Magister Legum - LLM / With regard to the establishment of legislative frameworks for investigating and prosecuting genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes at both national and international level, a number of pertinent issues come up concerning the Court which should have primacy to deal with a particular case. States have had a variety of options at their disposal, such as complementarity, exclusivity, subsidiarity and concurrent jurisdiction principles. As a rule, these experiences find their limits in the full criminalisation of conduct that is also punishable before the international criminal tribunals under international law, ignoring the fact that international law does not provide definite guidance with respect to a number of questions in relation to interaction between national and international jurisdiction vis-à-vis the ‘core crimes.’ In addition,a considerable increase in the content of international law and divergences in various legal systems in criminal law, both general and special, since the end of World War II, influence the effective prosecution of ‘core crimes.’ Against this background; this work is organised into five chapters. Chapter one gives a general introduction and background to the study. Chapter two will set out the present international legal framework governing the prosecution of ‘core crimes’ in national courts and a description of the relevant practice in various states. Chapter three will examine critically the jurisdiction and overlaps of the international courts and ad hoc tribunals,along with the corresponding models of international criminal justice of exclusivity, subsidiarity, complimentarity and concurrent jurisdiction. Chapter four seeks to discuss the optimal relationship based on interactions between national and international jurisdictions. It will also include the merits and limits of both jurisdictions, basing on existing precedents and legislation.Finally, Chapter five contains a summary of conclusions drawn from the whole study and winds up with a set of recommendations.

La présente thèse porte sur l'activisme juridictionnel du Tribunal Fédéral suprême du Brésil dans le cadre de la constitution de 1988, c'est-à-dire sur les méthodes et les stratégies permettant à la Cour d'affirmer son rôle vis-à-vis du justiciable et des autres pouvoirs publics. L'activisme y est étudié en utilisant les concepts développés par la doctrine française, les plaçant dans le contexte de la séparation des pouvoirs consacrée par la constitution de 1988. D'un point de vue méthodologique, cette thèse s'appuie sur une démarche qualitative, et privilégie l'analyse des décisions judiciaires. Elle se compose de deux parties, découpées en huit chapitres totaux. La première partie se concentre sur les conditions permettant l'activisme du Tribunal fédéral suprême. Elle démontre que ce phénomène a eu lieu en raison de la convergence contextuelle de diverses circonstances historiques, institutionnelles, normatives et doctrinales, au nombre desquelles les plus importantes ont été des innovations apportées par la constitution de 1988 et l'adoption de nouvelles conceptions doctrinales de la fonction du juge constitutionnel dans l’État de droit. La deuxième partie identifie et analyse les manifestations concrètes de l'activisme de la Cour. Partant des motifs des décisions judiciaires, elle expose les orientations et l'évolution des politiques jurisprudentielles du Tribunal fédéral suprême, mises en perspective avec les compétences des autres institutions. La configuration normative et doctrinale de la séparation des pouvoirs au Brésil, comme l'identification des compétences attribuées au Tribunal suprême, servent ainsi d'instrument heuristique pour l'exposition du rhème abordé. / This dissertation joins a vibrant conversation in legal sciences about judicial activism and the place of supreme courts and constutional tribunal in today's representative democracies. It explores the judicial activism of the Brazilian Supreme court under the Constitution of 1988. Following the tradition of French law schools, the dissertation is divided two parts. The first part examines the scope and context of the Supreme court's activism. It posits that an expansion of the Court's role in relation to the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branches, starting ine the 1990's, originated in many historical, institutional, normative and doctrinal innovations that took place in Brazil after democratization in the 1980's. Notably, the promulgation of a democratic Constitution in 1988 and the adoption of new theoretical concepts regarding the role of the Judiciary in a democracy were key factors that allowed the court to rethink its place among Brazil'q supreme organs of State. The second part identifies ans examines the concrete manifestations of the Supreme Court's activism. Focusing on the qualitive analysis of the Court's decisions, the dissertation delineates the evolution of selected key themes in the Court's case law, considering it within the context of the competences conferred by the Constitution to other branches of government. Thus, the separation of powers as defined by the Constitution of 1988 is the heuristic device employed to organize the analysis and demonstrate the expansion of the Court into the domains of the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers.

"Rwanda was largely destroyed in 1994. Among an endless host of problems, highly complex questions and dilemmas of justice, unity, and reconciliation haunt Rwanda to this day. A basic question confronting Rwanda is how to deal with the legacy of the conflict that culminated in the genocide of the Tutsi and in the massacres of Hutu opponents of the genocide. The UN set up an International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, and Rwanda has its own courts. In both cases, the process of trying accused genocidaires is long, laborious, and frustrating. Only eight convictions have been handed down in Arusha after five years of work, while in Rwanda only some 3,000 cases have been disposed of. At least 120,000 detainees are in prisons around the country, the vast majority of whom are accused of participation in the genocide. At the present rate it is estimated that it will take anywhere between two and four centuries to try all those in detention. The Rwandese government has developed a new procedure called “gacaca,” lower-level tribunals that attempt to blend traditional and contemporary mechanisms to expedite the justice process in a way that promotes reconciliation. The impact of gacaca remains to be seen, and as a process, it certainly needs an evaluation or, at least, an attempt to evaluate its possible contribution to the perplexing questions of justice, unity and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide. This paper mainly aims to analyse the draft legislation on the gacaca jurisdictions. Further, this essay attempts to examine the impact of criminal trials in the aftermath of mass violence and genocide. Although conventional wisdom holds that criminal trials promote several goals, including uncovering the truth; avoiding collective accountability by individualising guilt; breaking cycle of impunity; deterring future war crimes; providing closure for the victims and fostering democratic institutions, little is known about the role that judicial intervention have in rebuilding societies. The present essay deals only with criminal trials. By definition, these are focused on the perpetrators of abuses and their allies. Although not examined in the essay, a comprehensive and holistic approach to dealing with a legacy of past atrocities should also include range of victim-focused efforts, such as programs for compensation and rehabilitation, the establishment of memorials, and the organisation of appropriate commemorations. The main sources of this study are textbooks, articles from journals and official documents of national and international bodies. Since this essay aims at evaluating the gacaca proposals, a great deal of attention is paid to the terms of the draft legislation. It is certainly premature to make an in-depth assessment of a draft law and the merits and flaws of the legal institution it is designed to set up. Only gradually and over a period of time can the gacaca become effective and credible. Further research aimed at gathering data through interviews, field observations, participant observation, study and analysis of the implementation can also illuminate experience in ways that analysis of published sources do not. A thorough and sound appraisal of this new institution must therefore wait some time. I shall nevertheless attempt in this essay to set out some initial and tentative comments on some of the salient traits of the future gacaca tribunals. This paper makes a preliminary “human rights impact assessment” of the implementation of the draft law establishing “gacaca jurisdictions”. The potential role of the new institution in rebuilding the Rwandese society is also discussed. Considering the many complex issues which still surround the process of justice in Rwanda six years after the genocide, as well as the continuing challenge to the judicial system in terms of the inadequacy of resources for dealing with such an enormous caseload, recommendations to help the process follow the analysis of the gacaca proposals (Chapter Three). To end impunity, it is necessary to respond in accordance with human rights law to the genocide and mass killings. Therefore, the starting point for our evaluation of the gacaca proposals will be an analysis of the proposals in human rights law. Does human rights law impose any affirmative duties to punish genocide and other mass killings that occurred in Rwanda? In addition, for the “gacaca jurisdictions” to be effective, they should not be viewed in isolation, as their performance will depend to a large extent on whether other judicial mechanisms and institutions are functioning properly. The relationships between the gacaca jurisdiction and other mechanisms are thus reviewed. In particular, the process of setting up the gacaca jurisdictions should include an evaluation of the genocide trials which have taken place to date both at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and in the domestic courts and apply the lessons learnt (Chapter Two). An evaluation of the potential contribution of the use of gacaca courts needs to be put into the broader context of the conflict in Rwanda. Thus, an analysis of the conflict in Rwanda is necessary to grasp the challenges facing the questions of justice and social reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda (Chapter One)." -- Introduction. / Prepared under the supervision of Professor Jeremy Sarkin, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2000. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

"As already mentioned, gauranteeing the right to a fair trial aims at protecting individuals from unlawful and arbitrary curtailment or deprivation of other basic rights and freedoms. The fundamental importance of the right to a fair trial is illustrated not only by international instruments and the extensive body of interpretation it has generated, but most recently, by a proposal to include it in the non-derogable rights stipulated in article 4(2) of the ICCPR. Standards for a fair trial may stem from binding obligations that are included in human rights treaties to which a state in examination is a party, but they may also be found in documents and practices which, though not binding, can be taken to express the direction in which the law is evolving. One of the problems is that law and human rights have been viewed largely as Western concepts, and are therefore defined and valued by Western criteria. This leads to a number of difficulties. First, there are many non-Western societies in which law and human rights thus defined, is impractical and mechanisms of protecting human rights in non-Western justice systems are not recognised as comparable counterparts to those in Western societies. Secondly, African states have failed to abide by their international fair trial obligations because, probably, these standards are impractical given the realities like poverty, illiteracy and strong cultural beliefs that characterise most African communities. As a result, the law applied by the Western style courts is felt to be so out of touch with the needs of most African communities, and coercion to resort to them amounts to denial of justice. This explains why communities, especially in the rural Africa, resort to indigenous African justice systems irrespective of state recognition or otherwise. Upon realisation that the Western style of justice did not respond to the prevailing post-genocide situation for example, the government of Rwanda re-established traditional courts to help deal with the crime of genocide and foster reconciliation. A Gacaca court is constituted of a panel of lay judges who coordinate a process in which genocide survivors and suspected perpetrators and the latter between themselves confront each other. They, and the community, participate by telling the truth of what happened; who did what during the genocide, and then the judges, based on the evidence given to them, decide on the case. These judges are elected by their respective communities for their integrity, not their learning. However, human rights organisations argue that Gacaca proceedings violate the accused persons's fair trial rights. They question among other things capacity of lay judges who make decisions in these courts, to conduct a fair trial. They also contend that Gacaca does not guarantee the right to be presumed innocent because it requires confessoins and that defendants are denied legal representation. In South Africa, traditional courts (konwn as chiefs' courts) exist. They have played a crucial role in dispensing justice in the indigenous communities and are prototypes of the kind of dispute resolution mechanisms desirable in a modern society. They apply 'people's law', which developed as a result of lack of legitimacy of the Western system of justice among the indigenous South Africans. However, critics see them as conservative and unable to render justice in the modern social, economic and political climate in South Africa today. As a result, Western style court proceedings that are conducted in foreign languages to indigenous communities, and thus have to rely on inaccurate and unreliable interpreters in addition to costs for legal counsels and subjection to very technical and formal procedures, are the only alternative in criminal matters. Briefly, the major problem is to ascertain whether indigenous African criminal justice systems do, or otherwise conform to fair trial standards. If they do not, according to who are they not fair? In other words, is there a universal measure of fairness or does appreciation depend on people's enviornment and their socio-economic backgrounds, in which case, the beneficiaries of indigenous African criminal justice systems should be the ones to appreciate its fairness?" -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004. / Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Nii Ashie Kotey at the Faculty of Law, University of Ghana / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Book Summary: Offering a unique resource for students, scholars, and citizens, this work fully explains all of the 21 enumerated powers of the U.S. Congress, from the "power of the purse" to the power to declare war. • Presents comprehensive coverage of all congressional powers through authoritative essays by recognized experts • Enables readers to connect the long-ago goals and perspectives of the Founding Fathers to current issues and controversies • Facilitates a fully contextualized understanding of the legislative power of Congress―and the extent and limitations of leverage that it can wield on domestic and foreign policy • Provides an accessible gateway to further, more detailed research of each of the individual congressional powers • Includes appendices containing the full texts of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union and the Constitution of the United States

La justice est rendue « au nom du peuple français », c’est ce qu’on peut lire en première page des décisions rendues par les juridictions françaises. Tout citoyen peut être conduit à l’œuvre de justice. Néanmoins, juger requiert des capacités et aptitudes propres aux magistrats professionnels en raison de leur formation. Pour autant, en France, le système juridique fait participer à la justice des citoyens peu accoutumés à ce qui peut sembler à un véritable métier. Ces citoyens non professionnels endossent la fonction de juge et le pouvoir de juger à leur prestation de serment à l’instar des juges de carrière. Ces juges, jurés ou juges occasionnels offrent-ils une garantie de bien juger ? Pour les premiers, les jurés, recrutés ponctuellement par tirage au sort le temps d’une session d’assises selon une obligation civique, il s’agit de « citoyens juges » qui découvrent la justice criminelle le jour de leur recrutement. Si le bon sens est utile au jugement criminel, il est loin d’être suffisant. Pour les seconds, les juges occasionnels recrutés partiellement le temps d’un mandat, il s’agit de « juges citoyens », considérés comme plus proches du « terrain », plus habitués aux usages d’une profession. Membres des tribunaux de commerce, juges de proximité ou conseillers prud’hommes statuent ainsi sans l’assistance d’un juge professionnel. Leur mode de recrutement garantit-il leur compétence ? La reconnaissance de l’expérience juridique traduit-elle l’aptitude à juger ? A l’inverse que vaut l’expérience, la pratique dans un secteur d’activité au regard d’un droit de plus en plus légiféré, réglementé, qui exige, au quotidien, de solides connaissances juridiques ? / On the front page of the decisions made by the French courts can be read « Justice is given in the name of the French people ». Every citizen may be brought to work for the justice. Nevertheless, judging requires professional skills and abilities that magistrates have acquired through their training. In France, the legal system however, uses citizens that are little accustomed to what may be considered as a real profession. These non-professional citizens take on the role of the judge and the right to judge by giving sermon in the same manner as a career judge. Do these judges, jurors or occasional judges offer the same guarantee of good judgement? First, the jurors, recruited punctually by random selection for a session of assizes according to a civic obligation, are “citizen judges” who only discover criminal justice on the day of their recruitment. If common sense is useful to criminal judgment, it is far from being sufficient. Second, occasional judges recruited partly during a mandate, are “citizen judges”, considered to be closer to be closer to their specific “field” and more accustomed to the uses of a particular profession. Members of commercial tribunals, local judges of industrial tribunal advisors decide without the assistance of a professional judge. Do their recruitment methods guarantee their competence? Does the recognition of legal experience reflect the ability to judge? Conversely, what does this experience worth, when practicing in a sector of activity with regard to an increasingly legislated, regulated law, which requires a strong legal knowledge on a daily basi?

Thesis (LLM )--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In the field of administrative law, the judiciary has traditionally exercised control over the administrative actions of the executive through judicial review. However, judicial review is neither the most effective nor the most efficient primary control mechanism for systemic administrative improvement. In a country faced with a task of =transformative constitutionalism‘, and hindered with scarce resources, there is good cause to limit judicial intervention as the first response to administrative disputes. The major theme of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility of administrative tribunal reform in South Africa, using two other commonwealth countries, Australia and England, as a basis for comparison. Australia and England have been chosen for comparison because they share similar administrative law traditions and they can provide working models of coherent tribunal structures. The Australian tribunal system is well-established and consists of tribunals which fall under the control of the executive, while tribunals in England have recently undergone a significant transformation, and are now part of the independent judiciary. The South African government currently spends, indeed wastes, a significant amount of money on administrative law litigation. Due to the limitations of judicial review, even after the high costs of litigation and the long duration of court proceedings, the results achieved may still be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, judicial review is unsuited to giving effect to systemic administrative change and the improvement of initial decision-making. Australia and England have begun to move away from the traditional court model for the resolution of administrative disputes. Both have indicated a preference for the important role of tribunals in the administration of disputes. Tribunals have been shown to offer the advantage of being speedier, cheaper, more efficient, more participatory and more accessible than traditional courts, which contributes to tribunals being a more available resource for lay people or people without sophisticated legal knowledge, and provides wider access to remedies than courts. The English and Australian models indicate a few important trends which need to be applied universally to ensure a sustained tribunal reform and a system which provides a higher level of administrative redress than the over-burdened and institutionally inept courts currently do. These include co-operation among government departments and tribunals; open and accountable systemic change; the need for supervision and evaluation of the whole of administrative law by an independent and competent body; and ultimately a focus on the needs of users of state services. At the same time, there are arguments against administrative tribunal reform. These include the costs of reform; the ways to establish tribunals; and the level of independence shown by the tribunals. These arguments are especially relevant in the South African context, where the government faces huge social problems and a scarcity of resources. However, after an analysis of the valuable characteristics of tribunals and the role that they serve in the day to day administration of justice, it is difficult to see how these objections to tribunals can outweigh their potential importance in the administrative justice system. The need for sustained systematic reform in South Africa is one that cannot be ignored. Tribunals offer a valuable alternative to judicial review for the resolution of administrative disputes. Furthermore, the tribunal systems of Australia and England demonstrate how the effective creation and continued use of comprehensive tribunal structures contributes firstly to cost reduction and secondly to ease the administrative burden on courts who are not suited to cure large-scale administrative error. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die administratiefreg oefen die regsprekende gesag tradisioneel beheer uit oor die uitvoerende gesag deur middel van geregtelike hersiening. Geregtelike hersiening is egter nie die mees doeltreffende of effektiewe primêre beheermeganisme om sistemiese administratiewe verbetering teweeg te bring nie. In 'n land met die uitdagings van 'transformatiewe konstitusionalisme‘ en skaars hulpbronne, kan 'n goeie argument gevoer word dat geregtelike inmenging as die eerste antwoord op administratiewe dispute beperk moet word. Die deurlopende tema van hierdie tesis is 'n ondersoek na die lewensvatbaarheid van hervorming van administratiewe tribunale in Suid-Afrika, in vergelyking met die posisie in Australië en Engeland, waarvan beide ook, tesame met Suid-Afrika, deel vorm van die Statebond. Hierdie lande is gekies vir regsvergelykende studie aangesien hulle 'n administratiefregtelike tradisie met Suid-Afrika deel en beide werkende modelle van duidelike tribunale strukture daarstel. Die Australiese tribunale stelsel is goed gevestig en bestaan uit tribunale onder die beheer van die uitvoerende gesag, terwyl die tribunale stelsel in Engeland onlangs 'n beduidende hervorming ondergaan het en nou deel van die onafhanklike regsprekende gesag is. Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering mors aansienlike hoeveelhede geld op administratiefregtelike litigasie. Selfs na hoë koste en lang vertragings van litigasie mag die resultate steeds onbevredigend wees as gevolg van die beperkings inherent aan geregtelike hersiening. Tesame met hierdie oorwegings is geregtelike hersiening ook nie gerig op sistemiese administratiewe verandering en verbetering van aanvanklike besluitneming nie. Australië en Engeland het onlangs begin wegbeweeg van die tradisionele hof-gebaseerde model vir die oplossing van administratiewe dispute. Beide toon 'n voorkeur vir die belangrike rol wat tribunale in die administrasie van dispute kan speel Tribunale bied die bewese voordele om vinniger, goedkoper, meer doeltreffend, meer deelnemend en meer toeganklik te wees as tradisionele howe, sodat tribunale 'n meer beskikbare hulpbron is vir leke, oftewel, persone sonder gesofistikeerde regskennis en dus beter toegang tot remedies as tradisionele howe verskaf. Die Engelse en Australiese modelle dui op enkele belangrike tendense wat universeel toegepas moet word om volgehoue tribunale hervorming te verseker en om =n stelsel te skep wat 'n hoër vlak van administratiewe geregtigheid daarstel as wat oorlaaide en institusioneel onbekwame howe kan. Dit verwys bepaald na samewerking tussen staatsdepartemente en tibunale; deursigtige en verantwoordbare sistemiese veranderinge; die behoefte aan toesighouding en evaluasie van die hele administratiefreg deur 'n onafhanklike, bevoegde liggaam; en uiteindelik 'n fokus op die behoeftes van die gebruikers van staatsdienste. Daar is egter terselfdertyd ook argumente teen administratiewe tribunale hervorming. Hierdie argumente sluit in die koste van hervorming; die wyses waarop tribunale gevestig word; en die vlak van onafhanklikheid voorgehou deur tribunale. Hierdie argumente is veral relevant in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks waar die regering voor groot sosiale probleme te staan kom en daarby ingesluit, 'n tekort aan hulpbronne ook moet hanteer. Daarenteen is dit moeilik om in te sien hoe enige teenkanting en teenargumente met betrekking tot die vestiging van administratiewe tribunale swaarder kan weeg as die potensiële belang van sulke tribunale in die administratiewe geregtigheidstelsel, veral nadat 'n analise van die waardevolle karaktereienskappe van tribunale en die rol wat hulle speel in die dag-tot-dag administrasie van geregtigheid onderneem is. Die behoefte aan volhoubare sistemiese hervorming in Suid-Afrika kan nie geïgnoreer word nie. Tribunale bied 'n waardevolle alternatief tot geregtelike hersiening met die oog op die oplossing van administratiewe dispute. Tesame hiermee demonstreer die tribunale stelsels in Australië en Engeland hoe die doeltreffende vestiging en deurlopende gebruik van omvattende tribunale bydra, eerstens om kostes verbonde aan die oplossing van administratiewe dispute te verlaag en tweedens, om die administratiewe las op die howe, wat nie aangelê is daarvoor om grootskaalse administratiewe foute reg te stel nie, te verlig.

Cette étude aborde les questionnements relatifs à l’homologation et à l’entérinement d’une entente de règlement amiable conclue dans le cadre des processus de médiation ou de conciliation administrative. L’étude vise d’abord à clarifier les concepts en définissant précisément la terminologie privilégiée. La mise en œuvre des demandes est ensuite analysée au regard de la compétence des tribunaux administratifs et de celle des tribunaux de droit commun à l’égard d’un accord de conciliation ou d’une transaction conclu dans le cadre d’un litige administratif. Les formalités relatives à la présentation de la demande sont exposées. Les tests de conformité à la loi et à l’ordre public sont ensuite circonscrits pour terminer par un examen des conséquences de l’homologation ou de l’entérinement de l’entente sur les recours ultérieurs possibles tels que le recours en révision administrative ou le recours en révision judiciaire. / This study examines the homologation or approval of a settlement agreement reached under administrative mediation or conciliation. The first part aims to clarify the concepts by defining the preferred terminology in a comprehensive way. The implementation of these applications is then analyzed according to the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals and courts of law with respect to a conciliation agreement or a transaction concluded under administrative proceedings. The formalities relating to the submission of the demand are exposed. The tests for compliance with the law and with public order are then circumscribed to complete with an examination of the consequences of the agreement on eventual remedies, as administrative review or judicial review.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Das Verfahren der internationalen ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und für Ruanda kann als die erste völkerstrafverfahrensrechtliche Ordnung betrachtet werden. Von den Richtern selbst ausgearbeitet und entwickelt, orientierte sich dieses Verfahren ursprünglich sehr an dem angloamerikanischen Strafprozessmodell. Mangels geeigneter Präzedenzfälle und angesichts der vielen Analogiefaktoren zwischen dem innerstaatlichen Strafverfahrensrecht und dem Völkerstrafverfahrensrecht haben sich die Richter -insbesondere während der ersten Tätigkeitsjahre ihrer Gerichtshöfe- öfter auf innerstaatliche Rechtspraxen bei der Anwendung ihrer Verfahrens- und Beweisordnungen bezogen. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht diese Bezugnahme auf innerstaatliches Recht anhand der Rechtsprechung beider ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe im Bereich des Beweisrechts. Die Gründe und Formen der Bezugnahme auf innerstaatliches Recht werden zuerst dargestellt und anschließend analysiert. Aus der Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung ergibt sich eine insgesamt unsystematische und pragmatische Nutzung des innerstaatlichen Rechts, welches meistens dazu dient, die für den Einzelfall geeignetste Lösung zu liefern und/ oder die von den Richtern getroffene Entscheidung zu legitimieren. Solch eine Vorgehensweise birgt zweierlei Probleme: Ein Legitimitätsproblem angesichts der Internationalität des Verfahrens der ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe und ein Problem hinsichtlich der Vorhersehbarkeit der Anwendung ihrer Verfahrens- und Beweisordnungen. Abschließend widmet sich diese Arbeit dementsprechend der Frage nach einer methodischen Herangehensweise, welche zu mehr Legitimität und Vorhersehbarkeit bei der Anwendung der Verfahrensregeln internationaler Strafgerichtshöfe beitragen könnte, und dies abgesehen davon, ob sich die Richter dabei auf externe normative Räume, wie diejenigen innerstaatlicher Rechtsordnungen, beziehen oder nicht. / The procedure of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda can be regarded as the first set of rules of international criminal procedure. This procedural law, constructed and developed by the judges themselves was primary inspired by the common law approach to criminal proceedings. In the absence of precedents, and given the numerous potential analogies between domestic criminal procedure and international criminal procedure, the judges often referred to domestic legal practices - particularly during the ad hoc tribunals’ first years of activity - when applying rules of procedure and evidence. The present work investigates this reference to domestic law by examining the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence regarding the law of evidence. The reasons for and forms of the reference to domestic law are first presented and then analysed. This study concludes that, on the whole, domestic law is referred to in an unsystematic and pragmatic manner: It is mostly used by the judges in order to provide the most suitable solution for the particular case before them and/ or to legitimate a decision they have already made on the basis of their own procedural rules. Such an approach raises two problems: a legitimacy deficit in regard to the internationality of the ad hoc tribunals’ procedure and a lack of predictability in the application of the rules of procedure and evidence. This study deals therefore finally with the possibility of a methodical approach, which could contribute to more predictability and legitimacy in the application of the procedural rules of international criminal tribunals, regardless of whether or not the judges refer to external normative systems, such as domestic legal orders.