Ce travail doctoral traite de l’influence du contrat de rémunération du dirigeant, et plus particulièrement des caractéristiques incitatives de la rémunération en titres, sur les décisions prises par l’entreprise. Nous nous proposons en particulier d’apprécier l’effet de l’articulation des incitations financières à la prise de risque et à la performance boursière sur le niveau de risque de l’entreprise. Le travail, essentiellement empirique, s’appuie sur un échantillon d’entreprises américaines issu des bases de données Compustat et Execucomp sur la période 1992-2005. Quatre dimensions du risque de l’entreprise sont successivement abordées. Un premier chapitre se propose de définir de manière exploratoire un lien possible entre les caractéristiques incitatives de la rémunération du dirigeant et le niveau de contrainte de financement auquel l’entreprise fait face. Un deuxième chapitre se propose d’analyser empiriquement l’influence des caractéristiques incitatives de la rémunération du dirigeant sur le risque d’investissement notamment appréhendé par la R&D. Dans un troisième chapitre, nous nous intéressons aux déterminants du niveau d’endettement recherché par l’entreprise. Nous utilisons, pour ce faire, un modèle d’ajustement dynamique. Enfin dans un quatrième et dernier chapitre, nous analysons les déterminants du risque de défaut de l’entreprise mesuré par l’indicateur de distance au défaut. Le résultat essentiel de ce travail doctoral est que les caractéristiques incitatives à la prise de risque ne conduisent le dirigeant à prendre du risque que si, simultanément, la sensibilité de sa rémunération à la valeur créée est suffisante. / The purpose of this work is to analyze the influence of CEO’s compensation package on the risk taking behavior of the firm. We focus on the financial incentives contained in equity based compensation and their interaction. Our sample consists of US firms for the period 1992-2005. The data come from the Compustat and Execucomp databases. The purpose of the first chapter explores the link between CEO’s compensation and the financial constraints of the firm. In a second chapter, we empirically analyze the effect of financial incentives on the risk of investment. We use Research and Development expenses level as a proxy of the risk of investment. In a third chapter, we focus on target debt leverage level determinants using a dynamic adjustment model. In the last chapter we analyze default risk determinants. The main result of this work is that the efficiency of risk incentive is highly dependent of CEO’s performance incentive reaching a given threshold.

Le but de cette thèse consiste à démontrer que la rémunération des dirigeants est d'une nature contractuelle car l'ensemble des relations juridiques au sein de l'entreprise l’est. Il ne s'agit pas d'un postulat idéologique mais de la conséquence d’une déduction faite après avoir étudié la nature de l’ordre juridique français, à savoir une démocratie libérale où un Etat de droit-au sens moderne du terme-protège une économie de marché. Donc en présence d’une économie de marché, les relations inter-entreprises sont forcément des relations fondées sur le contrat. Par conséquent, toute rémunération de n’importe quel dirigeant de toute entreprise privée indépendamment de sa forme juridique (entreprise sociétaire personnifiée, non personnifiée, entreprise en nom) est forcément d’une nature conventionnelle. Reconnaître ce point de vue permettrait de faire une réforme du droit des sociétés et d’en finir avec la vision institutionnelle de l’entreprise qui est inexacte dans une économie où l’Etat n’est pas propriétaire des moyens de production. Aujourd’hui, les mandataires sociaux des grandes entreprises ont une rémunération parfois conséquente qui n’est pas véritablement contrôlée : ni par un contrôle institutionnel (défaillant car contre-nature), ni par une logique de marché (car non reconnue par beaucoup de juristes). / The remuneration of corporate officers is a highly publicized subject, particularly because of the impression, rightly or wrongly, of the important amounts received by corporate officers of numerous large companies. The legal relationship under which corporate officers perceive their remuneration does not appear to be precisely defined within the framework of positive law. There are two types distinct natures of remunerations. While one has a contractual nature, the other one is institutional by nature. The nature would depend on several criteria including the legal form of the company studied, whether the company is listed or not, and the type of remuneration paid. This analysis, inherited from the French corporate law history of the twentieth century, does not seem accurate to us. The private enterprise is first and foremost an economical reality, before being apprehended by the law. In a legal order such as ours, i.e. a liberal democracy and a market economy, the private enterprise, whether it is represented by a legal personality or not, is always structured by the private property and the contract. Property and exchange (through contracts) translate the principle of individual liberty within the civil law. The private enterprise of a legal order, which recognizes the economic freedoms, is first the exercise of the entrepreneurial freedom, alone or with others. Any power exercised within a private enterprise roots in a legal act of private law, generally a contract. The company with a legal person allows the realization of various legal effects, including the protection of the company assets. The legal autonomy of the company, authorized by law, should however not hide the fact that the company is not independent from those who founded it or their successors. The company officer, the one in charge of the company management, derives its power and remuneration from a contract. This remuneration, as the object of a contractual obligation, has always the same cause, i.e. the compensation for a management work, in the broad sense of the term.

Il est en effet reconnu que la tendance vers la responsabilité économique, sociale et environnementale des entreprises ne peut devenir pérenne qu’avec l’implication d’une masse critique de PME. Ce constat paraît évident au regard du rôle et de la place qu’occupent ces entités dans les économies nationales et internationales. En effet, elles sont pourvoyeuses d’emploi sur le territoire. De ce fait, nous nous sommes intéressés à la question suivante : comment les dirigeants de PME perçoivent-ils le concept de la RSE et comment cela se traduit au niveau de leurs politiques et pratiques RH ? De nombreuses recherches ont mis en lumière la trop grande facilité de la RSE à se prêter à l’art du discours. Plusieurs travaux antérieurs nous ont également permis de nous interroger sur le caractère tangible, mesurable et engageant des politiques dites socialement responsables. Nous souhaitons donc, à travers ce travail, confronter les discours à la réalité des pratiques dans les PME. Le caractère exploratoire de notre recherche nous amène à choisir une méthodologie qualitative à visée compréhensive basée sur les études de cas. Des entretiens semi-directifs, un suivi sur une période de deux ans ainsi que des visites de sites ont été réalisés auprès de dirigeants de PME et ont permis d’explorer les différentes perceptions des dirigeants et les pratiques associées. / It is a known fact that the economic, social and environmental corporate responsibility trends can only be sustainable through the massive involvement of SMEs. This seems even more obvious when faced with the role that these entities play in their economy. Thus, we are interested in how SME managers perceive the concept of CSR and what that translates to in their policies and HR practices. Much research has shed light on the discursive tendencies of CSR and has led us to ask ourselves about the tangible, measurable and engaging nature of so-called socially responsible policies. Therefore, through our exploratory research, we hope to confront reality by choosing a comprehensive qualitative approach based on case studies. Semi-structured interviews, and a two-year period follow -up were carried out among SME managers and allowed the exploration of their various perceptions and associated practices.

Titel: Ledningens karaktärsdrag - effekten på kapitalstrukturEn studie om förhållandena mellan tre individuella chefers karaktärsdrag och företagshävstång  Bakgrund och problematisering: Här diskuteras bakgrunden till studien och enproblematisering kring chefers karaktärsdrag och dess påverkan på kapitalstruktur samt vadsom menas med dessa begrepp. Vidare tar detta kapitel upp det underliggande intresset attförklara sambandet mellan tre chefers karaktärsdrag (CEO, CFO och COO) ochkapitalstruktur. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att förklara effekten av individuella chefers karaktärsdragpå svenska börsnoterade företags kapitalstruktur. Metod: Företagens kapitalstruktur undersöks genom att använda en kvantitativforskningsmetod med en deduktiv forskningsansats för att identifiera förhållanden mellanchefernas karaktärsdrag och hävstång. Paneldata används från 114 svenska börsnoteradeföretag över en femårsperiod (2014-2018). Studien fann totalt 179 chefer varav 87 CEO:s, 73CFO:s och 19 COO:s. Den insamlade datan testas genom regressionsanalyser där paneldataregressioner med random effects-modellen och robusta standardfel utförs. Slutsats: Resultaten från testerna visar på både signifikanta och icke-signifikantaförhållanden mellan de tre chefernas karaktärsdrag och företagens kapitalstruktur, mätt somhävstång. Det finns därmed bevis som tyder på att olika karaktärsdrag hos individuella cheferpåverkar företags kapitalstruktur.

Thesis (M.Com. (Accountancy))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, School of Accountancy, 2015 / Many studies considering the effects CEOs‟ characteristics have on the companies they run have been carried out in America. This study considers if organisational outcomes and strategic choices are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics as put forward by Hambrick and Mason (1984). It attempts to determine if the personality traits of CEOs of JSE listed companies (which result in them being classified as a narcissist) have an impact on the financial performance on the company for which they work. As identified by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007), prior research has explored how executive‟s characteristics are manifested in organisational outcomes, however very little research addresses the narcissistic aspect of CEOs personalities. This study explored whether a relationship exists between CEO narcissism and strategic dynamism in a nonprobability, convenience sample.. A 5-item narcissism index was used as a proxy for narcissism and financial leverage, overhead efficiency and plant and equipment newness, were used to measure strategic dynamism. Multiple regression was used to analyse the data by applying CEO narcissism as the independent variable, strategic dynamism as the dependents variable whilst including control variables, including the CEO tenure, the age of the CEO, the age of the company, and indicator variable for the presence of a COO, the phase of the economy during which the CEO served his tenure and an indicator variable for which industry the company is operating in. The results of this study revealed that there is a viii correlation between the level of narcissism, captured using unobtrusive measures, of a JSE listed company‟s CEO and the level of strategic dynamism of that company. The results of the regression models suggest that whilst there is no observable relationship between narcissism and strategic dynamism, there is a relationship between narcissism and two of the components of strategic dynamism, financial leverage and plant and equipment newness. This research contributes further to the study of the effect of narcissistic CEO‟s on the companies for which they work and suggests that the personality traits of CEOs should be considered by company boards and shareholders when deciding to elect a person as CEO as well as by investors when deciding which companies to invest in.

Bakgrund och problemdiskussion: Inom organisationer är vd:n ett hett och debatterat samtalsämne när det kommer till verksamhetsstyrning. Inom små till medelstora verksamheter är det inte ovanligt att ägaren är både ägare och vd för verksamheten, vilket betecknas som ett ägarlett företag. När ett företag går från ett ägarlett styre till en extern vd kan det ha en stor inverkan på verksamheten. Ett byte av vd innebär att en ny person kommer att bestämma hur verksamhetens styrning ska utformas och implementeras. Fortsättningsvis innebär det ett stort steg för ägaren när den ska frånsäga sin vd-position och lämna över till en extern vd. Det finns två olika teorier som förklarar relationen mellan ägare och vd. Agentteorin, som antar att människor agerar utifrån sitt eget intresse, och stewardshipteorin, som utgår från att människor agerar utifrån verksamhetens bästa. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka om verksamhetsstyrning förändras i samband med att en extern vd intar vd-rollen i ett tidigare ägarlett företag. Ytterligare kommer studien att undersöka hur ägaren och den externa vd:n ser på skiftet när en extern vd intar vd-rollen utifrån agentteorin och stewardship. Metod: Studien är en fallstudie som undersöker två företag som har genomgått ett skifte från ägarlett styre till externt styre. Denna studie kompletteras med inblick och erfarenhet från rekryterare inom högre befattningar. Studien utgår från en kvalitativ forskningsstrategi, med induktiva forskningsval som har abduktiva anslag. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in via sju stycken respondenter via semistrukturerade intervjuer. Slutsats: De slutsatser som kan dras från studien är att verksamhetsstyrningen förändras till att bli mer målstyrd när företaget går från ett ägarlett styre till att en extern person intar vd-rollen. Både ägare och vd från respektive verksamhet visar en skiftning av både opportunistiskt beteende och beteende som liknar en ‘steward’. Det innebär att det inte finns ett svart-vitt beteende avseende om individerna agerar efter sitt eget bästa eller efter verksamhetens bästa. Deras synsätt och agerande uppvisar en kombination av båda teorierna i samband med att verksamheten blir mer professionell, strategisk och målstyrd. / Background: Within organisations, the CEO is a well-known and debated subject when it comes to corporate governance in small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). When a company moves from an owner-led governance to an external CEO, it can have a major impact on the business. An alteration in the role of CEO would allow for a change in the governance of the business, through potential new individualistic implementations and structural decisions. Furthermore, it is a largely significant step for the owner to relinquish the position of CEO to an external individual. There are two different theories to explain the relationship between owners and CEOs. Agent theory, which assumes that people act in their own interest, and stewardship theory, which assumes that people act in the best interests of the business. Purpose: The purpose of the thesis is to investigate whether corporate governance changes when an external person is appointed CEO in a previously owner-managed company. Furthermore, this thesis will investigate how both the owner and the external CEO perceive the transition when the role of CEO is assigned to an external individual based on agent theory and stewardship theory. Method: The study is a case study examining two case companies that have experienced a shift from owner-led governance to external governance, along with the insight and experience of two senior recruiters. The study is based on a qualitative research strategy, with specific attention to inductive research choices and abductive approaches. The empirical material has been collected via semi-structured interviews and the involvement of seven respondents. Conclusion: The conclusion that can be drawn from the thesis is that the corporate governance changes and becomes more goal-oriented when an external person is the CEO. Both owners and CEOs from each business have a tendency towards both opportunistic and steward-like behavior. This means that there is no specific behavior regarding whether they act in their own best interests or in the best interests of the business. Their views and actions reflect a combination of both theories as the organisation becomes more professional, strategic and goal- oriented.

Not all companies are equally aggressive in their pursuit of corporate tax avoidance, which explains intensive research on the determinants of tax avoidance. Many determinants have been investigated, but the process of tax avoidance, and the relationships between corporate tax avoidance, longtermism (indicative of a stakeholder-orientated corporate culture), and CEO characteristics (informed by upper-echelon theory), are not yet fully understood. Much of previous research is conceptualised from theories such as principal-agent theory. This study investigates the influence of stakeholder orientation, using corporate culture, on corporate tax avoidance, in response to calls for more research using stakeholder theory. A mixed-method approach is used. The quantitative stream uses regressions to investigate the relationship between corporate tax avoidance, corporate culture, and tax-knowledgeable CEOs, based on a sample of 112 large, listed South African companies, studied over a period of 15 years. The South African setting allows the operationalisation of a tax-knowledgeable CEO, based the homogenous nature of CEOs' qualifications in South Africa, where many are chartered accountants. The results suggest that long-term oriented companies pay more tax on average. The results further suggest that tax knowledgeable CEOs are associated with more tax avoidance. The qualitative stream conducts eleven interviews with corporate tax advisors, showing the influence of corporate culture and CEO characteristics on corporate tax avoidance processes, but also how corporate culture and CEO-characteristics mutually inform each other. Altogether, the evidence indicates that the effect of corporate culture is less static than expected, and that the influence of corporate culture on tax avoidance can transcend the influence of CEO-characteristics, as an upperechelon effect. The interviews suggest mechanisms used by CEOs to influence tax culture, such as the creation of a company-wide awareness of the strategic importance of low effective tax rates. These results also indicate the ethical dilemma faced by executives of large companies when considering the use of tax-deductible corporate social responsibility initiatives, not to benefit shareholders or agents, but rather to benefit society as a corporate stakeholder, when governments would not.

Bakgrund: På senare år har Pilotskolan blivit ett hett samtalsämne inom aktieanalys. Pilotskolan definieras av att ledande befattningshavare äger en betydande del av aktierna i bolaget, således bidrar ledningen med ett ekonomiskt engagemang och anses vara ett incitament för värdemaximering för bolagets aktieägare. Tidigare forskning är oense om större insiderägande har en positiv eller negativ effekt på avkastning Däremot råder det en avsaknad av tidigare forskning kring fenomenet i en svensk kontext. Därför är det av stort intresse att undersöka hur sambandet mellan VD-ägande och historisk avkastning faktiskt ser ut. Syfte: Syftet med studien är att undersöka om det finns ett samband mellan insiderägande i form av VD-ägande och historisk avkastning för bolag noterade på Stockholmsbörsen (OMXSPI) under tidsperioden 2016-12-31 – 2021-12-31. Metod: Studien har använt sig av en kvantitativ forskningsstrategi med en deduktiv ansats. Det slutgiltiga urvalet analyserades med hjälp av variabler som har sin grund i teoretiskt etablerad effekt på aktieavkastning. Studien använde sig av balanserade paneldata och resultatet har producerats med hjälp av panelregressioner. Resultat: Studiens slutgiltiga panelregression visade på ett starkt positivt signifikant samband mellan VD-ägande och avkastning. Vidare visade resultatet på att det positiva sambandet bara gäller upp till en viss nivå för att sedan ha en signifikant negativ påverkan på avkastningen. Resultatet är i linje med en del tidigare forskning inom ämnet som har gjorts på andra marknader. Författarna kunde därför utifrån resultatet fastställa att VD- ägande påverkar avkastningen i en svensk kontext och utvärdering av ägarstruktur bör därför vara en parameter vid bolagsanalyser. / Background: Pilot-school as a phenomenon has become a hot topic in stock analysis as of late. The Pilot-school is defined as senior executives owning a considerable amount of the shares in their company, where the management contributes with a financial commitment and is considered an incentive for maximizing shareholder value. Previous studies disagree on whether insider-ownership has a positive or negative effect on stock- returns. However, there is a lack of research within the field in a Swedish context. Accordingly, it is of great interest to examine the actual relationship between CEO- ownership and historical stock-returns. Aim: The aim of this study is to examine if there exists a relationship between insider- ownership in form of CEO-ownership and historical stock-returns on companies listed on the OMXSPI during the period 2016-12-31 – 2021-12-31. Methodology: The study has utilized a quantitative research strategy with a deductive approach. The final selection was analyzed using variables with theoretically established effects on stock-returns. The study used balanced panel data and the result was produced with the aid of multiple panel regression. Results: The final panel regression model exhibited a strong positive significant relationship between CEO-ownership and stock-returns. Additionally, the results showed that the positive relationship is applicable only up to a certain level and after that level CEO-ownership has a significant negative relationship with stock-returns. The results are in line with some previous studies within the field. The authors could therefore establish that CEO-ownership affects stock-returns and an evaluation of ownership structure should be a parameter when performing a company analysis.

Актуальность темы исследования обусловлена ростом количества смен топ-менеджеров как в российских, так и в зарубежных компаниях, и очевидной связью между основными экономическими показателями фирмы (доходность акций, рентабельность активов, прибыль, динамика выручки и др.) и этими сменами топ-менеджеров. Цель диссертации – выявить и сравнить факторы, влияющие на смену топ-менеджеров в российских и зарубежных компаниях нефинансового сектора. Научная новизна исследования заключается в том, что были изучены более новые данные, т.к. большую часть исследовательской базы составили данные российских и зарубежных компаний за 2015–2016 гг., т.е. годы не начала экономического кризиса, а явной стагнации в российской экономике. Собранные данные показали, что акционеры-собственники, реагируя на негативную динамику основных показателей, либо меняли своих топ-менеджеров, в единичных случаях вынуждены были либо продавать контрольные пакеты акций своих компаний, либо объединяться с другими компаниями, т.е. запускать процессы слияния или поглощения. Тем не менее, к таким радикальным мерам прибегала лишь малая часть исследованных компаний, большинство же из них пыталось выправить ситуацию внутри компании путем смены руководства. Кроме того, удалось сравнить частоту смены топ-менеджеров в различных компаниях по результатам двух крупных экономических кризисов: 2008 года и 2014 года. Практическая значимость исследования обусловлена тем, что выводы, сформированные в результате исследования, позволяют выработать рекомендации по совершенствованию механизмов корпоративного управления в части мониторинга деятельности топ-менеджеров. / The relevance of the research topic is due to the increase in the number of turnover of CEOs in both Russian and foreign companies, and the obvious link between the main economic indicators of the company (stock returns, return on assets, profit, revenue dynamics, etc.) and these changes of top managers. The purpose of the thesis is to identify and compare the factors affecting the change of top managers in Russian and foreign companies in the non-financial sector. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the fact that newer data has been studied, since Most of the research base was made up of data from Russian and foreign companies for 2015–2016, i.e. The years did not start an economic crisis, but an apparent stagnation in the Russian economy. The collected data showed that the shareholders, in response to the negative dynamics of the main indicators, either changed their top managers, in isolated cases they had to either sell controlling stakes in their companies, or merge with other companies, i.e. launch merger or acquisition processes. Nevertheless, only a small part of the companies studied resorted to such radical measures, most of them tried to rectify the situation within the company by changing top-managers. In addition, it was possible to compare the frequency of change of top managers in different companies based on the results of two major economic crises: 2008 and 2014. The practical significance of the study is due to the fact that the conclusions formed as a result of the research allow developing recommendations for improving the corporate governance mechanisms in terms of monitoring the activities of CEOs.

This thesis aims to take part of and contribute to the continuously ongoing debate ongender diversity, more specific about gender diversity in the operational level includingthe gender of CEO in Swedish firms across the Large cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap lists.The purpose is to analyze whether there is a statistical significance between operationalgender diversity and financial performance as well as firm volatility. The thesis uses aquantitative method with an OLS multiple regression analysis on a total of 448 Swedishlisted firms. The measures used for performance are return on assets (ROA) and return onequity (ROE), as well as volatility as a risk measure. The test variables used are femaleCEO and female executives, against the control variables females in the board, sector,market capitalization and full-time employees. The results of the thesis suggest that thereis not any significant correlation between the gender of the CEO and firm performance aswell as volatility, and there is neither any significant correlation between the genderdiversity amongst the executives and the firm performance or stock volatility.