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En samfällighet kan enligt dagens lagstiftning inte vara delägare i en gemensamhetsanläggning. Det är däremot ibland önskvärt att en samfällighet kan delta i en gemensamhetsanläggning, framförallt vid användning av vägar. Problematik uppstår då andelstal ska tilldelas när det gäller större marksamfälligheter med hundratals fastigheter som delägare. Praktiskt kan förrättningslantmätaren lösa hanteringen genom att ge ett gemensamt andelstal till de delägande fastigheterna i samfälligheten. Vidare kan registreringen av förrättningen förenklas genom att samfälligheten redovisas som delägare i fastighetsregistret istället för de delägande fastigheterna, detta har stöd i Lantmäteriets interna handböcker. Examensarbetets syfte är att utreda om tillämpningen som Lantmäteriet gör avseende andelstal är förenlig med anläggningslagens regler. Detta görs genom att beskriva den problematik som finns och redogöra för gällande rätt. Strukturen följer att definiera begreppet samfällighet och innebörden i denna uppsats, beskriva fastighetsregistret och vad gemensamhetsanläggningar är enligt anläggningslagen. Sedan analyseras relevanta rättsfall på området. Metoden avser huvudsakligen att studera relevant lagstiftning för ämnet, där inkluderat förarbeten. Uppsatsen skrivs i samarbete med Lantmäteriet och därmed har två förrättningsakter tilldelats vilka analyseras tillsammans med gällande lagstiftning. Utöver det studeras Lantmäteriets interna handböcker som en del i syftet. Slutligen ges ett annat perspektiv på rättsfallen från två aktiva domare i mark- och miljödomstolen. Gemensamma andelstal för samfälligheter är till största grad inte förenligt med anläggningslagen. Det undantagsfall, för brukningsenheter och möjligen även gemensamma ägovidder, då ett gemensamt andelstal är möjligt att tillämpa berörs inte i rättsfallen och är ytterst ovanligt förekommande. I det rättsfall där Lantmäteriets hantering av andelstal godkänts från domstolen, är det inte ett fall av gemensamt andelstal, trots att det vid en första anblick ser ut som det. Det förenklade registerförfarandet i Lantmäteriets interna handböcker är inte lika tydligt. De interna handböckerna tyder på att en samfällighet kan redovisas som delägare i en gemensamhetsanläggning. Det är dock mindre tydligt huruvida det är fullt förenligt med förordningen (2000:308) om fastighetsregister men det ser inte ut att finnas något som direkt strider mot lagen. Lantmäteriet verkar inte få tilldela gemensamma andelstal för de delägande fastigheterna i en gemensamhetsanläggning. En prejudicerande dom från mark- och miljööverdomstolen skulle ge ett starkare resultat. Den förenklade registerhanteringens tillämpning kan behöva utredas, trots att den verkar enig med lagen. / Under current laws, a joint property unit cannot be a part-owner in a joint facility. However, it may be desirable that it participate in a joint facility providing roads. A problem appears when determining the participatory shares for properties within a joint property unit that have hundreds of co-owners. The land surveyor can practically solve the handling by giving the co-owners in the joint property unit a shared participatory share. The purpose of this study is to determine whether Lantmäteriet’s handling of the participatory shares is compatible with the Joint Facilities Act (anläggningslag 1973:1149). This is done by explaining the current problem and presenting the law. Firstly, the term “joint property unit” is defined, followed by the property register and then what a joint facility is according to the law. Lastly, recent cases of the problem are presented before the final analysis. The method is mainly about reading laws relevant for the thesis, including preparatory work for the laws. The degree project is an assignment from Lantmäteriet. With that, two relevant administrative acts have been given to analyze against the law. Lantmäteriet’s internal guidelines are also studied as a part of the thesis. To give another perspective on the cases, two active judges within the Land- and Environment Court have been interviewed. The use of shared participatory shares is generally not considered to be legally approved. It does exist special cases where it is applicable, however, the analyzed cases are not as such. Those circumstances are exceedingly uncommon. In the case where Lantmäteriet’s handling of participatory shares has received approval is not, in fact, a shared number. The simplified register procedure in Lantmäteriet’s internal guidelines is not as clear. The internal guidelines indicate that a joint property unit can be registered as a part-owner in a joint facility. It is not as simple to determine the standing against the law, but it seems to be compatible with the Real Property Ordinance (förordning 2000:308 om fastighetsregister). Lantmäteriet are not allowed to assign these shared participatory numbers for participating properties in the joint facility. A prejudicial judgment from the Land- and Environment Court would give a more indicative result.

Выпускная квалификационная работа (магистерская диссертация) посвящена исследованию дивидендной политики. Предметом исследования выступает механизм разработки дивидендной политики, со всеми его особенностями формирования, методиками и формулами расчета, а также механизм взаимодействия данной системы со смежными и взаимозависимыми областями. Основной целью магистерской диссертации является разработка ключевых направлений и конкретных мероприятий по развитию системы дивидендной политики для обеспечения развития предприятия и увеличению стоимости компании. В заключении обозначены рекомендации по совершенствованию дивидендной политики и ее применению. / The final qualifying work (master's thesis) is devoted to the study of dividend policy. The subject of the research is the mechanism for developing a dividend policy, with all its peculiarities of formation, methods and calculation formulas, as well as the mechanism of interaction of this system with adjacent and interdependent areas. The main purpose of the master's thesis is to develop key areas and specific measures for the development of the dividend policy system to ensure the development of the enterprise and increase the value of the company. In conclusion, recommendations for improving the dividend policy and its application are indicated.

Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility – controlling for changes in fundamentals – and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders. / Business Administration/Finance

No / Without making any distinction of the applicable accounting standards, this paper investigates, firstly, the value relevance of accounting information from 1999 to 2012 in different segments of the Chinese stock market. This investigation includes A-shares, prepared under Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) for domestic firms; B-shares, prepared under either the International Accounting Standards (IAS) or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for both domestic and overseas firms; and H-shares prepared under either the IAS or Hong Kong GAAP for Hong Kong and overseas firms. Then, the paper examines whether or not the converged IFRS with CAS, applicable from 2007 onwards, is more value relevant when compared with prior to the 2007's standards (CAS, IAS, Hong Kong GAAP for A-share, B-share, and H-share markets, respectively). Based on 34,020 firm-year observations and after controlling for industry- and year-fixed effects, the findings suggest that accounting information is value relevant with A- and B-share markets, while it is partially relevant with the H-share market. The paper finds that the converged IFRS with CAS is more value relevant in A-shares and B-shares and it is partially more value relevant with the H-share market. These findings have implications for both policymakers and investors since they provide further empirical evidence for the current policy procedure which harmonizes local GAAP with IFRS.

L’apparition de l’acquisition et de la cession des actions étrangères en Chine s’inscrit dans la progression de développement de l’économie chinoise qui a été fortement stimulée par l’application de la politique d’ouverture. Depuis l’adhésion à l’OMC en 2001,les modes d’investissement de l’acquisition et de la cession d’actions ont graduellement commencé à remplacer celle d’investissement relative simplement à l’installation d’une entreprise étrangère en Chine. Bien que la législation chinoise ait essayé de contribuer à la protection de ces nouvelles modes d’investissement étranger, les défauts de loi ainsi que le vide juridique deviennent comme même l’obstacle principal qui empêche le développement de l’acquisition et la cession des actions étrangères en Chine. Dans ce contexte, la problématique de cette thèse est d’une part d’analyser l’ensemble des dispositions actuelles portant sur l’acquisition et la cession des actions étrangères afin de les mettre en œuvre en pratique, d’autre part de rationaliser les mécanismes juridiques chinois en recherchant la possibilité de réforme proposé. / The acquisition and the cession of foreign capital stocks have emerged with the development of Chinese economy since the Chinese reform and open policy tended to practice. As China has participated in the WTO, the investment modes as the acquisition and the cession of foreign capital stocks have replaced gradually the former mode which just tried to found enterprises in China. Even though the legislation in China always attempts to protect these new investment modes, the defects of law and the juridical vacuum still obstruct the development of the acquisition and the cession of foreign capital stocks in China. In this condition, this thesis tries to firstly analyze the existing legal provisions comprehensively for truly implementing the acquisition and the cession of foreign capital stocks; secondly, it also purposes to rationalize the Chinese legal system through researching the feasibility of some reformation.

En omvänd fusion definieras som det förfarande då ett moderbolag fusioneras in i sitt dotterbolag. Det eventuella inkråm som finns i moderbolaget tas vid fusionstillfället upp av dotterbolaget, medan de aktier moderbolaget innehar i dotterbolaget ges ut som fusionsvederlag till dess ägare. Per definition skiljer sig inte en omvänd fusion från en fusion där dotterbolaget absorberas in i sitt moderbolag. Dock är vägledning och litteratur kring området knapphändig vilket har lett till en spekulation om den omvända fusionen skall kunna anses strida mot det förvärvslåneförbud samt det förbud om att förvärva egna aktier som ställs upp i ABL. För att utröna de eventuella problem som kan uppstå vid en sådan fusion, krävs således en undersökning kring de skatte-, och redovisningsmässiga områden som berörs. Det faller sig således naturligt att utreda huruvida beskattning kan komma i fråga hos ett övertagande bolag, eller dess ägare, vid utgivande av ett fusionsvederlag bestående av de vid fusionen övertagna egna aktierna. Beskattningsunderlaget baseras på god redovisningssed och därmed redovisningen. Därför anser vi, för att åstadkomma en redovisningsmässig trygghet vid den omvända fusionen, att det bör påvisas vilken redovisningsmetod vid den omvända fusionen som skall användas. Vår utredning visar att den omvända fusionen är tillåten, samt att dotterbolaget aldrig innehar de aktier som utges som fusionsvederlag. Dock uppkommer vissa problem då rättsläget inte är helt klarlagt. Något som innebär att tolkningar av lagrum rörande fusioner uppräknade i ABL genomgående måste göras för att få fram ett resultat. En viktig tolkning är att uttrycket samtliga tillgångar inte innefattar aktier i det övertagande bolaget. Trots att många normgivare är aktiva inom redovisningen, har ingen av dessa gett någon rekommendation för redovisning av omvända fusioner. På grund av detta tolkar vi de källor vi har för att få fram det mest troliga tillvägagångssättet. Vi förespråkar att den så kallade koncernvärdemetoden tillämpas. Moderbolagets inkråm tas upp i dotterbolagets balans-, och resultaträkning. Detta ger en så rättvis redovisning som för tillfället är möjligt. Denna metod stöds också av IFRS 3. Eftersom rättsläget är osäkert och många luckor finns anser vi att det måste till ett införlivande i lagen av omvända fusioner. Vi trycker därmed på att den omvända fusionen skall regleras genom direktiv, rekommendation och råd. / A downstream merger is defined as a transaction where a parent company is merged into its subsidiary. The interior assets held by the parent company are transferred to the subsidiary in the merger, and the shares the parent company holds in the subsidiary is transferred to its owners as merger compensation. A downstream merger does not differ per definition from a merger where a subsidiary is merged into its parent company. Guidance and doctrine concerning this is scanty, therefore a speculation has arisen, whether the downstream merger complies with the prohibition to borrow money of a company to acquire it and the prohibition for a company to acquire its own shares, set up in the Swedish company act (ABL). To scrutinize the problems that can arise in such a merger, we need to study the tax- and accounting-topics that are concerned. It is therefore inherent to study if any taxation can arise for a t ransferringcompany, or its owners, when it gives a merger compensation consisting of the shares from the parent company. The taxation is based on the financial statements and a true and fair view. Thereby we need to show which accounting method to use. Our investigation shows that the downstream merger is in accordance with Swedish law, and that the parent company’s shares are not taken over by the subsidiary, though some problems arise since the rules of law are not clear. This means that interpretations of the company act generally has to be made to get a result. An important interpretation is that the expression “all their assets”, does not include shares in the overtaking company. Despite the fact that there are many active standard-setting powers, none of these has set any standard concerning downstream mergers. Also in this situation we have to interpret our sources to get the best procedure. We advocate a method where the values shown in the accounts of the group are used. With this the parent company’s interior assets is accounted for in the subsidiary’s balance sheet and income statement. This gives a balance sheet that is as neutral as possible. This method of accounting is also supported by IFRS3.

<p>En omvänd fusion definieras som det förfarande då ett moderbolag fusioneras in i sitt dotterbolag. Det eventuella inkråm som finns i moderbolaget tas vid fusionstillfället upp av dotterbolaget, medan de aktier moderbolaget innehar i dotterbolaget ges ut som fusionsvederlag till dess ägare. Per definition skiljer sig inte en omvänd fusion från en fusion där dotterbolaget absorberas in i sitt moderbolag. Dock är vägledning och litteratur kring området knapphändig vilket har lett till en spekulation om den omvända fusionen skall kunna anses strida mot det förvärvslåneförbud samt det förbud om att förvärva egna aktier som ställs upp i ABL. För att utröna de eventuella problem som kan uppstå vid en sådan fusion, krävs således en undersökning kring de skatte-, och redovisningsmässiga områden som berörs. Det faller sig således naturligt att utreda huruvida beskattning kan komma i fråga hos ett övertagande bolag, eller dess ägare, vid utgivande av ett fusionsvederlag bestående av de vid fusionen övertagna egna aktierna. Beskattningsunderlaget baseras på god redovisningssed och därmed redovisningen. Därför anser vi, för att åstadkomma en redovisningsmässig trygghet vid den omvända fusionen, att det bör påvisas vilken redovisningsmetod vid den omvända fusionen som skall användas.</p><p>Vår utredning visar att den omvända fusionen är tillåten, samt att dotterbolaget aldrig innehar de aktier som utges som fusionsvederlag. Dock uppkommer vissa problem då rättsläget inte är helt klarlagt. Något som innebär att tolkningar av lagrum rörande fusioner uppräknade i ABL genomgående måste göras för att få fram ett resultat. En viktig tolkning är att uttrycket samtliga tillgångar inte innefattar aktier i det övertagande bolaget.</p><p>Trots att många normgivare är aktiva inom redovisningen, har ingen av dessa gett någon rekommendation för redovisning av omvända fusioner. På grund av detta tolkar vi de källor vi har för att få fram det mest troliga tillvägagångssättet. Vi förespråkar att den så kallade koncernvärdemetoden tillämpas. Moderbolagets inkråm tas upp i dotterbolagets balans-, och resultaträkning. Detta ger en så rättvis redovisning som för tillfället är möjligt. Denna metod stöds också av IFRS 3. Eftersom rättsläget är osäkert och många luckor finns anser vi att det måste till ett införlivande i lagen av omvända fusioner. Vi trycker därmed på att den omvända fusionen skall regleras genom direktiv, rekommendation och råd.</p> / <p>A downstream merger is defined as a transaction where a parent company is merged into its subsidiary. The interior assets held by the parent company are transferred to the subsidiary in the merger, and the shares the parent company holds in the subsidiary is transferred to its owners as merger compensation. A downstream merger does not differ per definition from a merger where a subsidiary is merged into its parent company. Guidance and doctrine concerning this is scanty, therefore a speculation has arisen, whether the downstream merger complies with the prohibition to borrow money of a company to acquire it and the prohibition for a company to acquire its own shares, set up in the Swedish company act (ABL). To scrutinize the problems that can arise in such a merger, we need to study the tax- and accounting-topics that are concerned.</p><p>It is therefore inherent to study if any taxation can arise for a t ransferringcompany, or its owners, when it gives a merger compensation consisting of the shares from the parent company. The taxation is based on the financial statements and a true and fair view. Thereby we need to show which accounting method to use. Our investigation shows that the downstream merger is in accordance with Swedish law, and that the parent company’s shares are not taken over by the subsidiary, though some problems arise since the rules of law are not clear. This means that interpretations of the company act generally has to be made to get a result. An important interpretation is that the expression “all their assets”, does not include shares in the overtaking company.</p><p>Despite the fact that there are many active standard-setting powers, none of these has set any standard concerning downstream mergers. Also in this situation we have to interpret our sources to get the best procedure. We advocate a method where the values shown in the accounts of the group are used. With this the parent company’s interior assets is accounted for in the subsidiary’s balance sheet and income statement. This gives a balance sheet that is as neutral as possible. This method of accounting is also supported by IFRS3.</p>

A presente dissertação versa sobre limites para a intervenção do Estado na economia sob a forma empresarial e os controles a ela aplicáveis. Além de abordar o papel do Estado como acionista de sociedades privadas e a compatibilidade dessa forma de intervenção com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, promove-se uma releitura da doutrina e jurisprudência sobre as sociedades de economia mista e sobre as empresas públicas. Estuda-se as razões que levam o Estado a intervir na economia de uma maneira geral, seja de forma direta ou indireta, a partir das teorias econômicas normativas e descritivas sobre a intervenção estatal na economia. Discorre-se sobre os fundamentos constitucionais à intervenção do Estado na economia e os possíveis motivos para a criação de empresas estatais e participação minoritária em sociedades privadas, bem como sobre os condicionamentos impostos pelo princípio da livre iniciativa à intervenção do Estado na economia, em especial à luz da jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores. Foram abordados, ainda, os princípios da eficiência, da livre concorrência e da proporcionalidade, que também constituem fundamentos e limites gerais à intervenção do Estado na economia, além da necessidade de autorização legal. Além de apresentarmos um breve resumo da discussão histórica sobre a criação das empresas estatais no Brasil e os motivos para a escolha de um ou outro tipo de sociedade estatal, analisa-se o regime jurídico aplicável a essas entidades, à luz dos dispositivos constitucionais e da jurisprudência sobre o tema, incluindo-se o estudo do seu regime de pessoal, de bens, tributário, licitações, contratual, responsabilidade civil e falência. Estudaremos, ainda, as formas de controle incidentes sobre essas entidades. Por fim, a dissertação também abrange o estudo da intervenção do Estado como acionista minoritário em sociedades privadas, abordando os motivos para essa participação societária, bem como a natureza dessa intervenção. Trata-se de empresas controladas pela iniciativa privada, mas que têm algum grau de participação estatal em seu capital. São muitos os motivos que podem levar o Poder Público a participar sem poder de controle em empresas privadas. A participação minoritária pode visar a permitir um maior controle do Estado sobre a empresa participada, ou mesmo a tomada de controle gradual de determinada companhia, mas também pode constituir uma forma de parceria entre a iniciativa estatal e a privada, como forma mais eficiente de fomento de atividades consideradas de interesse público ou de compartilhamento de riscos e custos envolvidos em determinada atividade explorada pelo Poder Público e pela iniciativa privada. Aborda-se a relação das sociedades meramente participadas com a Administração pública, bem como os condicionamentos constitucionais à participação minoritária estatal sem controle em sociedades privadas (proporcionalidade, eficiência, necessidade de autorização legal, realização de procedimento licitatório com vista à escolha do parceiro privado, e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União). / This dissertation discusses the limits imposed to State intervention in the economy under corporate form and the respective control enforced. Further, to approach the role played by the State as shareholder on private Companies and the compatibility of this form of intervention with the Brazilian legal order, it promotes a doctrine and jurisprudential rereading over joint capital Companies and public capital Companies. It studies the reasons for a direct or indirect State intervention in the economy, from a normative and descriptive economic perspectives. It also analyses the constitutional fundaments for the economic intervention and possible reasons for the creation of state-owned enterprises and public-private companies without state control. It also approaches the principles of free market, efficiency, competition and proportionality, that constitute fundaments and general limits for the state interventionism on the market, besides the necessity of legal authorization. After a brief introduction about the historical discussion over Brazilian state owned enterprises, it analyzes the applicable law for those entities, according to constitutional jurisprudence over this theme, including the regime of labor, goods, taxes, bidding, contracts, liability and bankruptcy. It also encompasses the study of the forms of control falls on those entities. Finally, this dissertation also reaches the State as a minority shareholder on private Companies, landing reasons for this shareholder intervention. These companies, as not being controlled by the state partner, are not included in private and public joint stock companys definition given by the Decree-law n200/67. Its about corporations controlled by the private initiative, but with some degree of state participation on their capital. There are many reasons that may take the Public Power to participate without control power in private companies. The minority participation may aim to allow a bigger control by the State over the under-taking company, or even the gradual investiture of control on determined company, but may also constitute a way of partnership between public and private initiatives, as a more efficient way of promotion of activities considered of public interest or sharing risks and costs involved in certain activity explored by the Public Power and by the private initiative. This study gives special attention to the constitutional basis and limits for this kind of State intervention on the economy, as well as the incident control over it, with emphasis on the control done by the Brazilian Superior Audit Institution.

A presente dissertação versa sobre limites para a intervenção do Estado na economia sob a forma empresarial e os controles a ela aplicáveis. Além de abordar o papel do Estado como acionista de sociedades privadas e a compatibilidade dessa forma de intervenção com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, promove-se uma releitura da doutrina e jurisprudência sobre as sociedades de economia mista e sobre as empresas públicas. Estuda-se as razões que levam o Estado a intervir na economia de uma maneira geral, seja de forma direta ou indireta, a partir das teorias econômicas normativas e descritivas sobre a intervenção estatal na economia. Discorre-se sobre os fundamentos constitucionais à intervenção do Estado na economia e os possíveis motivos para a criação de empresas estatais e participação minoritária em sociedades privadas, bem como sobre os condicionamentos impostos pelo princípio da livre iniciativa à intervenção do Estado na economia, em especial à luz da jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores. Foram abordados, ainda, os princípios da eficiência, da livre concorrência e da proporcionalidade, que também constituem fundamentos e limites gerais à intervenção do Estado na economia, além da necessidade de autorização legal. Além de apresentarmos um breve resumo da discussão histórica sobre a criação das empresas estatais no Brasil e os motivos para a escolha de um ou outro tipo de sociedade estatal, analisa-se o regime jurídico aplicável a essas entidades, à luz dos dispositivos constitucionais e da jurisprudência sobre o tema, incluindo-se o estudo do seu regime de pessoal, de bens, tributário, licitações, contratual, responsabilidade civil e falência. Estudaremos, ainda, as formas de controle incidentes sobre essas entidades. Por fim, a dissertação também abrange o estudo da intervenção do Estado como acionista minoritário em sociedades privadas, abordando os motivos para essa participação societária, bem como a natureza dessa intervenção. Trata-se de empresas controladas pela iniciativa privada, mas que têm algum grau de participação estatal em seu capital. São muitos os motivos que podem levar o Poder Público a participar sem poder de controle em empresas privadas. A participação minoritária pode visar a permitir um maior controle do Estado sobre a empresa participada, ou mesmo a tomada de controle gradual de determinada companhia, mas também pode constituir uma forma de parceria entre a iniciativa estatal e a privada, como forma mais eficiente de fomento de atividades consideradas de interesse público ou de compartilhamento de riscos e custos envolvidos em determinada atividade explorada pelo Poder Público e pela iniciativa privada. Aborda-se a relação das sociedades meramente participadas com a Administração pública, bem como os condicionamentos constitucionais à participação minoritária estatal sem controle em sociedades privadas (proporcionalidade, eficiência, necessidade de autorização legal, realização de procedimento licitatório com vista à escolha do parceiro privado, e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União). / This dissertation discusses the limits imposed to State intervention in the economy under corporate form and the respective control enforced. Further, to approach the role played by the State as shareholder on private Companies and the compatibility of this form of intervention with the Brazilian legal order, it promotes a doctrine and jurisprudential rereading over joint capital Companies and public capital Companies. It studies the reasons for a direct or indirect State intervention in the economy, from a normative and descriptive economic perspectives. It also analyses the constitutional fundaments for the economic intervention and possible reasons for the creation of state-owned enterprises and public-private companies without state control. It also approaches the principles of free market, efficiency, competition and proportionality, that constitute fundaments and general limits for the state interventionism on the market, besides the necessity of legal authorization. After a brief introduction about the historical discussion over Brazilian state owned enterprises, it analyzes the applicable law for those entities, according to constitutional jurisprudence over this theme, including the regime of labor, goods, taxes, bidding, contracts, liability and bankruptcy. It also encompasses the study of the forms of control falls on those entities. Finally, this dissertation also reaches the State as a minority shareholder on private Companies, landing reasons for this shareholder intervention. These companies, as not being controlled by the state partner, are not included in private and public joint stock companys definition given by the Decree-law n200/67. Its about corporations controlled by the private initiative, but with some degree of state participation on their capital. There are many reasons that may take the Public Power to participate without control power in private companies. The minority participation may aim to allow a bigger control by the State over the under-taking company, or even the gradual investiture of control on determined company, but may also constitute a way of partnership between public and private initiatives, as a more efficient way of promotion of activities considered of public interest or sharing risks and costs involved in certain activity explored by the Public Power and by the private initiative. This study gives special attention to the constitutional basis and limits for this kind of State intervention on the economy, as well as the incident control over it, with emphasis on the control done by the Brazilian Superior Audit Institution.