How does the killing or capture of rebel leaders affect the ends of conflict? Although decapitation scholars argue that it reduces the duration of conflict by disrupting rebel group organizational capacity, few have ever researched what effects decapitations could have on peace negotiations. After reviewing the literature within the field of decapitation and the ripeness theory of negotiation this paper tests the hypothesis that Successful decapitations are likely to increase the duration of time it takes for the government to agree on seeking a negotiated end to their conflict. This small n-study uses Mill´s method of disagreement to compare the civil wars in Colombia and El Salvador where decapitations did and did not take place respectively. Although a weak correlation exists the casual mechanism did not find support and therefor the hypothesis was rejected. There was however a relation between the presence of decapitation and government perception of stalemate that could affect how a conflict reaches the point of ripeness.

The negative effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been felt on a global scale.This makes it more relevant than it has been in a long time to understand how to achievesuccessful mediation and negotiation between Russia and post-soviet states. By examining theRusso-Georgian War of 2008 and the Russo-Ukrainian War that began in 2022, and thencomparing the two cases. This paper aims to investigate what factors contribute to successfulmediation in these two cases, and to hypothesise what obstacles exist for achieving successfulmediation in the war between Russia and Ukraine. The method used for this purpose isprocess-tracing, and the theoretical framework that has been used is Zartmans ripeness theoryand its formula for the concepts of mutually enticing opportunity, mutually hurting stalemate,ripe moment, and way out. The results of this study shows that a ripe moment existed in theconflict between Russia and Georgia despite the weak grounds for the existence of a mutuallyhurting stalemate. The study also concluded that the ceasefire agreement between the twocountries included a strong presence of one of the subcategories of the mutually enticingopportunity concept. Furthermore, the study also showed that a mutually hurting stalemate doesnot exist in the war between Russia and Ukraine, but simultaneously indicated strong grounds fora mutually hurting stalemate developing in the near future. Finally, the study identified fourdifferent obstacles for successful mediation between Russia and Ukraine. These related to theexistence of a mutually hurting stalemate, the motivations of the two conflict parties, and thechallenge of developing a mutually enticing opportunity.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

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教廷與中華民國之外交關係 （一九四二年至二○一二年）: 歷史、挑戰與前景 / Diplomatic relations between the Republic of China (ROC) and the Holy See were established in 1942. However, after a devastating civil war, the Chinese Communists gained control of Mainland China in 1949 and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. As a consequence, the Nationalist government of the ROC was forced to move from Nanking to Taipei, Taiwan. The Papal representative continued to remain at his post but the Communist government expelled him in 1951. In the following year, the Holy See decided to relocate its Apostolic Nunciature to Taipei and maintain its ties with the ROC. The tensions in the Strait between the two Chinese governments have put the Sino-Vatican relations to several tests. Indeed, the Vatican desires to normalize its relations with the PRC but is also confronted with two major issues imposed by Beijing which requests the direction of the Catholic Church in China and the end of the Holy See’s recognition of Taipei. It would strike a serious blow to Taipei if the Supreme government of the Catholic Church decides to break off diplomatic relations. It will also create a fragile position for Taiwan on the international diplomatic stage since the Holy See, at present, is the only European ally to officially recognize the ROC government. The relations of the Holy See with Taiwan are characterized by a mutually productive and cooperative partnership, especially in the promotion of human rights, culture, world peace and advocacy of religious freedom and alleviation of global poverty. This thesis aims to clarify the triangular situation between the Vatican, the ROC and the PRC and to show the challenges as well as the dilemmas the Holy See is confronted with in order to normalize its relations with China. First, this study explains the international status of the Holy See and its specific mission. Then, through a diachronic analysis, this thesis traces the evolution of Sino-Vatican relations to later on identify the difficulties the Holy See has to face across the Taiwan Strait. Then, it will analyze the efforts of Pope Benedict XVI to initiate a rapprochement with China and all the issues that have to be solved before negotiating any diplomatic ties. Based on this analysis, this thesis will show that the PRC and the Holy See are still at a stalemate and that the Vatican won’t move its Nunciature from Taipei in the foreseeable future.

Plus de 70 ans après la création de l'État d'Israël, un quart de siècle depuis la signature des accords d'Oslo, les espoirs de paix entre l'État d'Israël et les Palestiniens s’estompent. Le conflit israélo-palestinien ne s’en trouve pas forcément exacerbé, mais plutôt bien enlisé. Étonnamment, la sortie de cette impasse ne semble pas être une priorité pour les actuels leaders politiques des parties au conflit, le premier ministre israélien, Benyamin Netanyahou, et le président de l'Autorité palestinienne, Mahmoud Abbas. S’appuyant sur des travaux en analyse de politique étrangère argumentant que les conflits interétatiques peuvent s’avérer un moyen de diversion utilisé par les leaders politiques pour esquiver des problèmes de politique interne, ce mémoire se penche sur les raisons qui pourraient expliquer l’intérêt des leaders israéliens et palestiniens à maintenir le statu quo dans le conflit. La période observée s’étend de 2009 à 2019, soit une période à laquelle les deux hommes politiques se trouvent respectivement au pouvoir. Basé sur des travaux scientifiques, sur des analyses de think-tanks et sur de l’information collectée dans les médias israéliens et palestiniens, le mémoire s’appuie également sur une série d’entrevues menées entre décembre 2019 et mai 2020 en Israël et en Cisjordanie avec des universitaires, journalistes et décideurs tant israéliens que palestiniens. Question de recherche: « Si un règlement au conflit israélo-palestinien semble souhaitable, pourquoi les leaders israéliens et palestiniens ne font-ils pas davantage d’efforts pour résoudre le conflit? » / More than 70 years after the creation of the State of Israel and a quarter of a century since the signing of the Oslo Accords, hope for peace between the State of Israel and the Palestinians is fading. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not necessarily exacerbated, but rather immobilized. Surprisingly, ending this stalemate does not seem to be a priority for the current political leaders of the warring parties, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas. Building on foreign policy analyses which argue that inter-state conflicts may be a diversion used by political leaders to evade domestic issues, this research looks at the reasons that might explain the interest of both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders in maintaining the status quo of the conflict. The researched period extends from 2009 to 2019 – a period in which the two politicians are respectively in power. Based on scientific work, think-tanks analyses, and information collected in Israeli and Palestinian media, the work also draws on a series of interviews conducted between December 2019 and May 2020 in Israel and in the West Bank with Israeli and Palestinian scholars, journalists, and policy-makers. Research question: "If a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems desirable, why are Israeli and Palestinian leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas not making more efforts to resolve the conflict?"