This dissertation examines the impacts of the 1973 Arab petrostate oil embargo on U.S. energy politics. I argue that the embargo was the moment that transformed oil from a domestic and highly regulated commodity into a matter of national security and competitive geopolitics. While its likelihood was foreseen by the Nixon Administration, the embargo did exacerbate an existing energy crisis that was caused by pre-embargo federal energy policies. Following the embargo, a dominant narrative emerged that viewed dependence on foreign oil supplies as an existential threat that merited extraordinary government measures. The securitization of the energy crisis allowed the Nixon Administration to implement many of its pre-embargo energy policies, including the launch of a national energy program to bring the U.S. to energy self-sufficiency by 1980. The embargo was the trigger for the creation of new governmental entities, such as the Department of Energy and U.S. Central Command, that endure to this day. It also shaped the U.S.'s close relationship with Saudi Arabia as an essential oil supplier and a key ally in the Arab world. The dissertation contests the revisionist accounts that argue that the embargo was a non-event, arguing that its impacts on U.S. domestic and foreign policies are still tangible and relevant. / Doctor of Philosophy / For most countries, ensuring energy security and uninterrupted oil supplies is a matter of national security and economic survival. However, for the U.S., long a major oil exporter, access to energy resources only rose to the status of a national security issue in the early 1970s. This dissertation examines the impacts of the 1973 Arab petrostate oil embargo on U.S. energy politics. I argue that the embargo was the moment that transformed oil from a domestic and highly regulated commodity into a matter of national security and competitive geopolitics. Pre-embargo rising domestic demand for oil, insufficient domestic supplies, and misdirected federal regulations had already weakened the resilience of the U.S. oil market and caused shortages. Following the embargo, the Nixon Administration launched a national program to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1980. I argue that the value of committing the U.S. to energy autarky was essential for conveying to foes and allies that the Nixon Administration was willing to invest in a very costly national program so that it can maintain the autonomy of both its foreign policy and of the economy. I also argue that racial and cultural prejudices influenced the Nixon Administration's reaction to the embargo, in that throughout the ramp-up and during the post-embargo period, both the media and the Nixon Administration expressed disbelief at the effrontery of underdeveloped countries that were until recently Western possessions to challenge a global superpower. Following the embargo, a dominant narrative emerged that viewed dependence on foreign oil supplies as an existential threat that merited extraordinary government measures. The securitization of the energy crisis allowed the Nixon Administration to implement many of its pre-embargo energy policies. The embargo was the trigger for the creation of new governmental entities, such as the Department of Energy and U.S. Central Command, that endure to this day. It also shaped the U.S.'s close relationship with Saudi Arabia as an essential oil supplier and a key ally in the Arab world.

This thesis reviews the significance of the 1969 Japan-US Summit between Prime Minister Satii Eisaku and President Richard Nixon in light of official documents that have been disclosed in Japan since 2010 and in the United States since the 1990s. Based on newly available sources, this thesis shows that the 1969 Summit should be considered a Japanese-led initiative with two aims: firstly, to announce a deadline for Okinawa's return with all nuclear weapons removed; and secondly, to reform the Japan-US security treaty system without repeating the kind of outright revision concluded in 1960. The Japanese plan to reform the security treaty system involved simplifying the prior consultation formula by making a public commitment to the security of South Korea of sufficient strength that the United States would agree to the dissolution of the 1960 secret 'Korea Minute'. The Japanese Government achieved its first aim but only partially succeeded in its second. Whilst the return of Okinawa was announced, the status of US bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan continued to be governed by an elaborate web of agreements, public and secret, which damaged public confidence and hampered an improvement in relations between Japan and its neighbouring countries. This thesis shows that commonly held academic opinions about the 1969 Summit are incorrect. Firstly, there was no quid pro quo in which Japan linked its security to South Korea in exchange for Okinawa: both these outcomes were in fact Japanese objectives at the beginning of the summit preparations. Secondly, the success of the summit did not depend on 'backchannel' negotiations between Wakaizumi Kei and Henry Kissinger: it is likely that an announcement on Okinawa's reversion would have been achieved in 1969 even if preparations for the summit had been left to the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the US State Department. Word Limit: Approx. 98,000 words, excluding Bibliography