Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marina Martins Brito da Cunha.pdf: 1521906 bytes, checksum: 6a8f32295885a26e3c06df7a5afa6cee (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-30 / During the banking history, there were movements of changes and adaptation to new realities, such as the internationalization and the increasing globalization of the financial markets. In this process economic instabilities of national monetary systems were recorded which raised questions about the necessity of strengthening the international monetary system and the stability of financial institutions of the countries. Amid the market turbulence , the Bank For International Settlements (BIS), has created the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision Basel that promulgated the Basel Accord entering the principles of banking supervision and a system for measuring and standardizing minimum capital requirements, in an attempt to manage the risks. This paper aims to analyze the effects of the implementation of Basel Accords on the structure and operation of the Brazilian financial system. The analysis method adopted is based on the historical and documentary evaluation of the Basel Accords I, II and III in the the Brazilian financial system, analyzing the principles of banking supervision and regulation implemented by the Brazilian Central Bank and financial institutions, such as the regulation of minimum capital and net worth, through Resolution No. 2099 and its main changes. The paper also provides an analysis of the new capital agreement with its main characteristics. Its implementation occurred through the Statement N. 12.746 of 2004, when the Brazilian Central Bank set a timetable to be followed by financial institutions for the implementation of several improvements in risk management controls and also the role of supervision and information disclosure to the financial market.Through the Statement N. 20.615 of 2011, a new step was taken to improve the inclusion of Basel III, one of the points presented was the improvement in the liquidity risk management. The paper concluded that despite of many improvements have been still discussed and have been under implementation in the Brazil and in the international markets, these innovations initiated by the Basel Accord marked the history of management and supervision of risk management in the financial market / Ao longo da história bancária, foram detectados movimentos de mudanças e adaptações às novas realidades, como a internacionalização dos bancos e a crescente globalização dos mercados financeiros. Nesse processo, foram registradas instabilidades econômicas dos sistemas monetários nacionais e internacionais, que levantaram questões sobre a necessidade do fortalecimento do sistema monetário internacional e a estabilidade das instituições financeiras dos países. Em meio a turbulências nos mercados, o Bank for International Settlements (BIS) criou o Comitê de Supervisão Bancária da Basileia (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision), que divulgou o Acordo da Basileia inserindo princípios de supervisão bancária e um sistema para mensuração e padronização dos requerimentos mínimos de capital na tentativa de gerenciar os riscos. O estudo, que se desenvolve nesse contexto, pretende analisar o funcionamento do sistema financeiro brasileiro os efeitos da implantação do Acordo da Basileia sobre esta estrutura. O método de pesquisa adotado é baseado na avaliação histórica e analise documental dos Acordos da Basileia I, II e III, sobre o sistema financeiro nacional, por meio do qual se analisarão os princípios de supervisão e a regulação bancária implementada pelo Banco Central do Brasil, como a regulamentação dos limites mínimos de capital e patrimônio líquido, consoante a Resolução n. 2.099 e suas principais alterações. O trabalho também faz uma análise do novo acordo de capital, com as suas principais características. Sua implantação ocorreu com a edição do Comunicado n. 12.746 de 2004, em que o Banco Central do Brasil estabeleceu um cronograma a ser seguido pelas instituições financeiras brasileiras para a implantação de diversas melhorias nos controles de gestão de risco e também no papel da supervisão e divulgação de informações ao mercado financeiro. Por meio do Comunicado n. 20.615 de 2011, houve um aprimoramento, com a inclusão do Basileia III, e um dos pontos tratados é a melhoria no gerenciamento de risco de liquidez. Do esforço de pesquisa, conclui-se que muitas melhorias ainda são discutidas e estão em processo de implantação nos mercados brasileiro e internacional, contudo estas inovações iniciadas pelo acordo de Basileia marcam a história da gestão e da supervisão do gerenciamento de riscos no mercado financeiro

巴塞爾資本協定是一個非強制性的國際銀行監管制度，若世界各國均遵照此協定，能夠提升各國金融體系的穩定性，進而降低國內與國際金融危機發生的可能性。然而，在其非強制性的本質下，有些國家的實行程度相當高，但有些國家實行程度相當低，本論文的核心問題在於理解世界各國實行巴塞爾資本協定的差異。本論文採用國際政治經濟理論中的理性選擇理論，以一個簡單的國際與國內政治壓力模型，描繪出各國政府試圖降低銀行監管規範所帶來的國際與國內政治成本總和，以求得最適化的金融監管規範。 根據此模型的內涵，本論文假設：若一個國家是個經濟強權、與全球經濟市場的互賴程度低，且擁有一個弱勢且較無法隔絕國內政治因素的行政體系時，該國的巴塞爾資本協定通常較低；若一個國家並非為經濟強權、與全球經濟市場的互賴程度高，且擁有一個強勢且較能隔絕國內政治因素的行政體系時，該國能實行較高程度的巴塞爾資本協定；若一個國家是個經濟強權、與全球經濟市場的互賴程度低，且擁有一個強勢且較能隔絕國內政治因素的行政體系時，該國較不受到政治壓力的影響，因此能夠自行決定巴塞爾資本協定的實行程度；若一個國家並非為經濟強權、與全球經濟市場的互賴程度高，且擁有一個弱勢且較無法隔絕國內政治因素的行政體系時，該國將部分實行巴塞爾資本協定，且將帶來相同程度的國際與國內政治壓力，以最小化政治壓力之總和。 在實證分析部分，我採用並分析了涵蓋91個國家，從1973至2005年的時間序列資料，以及一份涵蓋150個國家的問卷資料，以進行量化迴歸分析。此外，我針對台灣與中國大陸銀行監管制度的變遷，進行兩國的個案研究與比較，其資料包括第一手的訪談，以及第二手的統計、學術研究、媒體報導、與專家評論等資料。量化與兩個個案的實證結果支持了本論文的核心論點。 / This dissertation seeks to answer the question of why some countries comply with high level of Basel Accords while others ignore this global governance regime. It adopts a rational theory of international political economy that treats a government’s bank regulation preference as a result of the interaction between international and domestic political costs. The theoretical model shows that if a country is more economically powerful (weak) or less (more) economically interdependent on global markets, and has a weaker (stronger) executive branch that is unable (able) to shield itself from domestic political factors, it is more likely to realize lower (higher) level of Basel Accords. If a country is powerful or not economically interdependent on global markets, and has a strong executive branch, it has more leeway to decide the level of bank regulation. If a country is weak or economically interdependent on global markets, and has a weak executive branch, an equilibrium level of bank regulation will cause equal international and domestic political costs that minimize the aggregate pressure. For quantitative tests, I collect time-series data covering 91 countries from 1973 to 2005, as well as a cross-national survey dataset covering more than 150 countries. In addition, I conduct two in-depth case studies of China's and Taiwan's changes of bank regulations since 1980, which rely on first hand interviews and second hand data. Both quantitative and qualitative results support political pressure hypotheses.

銀行的存續有賴於能正確的評估有利的交易，以及能在經濟環境逆勢的時候仍然能夠有效的經營獲利。資本市場中的企業信用評級，影響著股票和債券的的價值，同時唯有完善的風險管理機制和資本，信評機構才可以正確的評價信用。 金融產品的市場價值決定了預期損益。在市價衡量法的基礎之上，銀行可以決定是否要持有該部位或是使用該部位建立一個避險的投資組合。也因此，銀行面臨了許多抉擇，包括怎麼轉換市場風險到不同的資本市場，以及有關市場風險的所有決策。 基於以上的原因，銀行也已經被要求需要回應巴塞爾協定的要求，必須揭露相關的風險測度予金融市場的監督機構。在1993年，G30建議銀行可以使用風險值系統來衡量風險。依據1996年的BaselⅡ，銀行則被要求使用內部模型法來測量資本充足率。然而，計算風險值包括許多工作，例如選擇合適的風險因子、產生零息曲線、金融產品的評價、敏感度分析、損失分配的估計、投資組合管理以及風險報告等。在過去幾年，更因為避險、套利的目的，銀行累積了巨大的投資在衍生性商品商場，也使得風險管理更加的困難。在2008年的金融風暴之後，BaselⅢ指出，金融機構必須強化其交易簿內信用衍生性商品的風險管理，並同時揭露壓力風險值。綜合以上原因，銀行通常會建置風險管理系統來滿足這所有的需求和報告。也因為這些工作的複雜性，銀行一般會採用系統供應商的解決方案來實施一個市場風險管理系統。 此論文從市場風險管理的歷史發展角度，完整回顧風險值理論及實務應用的相關文獻，涵蓋parametric及non-parametric 風險值模型。同時，對於市場風險管理系統以及實務建置的流程也有完整的介紹和探討，著重在趨勢、方法論及系統實務理論應用上。 / The existence of a bank involves evaluating the advantages of potential trade and with the bank’s ability to survive under adverse economic cycles, which causes market pressure. The credit rating of corporations in the market affects the market value of shares and bonds, and the rating agency requires high-risk management standards and the capitalization of the corporation to assess the proper credit rating. The market price of a financial product determines the expected profit and loss for a bank. Based on the market price, a bank may make a decision to hold the position for a while or to build a well-diversified portfolio for hedging purposes. Banks therefore face the challenges of having many choices that they can transfer their market risk into different capital markets, and all decisions are associated with the market risk. For these reasons, the bank has been responded to disclose the risk metrics that have been set by the financial system supervisor. In 1993, G30 advised that banks should evaluate the financial risk of derivatives financial instruments by the Value-at-Risk (VaR) system. According to Basel Ⅱ in 1996, banks were required to have an internal model to measure sufficient capital using VaR. However, the calculation of VaR involves many tasks, such as the selection of a large number of risk factors, the methodologies of generating zero curves, the valuation of financial instruments, sensitivity parameters, loss distribution estimations, portfolio management and risk management reports for compliance purposes. In recent years, because of hedging, arbitrage and speculation purposes, banks leverage a huge sum of money in the derivatives market and make the difficult for the risk management. After the 2008 global financial crisis, BaselⅢ was introduced which asked for financial institutions to strengthen credit derivatives in trading books and disclose the stressed VaR etc. It is common that a bank has set up a risk management system to fulfill the requirements of the regulatory compliance, governance and reporting. Usually, banks adopt the provider’s solution for the implementation of a market risk management system. This dissertation surveys the literature on VaR theory and practices from a historical perspective for market risk. An overall survey of parametric and non-parametric VaR models is provided. The market risk management system and its implementation practices were also surveyed. Emphasis is placed on recent trends and developments in methodologies and system practices.

Submitted by José Augusto Mazzoni Martins Ferreira (josemazzoni@bancobbm.com.br) on 2017-11-01T19:45:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao - José Mazzoni (versão final).pdf: 1837578 bytes, checksum: 7e30e5efce6e72b928dccfb012c11a50 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2017-11-29T13:53:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao - José Mazzoni (versão final).pdf: 1837578 bytes, checksum: 7e30e5efce6e72b928dccfb012c11a50 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-11-29T13:54:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao - José Mazzoni (versão final).pdf: 1837578 bytes, checksum: 7e30e5efce6e72b928dccfb012c11a50 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-01-24 / This work evaluates the regulatory capital required by Brazilian Central Bank (“BCB”) from financial institutions under its regulation, concerning the standard approach for marked risk, compared to alternative approaches commonly used by the financial industry, equivalent to VaR and Stress-Testing models. For a chosen group of risky assets (foreign currencies, stocks, stock indexes, commodities and interest rates), it was calculated the regulatory capital required by BCB under standard approach and compared to the estimated potential losses, according the alternative models. The results evidence a conservative position by BCB related to market risk of foreign currencies and interest rates, being more suitable for commodities and lenient for equities and their respective indexes. It is also possible to observe the existence of regulatory arbitrage, in which there is very low regulatory capital requirement (or no requirement) for certain risky assets portfolios. / Esse trabalho avalia o capital requerido pelo Banco Central do Brasil (“BCB”) das instituições financeiras por ele reguladas, para risco de mercado segundo abordagem padronizada, em comparação com métricas comumente adotadas pela indústria financeira, referentes aos modelos de VaR e Stress-Testing. Para um determinado grupo escolhido de ativos arriscados (moedas, ações, índice de ações, commodities e taxas de juros), foi aplicada a abordagem do BCB para o capital regulatório requerido e comparada com a perda potencial estimada pelos modelos alternativos. Os resultados evidenciam uma postura bastante conservadora por parte do BCB em relação aos riscos de mercado de moedas e taxas de juros, sendo mais ponderada para commodities e leniente para ações e seus respectivos índices. Pode-se também avaliar a existência de arbitragens regulatórias, onde há exigência muito baixa de capital regulatório (ou nenhuma exigência) para determinados portfólios arriscados.

This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.<p><p>The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.<p><p>The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e. just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.<p><p>The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.<p><p>The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.<p> / Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Este trabalho consiste em um estudo comparativo de diversos modelos para cálculo do Valor em Risco de um portifólio. São comparados modelos que consideram a série univariada de log-retornos do portifólio versus mo- delos multivariados, que consideram as séries de log-retornos de cada ativo que compõe o portifólio e suas correlações condicionais. Além disso, são testados modelo propostos recentemente, que possuem pouca literatura a respeito, como o PS-GARCH e o VARMA-GARCH. Também propomos um novo modelo, que utiliza o resultado acumulado do portifólio nos últimos dias como variável exógena. Os diferentes modelos são avaliados em termos de sua adequação às exigëncias do Acordo de Basileia e seu impacto financeiro, em um período que inclui épocas de alta volatilidade. De forma geral, não foram notadas grandes diferenças de performance entre modelos univariados e multivariados. Os modelos mais complexos mostraram-se mais eficientes, produzindo resultados satisfatórios inclusive em tempos de crise. / The present work consists of a comparative study of several portfolio Value-at-Risk models. Univariate models, which consider only the portfolio log-returns series, are compared to multivariate models, which consider the log-returns series of each asset individually and their conditional correlations. Additionally, recently proposed models such as PS-GARCH and VARMA-GARCH are tested. We also propose a new model that uses past cumulative returns as exogenous variables. All models are evaluated in terms of their compliance to Basel Accord and financial impact, in period that includes high volatility times. In general, univariate and multivariate models performed similarly. More complex models yielded more accurate results, with satisfactory performance including in crisis periods.

Este trabalho consiste em um estudo comparativo de diversos modelos para cálculo do Valor em Risco de um portifólio. São comparados modelos que consideram a série univariada de log-retornos do portifólio versus mo- delos multivariados, que consideram as séries de log-retornos de cada ativo que compõe o portifólio e suas correlações condicionais. Além disso, são testados modelo propostos recentemente, que possuem pouca literatura a respeito, como o PS-GARCH e o VARMA-GARCH. Também propomos um novo modelo, que utiliza o resultado acumulado do portifólio nos últimos dias como variável exógena. Os diferentes modelos são avaliados em termos de sua adequação às exigëncias do Acordo de Basileia e seu impacto financeiro, em um período que inclui épocas de alta volatilidade. De forma geral, não foram notadas grandes diferenças de performance entre modelos univariados e multivariados. Os modelos mais complexos mostraram-se mais eficientes, produzindo resultados satisfatórios inclusive em tempos de crise. / The present work consists of a comparative study of several portfolio Value-at-Risk models. Univariate models, which consider only the portfolio log-returns series, are compared to multivariate models, which consider the log-returns series of each asset individually and their conditional correlations. Additionally, recently proposed models such as PS-GARCH and VARMA-GARCH are tested. We also propose a new model that uses past cumulative returns as exogenous variables. All models are evaluated in terms of their compliance to Basel Accord and financial impact, in period that includes high volatility times. In general, univariate and multivariate models performed similarly. More complex models yielded more accurate results, with satisfactory performance including in crisis periods.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:06:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5762.pdf: 2315381 bytes, checksum: 2d23013b02c4b33dcbf1b10405b613b9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-12 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / In this work, we present and discuss the operational risk in the financial institutions, Basel Accord II, the structure of dependence between cumulative operational losses, a tool for modeling this dependence (theory of copula) and the allocation of a capital, called regulatory capital. The usual method for calculation of regulatory capital for operational risk, suggested by Basel Committee, overestimates the final capital because it is considered that the losses are perfectly positively dependents. Then, we propose a new method for this calculation based on theory of copula for the bivariate case. Such method models the dependence between two losses and considers a index (representing the expert opinion). We discuss also a method studied on Alexander (2003) and perform a simulation study in order to compare all methods, the usual, the proposed and the convolution one. / Nesse trabalho, abordamos o risco operacional nas instituições financeiras sob o ponto de vista do Acordo de Basileia II, a característica da presença de dependência estocástica entre as variáveis aleatórias em questão, a ferramenta para modelagem de tal dependência (teoria de cópulas) e a alocação de capital regulatório. Como o método usual para alocação de capital regulatório sugerido pelo Acordo de Basileia II superestima tal capital por considerar que as variáveis perdas são perfeitamente dependentes, propomos neste trabalho uma metodologia alternativa, baseada em teoria de cópulas, para o caso bivariado. Tal metodologia modela a dependência entre duas perdas e ainda inclui a opinião de especialistas da área no modelo final. Também discutimos uma metodologia existente na literatura (método da convolução) e fazemos um estudo de simulação para analisar o comportamento dos métodos abordados: método usual, proposto e da convolução.