CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Sabemos que o problema do livre-arbÃtrio à tratado, pelo menos, desde Epiteto. A liberdade de escolha que âjulgamosâ possuir à algo que supomos ser inerente à natureza humana. AlÃm disso, parece que sà poderemos ser pessoalmente responsÃveis por nossos atos se os realizarmos livremente. Acreditamos que ser responsÃveis por nossas aÃÃes e escolhas à o que nos torna diferentes dos outros animais. No entanto, apesar de todas essas nossas intuiÃÃes, nÃo sà algumas correntes filosÃficas defendem que nÃo somos livres, mas tambÃm a ciÃncia parece nos dizer que somos sistemas ou mÃquinas determinÃsticas. Os resultados de vÃrios experimentos neurocientÃficos tÃm sugerido que nÃo escolhemos conscientemente fazer o que fazemos. E, posto que a noÃÃo de livre-arbÃtrio tem como prÃ-requisito bÃsico a noÃÃo de consciÃncia, entÃo parece que hà um conflito entre nossas intuiÃÃes cotidianas e as conclusÃes cientÃficas e filosÃficas. O objetivo central desta dissertaÃÃo serÃ, nÃo somente analisar a coerÃncia conceitual das diversas teses sobre o livre-arbÃtrio que surgiram na GrÃcia clÃssica e nos estudos neurocientÃficos atuais, mas tambÃm mostrar que as explicaÃÃes que tentam conectar os fenÃmenos subjetivos e objetivos relativos ao problema nos levaram, ao menos, atà o presente momento, a uma lacuna explicativa. Isto Ã, uma lacuna na explicaÃÃo sobre como podemos conectar nossas intuiÃÃes subjetivas sobre como somos os autores de nossas aÃÃes e as explicaÃÃes objetivas sobre como nosso corpo executa tais aÃÃes.

Durante o ano de 1781 Kant lança a obra Crítica da razão pura, a qual é exclusivamente voltada para o problema do conhecimento humano, mais precisamente, sua origem, seu limite, sua organização e sua validade perante a realidade empírica. Contudo, foi a questão quanto a origem do conhecimento que se tornou o foco das atenções e discussões durante todo o período do idealismo alemão, visto que tal questão trazia a luz o conceito de coisa em si. O problema deste conceito era saber qual deveria ser seu lugar em relação ao conhecimento, isto é, se a coisa em si era ou não a causa do conhecimento empírico e quais as consequências e soluções diante a escolha de alguma destas posições. Desse modo, durante o idealismo alemão surgiram vários sistemas que ora tentavam resolver ora atacar, com argumentos céticos, o problema da coisa em si kantiana. Dentre estes sistemas, como defensor da doutrina transcendental, destaca-se o de Arthur Schopenhauer, que tanto dá uma denominação metafísica-imanente para a coisa em si, Vontade, quanto soluciona o problema da origem do conhecimento empírico sem o uso de tal conceito problemático. Sendo assim, nossa dissertação tem como objetivo discutir a solução e o significado do conceito de coisa em si encontrado por Schopenhauer em seu livro O mundo como vontade e como representação. / During all the year of 1781, Kant releases his Critique of Pure Reason, which is exclusively devoted to the problem of human knowledge, more precisely his origins, his limits, his organization and his validity face off the empirical reality. Although, the question around the knowledge origins has become the focus of lectures and discussions during all the period of German idealism because it brings out the thing-in-itself concept. That concepts problem is to know which should be his role concerning knowledge, or if thin-in-itself was the cause of empirical knowledge or not, and which consequences and solutions were implicated in this positions. With that, during the period of German idealism several philosophical systems began to exist, attempting to solve or to attack, using skeptical argumentations, Kantians thing-in-itself problem. Among these systems, as a defender of transcendental philosophy doctrine, Arthur Schopenhauers system gains force, as an author of the denomination metaphysical-immanent to the thing-in-itself (the Will), and both as the proposer of a solution to the problem of the empirical knowledge without the using of this problematical concept. Therefore, our master thesis has, as her goal, to discuss solution and signification of thing-in-itself inner concept, founded by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation.

Submitted by Erika Demachki (erikademachki@gmail.com) on 2014-10-17T20:02:04Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Kárita Paul de Melo Pedra - 2014.pdf: 942563 bytes, checksum: 9b61aa9e003d47b05a510eb7a41571de (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Jaqueline Silva (jtas29@gmail.com) on 2014-10-17T20:27:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Kárita Paul de Melo Pedra - 2014.pdf: 942563 bytes, checksum: 9b61aa9e003d47b05a510eb7a41571de (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-17T20:27:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Kárita Paul de Melo Pedra - 2014.pdf: 942563 bytes, checksum: 9b61aa9e003d47b05a510eb7a41571de (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-26 / This master thesis will be an investigation about the concept of freedom present in the Introduction to Hegel 's Philosophy of Right. Our aim will be to focus on a detailed analysis of the moments (Stufen) constituents of free will, noting that the speculative description exposed by Hegel in the Introduction, can be understood as the basis upon which is built the whole system of Right. The philosophical science of Right is grounded in a conception of freedom different from the will of the modern tradition of natural right, the idea of wills that gather a contract or even the subjectivist conception of freedom. This ground seems to point toward a reflexivity of free will, that is, in the conception of a rational free will that realizes iteself only by being free in and for itself, self-determining free will, which is the form and contente of itself. It remains to raise the question of how can the integration of form and content of arbitrium (insufficient level of the will) can be conceived as self-determination in and of itself. Thus, we will try to understand what the reflexivity of free will consists in, how it relates to and addresses the three moments of freedom and how it gives rise to the system of right. / Este estudo pretende ser uma investigação acerca do conceito de liberdade presente na Introdução à Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Nosso intuito será focar numa análise pormenorizada dos momentos (Stufen) constituintes da vontade livre, tendo em vista que a descrição especulativa apresentada por Hegel na Introdução pode ser compreendida como a base sob a qual está construída todo o sistema do Direito. A ciência filosófica do direito tem seu fundamento numa concepção de liberdade da vontade distinta da tradição moderna, do direito natural, da ideia de vontades que se reúnem num contrato ou mesmo da concepção subjetivista da liberdade. Este fundamento parece apontar na direção de uma reflexividade da vontade livre, isto é, na concepção de uma vontade livre racional que só se efetua na medida em que é livre em si e para si, uma vontade livre autodeterminante, que é a forma e o conteúdo de si mesma. Cabe com isso levantar a questão de como é possível a integração da forma e do conteúdo do arbítrio (momento insuficiente da vontade livre) para que a vontade possa ser concebida como autodeterminação livre em si e para si. Sendo assim, buscaremos entender em que consiste a reflexividade da vontade, como ela se relaciona e engloba os três momentos da liberdade e como ela dá origem ao sistema do direito.

A pesquisa busca apontar fundamentos da teoria da ação em Max Weber a partir da formação da vontade na filosofia prática de Immanuel Kant. Verifica-se em que medida a sociologia poderia aceitar tais elementos constitutivos, sem deixar de cumprir sua tarefa como ciência. O vínculo irrecusável entre ambas está nas relações entre a representação de uma regra e a determinação de uma ação. O interesse sociológico na regularidade permite a passagem da ação às formações sociais mais complexas. O dispositivo conceitual que oferece tal chave é o sentido da ação social. Através de sua constante referência, Weber elabora a tensão entre perspectivas subjetivas e objetivas na unidade coerente da ação: o tecelão, que não sabe o que tece. Daí se desenvolve uma profícia relação entre os domínios da realidade concreta e da validade ideal. Ao manter tal tensão, recusa-se também valores universalmente válidos à ciência o limite de seu kantismo é disputa entre valores últimos. O problema da insociável-sociabilidade apresentado por Kant, repõe esta tensão no plano da história. Na ocasião da coerência observada entre os diversos níveis teóricos dos escritos weberianos, este movimento também se mostra operante, na formação da legitimidade. Por isso, pode-se dizer que a exposição da vontade apresentará uma crítica da sociologia da dominação. A tensão atua no momento mesmo da tessitura social: o tecelão, perdoa-lhe, ele não sabe o que faz. / This work seeks the grounds for Max Webers theory of action on Immanuel Kants pratical philosophy, since the formation of will. It enquires into the extents sociology accepts this founding elements without leaving scientific duties. A straightforward binding along with both of them is found in the link between rule representation and the determination of action. Sociological interest in regularity allows the access from action to more complex social formations. The conceptual device that provides the key: the meaning of social action. Throught out its continual reference, Weber develops the strain between subjective and objective perspectives in a coherent action unity: the weaver, that doesnt know what he weaves. From there on, he builts up a fruitful relationship for the domains of concrete reality and ideal validity. For holding this strain also means to refuse universal validity of values in science the borders of his kantianism is the struggle around the latest values. Kants expositions on the unsocial-sociability restores the strain on historical scale. Given the noted coherence, to be found on Weber, between distinct theoretical levels, this trend is also undertaken, during legitimations building. For the exposition of will presents a critic of the sociology of domination. A tension on the weaving social fabric: the weaver, forgive him, he doesnt know whats doing.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ruy de Carvalho Rodrigues Junior.pdf: 1268289 bytes, checksum: fad0f536ccc8ba89c95cc22c67280d11 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The purpose of the present study is to introduce and justify the hypothesis that the notion of Will in Shopenhauer s philosophy is better understood when considered as a hermeneutics of Representation. It is defended that the dialogue with the theoretical part of Kant s philosophy, as well as its distinction, operated by Schopenhauer as objective and subjective being and subjective and objective consideration are fundamental issues while constructing Schopenhauer s single thought. By analyzing the relationship between the philosophy and wisdom of Schopenhauer s thought, through the notion of transition (Übergang) and through what we call reverse intelligibility thesis on Metaphysics of Nature and on the process of the objectification of the Will in the world, we intend to interpret Schopenhauer s philosophy as the philosophy of limit. This way, we would make possible the articulation of both the relationship between Will and Representation, and the philosophy with what could be named as wisdom / A presente tese tem por objetivo apresentar e justificar a hipótese de que a noção de Vontade na filosofia de Schopenhauer é melhor compreendida quando considerada como uma hermenêutica da Representação. Ela defende que o diálogo com a parte teórica da filosofia kantiana, assim como a distinção operada por Schopenhauer entre ser subjetivo e objetivo e consideração subjetiva e objetiva são fundamentais na construção do pensamento único de Schopenhauer. Analisando a relação entre filosofia e sabedoria no pensamento deste último propõe-se, através da noção de passagem (Übergang) e do que chamamos de tese da inteligibilidade inversa na Metafísica da Natureza e no processo de objetivação da Vontade no mundo, interpretar a filosofia de Schopenhauer como uma filosofia do limite. Esta deve, então, tornar possível a articulação tanto da relação entre Vontade e Representação quanto da filosofia com aquilo que se poderia chamar de sabedoria

The most systematic work Martin Luther ever created was his De servo arbitrio / The Bondage of the Will (1525), his powerful polemic against the leading Humanist of his day, Erasmus, who had criticized Luther in his De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio / The Freedom of the Will (1524). Luther's The Bondage of the Will is regarded as a work representing the organic unity of his entire theological thought; it can be seen as his theology in a condensed form. In spite of the immense significance of Luther's magnum opus, its theological structure and content have so far not yet been satisfactorily revealed. Much research has been conducted on certain detailed aspects of this work of Luther's, such as the problems of the free will, determinism, and predestination. The basic weakness of those analyses is that the details of The Bondage of the Will can be correctly understood only on the basis of a comprehension of the basic systematic theological idea of his work. The very kernel of Luther's own thought and the deepest intentions of his theology in this work are best comprehended by analyzing the inner structure and cohesion of his own thinking and by seeing how his argumentation developed in his dispute with Erasmus. The task of this study is to expose the fundamental systematic theological idea and structure in Luther's The Bondage of the Will. The method employed in the present study is a comprehensive systematic analysis of Luther's thought in his work. Attention will be paid to the conceptualization of issues by Luther, to his main propositions and the arguments he uses to support his claims, and to the structural principles and the core body of his thinking system. The debate between Luther and Erasmus contained genuine paradigmatic differences in their understanding of the Christian faith, but also some misunderstandings, even intentional misinterpretations. The present study aims at clarifying these conceptual confusions and at exploring the possibility of some degree of reconciliation between the conflicting views. My hypothesis is that Luther's own specific and comprehensive understanding of the Trinitarian theology of grace, with special emphasis on Pneumatology, alongside the more obvious Christology, strongly linked with the theology of creation, is the fundamental thought structure of his magnum opus. This enables him to get rid of the common Late Medieval teaching of the free choice of the human being, represented by Erasmus. Above all, Luther is a theologian of grace, sola gratia. The Bondage of the Will, the most Pneumatological treatise he ever wrote, offers a radical and comprehensive Trinitarian theology of grace. Luther understands the human being as an "ecstatic" creature who receives his/her existence and the quality of his/her existence from extra se. Luther argues for this paradigm in terms of the theology of creation, Christology, Pneumatology, and soteriology. As such, the human being was created a creature which is destined for union with his/her Creator in the Holy Spirit who is the actual presence of the Creator in his creature, God sharing his life with the human being. After losing this original state of union, the human being became a battlefield of the opposing transcendental powers, Satan and sin on the one side, and God and his grace, on the other side. The human is free in "things below oneself," in matters that belong to daily human life, but he/she is not free in "things above oneself," in matters that transcend the human being. Luther sees sin as human infirmity, inability to get rid of unbelief and pride which destroyed the human's union with God. The human being cannot change his/her evil orientation but must continue such as he/she is: this is Luther's concept of "the necessity of immutability"; he applies this philosophical concept to soteriological usage. The human being is in a desperate situation in regard to his/her capacities of contributing to his/her own salvation; here Luther follows his logic of theologia crucis. Both in terms of creation and salvation, the human being is meant to be in a communion of life with the Triune God. Luther develops a strong soteriology, understood in terms of an intimate union between the Triune God and the human being. This union is not primarily a cognitive-rational and morally responsible relation, as Erasmus was inclined to think, but a union of being with Christ in the Holy Spirit, koinonia/unio cum Christo in Spiritu sancto. The quality of a human being's life in this world and his/her eternal beatitude depends on whether his/her person is or is not in union with the Holy Trinity. In his Trinitarian theology of grace, Pneumatology, arguably neglected in Medieval times, is powerfully revived. Luther's conception of divine grace, with some peculiarities of his own, recalls Augustine's doctrine of grace, differing from the soteriological views of Scholasticism and Nominalism. The present study culminates in a systematic presentation of the three dimensions of Luther's Trinitarian doctrine of grace: First, contrition, conversion, and faith are effected by God's Spirit, sola fide is a thoroughly Pneumatological concept - a fact not sufficiently emphasized in research. Second, Luther sees the union with Christ simultaneously as a Christological and as a Pneumatological reality - a view not underscored in research. Third, sanctification means growth in love by way of being increasingly controlled by the Holy Spirit, who is the essence of divine love. This three-dimensional conception of grace can be supported by other works of Luther's mature theology. There are strong points of contact with Johannine, Pauline, Augustinian, and Greek Patristic theology here; a more detailed analysis of these connections, however, is not in the scope of the study at hand. The results of the study intensify the ecumenical potential of Luther's doctrine of grace. Moreover, these results contribute an amendment to the Finnish school of Luther interpretation where the Pneumatological dimension is underemphasized in the first and the second dimensions of Luther's doctrine of grace. Finally, the possibility of some degree of reconciliation between the views of Erasmus and Luther will be considered.

A presente Dissertação analisa o problema da teleologia na obra de Schopenhauer. Em nosso trabalho, buscamos compreensão sobre a modulação existente do \"como se\" kantiano, ao mostrar como o jogo entre vontade e representação modifica o sentido do juízo teleológico da Crítica do Juízo. Nessa chave de leitura, procuramos construir uma argumentação que permita pensar a existência de um horizonte regulativo aliado à intuição primordial da vontade. Como consequência, encontramos, nessa modulação, uma expansão do problema do organismo para uma questão sobre a essência da natureza. Como resultado, o deslocamento da teoria do juízo de reflexão kantiana transforma essa leitura sobre o mundo natural em uma questão da teleologia na metafísica da vontade, transformando o problema da finalidade na natureza em problema a respeito da finalidade no campo da ética. É nela que se apresenta o paradoxo da individualidade, na crise entre a afirmação do indivíduo e a destinação do mundo / This dissertation examines the problem of teleology in Schopenhauer\'s work. In our work, we seek an understanding of the existing modulation of the Kantian\'s \"as if\", to show how the interplay between will and Representation modifies the sense of teleological judgment of the Critique of Judgment. In this reading key, we seek to set up an argument to suggest the existence of a regulative horizon coupled with the primordial intuition of will. As a consequence, we find, in this modulation, an expansion of the problem of organism onto a question about the essence of nature. As a result, the displacement of the Kantian\'s theory of judgment reflection transforms this reading about the natural world in a question of teleology in the metaphysics of will, and transforming the problem of purpose in nature in issue as to the purpose in the field of ethics. Is it that presents the paradox of individuality: the crisis between the assertion of the individual and the destination of the world

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Whether the weakness of the evidence for God’s existence is not a sign that God is hidden, but rather a revelation that God does not exist is the question I will explore in this paper. I will investigate whether the absence of sufficient evidence for God constitutes evidence of his absence. Since it is not clear a-priori that God would be more clearly revealed to humans, reasons must be provided to show the degree of clarity and level of accessibility one would expect to find if God exists and remains hidden.

The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the free will debate. Traditional compatibilists claim that determinism does not preclude our capacity for moral agency. Nuanced determinists, such as Derk Pereboom, deny the existence of moral agency and argue that free will is not required to save the basic modes of our practical lives, such as our capacity to affect each other and to lead practically morallives. I will argue in favor of Kant’s view, which holds that since freedom and moral agency is metaphysically possible we cannot deny the possibility of free will and morality. The object of this thesis is to argue for why Kant’s position holds an advantage over determinism and compatibilism; it is not necessarily to argue for Kant’s argument, although I do explain and argue for aspects of it in support of my broader goal of establishing the superiority of Kant’s account.