Humans' capacity to attain knowledge is central to Spinoza's philosophy because, in part, knowing things enables humans to deal properly with their affects. But it is not just any sort of knowledge that humans should attain. There are different types of knowledge, but only two of them–rational and intuitive knowledge–enable humans who attain them to know things clearly. Because rational knowledge attends to universals whereas intuitive knowledge attends to particulars, intuitive knowledge is better than rational knowledge at enabling humans to deal with their affects. Most scholars recognize both the importance of knowledge to humans' dealing with their affects and the superiority of intuitive knowledge at enabling them to do this. But these points are particularly relevant to the affect that Spinoza calls "tristitia," which is usually translated as either "pain" or "sadness." I argue in this dissertation that attaining knowledge– especially intuitive knowledge–enables humans to deal properly with their experiences of pain. This ability that humans acquire by knowing things is what I call "active suffering." A person suffers passively when she merely reacts to her pain, in this way allowing an external force to control her. She suffers actively when she uses knowledge to respond to her pain, in this way being in control of herself. This knowledge she uses to deal actively with her pain bears a relation to Spinoza's theory of freedom, since it entails a realization that all events (such as a person's experience of pain) happen necessarily and that embracing this necessity is the same as being free.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía

In Payback: Debt and the Shadow Side of Wealth, Margaret Atwood examines different forms of debt and their various interrelations. Her work invites, but does not provide, an account or philosophy of debt or its deep implication in Christian beliefs such as sin, satisfaction, and atonement. This paper aims to bring to light insights into the link between debt and some aspects of Christian belief, especially the ideas of sin and satisfaction. It draws upon another unlikely source-the Ethics and political treatises of Spinoza. Spinoza’s view at least implies that the idea that sin (understood as the voluntary actions of a free agent) creates a ‘debt’ that is ‘paid’ by punishment is a potentially dangerous ‘fiction.' Spinoza intuits that the subsumption of the idea of debt into notions of retribution, vengeance, satisfaction, or atonement, are driven by ‘superstition,' envy, and hatred, and through imitating others’ hateful ideas of oneself. The idea of ‘debt’ is an artefact of civil authority that can only assume affective, normative purchase through internalizing fear of the implicit threat of punishment inherent in law. I will seek, finally, to suggest an implicit critique in Spinoza of the imaginative subsumption of debt into the space of religio.

<p> There are very few studies devoted specifically to the ethical teaching of Spinoza's Ethics. Instead, commentaters have focussed their attention mainly on the metaphysical and epistemological doctrines found chiefly in Parts I and II. Nevertheless, ethics was Spinoza's primary concern and the metaphysical and epistemological doctrines were intended by him to support and culminate in a practical doctrine of the best way of life. Despite its title, however, the Ethics is silent about what Spinoza means by ethics; indeed, nowhere in this work does he define or explain what ethics is. With this in mind, my chief objective will be to determine what Spinoza himself means by ethics and the significance of this for an understanding of both his ethics and his philosophy as a whole.<p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

In my thesis, I will argue that while at first glance Spinoza's system seems to conflict with itself and provide an explanation of the mind that can be more confusing than helpful, its aspect of panpsychism provides a sort of lifeline for understanding. Not only does Spinoza's cosmopsychism make his system cohesive, but it can also be independently motivated by ideas that are compatible with the more contemporary intuitions in philosophy of mind. I will explore the specific nature of this universal mentality, how Spinoza's particular genre of panpsychism relates to other theories of panpsychism, and how his conception of omnipresent mind affects our understanding of consciousness and its place in the world.

L'idée de transcendantal, selon son inventeur E. Kant, doit être conçue comme la condition pure et préalable de toute expérience possible. Mais, pour G. Deleuze, une telle idée de transcendantal implique deux défauts fondamentaux : d'une part, elle n'est pas susceptible de rendre compte de la singularité de l'expérience réelle et sensible ; d'autre part, elle présuppose illégitimement qu'il existe un rapport de ressemblance entre le transcendantal qui est la condition et l'empirique qui est le conditionné. Ayant l'ambition de renouveler l'idée de transcendantal en dépassant ces deux limites foncières du transcendantalisme kantien, Deleuze élabore son propre empirisme transcendantal qui détermine le principe générateur du sensible singulier comme la différence d'intensité et définit la condition transcendantale non-semblable comme la différence de virtualité. La différence d'intensité et la différence de virtualité sont respectivement les objets des deux parties de l'empirisme transcendantal qui sont l'esthétique impliquante et la dialectique problématique. De plus, la différence d'intensité et la différence de virtualité, toutes les deux sont les multiplicités qui s'opposent à la simplicité de l'essence de la métaphysique traditionnelle. Et la théorie deleuzienne de la multiplicité complètement différenciée et absolument infinie trouve son origine de la philosophie de Spinoza qui se déploie à travers trois moments qui sont la substance en tant que Multiplicité suprême, l'attribut en tant que multiplicité intensive, et le mode existant en tant que multiplicité extensive. / The idea of transcendental, according to its inventor I. Kant, should be conceived as the pure and priori condition of any possible experience. However, for G. Deleuze, such an idea of transcendental involves two fundamental flaws: on the one hand, it cannot explain the singularity of the real and sensible experience; on the other hand, it presupposes illegitimately that there exists a relation of resemblance between the transcendental qua condition and the empirical qua conditioned. Having the ambition of renewing the idea of transcendental by surpassing these two limits of the Kantian transcendentalism, Deleuze elaborates his own transcendental empiricism which determines the generic principal of singular sensible as the difference of intensity and defines the non-ressemblable transcendental condition as the difference of virtuality. The difference of intensity and the difference of virtuality are respectively the objects of the two parts of the transcendental empiricism that are the implicating aesthetics and the problematic dialectics. Furthermore, both the difference of intensity and the difference of virtuality are the multiplicities which oppose to the simplicity of the essence of the traditional metaphysics. And the Deleuzian theory of the completely differentiated and absolutely infinite multiplicity finds its origin in Spinoza's philosophy which extends itself through three moments that are the substance qua supreme Multiplicity, the attribute qua intensive multiplicity, and the existing mode qua extensive multiplicity.

Dans leurs lectures respectives de la critique marxienne de l’économie politique, Louis Althusser et Antonio Negri ont tous deux tenté de compléter cette critique par une lecture originale de la philosophie moderne de Baruch Spinoza. Notre thèse est que dans cette articulation des corpus de Marx et de Spinoza, il est possible de reconstruire une théorie originale de l’être social, ou en d’autres termes, une ontologie sociale hétérodoxe, dont la dominante peut-être caractérisée comme une prise de position « néo-spinoziste » en théorie critique. / In their respective readings of Marx’s critique of political economy, Louis Althusser and Antonio Negri have both attempted to complement this critique with an original reading of the Early Modern philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. Our claim is that in this articulation of Marx and Spinoza’s corpuses, one can reconstruct an original theory of social being, or in other words, a heterodox social ontology, whose dominant can be characterized as a “neo-Spinozist” position in critical theory.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo explorar os elementos constituintes da teoria sobre a afetividade humana conforme desenvolvida por Espinosa na Ética, analisando seus pressupostos metafísicos bem como a relação dos afetos com o intelecto humano. Serão enfatizadas as particularidades desta teoria mediante análise e exposição dos conceitos centrais que a compõem, identificando as características estruturais do universo conceitual espinosista. A análise crítica utilizada conta também com a avaliação sobre um dado posicionamento interpretativo que pretende destacar a existência de um enfraquecimento do naturalismo espinosista. Destacando-se assim a necessidade de negar certas noções sobre a afetividade humana que a colocam como sendo composta por traços contrários ao conatus. O propósito da dissertação repousa na busca por evidências onde a forma de naturalização, como encontrada na Ética, revele seu caráter constitutivo na teoria afetiva de Espinosa, destacando assim duas formas pelas quais o conceito de ação pode ser entendido nesta obra. Por fim, pretende-se determinar a origem das paixões humanas em Espinosa, expondo o interior da problemática por elas imposta à empreitada medular da Ética, em um tratamento onde a afetividade é vista como caráter fundamental da existência humana. / The aim of this study is to present the constituent elements of Spinoza's theory of human affects in Ethics, through a study of its metaphysical presuppositions and their involvement as a full part of the human intellect. The particularities of this theory will be emphasized and its central concepts will be analyzed in terms of the structural characteristics of Spinoza's conceptual framework. An interpretation that objects to Spinoza’s alleged naturalism will also be evaluated, arguing that some of our affective experiences cannot be explained by the concept of conatus, as is proven in the beginning of the third part of Ethics. Some evidence will be provided against this interpretation, and hence, in favor of Spinoza’s naturalism as it is found in Ethics, highlighting two ways in which the concept of action can be understood in this work. Finally, we aim to determine the origin of human passions, according to Spinoza, in order to elucidate the sense in which they are problematic from the perspective of ethical theory, whilst preserving the view that affectivity is a fundamental character of human existence.

[pt] Para Freud, o conceito de pulsão é um dos mais importantes da psicanálise e é imprescindível à psicologia. A despeito de sua relevância e centralidade conceituais, a obscuridade e a imprecisão que permeiam essa definição sempre levantaram questões controversas. A teoria das pulsões sofreu remanejamentos, acréscimos e correções ao longo da produção freudiana e ainda assim permaneceu, segundo o próprio autor, incompleta. Neste trabalho, a apresentação do conceito spinozano de potência serve como ponto de partida para a leitura e sistematização do conceito de pulsão em Freud. A persistência do antigo problema da relação entre a mente e o corpo explica, em parte, a retomada e o interesse atual pelo pensamento de Spinoza. Para o filósofo, mente e corpo são expressões de uma substância única – indivisíveis, por um lado, mas com causalidades próprias a cada um, por outro. Um dos conceitos chaves desta filosofia é o de potência, cuja utilização nesta pesquisa tem o intuito de oferecer uma leitura a mais para o conceito de pulsão, por excelência situado na fronteira entre o psíquico e o somático. O eixo de convergência entre os dois conceitos trabalhados reside principalmente no fato de se tratarem de forças constitutivas, que engendram o vivo e que apresentam variações intensivas. A partir dessa semelhança, são abordadas ainda as questões da impossibilidade de um governo soberano consciente sobre as causas inconscientes que movem o sujeito, e da produção do aparelho psíquico como um trabalho do corpo. / [en] According to Freud, the concept of drive is one of the most important of psychoanalysis and it is essential for psychology. Despite its conceptual relevance and centrality, the obscurity and vagueness that permeates this definition always raised controversial issues. The theory of drives suffered rearrangements, additions and corrections throughout the freudian production and still remained, according to the author, incomplete. In this work, the presentation of Spinoza’s concept of potency serves as a starting point for reading and systematization of Freud’s concept of drive. The persistence of the old problem concerning the relation between mind and body explains, partly, the current interest in the thought of Spinoza. For the philosopher, mind and body are expressions of a unique substance - indivisible, in one hand, but with proper causalities of each one, in the other. The potency, one of the key concepts in this philosophy, is used in this research with aim to provide an extra view of the drive’s concept, which definition is at the center of the mind-body problem. The axis of convergence between these two concepts mainly lies in the fact that are both constituent forces, that engender the human and that they present intensive variations. Starting from this similarity, other issues are also managed: the issue of lack of free will and the possibility of thinking the psychic apparatus as a work performed by the body.

In Zusammenhang mit der Heroisierung und Stilisierung Spinozas durch die Philosophen des deutschen Idealismus gewinnt ein altes Motiv der Spinozalektüre wieder an Kraft: es ist der im Begriff des "Spinozismus" mitschwingende Vorwurf des ,"Pantheismus". Noch im 18. Jahrhundert mit Atheismus weitgehend identisch, scheint der Begriff im 19. Jahrhundert eine bestimmte philosophische Radikalität zu bezeichnen. Keiner, der über Spinoza im 19. Jahrhundert schreibt, läßt ihn außer Betracht, viele verwenden ihn affirmativ, einige kritisch.