possible horizon not only to theological reflection, but also to religious studies, to infer from the declaration concerning the situations design of a theology of religions and theology of religious pluralism; whose religious language provides contribution to constitution of the States of democratic rights, which in turn has the function of protecting and promote religious freedom. The theme of religious freedom gives new perspective to the free practice of religion and opens wide dialogic engagement between the Catholic Church, other Christian churches, other religions, people "without religion" and other "good will". / A Declara??o Dignitatis humanae do Conc?lio Vaticano II apresenta doutrinariamente a concep??o de liberdade religiosa fundamentada na dignidade da pessoa humana. Sobressai, neste ?nterim, o fundamento antropol?gico que se desdobra do teol?gico e doutrin?rio, configurando a liberdade religiosa como o apogeu de todas as liberdades. O objetivo desta disserta??o ? desenvolver o processo de g?nese deste tema, estabelecer a defini??o conceitual e apresentar o debate acerca da liberdade religiosa. Isto, mediante uma an?lise fenomenol?gica que desemboca na hermen?utica hist?rica e teol?gica dos per?odos conciliares Antepreparat?rio, Preparat?rio e das quatro Sess?es do Conc?lio Vaticano II, bem como de documentos do Magist?rio eclesi?stico dos s?culos XIX e XX que trataram do tema. O texto se estrutura de maneira sistem?tica em quatro cap?tulos. O primeiro deles se constitui em status quaestionis ao apresentar o contexto do desenvolvimento do tema da liberdade religiosa nos documentos magisteriais que antecedem a Dignitatis humanae, bem como o posicionamento do Magist?rio eclesi?stico, que da intoler?ncia religiosa, passa ? toler?ncia e afirma??o do direito ? liberdade religiosa. O segundo e terceiro cap?tulos abarcam o conte?do doutrinal dessa Declara??o em seu contexto pr?ximo, o do Conc?lio Vaticano II. Apresentam o processo de g?nese da concep??o de liberdade religiosa expressa no texto da Declara??o Dignitatis humanae expondo e, j? analisando, as diversas etapas tem?ticas e redacionais at? que se chegue ? vers?o definitiva da Declara??o e da concep??o de direito ? liberdade religiosa. O quarto cap?tulo apresenta os desdobramentos jur?dico, teol?gico, antropol?gico e ?tico prospectivos ? Dignitatis humanae. ?mbito que possibilita a compreens?o do fen?meno da pluralidade religiosa em termos de um horizonte poss?vel n?o somente ? reflex?o teol?gica, mas tamb?m ?s ci?ncias da religi?o, ao inferir da Declara??o as suscita??es concernentes ? concep??o de uma teologia das religi?es como teologia do pluralismo religioso; cuja linguagem religiosa oferece contributo ? constitui??o do Estado de direito democr?tico, que por sua vez, tem a fun??o de tutelar e promover a liberdade religiosa. O tema da liberdade religiosa proporciona nova perspectiva para a livre pr?tica da religi?o e inaugura amplo empenho dial?gico entre a Igreja Cat?lica, as outras Igrejas crist?s, as outras religi?es, as pessoas sem religi?o e outras de boa vontade .

La présence définitive des minorités musulmanes sur les territoires de l'Union européenne est devenue une réalité. Cette présence massive et durable a changé le paysage religieux européen au XXe siècle. Mais le développement de la présence musulmane dans les pays de l'Union européenne est un processus hétérogène et loin d'être terminé en raison de l'existence de certaines difficultés qui empêchent l'intégration complète de cette communauté. Les minorités musulmanes essaient de franchir ces obstacles pour arriver à obtenir une protection optimale et réaliser leur objectif principal relatif à l'obtention d'une égalité de traitement vis-À-Vis des autres minorités religieuses qui ont une présence plus longue dans cette partie du monde.Cette étude s'efforce de comparer les différents statuts juridiques accordés aux minorités musulmanes dans les pays de l'Union européenne pour établir un état des lieux juridique de la présence musulmane dans ces pays. La distinction entre les minorités musulmanes en tant que groupes minoritaires et leurs membres est nécessaire pour savoir si les droits collectifs de ces groupes ont été reconnus et privilégiés au détriment des droits individuels des personnes appartenant à ces minorités / The permanent presence of Muslim minorities in the countries of the European Union has become a reality.This massive and lasting presence has changed the religious European scene in the 20th century.But the development of the Muslim presence in the countries of the European Union has been a heterogeneous process which is not over yet because of certain difficulties which prevent this community from being integrated completely. The Muslim minorities are trying to overcome those obstacles to manage to get the best protection and achieve their main goal that is to say getting the same treatment as other religious minorities who settled inthe European Union long before them.This study attempts to compare the different legal statuses granted to the Muslim minorities in the different countries of the European Union so as to assess the Muslim presence in those countries legally. The distinction between the Muslim minorities as minority groups and their different members must be made so as to know ifthe collective rights of these groups have been acknowledged and given more importance than the individual rights of the people belonging to these minorities

本文探究的主題為宗教教育之合憲性，這個主題在本論文中包含三個子題：一、公立學校可否實施具有宗教信仰內涵的生命教育？二、國家可否禁止私立中小學開設宗教教育？三、憲法是否賦予新約教徒有權拒絕接受牴觸其宗教信仰之教育，而選擇在家教育的權利？針對這些問題，本論文首先從歷史分析的角度，探討宗教教育之發展。其次，闡釋宗教教育之合憲性基礎。最後，基於上述的研究基礎，再進一步判斷宗教教育之合憲性。 　　在公立學校之宗教教育方面。若依據政教分離之限定分離說觀點，生命教育的實施，如果能對於各種宗教信仰廣為介紹，保障學校成為一個以學生自我實現為核心之多元、開放、中立而寬容之場域，尚不至於違憲；但若只提供某一特定宗教信仰的內涵，使學生沒有選擇的可能性，將會違反政教分離原則。若從徹底分離說的觀點，生命教育的教材內容，如果其內容蘊含一特定宗教信仰內涵時，將會違反憲法之政教分離原則。 　　在私立學校之宗教教育方面。在公立學校以外的宗教教育，由於並不涉及政教分離原則，而為憲法宗教自由之保障對象；而且，私立學校基於其辦學之目的，得自由選擇教師及學生，且已事先告知其應接受之宗教教育課程，故私立學校得自由開設宗教教育課程；因此，我國禁止私立學校開設宗教教育課程，實已違反憲法對於宗教自由的保障。 　　在新約教會之案例方面。當父母之宗教信仰與學校之價值體系有衝突時，為保障父母之宗教自由，應承認父母享有入學義務拒絕權，而可以主張在家教育；但為了保障子女之受教育權，此種取代學校教育之在家教育，必須除了宗教內容之課程外，也必須提供相當於一般公、私立學校所實施之國民教育內容及程度，使其子女享有與一般學校學生同值之教育。 / The motif of the thesis is to investigate the constitutionality of the religious education. This thesis includes three sub-thesis: 1. could the public schools enforce the education of the life with the significance of the religion?2. could the state forbid the private primary and junior high schools to establish the religious education? 3.does the constitution authorize the Xinyue Protestants to decline the general education which offends against their religious beliefs and choose to be educated at home? Aiming at these problems, this thesis sets out from the stance of the historical analysis to inquire into the development of the religious education. Then, the thesis explicates the foundation of the constitutionality of the religious education. Finally, basing upon the aforesaid results, then further discuss the constitutionality of the religious education. 　　With the respect of religious education in the public schools, if according to the standpoint of the separation of church and state, the enforcement of the life education should spread various religions, secure the schools to provide a place for targeting the self-realization of the students and for the diversified, broadminded, neutralism and tolerance sphere, the aforesaid religious education is unlikely to unconstitutionality. But if the schools provide the one and only religious education, make the students have no selective possibility, and then these schools have acted against the principle of the separation of church and state . If from the standpoint of thorough split, the content of the teaching materials of the life education includes the courses of the one and only religion, then it acts against the constitutionality of the principle of the separation of church and state . 　　With the respect of religious education in the private schools, because the schools don’t involve the principle of the separation of church and state , therefore, they are targets of protection under the constitution for religious freedom; furthermore, the private schools may depend on its own purpose of establishment to freely select instructors and students and because being notified them about the required courses of religious education in advance, they may freely set up religious courses; our country forbids their setting religious courses have violated constitution. 　　With the respect of the case study of Xinyue Protestants, when the parents’ religious beliefs and the value system of the schools generate the conflicts, to protect the parents’ religious freedom the state should acknowledge that the parents have the right to decline the registration of their children for the required schooling education and may have right to educate their children at home; while to protect the rights of children for education as well, the substitute schooling education at home should provide similar content and standard of the general civil education as offered by the public and private schools in general in addition to the courses of religious education to let their children may also accept the equivalent education in the general schools.

L’impact de la religion sur la violence demeure à ce jour ambivalent dans la littérature. D’un côté, les religions et leurs préceptes de paix sont identifiés comme des facteurs de dissuasion dans la commission d’actes violents. D’un autre côté, l’identité religieuse est historiquement décriée comme une source majeure de guerres. Cette étude propose de comparer dans 163 pays du monde l’influence sur le taux d’homicide de quatre aspects religieux : la religion principale, l’hétérogénéité religieuse, la liberté religieuse et la religiosité. Les taux d’homicide sont fournis par l’Organisation mondiale de la santé alors que les variables religieuses proviennent de sources variées. Les analyses de régressions linéaires tiennent également compte de quelques facteurs socio-économiques. Certains sont considérés dans la littérature comme des facteurs majeurs influant sur l’homicide et d’autres sont plutôt soupçonnés d’interaction sur la relation ici étudiée. Les résultats indiquent qu’il y a modérément plus d’homicides dans les pays qui présentent une forte hétérogénéité religieuse ou une faible religiosité dans la population. Par ailleurs, les pays musulmans, notamment chiites, présentent les taux d’homicide les plus bas, surpassant les pays bouddhistes et hindouistes, alors que les pays chrétiens, notamment catholiques, présentent des taux d’homicide très élevés. Ce constat s’oppose à la théorie libérale chrétienne qui démonise les États religieux musulmans. Néanmoins, l’interprétation des conclusions de cette étude invite à la prudence étant donné son aspect délicat et exploratoire. / The impact of religion on violence remains ambivalent in the litterature. On the one hand, religions and their teachings of peace or compassion are identified as deterrents in the commission of violent acts. On the other hand, religious identity has historically been criticized as a major source of violence and war. This study proposes to compare in 163 countries worldwide the impact on violence of four religious factors : religious denomination, religiosity, religious heterogeneity and religious freedom. The analysis is based on the homicide rates, supplied mainly by the World Health Organization, while religious variables are taken from various sources. Linear regression analysis also take into consideration few socio-economic factors. Some of these are considered in the literature as major factors in homicide and others are suspected of interaction in the relationship studied here. The results indicate that there is moderately more homicides in countries that have strong religious heterogeneity or low religiosity among the population. In addition, muslim countries, especially chiites, presents the lowest homicide rates, surpassing buddhist and hindu countries, while christian countries, especially catholics, have the higher homicide rates. This finding opposes the christian liberal theory that demonizes muslim religious states. Nevertheless, interpretation of findings from this study suggest caution in view of its exploratory and delicate aspect.

This thesis uses a philosophical discussion to explore the tensions that result in the meeting between universal claims and particular contexts regarding human rights and how these tensions can be mediated by exploring the right to religious freedom. In order to do this, two approaches will be studied, one liberal and one postcolonial, represented by Martha Nussbaum and Saba Mahmood respectively. In comparing the approaches of Nussbaum and Mahmood, their arguments and positions become clearer, but also the nuances of the debate between universalism and contextualism. The right to religious freedom, with its many tensions between theory and practice, has been useful in exploring what values are at stake when we talk about human rights in general and how we can think about the apparent tension between universalism and contextual sensitivity. The thesis thus shows that there are more similarities between these two approaches than it may first seem and that they are not incompatible. This is argued to provide insight into possible ways of mediating human rights between theory and practice. / Denna uppsats utgår från en filosofisk diskussion kring spänningen mellan universella anspråk och specifika sammanhang när det kommer till mänskliga rättigheter och hur dessa spänningar kan medlas utifrån en undersökning av religionsfriheten. För att åstadkomma studeras två inriktningar, den ena liberal och den andra postkolonial. Dessa inriktningar representeras av Martha Nussbaum respektive Saba Mahmood. I och med en jämförande analys mellan dessa två inriktningar är förhoppningen att deras likheter och skillnader blir tydligare, samt att nyanserna inom debatten mellan universalism och kontextualism blir tydligare. Det finns många spänningar mellan teori och praktik när det kommer till rätten till religionsfrihet och just denna rättighet är på så sätt användbar för att utforska spänningen mellan universalism och kontextualism när det kommer till mänskliga rättigheter. Denna uppsats visar därmed att det finns flera likheter mellan dessa inriktningar och att de därför inte kan anses vara oförenliga med varandra. Detta för med sig en insikt i möjligheter till att medla mänskliga rättigheter mellan teori och praktik.

This dissertation analyses the use of the word “religion” in Canadian law and theorises the consequences of its use for the legal protection of religious movements in Canada. Chapter One establishes the problems of the word “religion” in academic discourse by providing an overview of work in the field of critical religion. This dissertation considers whether the critiques of the term “religion” by scholars working within critical religion are equally relevant when considering the role of religion in human rights law. Chapter Two turns an investigative eye toward Canadian case law using the word “religion”, from Chaput v Romain (1959) to Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony (2009). The analysis highlights how the use of “religion” in Canadian law does indeed reflect academic concerns. Chapter Three uses queer theory to speculate the consequences of an unstable concept of religion for the protection of religious freedom, especially as it pertains to new religious movements. Judith Butler’s notions of performativity and drag are applied to theorise the performance of “religion” and its outcomes. Some suggestions for how to proceed conclude the dissertation.

La liberté religieuse, qui représente l’un des principaux mythes fondateurs des États-Unis, est devenue un enjeu juridique et d’intérêt public majeur qui s’est renforcé au seuil du XXIe siècle. Garantie par le Premier Amendement à la Constitution fédérale, elle affirme que « le Congrès ne fera aucune loi visant l’établissement d’une religion où l’interdiction du libre exercice de celle-ci ; ou à limiter la liberté d’expression, de la presse ou le droit des citoyens de se réunir pacifiquement ou d’adresser à l’État des pétitions pour obtenir réparation de torts subis. ». Aussi, l’État se doit-il de garantir la liberté religieuse de ses citoyens (selon la célèbre clause du libre-exercice), tout en restant neutre à l’égard de toutes les religions (c’est ce que l’on appelle la clause d’établissement). Si à première vue les clauses constitutionnelles semblent claires, la formulation délibérément vague choisie par les Pères fondateurs, dont James Madison qui fut chargé de rédiger les Amendements, jette déjà les bases des débats perpétuels sur l’interprétation du rôle de l’État dans la gestion du fait religieux et plus particulièrement des limites de la liberté religieuse expressément protégée par la clause du libre-exercice, mais dont la portée demeure confuse. Lorsque la finalité de la loi ne permet pas l’intégration d’un aménagement prévoyant des clauses spécifiques à une religion, le groupe peut alors demander à être totalement exempté de l’application de la loi en question. L’exemption est donc le deuxième recours envisageable, mais contrairement à l’aménagement, elle est accordée uniquement par les juges, qui après le passage de la loi, peuvent, au nom de la clause du libre exercice, dispenser le groupe religieux ou l’individu d’observer la loi qui représente selon eux une entrave à leur liberté religieuse. Dans la grande majorité des cas, le conflit entre pratique religieuse et application de la loi donne lieu à un litige opposant l’État, représenté par le Procureur (Attorney General) au groupe en question, et donc à un procès. Ces trente dernières années, les procès pour menace à la liberté religieuse ont été plus nombreux que dans toute l’histoire du pays. Comme l’observe le sociologue des religions James Richardson, ce sont principalement les mouvements religieux minoritaires qui sont concernés par ces litiges, leurs pratiques religieuses paraissant parfois trop « déviantes » au vu de la culture protestante, dominante aux États-Unis. L’objet premier de cette thèse est donc de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des situations de conflit entre les pratiques religieuses collectives ou individuelles d’une part, et l’exercice de l’autorité de l’État, de l’autre, sachant que ce dernier se doit de faire appliquer la loi à l’ensemble de ses citoyens, tout en veillant à protéger leurs droits constitutionnels. Afin de tenter d’apporter un éclairage sur la jurisprudence en matière de liberté religieuse, nous proposons une analyse de conflits juridiques impliquant exclusivement ce type de groupes (et non des religions dites « traditionnelles »). Dans le cadre de nos études de cas, nous avons privilégié une analyse de cinq mouvements religieux minoritaires (MRM), dont la pertinence réside principalement, à notre sens, dans leur diversité. Nous soulignerons ici que nous n’entendons pas fournir une étude exhaustive de la jurisprudence en matière de liberté religieuse, puisqu’il s’agit de ne retenir que quelques affaires qui ont jalonné l’histoire de cette chronologie façonnée de manière assez inconstante par une Cour Suprême changeante, à la fois reflet et actrice des évolutions de la société. / Religious freedom is one of United States’ major founding myths and it has become a key issue in the public sphere. The First Amendment to the US Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”. Religious freedom is thus a fundamental principle protected by the first part of the Amendment called the free exercise clause while the State is prohibited from interfering with or favoring any religion. However, when a law of generally applicability is seen by an individual or a group as overlapping their religious freedom, going to trial to protect their constitutional right appears in many as the best option. The “case by case” approach by the courts, and in particular by the federal Supreme Court, as well as the lack of a coherent jurisprudence show how difficult and challenging dealing with religious freedom issues are. Indeed, beyond judging facts in the various cases the judges hear, their constant redefinitions of the boundaries of religious freedom have given them a major role in regulating religious matters. In our study, we focus on six such religious groups which have been involved in litigations and most of whom had their case heard by the US Supreme Court, in order to seek an exemption from the law and continue their otherwise illegal religious practice. After a review of the Mormons’ famous polygamy cases in the late 19th century, we move on to analyzing the litigation involving a Brazilian Church (called the Centro Espirto Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal) using an illegal substance in their sacramental tea. The child death cases involving Christian Scientists are also analyzed as they point out the question of the limits of parents’ religious rights when it comes to their children’s health. The issue of parents’ rights is further discussed in the following case studies of the Amish who can have their own community schools since the famous US Supreme Court Yoder decision in 1972, and in the case of the Twelve Tribes who have been facing accusations of child abuse and illegal child labor.