Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-10T13:57:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Tifaldi.pdf: 864654 bytes, checksum: 1dbc883557bd48ed70003affc0e32f90 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-10T13:57:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Tifaldi.pdf: 864654 bytes, checksum: 1dbc883557bd48ed70003affc0e32f90 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Fundação São Paulo - FUNDASP / The general objective of this dissertation is the residual dictatorship. Highlight so that you can understand what's left of the civil-military dictatorship, from 1964 to 1985, in the contemporary democratic and, above all, why no progress, or rather, why won't you move, keeping the transition between authoritarianism and democracy, from 1986 to 1988. It is considered to be dictatorial residue which makes the current democratic regime, formally established in 1988, stay stagnant, or rest in a kind of intermediate regime, safety, fostered by the diffuse feelings of fear and insecurity, which recriaria a society eager for militarism. To highlight the residual dictatorship, will be addressed in this essay aspects such How to: maintain repressive apparatus of the civil-military regime of 1964 in democratic rule after 1988, in particular the auxiliary armed forces and army reserve; resistance on if reestruturto them in the context of the current democratic regime; the absence of content or subjects of Military Law in legal education; and, as the proposed ' constitutional ' military intervention, the latest public demonstrations , ria can be interpreted in the context of the dictatorship. Aspects that will be discussed from a theoretical explanatory basis, adding to the primary production data methodology to illustrate the argument / O objetivo geral desta dissertação de mestrado é evidenciar a ditadura residual. Evidenciar para que se possa compreender o que resta da ditadura civil-militar, de 1964 a 1985, no regime democrático contemporâneo e, principalmente, por que não se avança, ou melhor, por que não se quer avançar, mantendo-se incompleta a transição entre autoritarismo e democracia, de 1986 a 1988. Considera-se ser esse resíduo ditatorial o que faz com que o regime democrático atual, formalmente instaurado em 1988, mantenha-se estagnado, ou repouse numa espécie de regime intermediário, difuso de segurança, fomentado pelos sentimentos de medo e de insegurança, o que recriaria uma sociedade ávida pelo militarismo. Para se evidenciar a ditadura residual, serão abordados nesta dissertação aspectos tais como: a manutenção de aparatos repressivos do regime civil-militar de 1964 em regime democrático do pós-1988, em especial as forças armadas auxiliares e reserva do Exército; a resistência em se reestruturá-las no contexto do atual regime democrático; a ausência de conteúdos ou de disciplinas de Direito Militar no ensino jurídico; e, de como a proposta de intervenção militar “constitucional”, das mais recentes manifestações públicas, poderia ser interpretada no contexto da ditadura residual. Aspectos que serão abordados a partir de base explicativa teórica, acrescentando-se à metodologia produção primária de dados para se ilustrar a argumentação

The changing security environment in Asia has led to a renewed interest in the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF). However, the SDF itself remains a black box: assessed either in terms of its problematic legal standing or physical military capacity, but with limited understanding of the people within; who they are, what they do, and how they think. This dissertation opens up the black box and brings the SDF officers into the analysis of civil-military relations in post-war Japan. I present a theoretical framework inspired by principal-agent theory, in which I hypothesize that the type of control (ex-ante or ex-post) and preference divergence between the civilians and the military produces four different outcomes in civil-military relations: containment, auto pilot, conflictual, and cooperative (possibly excessive). I examine how civil-military relations in Japan evolved over time and across three realms of defense policy making, budget, personnel, and use of force; utilizing the findings from an opinion survey conducted among SDF officers and civilian elite addressing the "civil-military gap," oral history records of former SDF leaders and civilian defense officials, and interviews with active duty SDF officers and civilian officials. My research shows that civil-military relations in Japan was generally calm, not because the ex-ante constraints were strong and suppressed the opposing views of the SDF, but because the policy preferences of SDF officers and civilian bureaucracy converged in support of the alliance relationship with the United States. Such preference convergence made it possible for the politicians to continue "auto-pilot control" of the SDF, which was convenient for politicians who preferred to avoid dealing with military matters in face of the anti-militaristic public. However, this led to two paradoxical outcomes: (1) the SDF came to enjoy their relative autonomy within the ex-ante constraints, and (2) the ex-ante constraints turned out to be self-binding for politicians, possibly hampering their ability to control the SDF ex-post. Institutional changes through the electoral and administrative reforms in the 1990s along with the perceived changes in the security environment surrounding Japan enhanced both the incentive and capacity of politicians to release the ex-ante constraints and to control the SDF in their own hands. Re-interpretation of the constitution to allow for collective self defense is a step in the same direction. Looking towards the future, the shift from ex-ante to ex-post control may result in tension between the civilians and SDF officers, in cases where their preferences diverge.

For much of history, multinational wars have been the norm rather than the exception. Yet the study of these wars has been largely ignored. Existing scholarship on wartime alliances focuses almost exclusively on the causes of alignment or the onset of conflict ignoring the conduct and consequences of these arrangements. Wartime partnerships exhibit enormous variation in their structure, however. What accounts for the varied multinational security arrangements states adopt in wartime? I argue that the choices states make in constructing these wartime partnerships have important consequences for both the conduct and outcome of conflicts. Following the institutional design literature, I argue that these differences are purposeful and originate from the rational calculations and strategic interactions among the actors creating them. I focus on one design feature of multinational military structures in particular, that of command and control (C2). The enormous variation visible in multinational command and control structures in wartime begs two questions: First, why do states adopt different command and control structures? Second, what drives actors to abandon one structure in favor of another? To answer these questions, I develop a theory of failure-driven change. Because conventional wisdom suggests that greater cooperation is beneficial, yielding gains for all, the puzzle naturally arises as to why all wartime partnerships don’t start out in the tightest configuration possible, that of unified command. After all, the benefits of greater wartime integration are seemingly vast; from the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs to the conferral of legitimacy, tightly integrated arrangements confer distinct advantages. Despite the many benefits wartime integration confers, however, I argue states are reluctant to adopt unified command for fear of having to surrender operational control over their military forces. Yet even a cursory examination of wartime multinational partnerships reveals that states do sometimes enter into more integrated command relationships, leading to the (second) question of what motivates them to do so. Here, I argue that one factor in particular, that of battlefield performance, leads states to abandon their intrinsic reluctance toward unity of command. Specifically, I argue that when faced with military defeat on the battlefield, states often respond by experimenting with new command and control arrangements. The learning process is often tentative and slow yet over time leads to greater integration. Additionally, I argue that greater integration in multinational command and control structures is correlated with improved military performance. In short, failure leads to adaptation which then leads to success. To test my theory of institutional learning, I employ comparative historical analysis, specifically process tracing and the congruence method. The universe of cases consisted of all multinational wars since 1816, some 38 conflicts. However, because a number of these cases featured multinational parties on both sides, this yielded a total of 43 cases. Three cases were chosen on the basis of representativeness and variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest. The cases examined were the Entente and Central Powers in World War I and the UN coalition in the Korean War. Overall, the cases provide strong support for my theory of wartime learning. The findings suggest that failure is a key determinant of wartime integration.

This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine.

Com a decretação, pelo regime militar, do Ato Institucional n° 2 (AI-2), em outubro de 1965, todos os civis e militares acusados de infringirem a Lei de Segurança Nacional passaram a ser processados pela Justiça Castrense. Entre 1967 e 1968, surgiram no Brasil várias organizações comunistas que propunham o recurso às armas no combate contra o regime vigente e pela implementação do socialismo. Dentre estes agrupamentos, um dos mais importantes foi a Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN), cuja principal liderança foi Carlos Marighella. O presente trabalho debruça-se sobre o julgamento de militantes da ALN por tribunais militares. Recorreu-se à análise de autos de processos instaurados contra a organização em São Paulo para embasar o estudo. É abordada a atuação dos delegados de polícia, responsáveis pelos inquéritos que originaram os processos, assim como a atuação dos procuradores, vinculados ao Ministério Público. Além disto, trata-se do comportamento e das estratégias utilizadas pelos réus e por seus advogados. Finalmente, são apresentados um levantamento quantitativo das decisões judiciais e os critérios decisórios dos juízes, enfatizando sua preocupação com a readequação social dos réus. O período abrangido pela pesquisa inicia-se em 1969 quando os primeiros processos contra a ALN foram abertos - e termina em 1979 ano em que todos os julgamentos de militantes da organização foram interrompidos, por conta da anistia política. / With the decree by the Brazilian military regime of Institutional Act No. 2 (IA-2) in October 1965, all civilian and military defendants accused of violating the National Security Law were to be judged by military tribunals. In 1967 and 1968 several communist organizations emerged to support armed resistance against the regime and the implantation of socialism. One of the most important of these groups was National Liberating Action (NLA), whose principal leader was Carlos Marighella. The present work analyzes the trials of NLA militants in military tribunals. The primary sources are the court documents of cases filed against the NLA in São Paulo. This study focuses on the actions of the police chiefs in charge of the investigations that led to charges and also the prosecutors employed by the Brazilian Justice Department. In addition, the study examines the behavior and strategies used by the defendants and their lawyers. Finally, this project presents a quantitative investigation of the judicial rulings and the criteria used by the respective judges, in particular their concern for the social readjustment of the defendants. The period covered begins with 1969 - when the first cases were brought against the NLA - and ends in 1979 - when all cases against the organization came to a halt because of the political amnesty declared by the government.

No description available.

No description available.

Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has witnessed a proliferation of civil-military initiatives that have engendered overt and celebratory displays of support for the British Armed Forces. This thesis interrogates two of these initiatives: the annual public relations event Armed Forces Day and the military charity Help for Heroes. Significantly, these initiatives have emerged against a backdrop of morally and politically contentious military violence, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hence, these initiatives raise important questions about the type of politics which underwrite them. In this thesis, I address these questions by critically engaging with a figure who occupies a key position within this UK civil-military landscape: the professional soldier. Adopting a Foucauldian approach, I place this figure within a broader political, social and historical context and show how, since the end of the Second World War, the professional soldier has continually remerged to rewrite the conditions of possibility for liberal war-fighting. Drawing on this insight, I identify a professional soldier, I label the biopolitical military professional, who greatly informs the contours of this contemporary UK civil-military landscape. The biopolitical military professional is an important figure because they are able to co-opt "civilian" political subjects into the service of liberal-warfighting despite a conflict's political context. This is made possible because the biopolitical military professional is a figure who incorporates their military expertise and professional concerns within a wider set of life-administering knowledges concerned with the health and well-being of the population. Crucially, the most overt expressions of biopolitical military professionalism are produced through these UK civil-military initiatives. I demonstrate this by showing how these initiatives mobilise a whole host of "civilian" proto-professional subjects into the active service of liberal war-fighting through an appeal to both their military "obligations" and their fitness and wellbeing. An effect of this is that participating in one of these initiatives becomes more than an act of military support it also becomes a way of partaking in a healthy and life-enriching activity. For example, a day out at Armed Forces Day is a way to get children to take part in active play and educational activities. Supporting the armed forces through Help for Heroes may involve running a marathon or taking part in a long-distance cycle ride. Consequently, via the presence of the biopolitical military professional these initiatives achieve a certain resonance with a civilian population disinterested in the politics of war but increasingly concerned with their health and wellbeing.

This thesis explores the work carried out by forensic specialists employed by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP). Headquartered in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), ICMP assists the work of local governments around the world in addressing the issue of missing persons following armed conflict, atrocities, and natural disasters. This thesis focuses on ICMP's efforts to aid the Bosnian government in locating, exhuming, and identifying the remains of the individuals who went missing during the country's recent war (1992-1995). Utilising data obtained via interviews with and observations of ICMP staff members, it primarily represents a study of the management of professional identity in emotionally charged situations, examining the experiences of the forensic specialists who work in the organisation's three mortuary facilities throughout BiH. It explores forensic specialists' work with human remains, their interactions with victims' family members, and their attendance at events in which victims are commemorated and/or buried. Discussion of forensic specialists' experiences with the deceased brings into consideration their varying responses to the remains, emphasising the prevalence and perceived importance of emotional detachment. Situations in which emotional detachment from the remains may prove challenging are considered, as are the varying techniques forensic specialists utilise in managing emotional responses to their work. Examination of forensic specialists' interactions with the living suggests their general dislike of these encounters, although the positive aspects of these interactions are also examined. Exploration of forensic specialists' opinions of attending burials and/or commemorations brings into further consideration the balance between emotional attachment and detachment. While respondents noted the importance of maintaining an emotional connection to their work, they nevertheless emphasised the importance of avoiding such responses while in the mortuary. Commemorations and/or burials become ‘safe spaces' for forensic specialists to express and experience emotional responses to their work that are not overtly professional.

Com a instauração do regime militar no Brasil em 1964 e a decretação do Ato Institucional no. 2 (AI-2) em 1965, os civis que cometiam crimes contra a Segurança Nacional passaram a ser julgados pela Justiça Militar. O presente estudo analisa os processos políticos movidos contra a Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR), no período de 1969 a 1971, principalmente aqueles que se referem ao seu principal líder Carlos Lamarca. Trata-se da compreensão das facetas da Justiça Militar, buscando apreender na lógica dos textos dos processos seus objetivos e significado histórico. Sendo que a atuação da Justiça revelou-se extremamente complexa, no julgamento dos militantes de uma das principais organizações de esquerda que empreendeu a luta armada contra o regime. A pesquisa abordou a relação entre a administração da Justiça e o Estado, os mecanismos de repressão denunciados nos tribunais, como a tortura, desaparecimento e mortes de militantes e as irregularidades na aplicação da legislação. A figura emblemática de Carlos Lamarca que permeia todas as fases dos processo, o perfil dos réus e da organização, as formas de atuação e estratégias adotadas pelos representantes do Ministério Público e advogados de defesa. O enfoque centrou-se no rigor da Justiça em defesa da Segurança Nacional e na repressão judicial como parte das práticas repressivas do regime, em que legalidade e ilegalidade não se separavam. / With the instauration of the military government in Brazil, in 1964, and the Institutional Act no. 2 (IA-2), in 1965, the civilians who committed crimes against national security started facing trials in the Military Justice. The following study analizes the political processes moved against the "Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária" (PRV - Popular Revolutionary Vanguard), between 1969 and 1971, particulary those concerning its main leader, Carlos Lamarca. It deals with the comprehension of the many aspects of Military Justice, trying to learn, in the logic of the processes texts, its goals and historical meaning. The acts of the Justice revealed themselves as being extremely complex while judging the active members of one of the main left organizations that fought the Military Government. This research treated subjects like the relation of Justice and State, the repression mechanisms denounced in court, like torture, kidnapping and the killing of militants, and the irregularities in the applications of the law. It also deals with the emblematic figure of Carlos Lamarca, who appears during the whole process, the profile of defendants and their organization, the ways and strategies of both the Public Ministry ( who acted as Prosecutor) and the defense lawyers. The attention focused on the rigorous way the justice acted in defense of the national security, and in the judicial repression as a part of the repressive acts of State, where legal and illegal were very similar.