O objetivo desta tese é discutir uma mudança diacrônica na introdução dos argumentos indiretos das sentenças ditransitivas do português brasileiro (PB). Desde o século XIX, o PB iniciou uma reanálise das estratégias possíveis para a introdução de seus objetos indiretos (OI), generalizando o uso da preposição lexical para em detrimento da preposição a, nos contextos de verbos ditransitivos de movimento, transferência e criação dar, enviar, preparar, respectivamente. Ao mesmo tempo em que essa mudança ocorreu, a expressão morfológica do argumento dativo representada pelo clítico dativo de terceira pessoa lhe(s) também foi substituída por outras estratégias, tais como objetos pronominais para / a ele(s)/ ela(s) (cf. Gomes, 2003; Freire, 2005; Torres Morais & Berlinck, 2006, 2007; Torres Morais & Salles 2010). Com o intuito de apresentar uma análise abrangente desse processo de mudança histórica no PB, analisei um corpus jornalístico composto por 223 primeiras capas da Folha de São Paulo escritas entre as décadas de 1920 e 2010, recolhidas do livro 90 anos de história nas capas mais importantes da Folha. Dessa forma, o PB não possui mais a expressão de caso dativo, nem através da preposição funcional a, nem do clítico dativo lhe(s), portanto assumo nesta tese que, diferentemente do PE, a introdução dos argumentos indiretos em PB não pode ser feita através de núcleos aplicativos. Assim sendo, o PB passou de um tipo de língua que apresentava evidência de Caso dativo para uma variante na qual apenas Caso oblíquo é atribuído ao OI por meio de preposições transitivas lexicais. Desse modo, proponho que os argumentos indiretos em PB são introduzidos por uma projeção pP (cf. Svenonius 2003, 2004, 2007; Wood 2012). / The aim of this paper is to discuss a diachronic change in the introduction of indirect arguments in Brazilian Portuguese (BP). Since the 19th century, BP has initiated a reanalysis of the possible strategies to head indirect objects (IO) by generalizing the use of the full preposition para to instead of the preposition a in ditransitive sentences with verbs of movement, transfer and creation as dar give, enviar send and preparar prepare, respectively. Alongside with the substitution of the prepositions stated above, the morphological notation of the dative argument - represented by the third person clitic lhe(s) has also been replaced by other strategies, such as 3rd person pronouns preceded by para - para ele(s)/ ela(s) to him/ her/ them (cf. Gomes, 2003; Freire,2005; Torres Morais & Berlinck, 2006, 2007; Torres Morais & Salles 2010). Hence, in order to make a more thorough analysis of this historical change in BP, I analyzed a corpus of first pages from a Brazilian newspaper, Folha de São Paulo collected in the monograph 90 anos de história nas capas mais importantes da Folha (90 years of History through the most important cover pages of Folha), which spans the 20th century with 223 covers from 1920 to 2010. Hence, as BP cannot express the dative case anymore, nor via a functional preposition, nor by its morphologic counterpart (the dative clitic lhe), it has also lost the possibility of introducing dative elements in its argument structure by an applicative head. Thus, BP has shifted from a type of language which has evidence for Case, as EP, to one where Case is assigned via lexical prepositions. Consequently, I assume that the indirect arguments in BP are always headed by a lexical preposition and are introduced in the argument structure via a p head (cf. Svenonius 2003, 2004, 2007 and Wood 2012).

A partir da premissa de que a ordem constitucional e, no âmbito desta, a ordem constitucional federativa constituem duas ordens jurídicas abertas e, nessa medida, tanto indeterminadas como incompletas, propõe-se um modelo decisório baseado no argumento por analogia como forma de fazer frente tanto ao problema das lacunas normativas como à questão das lacunas de indeterminação presentes naqueles dois sistemas jurídiconormativos, com vistas especialmente a resolver certas questões federativas sem solução constitucional evidente que ocupam o Supremo Tribunal Federal naquelas hipóteses em que normalmente a Corte invoca como postulado para a sua decisão um suposto princípio da simetria. / Based on the assumption that the constitutional order and the underlying federative constitutional order are two open legal orders and, in this sense, are indeterminate as well as incomplete, a decision matrix based on the argument by analogy is proposed. This approach would address the problem of the normative gaps and also the issue of the semantic gaps that exist in the above-mentioned legal systems. In particular, it would help in the resolution of specific federative issues devoid of a clear constitutional solution that are under review by the Brazilian Supreme Court and which are decided by the Court on the basis of a supposed symmetry principle.

Submitted by Fabiano Vassallo (fabianovassallo2127@gmail.com) on 2017-04-19T18:20:18Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO JOCINEIA ANDRADE RAMOS - FINAL.pdf: 882559 bytes, checksum: c7d285c8b8ab653650d3ff8f81ba4611 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Josimara Dias Brumatti (bcgdigital@ndc.uff.br) on 2017-05-03T19:01:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO JOCINEIA ANDRADE RAMOS - FINAL.pdf: 882559 bytes, checksum: c7d285c8b8ab653650d3ff8f81ba4611 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-03T19:01:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) DISSERTAÇÃO JOCINEIA ANDRADE RAMOS - FINAL.pdf: 882559 bytes, checksum: c7d285c8b8ab653650d3ff8f81ba4611 (MD5) / Este trabalho abarca o estudo da construção “subjetiva” com É + ADJETIVO ASSEVERATIVO (claro, óbvio, lógico e evidente). A pesquisa objetiva, sob a perspectiva funcionalista – com contribuições da Gramática Cognitiva –, analisar sintaticamente as construções subjetivas cujas orações matrizes selecionam um argumento na posição de sujeito oracional, verificando o papel semântico-discursivo dessas construções e a manifestação da (inter) subjetividade em seu uso. Primeiramente, observamos que a posição inicial quase fixa das orações matrizes e seu caráter semântico impessoal revelam a marca de (inter) subjetividade do falante. Tais orações são ainda detentoras de modalidade asseverativa, indicando o campo da máxima certeza do falante. Por meio da análise dos dados, verificamos que a modalidade pode apresentar-se em graus e que os fatores do entorno linguístico da construção influenciam diretamente na maior ou menor asserção da construção. Dessa maneira, observamos que as marcas de argumentação (contra-argumentação, estatísticas, justificativas e evidencialidade) tornam a construção mais asseverativa, enquanto as marcas de avaliação (julgamento e apreciação) tornam a construção menos assertiva. As construções abordadas podem, ainda, sofrer um processo de gramaticalização, passando a funcionar como advérbios sentenciais / This paper covers the study of subjective construction of "To be + asseverative adjective" (clear, obvious, logical, evident). The objective research, from a functionalist perspective with the contributions of cognitive grammar - syntactically analyzes the subjective constructions of which the matrix clauses select an argument in the subject position, verifying the semantic-discursive role of these constructions and the manifestation of (inter) subjectivity on its use. Firstly, we observe that the almost fixed initial position of the matrix clauses and its impersonal nature reveal the evidence of subjectivity from the speaker. Such clauses are also asseverative modality holders, showing the maximum certainty from the speaker. By data analysis we verified that the modality may be presented in degrees and that the surrounding factors of the construction directly influence on the greater or lower construction assertion. This way we observe that the argument evidences (counter-argument, statistics, justifications, evidentiality) make the construction more assertive, while the assessment evidences (judgment and appreciation) make the construction less assertive. The discussed constructions may also undergo a Grammaticalization process, working as sentential adverbs

Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka gymnasielärares inställning till grammatikundervisning. Metoderna som användes var fem kvalitativa intervjuer samt en liten enkätundersökning. Resultatet visar att lärarna tycker att språkriktighet är viktigare än grammatik i undervisningen. Samtliga ser grammatiken som ett redskap för att förbättra språket men ingen av dem vet hur de ska motivera sina elever till att lära sig den. Lärarnas åsikter skiljer sig åt gällande elevernas bristande kunskaper inom grammatik när de kommer från högstadiet. Det förekommer även olika åsikter kring hur viktigt det är att avsätta tid för grammatik i undervisningen samt huruvida grammatiken uttrycks i styrdokumenten.

The compositional relational programming (CRP) is a purely declarative and naturally compositional programming paradigm, but the low readability and some binding issues limit its use. The main purpose in this thesis is utilizing the common binding patterns identified from Prolog programs to improve current argument binding mechanism in CRP. In order to collect relevant Prolog rules and convert them to a measurable form, a data mining tool is built and applied to extract data from Prolog code repository. After the analysis, two kinds of patterns are identified respectively, based on the binding outside and inside the logical combination. Correspondingly, the projection operator make is optimized for highlighting the dummy argument; three extended and combinators are proposed to handle common binary combinations; the join operator is modified to efficiently and flexibly combine multiple predicates. In the future, the usability of those improved operators should be carefully evaluated.

La question de la philosophie et de la religion que nous allons traiter ici n’a cessé, depuis le troisième siècle de l’hégire jusqu’à nos jours, de préoccuper les chercheurs de tous bords et de toutes origines. Il ne fait aucun doute que celui qui entreprend une recherche dans ce domaine va devoir faire face à de vraies difficultés. En effet, faire la différence entre les philosophes, les religieux et les théologiens n’est pas chose aisée. La religion et la philosophie sont considérées comme des activités de réflexion qui tentent chacune, avec ardeur et selon sa méthode propre, d’atteindre la vérité. Elles aident l’individu à comprendre les énigmes de la vie, sa complexité, certains secrets qu’elle comporte, et à vivre une vie naturelle.La religion vise à aider ses adeptes à bénéficier de la vie, à composer avec la réalité et ses différents niveaux de complexité, à travers une incitation et de façon consciente. Elle les pousse aussi à considérer cette vie d’ici-bas comme une station avant une autre vie. Quant à la philosophie, elle cherche à aider ses partisans à jouir de la vie en les exhortant à faire face à leurs difficultés croissantes, à développer leurs capacités rationnelles et à pratiquer la contemplation consciente, de même que la réflexion scientifique. Elle ne considère pas que l’homme doive abandonner cette vie pour une vie future promise par la religion. Ainsi, la philosophie peut saisir la vie de manière générale et expliquer ses subtilités, mais elle ne peut pas inventer une société différente des autres, harmonieuse et régie par les mêmes valeurs. La religion se distingue en revanche par sa capacité à créer des sociétés cohérentes qui partagent les mêmes dogmes, les mêmes valeurs et les mêmes traditions qui garantissent l’unité. Ainsi, si la religion vise à établir des sociétés vertueuses, la philosophie n’a pas vocation à bâtir des sociétés se fondant ou non sur des valeurs. Cependant, ni la religion ni la philosophie ou toute autre idéologie sociale ou politique ne peuvent ne pas subir la logique de l’histoire et son évolution permanente. Nous avons étudié cette question chez deux philosophes du cinquième et du sixième siècle de l’hégire, à savoir al-Ghazâlî et Ibn Rushd, du fait que cette époque a été une période charnière dans l’histoire de la philosophie islamique al-Ghazâlî un jurisconsulte, un spécialiste des fondements du droit, un philosophe et un des plus célèbres penseurs de l’islam. Il a vécu dans la deuxième moitié du cinquième siècle de l’hégire c'est-à-dire, durant la période que les historiens qualifient de la troisième époque abbasside. Ibn Rushd, lui aussi, philosophe, médecin jurisconsulte et juge est né en 1126. En effet, il a passé son enfance et une partie de sa jeunesse sous le pouvoir des almoravides, et le reste de sa vie sous la dynastie des almohades. al-Ghazâlî et Ibn Rushd sont deux grandes écoles de pensée qui représentent l’Orient et le Maghreb. Ils ont beaucoup écrit, et grandement contribué à l’évolution de la philosophie islamique, et à la progression du dialogue entre la rationalité et la spiritualité. al-Ghazâlî a critiqué les philosophes sur leurs positions qui étaient en contradiction avec les fondements du dogme islamique, et cela sur des points précis qu’il a exposé dans son ouvrage Tahâfut al-falâsifa. Ces critiques portent, comme il l’indique lui-même, sur les fausses conclusions fondées sur des hypothèses justes et inversement sur des conclusions exactes à partir d’hypothèses fausses. Dans la pensée islamique, certains savants anciens avaient l’habitude de mettre des barrières entre la spiritualité d’al-Ghazâlî et la rationnalité d’Ibn Rushd.Toutefois, nous pensons que cette opposition n’a pas de raison d’être, d’autant plus qu’il est avéré que la rationalité d’Ibn Rushd et la spiritualité d’al-Ghazâlî sont nécessaires et fondamentales pour la recherche de la vérité d’ici bas et celle de l’au-delà. / The question of philosophy and religion we are treating here has continuously been preoccupying researchers from all sides and from all backgrounds, since the third century AH until now. There is no doubt that those who undertake research in this area will have to face real difficulties. Indeed, making the difference between the philosophers, the theologians and the religious people is not an easy task. Religion and philosophy are considered reflective activities that attempt both, in their own way, to reach the truth with enthusiasm. They help the individual to understand the riddles of life, its complexity, some secrets it has, and to live a natural life. Religion aims to help its followers to enjoy life, to deal with reality and its different levels of complexity, consciously and through an incentive. It also urges them to consider this earthly life as a station before another life. As for philosophy, it seeks to help its supporters to enjoy life, urging them to cope with their increasing difficulties, to develop their rational capacities and to practise conscious contemplation, as well as scientific thinking. It does not consider that man must give up this life for a future life promised by religion. Thus, philosophy can capture life in general and explain its subtleties, but it cannot invent a society different from others, harmonious and governed by the same values. Religion stands in contrast with its ability to create cohesive societies sharing the same dogma, the same values and the same traditions that ensure unity. Thus, if the religion aims to establish virtuous societies, philosophy is not intended to build societies based on values or not. However, neither religion nor philosophy or any other social or political ideology can avoid undergoing the logic of history and its constant evolution. We studied this question in two philosophers of the fifth and sixth century of the Hegira, namely Al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd, considering the fact that that era was a pivotal period in the history of Islamic philosophy.Al-Ghazâlî, a legal adviser, a specialist of the foundations of law, a philosopher and one of the most famous thinkers of Islam. He lived in the second half of the fifth century AH that i.e. during the period historians call the third Abbasid era. Ibn Rushd, a philosopher too, a physician and legal adviser was born in 1126. In fact, he spent his childhood and part of his youth in the power of the Almoravids and the rest of his life under the Almohad dynasty. Al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd are two major schools of thought that represent the East and the Maghreb. They wrote, and contributed a lot to the development of Islamic philosophy and the progression of the dialogue between rationality and spirituality. Al-Ghazâlî, on specific points outlined in his book al-Tahafutfalâsifa, criticized philosophers in their positions that were in contradiction with the fundamentals of Islamic dogma. As for Ibn Rushd, in his criticism addressed to Al-Ghazâlî, he limited himself to what the latter wrote in his book, and only on some issues related to his methodological approach. Ibn Rushd considers the title of Al-Ghazâlî al-Tahafutfalâsifa's work portative, in the sense that fo rAl-Ghazâlî, everything is not inconsistent in philosophers. In Islamic thought, some ancient scholars used to put barriers between Al-Ghazâlî's spirituality and Ibn Rushd's rationality. Some have argued that Al-Ghazâlî completed the Islamic philosophical reason, and others are defending the need to promote Ibn Rushd's rationality. However, we believe that the opposition has no reason to be, especially as it’s proven true that Ibn Rushd's spirituality and Al-Ghazâlî's rationality are necessary and fundamental to the pursuit of truth in this world and the hereafter.

Ce travail de recherche s’attache à spécifier la valeur argumentative de l’analogie à la lumière des recherches récentes sur l’analogie en prenant compte l’apport des sciences cognitives. Les liens de l’analogie avec une théorie plus générale de l’argumentation sont étudiés. Un corpus a été constitué, constituant une étude de cas, celui du discours de la critique cinématographique. Ce travail met en évidence le lien argumentatif entre analogie et connivence, phénomène qui a pu être observé dans diverses de ses manifestations et qui conduit à définir ce discours comme genre de discours dans la relation particulière qu’il instaure entre orateur et auditoire, entre critique et lecteur. Cette recherche a évolué vers ce qui semble être la caractéristique majeure de ce type de critiques : la recherche d'une forme ou d'une autre de connivence avec le lecteur. / This research aims to specify the argumentative value of analogy in light of recent research on analogy and its links with a more general theory of argumentation. A body has been formed, constituting a case study, the discourse of film criticism. This work highlights the argumentative relationship between analogy and collusion, a phenomenon that has been observed in a variety of its manifestations and leads to define this discourse as a kind of speech in the special relationship that develops between speaker and audience, between critical and reader. This research has evolved into what appears to be the major feature of this type of criticism: the search for a form or other of complicity with the reader.

In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content the truth of which does not require mathematical objects to exist. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more than we otherwise would be able to about, or yielding a greater understanding of, the physical world. Mathematical objects to not need to exist for mathematical language to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences and show that they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which shows that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show the hermeneutic fictionalist position that emerges is preferable to any alternative which interprets mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects.

In the absence of formal legal recognition, domestic partners (i.e. persons who cohabit outside of marriage) are required to regulate the consequences of their relationship by utilising alternative regulatory measures and remedies which are, for the most part, inadequate. The traditional justification used to differentiate between domestic partners and spouses is known by some as the “choice argument”. The choice argument is based on the rationale that persons who choose not to marry cannot claim spousal benefits. It understands choice narrowly as it only takes into account an objective legal impediment to marriage. As such, it has been the driving force behind the non-recognition of heterosexual domestic partnerships. Same-sex domestic partners have, however, been able to sidestep the choice argument considering that their sexual orientation has until recently been an objective legal impediment against marriage. According to the majority of legal commentators the enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 has removed the objective legal impediment against same-sex marriage. As such, they argue that the choice argument should now be applied to both heterosexual and same-sex domestic partners equally. The Constitutional Court has, however, held that unless the legislature intervened the benefits accrued by same-sex domestic partners prior to the enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 should be available to them exclusively. As the legislature has not yet done so, the legislature does not appear to view the choice argument as being equally applicable to heterosexual and same-sex couples. Taking into consideration the choice argument’s narrow understanding of choice, together with the possible unfair discrimination caused by its application, an alternative theoretical basis for the future recognition and regulation of domestic partnerships has to be found. Three possible solutions will be investigated in this study, namely, the model of contextualised choice, the function-over-form approach, and finally, the Smith model. Because of the invasive effect of the latter two approaches, the study advocates for the adoption of the model of contextualised choice. If adopted it will imply that the subjective considerations of domestic partners will be taken into account and they will be afforded a minimum degree of protection based on need. If this approach is adopted it must be determined to what extent it is supported in proposed legislation. Accordingly, it has to be investigated whether proposed legislation provides domestic partners with need-based claims while still upholding the established differences between domestic partnerships and formalised relationships. It is ultimately concluded that the proposed legislation will have the effect of blurring the differences insofar as registered domestic partnerships are concerned. The reason for this is that such a partnership comes into existence through a public expression of the partners’ commitment and, as such, does not really fall within the ambit of the definition of a domestic partnership in the narrow sense of the word. With regard to unregistered domestic partners, it is concluded that the proposed legislation goes too far in protecting unregistered partners’ proprietary rights (even if only on an ex post facto basis) as these claims are not based on need. As such, it is recommended that the proposed legislation be redrafted. If not redrafted the proposed legislation can possibly have the effect of not only infringing on the autonomy of one or both of the partners but also create a regulatory system which does not fully appreciate the differences between marriage and domestic partnerships. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / gm2015 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM / Unrestricted

O ensino de ciências por investigação representa um importante caminho para a promoção da alfabetização científica. A argumentação é uma das principais habilidades que podem ser desenvolvidas por meio dessa abordagem de ensino, e também aproximar os estudantes do processo da construção do conhecimento científico. O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de investigar relações entre diferentes graus de abertura de atividades investigativas e a qualidade de argumentos desenvolvidos ao longo desse processo. Ele foi realizado no contexto de Iniciação Científica Júnior, com estudantes do ensino fundamental II. Foram propostas duas aplicações das atividades investigativas: uma chamada de sequencial, respeitando a ordem sequencial proposta na literatura, dos graus 1 ao 3 de abertura; e outra, chamada de invertida, em que as atividades foram propostas dos graus 3 ao 1. As análises foram conduzidas com base em duas ferramentas: uma fundamentada no padrão argumentativo de Toulmin (TAP), proposta por Osborne, Erduran e Simon (2004), que caracteriza a qualidade estrutural dos argumentos, e outra, que avalia a qualidade do conhecimento científico utilizado para embasá-los, adaptada do trabalho de Zohar e Nemet (2002). As análises apontaram que os estudantes são capazes de desenvolver argumentos ao se envolverem em atividades investigativas. Porém, alguns fatores influenciaram na qualidade desses argumentos, como o grau de abertura das atividades e os comandos presentes em seus enunciados. Os argumentos construídos envolveram pelo menos dois componentes do TAP, principalmente nas atividades de maior grau de abertura. Porém, identificou-se a dificuldade de os estudantes introduzirem os seguintes elementos: qualificador e refutação. Nas duas formas de aplicação, tanto em relação à qualidade estrutural quanto à do conhecimento científico, os argumentos de mais qualidade foram identificados nas atividades de graus 2 e 3 de abertura, as quais fomentavam maior protagonismo dos estudantes. Logo, as atividades investigativas não proporcionam uma maior qualidade dos argumentos quando propostas de maneira gradual. Os resultados evidenciam a importância das atividades investigativas, em seus diferentes graus de abertura, como propostas que fomentam e qualificam a argumentação no ensino de ciências. / The inquiry-based science education represents an important way for the scientific literacy. Argumentation is one of the main skills that can be developed through this teaching approach, and also bring students closer to the process of building scientific knowledge. This study has the objective of investigating relations between different levels of inquiry activities and the quality of arguments developed throughout this process. It was carried out in the context of Scientific Initiation, with middle school students. Two methods of the investigative activities were proposed: one called \"sequential\", respecting the sequential order proposed in the literature, from levels 1 to 3; and the other, called \"reversed\", in which the activities were proposed from levels 3 to 1. The analyzes were conducted on the basis of two tools: one based on the Toulmin argumentative pattern (TAP), proposed by Osborne, Erduran and Simon (2004), that characterizes the structural quality of the arguments, and another, that evaluates the quality of the scientific knowledge used to support them, adapted from the work of Zohar and Nemet (2002). The analyzes pointed out that students are able to develop arguments by engaging in inquiry activities. However, some factors influenced the quality of these arguments, like the levels of inquiry and the commands present in their statements. The arguments developed by students involved at least two components of the TAP, mainly in the more open levels. However, we identified that it was difficult for students to introduce the elements qualifier and rebuttal. In both forms of application, in terms of structural quality and scientific knowledge, the highest quality arguments were identified in the levels 2 and 3 of inquiry, which provided more autonomy for the students. Therefore, inquiry activities do not provide a higher quality of arguments when proposed in a gradual manner. The results show the importance of inquiry based activities, in their different levels, to foment and qualify the argumentation in science education.