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“Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?”: Theorizing the Relationship between History and Cultural MemoryLê Espiritu, Evyn 01 April 2013 (has links)
Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn? He was born in Rạch Giá, Việt Nam in 1938; served in the South Vietnamese army—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)—during the Second Indochina War; and was publicly executed by the Communist forces on August 14, 1975, after refusing to surrender. Beyond that, it depends whom you ask. To the current Communist government of Việt Nam, whose historical narrative of national unity against foreign invasion denies the legitimacy of South Vietnam, he is a political traitor. To the American state, who conceptualizes the Vietnam War as a struggle between the U.S. and the Communists, he is a forgotten subject. To patriotic South Vietnamese veterans in the diaspora, who push back against these state imposed narratives of “organized forgetting,”[1] he is hero. To Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, most of whom live in Việt Nam, he is a loved a one. To me, he is a grand-uncle. But I did not know of his fame—of his story—until I was twenty-one.
Researching Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, I grappled with the following questions: Who has the power to write history? How do stateless peoples archive their own history? What is the relationship between history and cultural memory? How is cultural memory embodied and enacted? How do cultural memory practices both challenge and constitute “official” history and nationalist discourse? What is the nature and use of a politics haunted by ghosts and oriented towards the past?
In the first body chapter, I draw from websites created by South Vietnamese veterans—what I call a “subaltern digital archive”—to recreate a biographical sketch of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. This sketch is interwoven with a narration of the geopolitical context—the different events that were happening in the Asian Pacific during Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s lifetime. I acknowledge that all of history is a construction—a process of editing and making sense of the past—and thus I construct a history that centers, rather than effaces, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. The other two body chapters examine the cultural memory production surrounding Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. One chapter highlights the ways in which South Vietnamese Americans engage in cultural memory practices, carving out a space in the present for the ghost of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. In these memory acts, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn becomes a symbol for the Republic of Vietnam—a way for veterans to resurrect the ghost of this now-defunct state. Although South Vietnamese Americans’ resistance to state imposed narratives is admirable, I acknowledge that not everyone has the privileged to be so vocal. Thus in the next chapter, I highlight the oral histories of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, most of whom live in Việt Nam, and thus are not allowed to publicly commemorate their loved one. These are stories that exist only in the space of memory—that are absent from both official state histories as well as the online timelines created by South Vietnamese American veterans—timelines that focus of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s military valor. Instead, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives offer an alternate version of heroism—a more feminine version of heroism that appreciates Colonel Cẩn’s virtues and domestic contributions as well as his masculine victories.
[1] Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 7.
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“Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?”: Theorizing the Relationship between History and Cultural MemoryLê Espiritu, Evyn 01 April 2013 (has links)
Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn? He was born in Rạch Giá, Việt Nam in 1938; served in the South Vietnamese army—the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)—during the Second Indochina War; and was publicly executed by the Communist forces on August 14, 1975, after refusing to surrender. Beyond that, it depends whom you ask. To the current Communist government of Việt Nam, whose historical narrative of national unity against foreign invasion denies the legitimacy of South Vietnam, he is a political traitor. To the American state, who conceptualizes the Vietnam War as a struggle between the U.S. and the Communists, he is a forgotten subject. To patriotic South Vietnamese veterans in the diaspora, who push back against these state imposed narratives of “organized forgetting,”[1] he is hero. To Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, most of whom live in Việt Nam, he is a loved a one. To me, he is a grand-uncle. But I did not know of his fame—of his story—until I was twenty-one.
Researching Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn, I grappled with the following questions: Who has the power to write history? How do stateless peoples archive their own history? What is the relationship between history and cultural memory? How is cultural memory embodied and enacted? How do cultural memory practices both challenge and constitute “official” history and nationalist discourse? What is the nature and use of a politics haunted by ghosts and oriented towards the past?
In the first body chapter, I draw from websites created by South Vietnamese veterans—what I call a “subaltern digital archive”—to recreate a biographical sketch of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. This sketch is interwoven with a narration of the geopolitical context—the different events that were happening in the Asian Pacific during Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s lifetime. I acknowledge that all of history is a construction—a process of editing and making sense of the past—and thus I construct a history that centers, rather than effaces, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. The other two body chapters examine the cultural memory production surrounding Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. One chapter highlights the ways in which South Vietnamese Americans engage in cultural memory practices, carving out a space in the present for the ghost of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn. In these memory acts, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn becomes a symbol for the Republic of Vietnam—a way for veterans to resurrect the ghost of this now-defunct state. Although South Vietnamese Americans’ resistance to state imposed narratives is admirable, I acknowledge that not everyone has the privileged to be so vocal. Thus in the next chapter, I highlight the oral histories of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s family members, most of whom live in Việt Nam, and thus are not allowed to publicly commemorate their loved one. These are stories that exist only in the space of memory—that are absent from both official state histories as well as the online timelines created by South Vietnamese American veterans—timelines that focus of Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s military valor. Instead, Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn’s relatives offer an alternate version of heroism—a more feminine version of heroism that appreciates Colonel Cẩn’s virtues and domestic contributions as well as his masculine victories.
[1] Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 7.
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Operations new life/arrivals U.S. national project to forget the Vietnam War /Sahara, Ayako. January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 7, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-100).
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"Little Consideration... to Preparing Vietnamese Forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare"? History, Organization, Training, and Combat Capability of the RVNAF, 1955-1963Nguyen, Triet M. 31 July 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.
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"Little Consideration... to Preparing Vietnamese Forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare"? History, Organization, Training, and Combat Capability of the RVNAF, 1955-1963Nguyen, Triet M. 31 July 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.
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The Limits of Fire Support: American Finances and Firepower Restraint during the Vietnam WarHawkins, John Michael 16 December 2013 (has links)
Excessive unobserved firepower expenditures by Allied forces during the Vietnam War defied the traditional counterinsurgency principle that population protection should be valued more than destruction of the enemy. Many historians have pointed to this discontinuity in their arguments, but none have examined the available firepower records in detail. This study compiles and analyzes available, artillery-related U.S. and Allied archival records to test historical assertions about the balance between conventional and counterinsurgent military strategy as it changed over time.
It finds that, between 1965 and 1970, the commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Generals William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams, shared significant continuity of strategic and tactical thought. Both commanders tolerated U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Allied unobserved firepower at levels inappropriate for counterinsurgency and both reduced Army harassment and interdiction fire (H&I) as a response to increasing budgetary pressure. Before 1968, the Army expended nearly 40 percent of artillery ammunition as H&I – a form of unobserved fire that sought merely to hinder enemy movement and to lower enemy morale, rather than to inflict any appreciable enemy casualties. To save money, Westmoreland reduced H&I, or “interdiction” after a semantic name change in February 1968, to just over 29 percent of ammunition expended in July 1968, the first full month of Abrams’ command. Abrams likewise pursued dollar savings with his “Five-by-Five Plan” of August 1968 that reduced Army artillery interdiction expenditures to nearly ten percent of ammunition by January 1969. Yet Abrams allowed Army interdiction to stabilize near this level until early 1970, when recurring financial pressure prompted him to virtually eliminate the practice. Meanwhile, Marines fired H&I at historically high rates into the final months of 1970 and Australian “Harassing Fire” surpassed Army and Marine Corps totals during the same period. South Vietnamese artillery also fired high rates of H&I, but Filipino and Thai artillery eschewed H&I in quiet areas of operation and Republic of Korea [ROK] forces abandoned H&I in late 1968 as a direct response to MACV’s budgetary pressure. Financial pressure, rather than strategic change, drove MACV’s unobserved firepower reductions during the Vietnam War.
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"Little Consideration... to Preparing Vietnamese Forces for Counterinsurgency Warfare"? History, Organization, Training, and Combat Capability of the RVNAF, 1955-1963Nguyen, Triet M. January 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.
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