There are two competing theoretical debates about the impact of ownership concentration on organisational outcomes, namely efficient-monitoring hypothesis and conflict-of-interest (strategic-alignment) hypothesis. New Zealand has a distinctively concentrated ownership structure. This raises an important research question: Does concentrated ownership in New Zealand perform an efficient monitoring or opportunistic function? This question remains unanswered due to the very limited research on ownership structure in New Zealand. This research considers three specific where studying the function of ownership concentration is likely to be insightful. Three contexts are: CEO compensation scheme, corporate voluntary disclosures and investor perception of ownership structure in the stock market. This research further contributes to the existing literature by decomposing ownership into four mutually exclusive groups, namely financial institution-, government-, management- and other company-controlled ownership structures. The different impacts of ownership concentration under each type of controlling ownership structure are investigated. The findings of Essay One reveal that concentrated ownership is a significant contributor to the poor CEO compensation pay-for-performance relationship in New Zealand listed companies. However, reduced ownership concentration promotes the alignment between CEO compensation and firm performance. These results imply that large shareholders in New Zealand do not play a monitoring role in curbing managerial power; rather it exacerbates the poor relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. In Essay Two, regression results show that companies characterised by financial institution-controlled ownership structure tend to make significantly fewer (more) disclosures at high (low) concentration levels. In contrast, firm observations in the high concentration group with government- and management-controlled ownership structures have considerably higher voluntary disclosure scores compared with their low concentration counterparts. With respect to the linearity assumption, the relationship between ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure practices unveil a non-linear pattern, indicating that the efficiency of large shareholders’ monitoring varies with the level of intensity of ownership concentration. The results of Essay Three demonstrate that ownership concentration in general is positively associated with information asymmetry observed around annual report release date. This is supportive of investor-adverse selection towards ownership concentration, and such an adverse selection problem is strongly associated with financial institutional and managerial shareholdings. Also, ownership concentration decreases stock liquidity, so no result is found in line with the ownership concentration liquidity hypothesis. When voluntary disclosure is taken into account, regression results suggest that disclosure significantly attenuates information asymmetry risk related to ownership concentration. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms with management-controlled ownership structure. Findings highlight the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structure in eliminating information asymmetry and enhancing market efficiency in New Zealand.

Anand M. Goel and Anjan V Thakor 於最近的財務學刊中提出理性且風險趨避的經理人會放棄部分正報酬但風險高的投資，造成投資不足問題，使得公司價值未能極大化。然而，極端過度自信的經理人投資正負報酬皆有的計畫，造成過度投資，使得公司價值遞減。只有中度自信的經理人能為公司價值帶來極大化效果。本篇研究採用台灣上市櫃公司近二十年資料，以公司經理人對公司持股的變化來衡量其過度自信的程度，探討公司經理人自信程度對公司獲利能力與公司價值的影響。實證研究發現，極端過度自信的經理人與極端保守的經理人使公司的績效與成長性減少，降低公司價值。此研究增加我們了解經理人自有特徵對公司價值的影響，並為公司理財課題帶來新的貢獻。 / Former literature theorized that excessively overconfident CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs reduce the firm value for underinvestment and overinvestment problems and moderate overconfident CEOs willing to take risky but positive NPV projects increase the firm value. This paper conducts an empirical research by using the change of purchase and sale on own company stocks took by CEOs to measure CEO overconfidence level in Taiwanese listing companies and find that the profitability and stock performance of firms led by excessively overconfident CEOs and excessively diffident CEOs decrease compared to by moderate overconfident CEOs. The result contributes to the understanding of the impact on firm valuation by CEO idiosyncratic characteristics and offers new evidence to behavior finance on corporate management.

<p>The Chief information officer (CIO) position has been seen as very important to every organization; this includes organizations that have either outsourced   or Insourced their IT function. Various studies have shown that this role emerged as a critical executive position in most organization which helps to shape organizations strategy. CIO has a major responsibility of aligning IT with business strategy that leads to an organization achieving a higher competitive advantage. This  work describeD the various roles of the CIO in organizations with a special focus on IT-business strategy alignment.</p><p>Based on our investigations from previous research, case studies and current interviews with CIOs, we were able to see that the CIO roles are shifting from operational to more strategic one. The CIO is seen to be the bridge between IT strategy and business strategy. As a result of this, they have close collaboration with the CEOs in order to be successful in aligning IT strategy to the business objectives. In view of this, the CIO plays the role of both the chief architect who designs future possibilities for business and the technology provocateur (Intelligent officer) that aligns IT with business.</p>

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether institutional ownership has an influence on CEO compensation in companies where the institutions have invested. In order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis a quantitative study was carried out within the Swedish corporate context where we have studied Swedish institutional investors and companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our period of study was the financial year of 2007.</p><p>The empirical questions at issue is; Was there a connection between Swedish institutional ownership and the size of the CEO compensation, and, does Swedish institutional ownership lead to a certain type of CEO compensation in terms of structure?</p><p>Our results did not suggest that an increased institutional ownership neither leads to a certain type of salary level nor a certain kind of salary structure. These results contradict earlier American research, which has been done within this area and has previously shown a secured connection.</p><p>The reasons for our results may be many and it is difficult to state any concrete conclusions to why we received differing results. Based on our results we can only state that institutional ownership is not decisive for the formation of CEO compensation. It remains for future research to disprove the results of this study.</p> / <p>Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur institutionellt ägande påverkar VD-lönerna i de företag i vilka de har investerat. För att uppfylla vårt syfte har vi genomfört en kvantitativ studie inom den svenska företagskontexten där vi studerat bolag som var noterade på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap-lista samt svenska institutionella investerare. Den tidsperiod som studerades var räkenskapsåret 2007.</p><p>De frågeställningar som vi ämnar besvara är dels om det finns ett samband mellan svenskt institutionellt ägande och storlek på VD-lön i svenska börsbolag, dels om svenskt institutionellt ägande leder till en viss typ av VD-lönestruktur i svenska börsbolag.</p><p>Våra resultat visar på intet sätt att ökade ägarandelar för institutioner leder till vare sig en viss typ av lönenivå eller en viss typ av lönestruktur. Detta går emot tidigare amerikansk forskning på området som har funnit just dessa samband.</p><p>Förklaringarna till våra resultat kan vara flera och det är svårt att lägga fram några konkreta slutsatser om vad våra resultat beror på. Utifrån våra resultat så kan vi endast konstatera att institutionellt ägande inte är avgörande för VD-löner utformning. Det återstår för vidare forskning att motbevisa det vi kommit fram till.<em></em></p>

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether institutional ownership has an influence on CEO compensation in companies where the institutions have invested. In order to fulfil the purpose of the thesis a quantitative study was carried out within the Swedish corporate context where we have studied Swedish institutional investors and companies quoted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Our period of study was the financial year of 2007. The empirical questions at issue is; Was there a connection between Swedish institutional ownership and the size of the CEO compensation, and, does Swedish institutional ownership lead to a certain type of CEO compensation in terms of structure? Our results did not suggest that an increased institutional ownership neither leads to a certain type of salary level nor a certain kind of salary structure. These results contradict earlier American research, which has been done within this area and has previously shown a secured connection. The reasons for our results may be many and it is difficult to state any concrete conclusions to why we received differing results. Based on our results we can only state that institutional ownership is not decisive for the formation of CEO compensation. It remains for future research to disprove the results of this study. / Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka hur institutionellt ägande påverkar VD-lönerna i de företag i vilka de har investerat. För att uppfylla vårt syfte har vi genomfört en kvantitativ studie inom den svenska företagskontexten där vi studerat bolag som var noterade på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap-lista samt svenska institutionella investerare. Den tidsperiod som studerades var räkenskapsåret 2007. De frågeställningar som vi ämnar besvara är dels om det finns ett samband mellan svenskt institutionellt ägande och storlek på VD-lön i svenska börsbolag, dels om svenskt institutionellt ägande leder till en viss typ av VD-lönestruktur i svenska börsbolag. Våra resultat visar på intet sätt att ökade ägarandelar för institutioner leder till vare sig en viss typ av lönenivå eller en viss typ av lönestruktur. Detta går emot tidigare amerikansk forskning på området som har funnit just dessa samband. Förklaringarna till våra resultat kan vara flera och det är svårt att lägga fram några konkreta slutsatser om vad våra resultat beror på. Utifrån våra resultat så kan vi endast konstatera att institutionellt ägande inte är avgörande för VD-löner utformning. Det återstår för vidare forskning att motbevisa det vi kommit fram till.

The Chief information officer (CIO) position has been seen as very important to every organization; this includes organizations that have either outsourced   or Insourced their IT function. Various studies have shown that this role emerged as a critical executive position in most organization which helps to shape organizations strategy. CIO has a major responsibility of aligning IT with business strategy that leads to an organization achieving a higher competitive advantage. This  work describeD the various roles of the CIO in organizations with a special focus on IT-business strategy alignment. Based on our investigations from previous research, case studies and current interviews with CIOs, we were able to see that the CIO roles are shifting from operational to more strategic one. The CIO is seen to be the bridge between IT strategy and business strategy. As a result of this, they have close collaboration with the CEOs in order to be successful in aligning IT strategy to the business objectives. In view of this, the CIO plays the role of both the chief architect who designs future possibilities for business and the technology provocateur (Intelligent officer) that aligns IT with business.

Unlimited demands of development and non-stopped destruction of surrounding environments cause many environmental problems. In this paper, Climate Change as one important issue has been studied against an Asian background. For the purpose of showing a clear trend of communicated corporate awareness in global Climate Change issues, in this report, seventy Asian companies have been studied. The results show a relatively low-level growth curve of communicated corporate Climate Change awareness by dissecting companies’ CEO Letters during years 2000 to 2009, followed by a comparison study with European results and five possible explanations in the discussion part. As the conclusion of this paper, an increased interest among Asian governments and companies during year 2000-2009 has been observed. However, there is still lack of knowledge on a general level compared with the European results. According to the five possible explanations, several possible future studies have also been recommended in the paper: 1) Comparison study under the same scope within Asia or other continents; 2) Case-study on specific interested companies; 3) On-going study on the future curve trend with the same target group.

Titel: Förklaringar till varför ersättning till VD och styrelse är olika - En studie om ersättningars form och funktion. Bakgrund: Ersättning till VD är generellt sätt högre än den ersättning en styrelse erhåller. Vi ämnar studera varför ersättningarna mellan organen skiljer sig åt i den utsträckning de gör och vad det kan bero på. Syfte: Förklara varför ersättningarnas form och funktion skiljer sig åt mellan VD och styrelse. Metod: Utgå från tidigare forskning och genomföra statistiska analyser av kontrollvariabler, för att sedan studera hur resultaten i testerna förändras när vi tillför våra egna variabler, som mäter skillnader i uppgifter hos VD och styrelse, och observera ifall signifikanta samband till ersättningarna kan utläsas. Resultat: Utifrån våra statistiska tester erhöll vi ett positivt signifikant samband med hur VD:ar har yttrat sig i VD-breven i årsredovisningarna, och VD:ns rörliga ersättning. Vilket visar på att en specifik uppgift för VD genererar en högre ersättning till denne. Detta tyder på att en skillnad i uppgifter mellan organen VD och styrelse, kan förklara varför det finns nivåskillnader i ersättningarna till de båda organen. Vidare kunde inga empiriska samband till VD:ns fasta ersättning, eller styrelsens fasta ersättning hänföras till våra variabler som mätte skillnader i uppgifter. Slutsatser: Vi kan konstatera att VD:ns rörliga ersättning påverkas av hur denne uttalat sig i VD-breven i årsredovisningarna. Vi kan från vår teoretiska referensram, härleda att detta beror på en skillnad i uppgifter mellan organen VD och styrelse. Våra teoretiska modeller konstaterar att VD och styrelse har differentierade uppgifter, vilket i sin tur påverkar hur ersättning till respektive organ kan skilja sig i utformning och nivå. / Title: Explanations as to why compensation to CEO and board of directors are different – A study about the compensations form and function. Background: Compensation to a CEO is generally higher than that of the compensation witch a board of directors receive. We intend to study why the compensation between the agencies differ in the extent that they do, and the reasons for that difference. Purpose: Explain why the compensations form and function differ between the CEO and the board of directors. Method: From existing research, we aim to execute statistical analyses of controlvariables, then study how the results of our tests alters when we insert our own variables that aim to measure the differences in functions of the CEO and the board of directors, and observe if significant relationships are to be found. Results: Based on our statistical tests, we obtained a positive significant relationship with the CEOs discloser in the CEO letters in the annual reports, and the CEOs variable compensation. This shows that a specific function of the CEO generates a higher compensation to such a position. This suggests that a difference in functions between the agencies, CEO and board of directors, may explain why there are different levels of compensations to both agencies. Furthermore, no empirical relationship of the CEOs fixed compensation, or of the board's fixed compensation could be related to our variables measuring differences in functions. Conclusions: We can conclude that the CEO's variable compensation is affected by how the CEO has expressed himself or herself in the CEO letters in the annual reports. We can, from our theoretical framework, deduce that this is due to a difference in functions between the agencies CEO and board of directors. Our theoretical models conclude that the CEO and the board of directors have differentiated tasks, which in turn can affect how the compensation to each agency may differ in form and level.

<p>In the ever so increasingly competitive business climate of the 21^st century, human resources are vital for corporate success. Employees need proper incentives to perform in goal-oriented manners. Incentive systems, especially Chief Executive Officer [CEO] remunerations, have been a popular topic since the 1990s, and this tendency has increased both during the 2002-2003 corporate scandal era, as well as the financial crisis which sparked in 2007. The recent tendency appears to lean towards companies cutting their executive bonuses as well as criticism and suspiciousness towards large bonus payments. While remuneration policies within the banking industry have been thoroughly debated and researched, another financial industry that is left largely untouched are the insurance companies. The focus of this research is therefore CEO remuneration in European insurance companies.</p><p>This descriptive study, of annual reports of stock-listed insurance companies, uses a purposive cluster sample to explore quantitative trends in CEO remunerations. In addition, a content analysis of five randomly selected companies out of the sample provides a deeper, complementary understanding of the justifications of the trends. The research questions are: <em>What trends on CEO remuneration can be found over the years 2005-2009 in annual reports of European insurance companies, concerning total remuneration, fixed salary and short-term bonus? What justifications do companies make for the remunerations</em><em> over the years 2005-2009</em><em>? </em></p><p>The quantitative part of the research inductively tests the assumption that CEO remuneration has decreased during the past few years 2008 and/ or 2009 due to the impact of the financial crisis. The content analysis part of the research deductively tests if agency theory concerns and issues concerning attraction and retention play a role in determining remuneration policies.<em></em></p><p>From this research, it is concluded that short-term variable pay is largely performance-based. Still, many other aspects serve as input factors when determining compensation levels. Based on the content analysis, it is revealed that interest alignment and attraction- and retention-issues are important determinants of remunerations. Subjective factors such as discretionary judgements also play a crucial role. The quantitative trends found in this study show that total remunerations have decreased markedly in 2008, and more vaguely in 2009. The financial crisis has had an impact on especially the short-term variable part of salaries, but also on base salary levels. Although not all companies that were investigated in the content analysis explicitly mention it in their annual reports, over the years 2005-2009, all of them become more concerned about remuneration policies and business risk factors. Over the investigated years, these companies also become more attentive to creating proactive and sophisticated value creating remuneration policies that are in line with international standards, in order to act legitimate towards stakeholders.</p>

Syftet med vår studie är att kartlägga och förklara hur transparenta svenska börsbolag är vid redovisningen av utfallet samt bakgrunden till kortsiktig rörlig ersättning för den verkställande direktören, samt att identifiera potentiella förklaringar och bakomliggande orsaker till transparensen. Vi har valt att studera de 29 bolag som representerar de 30 mest omsatta aktierna på Stockholmsbörsens Large Cap lista (OMXS30). Metodmässigt kan studien delas in i två huvudsakliga delar. I den ena delen av studien använder vi en kvantitativ ansats och tillämpar ett positivistiskt synsätt. I den andra delen av studien använder vi en kvalitativ ansats och tillämpar ett hermeneutiskt synsätt. Vid insamlingen av datamaterialet har vi inspirerats av en tvärsnittsdesign där huvudsakliga syftet har varit att samla in relevant information för att kunna bedöma transparensen utifrån en egen framtagen modell. Modellen utgörs av fem kriterier inspirerade av Ersättningsakademiens riktlinjer för rapportering av ersättning och syftar till att ge en samlad bedömning av de studerade bolagens transparens. Vi har även identifierat ett antal potentiella förklarande variabler utifrån vilka vi har studerat orsakssamband till transparensen. Vi har dessutom analyserat kommunikationen utifrån ett legitimitetsperspektiv med avsikt att få en förståelse för bolagens val av rapportering. Utifrån resultatet av vår studie kan vi finna stöd till den kritik som riktats mot en bristande transparens vid rapportering av rörlig ersättning till verkställande direktören. Vi kan även se tendenser till att det orsakssamband som tidigare studier belyst mellan transparens och styrelsens oberoende, kan gälla även för svenska börsnoterade bolag. / The purpose of this study is to describe and explain the transparency of Swedish public companies when it comes to the reporting of short term bonus payment to the chief executive officer. Furthermore we intend to identify possible explanations and underlying causes regarding the transparency. We have selected the 29 companies that represent the 30 most traded stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMXS30). Methodology, the study can be divided into two primary parts. In the first part of the study we use a quantitative approach and apply a positivistic view. In the second part of the study we use a qualitative approach and apply a hermeneutic view. When it comes to collecting data we have been inspired by a cross section design and the primary focus has been to collect relevant information to allow an assessment of the transparency with a model we have developed. This model consists of five criteria inspired by the Ersättningsakademiens (Compensation Academy) guidelines regarding the reporting of compensation and is designed to provide an overall assessment of the studied company’s transparency. We have also identified a number of possible explanatory variables from which we have studied underlying causes to the transparency. Furthermore we have analyzed the communication from a perspective of legitimacy with the intent to obtain an understanding regarding the company’s choice of reporting. From the result of the study we find support to previous criticism regarding lacking transparency on the matter of the reporting of short term bonus payments to the CEO. We can also see tendencies to the fact that the causation that previous studies pointed out between transparency and the independence of the board, may exist in Swedish publicly traded companies as well.