In dieser Arbeit werden vier zwischen 1712 und 1755 entstandene Kritiken von Leibniz’ Optimismus-Lehre der ‚besten aller möglichen Welten‘, wie diese in der Theodizee (1710) vorgestellt wird, dargestellt und kritisch untersucht. Nach der Meinung etlicher Kommentatoren wurde Leibniz’ philosophischer Optimismus erst nach dem Erdbeben von Lissabon 1755 und Voltaires Angriffen zum Ziel gewichtiger Kritiken seitens Philosophen und Theologen. Gegen dieses geläufige Bild zeigt diese Dissertation, dass jene Kritiken sehr bald nach der Veröffentlichung der Theodizee kamen, und dass zentrale Thesen des Leibniz’schen Optimismus schon in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jh. Gegenstand philosophiegeschichtlich bedeutender Polemiken waren. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Kritik an Leibniz’ Gottesbegriff – der in dieser Arbeit als ‚intellektualistisch‘ bezeichnet wird – eine fundamentale Rolle spielt, und dass ein beträchtlicher Teil des Konflikts zwischen dem Optimismus und dem frühen ‚Gegen-Optimismus‘ durch den Konflikt zwischen Intellektualismus und Voluntarismus erklärt werden kann. / This work describes and examines four critical reviews, all of them written between 1712 and 1755, of Leibniz’s theory of optimism or the system of ‘the best of all possible worlds’, as it is presented in the Theodicy (1710). Several commentators state that the first important criticisms of Leibnizian philosophical optimism by philosophers and theologians came only after the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 and Voltaire’s subsequent attacks. In opposition to this standard picture, this dissertation shows that criticisms emerged very soon after the publication of Theodicy, and that central theses of Leibniz’s optimism were already the target of significant philosophical criticisms in the first half of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the criticism of Leibniz’s concept of God – a concept described here as ‘intellectualist’ – plays a fundamental role, and that a considerable part of the conflict between optimism and early ‘counter-optimism’ can be explained by referring to the conflict between intellectualism and voluntarism.

Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) construit sa pensée tantôt en se rapprochant d’esprits contemporains, tantôt en s’en éloignant. Pour examiner sa figure complexe, nous confrontons ses textes à ceux des écrivains de Port-Royal, tels Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Nicole et Blaise Pascal, ainsi qu’à ceux de Bossuet. Notre analyse se situe au prolongement des études ayant tenté ces comparaisons, comme l’ont fait É. Labrousse, K. Nozawa et L. Simonutti pour le débat théologique, et A. McKenna et G. Mori sur le plan philosophique. Après avoir vérifié que la théologie de Bayle et celle de Port-Royal sont également fondées sur les idées thomistes de conscience humaine et de loi naturelle, nous avons précisé que la relecture des textes de Nicole permet à Bayle de reformuler le concept thomiste d’ignorance pour proposer une forme plus radicale de tolérance religieuse : tous les hommes ont le droit de suivre leur conscience – fût-elle errante. Nous avons ensuite rapproché la pensée politique de Bayle de celle de Port-Royal ainsi que de celle de Bossuet. Bayle, Arnauld et Bossuet, partisans de l’obéissance civile au pouvoir politique, condamnent Pierre Jurieu qui réclame le droit des peuples contre les souverains, au nom de la liberté de conscience. Ils s’opposent également aux traités « monarchomaques » du XVIe siècle, dont Jurieu est héritier. Cette condamnation conduit Bayle à séparer politique et religion, ainsi qu’à s’opposer à Bossuet, qui permet à Louis XIV d’imposer aux huguenots la conversion au catholicisme, y compris par la force ; Bayle s’approche ainsi de Pascal qui n’adhère pas à l’emploi de la force pour étendre le catholicisme. / Our study is aimed at emphasizing the Catholic influence on Pierre Bayle (1647-1706)’s texts. For the purpose of arriving at sweeping interpretations, we deal with the texts of writers of Port-Royal, such as Antoine Arnauld, Pierre Nicole, Blaise Pascal, and those of Bossuet. We follow and develop Bayle studies that have attempted these comparisons such as E. Labrousse, K. Nozawa, A. McKenna, G. Mori. At first, we confirm that the theology of Bayle and Port-Royal is based on Thomistic ideas of human conscience and natural law. And the re-reading of the texts of Nicole allows Bayle to rephrase the Thomistic concept of ignorance to propose a radical form of religious tolerance : all men have the right to follow their conscience – even if it is errant. Our next approach is toward Bayle’s political thought. For this purpose, we compare his texts with Catholic texts. Bayle, Arnauld and Bossuet, advocates of civil obedience to political power, condemn Pierre Jurieu, who demands peuples right of rebellion against a monarch in the name of freedom of conscience. They are also opposed to French Huguenot theorists at the end of the sixteenth century named « Monarchomachs », who offered to Jurieu intellectual justifications for resistance to religious persecution. This condemnation leads Bayle to separate political domain from religious domain, contrary to Bossuet’s view, that allows Louis XIV to impose on the Huguenots the conversion to Catholicism, including by force. In this context, Bayle is similar to Pascal, who disapprove of using the political force to extend Catholicism.

Nous analysons le dernier ouvrage écrit par Pierre Bayle, les Entretiens de Maxime et de Themiste (1707), où il livre un combat de plume ultime avec deux théologiens réformés, Jean Le Clerc et Isaac Jaquelot. Il s’agit d’une querelle entamée après la publication du Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) de Bayle, et dont tous les ouvrages directement concernés sont aussi examinés. À partir du problème du mal et du péché, Bayle formule une critique à la théologie chrétienne visant à mettre en évidence la faiblesse des arguments rationnels qui doivent l’affirmer. Les seules forces de la raison ne suffisent pas à éclairer les dogmes qui forment la religion, et il faut avoir recours à la lumière de la foi, à la Bible, pour les accepter. De l’étude de cette argumentation nous concluons que, pour Bayle, la religion est une question privée, qui ne se prête pas vraiment au dialogue philosophique. / We analyze the last work written by Pierre Bayle, the Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste (1707), where he opposes for the last time two Arminian Theologians, Jean Le Clerc and Isaac Jaquelot. Their quarrel started with the publication of Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) and continued until his death in 1706. By pointing to the insoluble problem of evil and sin, he proposes a refutation of rational arguments that attempt to prove Christian Theology. We examine all the writings involved in this controversy and review in great length its arguments. Bayle shows that Christianity is unable to demonstrate its dogmas by reason, and claims that only faith can legitimate them. Therefore it is concluded that religion for Bayle belongs to the private sphere, and cannot be rationalized through a philosophical dialogue.

This study examines the constructions and uses of the figure of Ovid in French writing of the second half of the seventeenth century, and explores how they were modulated by contemporary aesthetic and cultural concerns. As the influence of Ovid’s poetry made itself felt in various ways – in the mythopoeia of the Sun-King and the fashionable galant salons – interest in the story of Ovid’s life blossomed. This, I argue, was facilitated by new forms of ‘life-writing’, the nouvelle historique and histoire galante, and fuelled in unexpected ways by the escalating querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. Research has been done on the reception and influence of Ovid’s poetry in this period, but little attention has been paid to the figure of Ovid. This thesis offers a new perspective and, informed by recent renewed interest in life-writing, argues that analysis of biographical depictions is vital for establishing a coherent picture of the uses of Ovid in the ‘Grand Siècle’. I explore a diverse range of textual descriptions of Ovid (Vies; prefatory material attached to translations and editions of his work; correspondence; dialogues des morts; biographical dictionaries and historical novels), organized according to their different, though intersecting, ways of writing about this poet. He was constructed as a historical figure, an author, a fictional character and a ‘parallèle’ – a point of identification or contrast for contemporary writers. Through close analysis of a multi-authored corpus, this thesis identifies and examines two instances of paradox: though an ancient poet, Ovid became emblematic of 'Moderne' movements and was used to explore aspects of galanterie; and, though his creative work was mobilized in the service of royal propaganda, Ovid, as a figure for the exiled poet, was also used to express anxieties about the sway of power and the machinations and pitfalls of the world of the court.

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Le projet de notre étude s’enracine dans un constat : alors que les multiples travaux sur Rousseau portent sur ses textes autobiographiques, politiques, anthropologiques, religieuses, esthétiques voire ses préoccupations scientifiques, ses réflexions morales n’ont pas ou peu été l’objet d’études systématiques. Or, nous sommes partis de l’hypothèse que l’interrogation morale constituait l’un des centres si ce n’est le coeur de son oeuvre. Plus précisément, partant d’une interrogation sur la nature de l’homme, cet être à l’origine naturel en même temps susceptible de se dénaturer en s’écartant de la règle de la nature, il en est venu à déployer et à explorer une série de possibilités pour que l’homme échappe à ce processus historique de dénaturation, autant dans l’ordre social que dans l’ordre moral. S’il se montre pessimiste sur les conditions de réalisation d’un ordre politique conforme aux principes du droit politique énoncé dans le Contrat social, il développe les conditions d’une éducation morale dans son ouvrage qu’il a toujours considéré comme le plus achevé : l’Émile. C’est dans ce texte que le projet moral transparaît clairement. Surtout, il souligne que le fondement de la morale n’est pas à situer dans l’amour de soi, qui n’est qu’un principe naturel, mais dans l’ordre de la nature. La lecture de l’Émile et d’autres textes conduit à poser que le fondement ultime de la morale est Dieu lui-même. L’amour de soi, expression de la bonté humaine, n’est que l’expression de la nature ou de Dieu qui parle en nous lorsque nous écoutons la conscience. En regardant l’interrogation morale comme le centrale de philosophie de Rousseau, nous tentons d’exhumer l’unité des œuvres en apparence hétérogènes, ses œuvres autobiographiques et la valorisation de l’existence de l’homme naturel, les concepts d’ordre et de la nature, les rapports entre vertu civique et vertu morale, la place de la croyance religieuse. / The project of our study takes root in the following observation : whereas a considerable work has been done on Rousseau autiographical, political, anthropological, religious and aesthetic texts, or even on his scientific concerns, his moral insights have not been, or nearly not, the subject of systematic studies. At the opposite, we have taken as our starting point that the moral reflection is in the centre, if not at the heart of his work. More specifically, starting with questioning the very nature of the human being, this being primarily natural at the same time able to denature himself by deviating from the rule of nature, he comes to deploy and explore a whole series of possibilities so that the human can escape himself from his historical denturation process, as much for social order as for the moral order. Although he is pessimistic about the condition of application for a political order that would comply with the political law principles which ar set out in the Contrat Social, he develops the moral education conditions within his publication he has always considered as the most completed l’Émile. It is in that text tthat the moral project is clearly reflected. Most of all, he underlines that the moral cornerstone has not to be placed in the love of self, which is only a natural principle, but in the natural order. Reading l’Émile and some others texts leads to think that the ultimate fondation of moral is God himself. The self love, expression of human goodness, is only the expression of nature or of God who speaks inside us when we listen to the awareness. By loocking at the moral reflection as being Rousseau’s philosophy center, we try to resurect the unity from some works which seen heterogeneous, that are his autiographical works and the esteem of the natural human existence, the order concepts, the connections between civic virtue and moral virtue, the place of religious belief.

L’elaborato analizza la ricezione del pensiero di Origene di Alessandria (c. 184-c.253) nell’opera del teologo arminiano Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736), soffermandosi in particolare sulla concezione origeniana della libertà e sulle questioni che vi sono annesse. Tale analisi consente anche di chiarire alcune pratiche argomentative e dinamiche intellettuali, soprattutto riguardanti i dibattiti religiosi ed interconfessionali, nella seconda metà del XVII secolo. L’elaborato è diviso in tre sezioni. La prima, di carattere introduttivo, mira ad indagare le premesse epistemologiche di Le Clerc, nonché la sua relazione con le auctoritates religiose ed intellettuali del passato. La seconda sezione prende in esame le citazioni dirette di Origene presenti nella vasta produzione di Le Clerc, come pure i suoi rimandi all’opera dell’Alessandrino e al suo pensiero, consentendo in questo modo di delineare un quadro preciso dell’Origene letto e reinterpretato da Le Clerc. La terza sezione restringe infine il campo d’indagine allo sguardo che Le Clerc porta sulla dimensione più propriamente teologica di Origene ed in particolar modo su quel nodo di concetti che ruota attorno al tema della libertà umana (peccato originale, grazia e predestinazione, il problema del male). Questo studio mostra come, malgrado l’indubbia, e talvolta malcelata, simpatia per Origene, Le Clerc non possa essere definito tout court un ‘origenista’, dal momento che la sua visione epistemologica, scritturale e teologica lo distanzia da una acritica e piena adesione al pensiero dell’Alessandrino. / The present thesis analyses the reception of the thought of Origen of Alexandria (c. 184-c. 253) in Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736). Its particular focus is on Origen's conception of freedom and the theological doctrines related to it. The goal of this thesis is to uncover, through Le Clerc's use of Origen, some of the argumentative practices and the intellectual dynamics of the time, in particular in religious, especially inter-confessional, debates. This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part has mainly an introductory character and looks at the epistemological assumptions of Le Clerc and his relationship with intellectual and religious authorities of the past. The second part reviews the various ways in which Le Clerc quoted, referred to or otherwise made use of the thought or the name of Origen in his vast production. This part provides a first result in that it frames, in general, Le Clerc's reception of Origen. This step is, at the same time, also preparatory for the material contained in part three. In the third part, only the material is considered which is strictly related to Origen's idea of freedom and the related theological doctrines of original sin, grace/predestination, and the problem of evil. The result of this analysis, as it appears form the examination of argumentative practices in the previous sections, is that Le Clerc was no simple "Origenist" but neither was he was fully uncommitted to the Origenian cause. A full commitment to Origen, despite this strong sympathy, was still hindered by Le Clerc's epistemological, scriptural and theological outlook.

This thesis presents a new study of Pierre Bayle’s Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1696), with special reference to Bayle’s polemical engagement with the theologian Pierre Jurieu. While recent years have seen a surge of interest in Bayle, there is as yet no consensus on how to interpret Bayle’s ambiguous stance on reason and religion, and how to make sense of the Dictionnaire: although specific parts of the Dictionnaire have received much scholarly attention, the work has hardly been studied as a whole, and little is known about how the Dictionnaire was influenced by Bayle’s polemic with Jurieu. This thesis aims to establish a new method for reading the Dictionnaire, under a dual premise: first, that the work can only be rightly understood when placed within the immediate context of its production in the 1690s; second, that it is only through an appreciation of the mechanics of the work as a whole, and of the role played by its structural and stylistic particularities, that we can attain an appropriate interpretation of its parts. Special attention is paid to the heated theological-political conflict between Bayle and Jurieu in the 1690s, which had a profound influence on the project of the dictionary and on several of its major themes, such as the tensions in the relationship between the intellectual sphere of the Republic of Letters and the political state, but also the danger of religious fanaticism spurring intolerance and war. The final chapters demonstrate that Bayle’s clash with Jurieu was also one of the driving forces behind Bayle’s reflection on the problem of evil; they expose the fundamentally problematic nature of both Bayle’s theological association with Jurieu, and his self-defence in the second edition of the Dictionnaire. The title of this thesis comes from Herman Melville’s novel: ‘Pierre, or the Ambiguities’.