Le travail de thèse s’articule autour de trois chapitres.Le premier chapitre « Electoral Institutions and Political Polarization: An Experiment on Approval Voting in Benin » s’intéresse au rôle des institutions politiques dans la division des sociétés africaines. L’idée principale étant que les institutions politiques pourraient influencer la formation des groupes à l’intérieur des sociétés. Certains systèmes de vote (pluralité, système majoritaire) par leur règle tendent à forcer les électeurs à choisir un camp et pourraient potentiellement conduire à des divisions sociales, ethniques ou religieuses. Les autres règles de vote qui permettent aux électeurs de voter plusieurs candidats à la fois, devraient en théorie éviter ces inconvénients, et ainsi aboutir à une moins grande polarisation politique. Ce chapitre fournit des preuves expérimentales de cette théorie. Nos données proviennent d'une expérience sur le vote d'approbation qui a eu lieu lors de l'élection présidentielle de 2011 au Bénin, un pays démocratique d’Afrique occidentale, multi-ethnique avec un paysage politique caractérisé par une forte fracture nord-sud au niveau sociale et politique. En parallèle au vote officiel (scrutin majoritaire), nous avons proposé le vote par approbation aux électeurs, dont règle leur permet de voter pour plusieurs candidats à la fois. Les résultats montrent que ce système de vote augmente le score de plusieurs candidats consensuels. Nous avons également trouvé que le vote ethnique ne disparait pas et pourrait même augmenter. Dans le chapitre 2 « L’impact du clientélisme électoral: Analyse d’une expérience de laboratoire », nous nous intéressons au clientélisme, son lien avec la modernisation et son impact sur les résultats des élections. Nous avons effectués des expériences de laboratoires dans deux endroits différents (France et Burkina Faso). Les résultats obtenus montrent un effet significatif des campagnes d’achat de vote et de promesses électorales sur le score des candidats dans les deux pays. Mais les campagnes clientélistes sont plus efficaces en Afrique car ils permettent l’élection du candidat clientéliste. Le troisième et dernier chapitre « Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent le consentement à l’impôt en Afrique du Sud Sahara : Une analyse empirique avec des données d’enquêtes d’opinion», fournit une analyse des facteurs déterminant le consentement à payer la taxe des citoyens en Afrique du sud Sahara. En utilisant les données de 29 pays, nous avons montré que la qualité des services publiques, le milieu de résidence, le niveau d’éducation, la confiance aux institutions, la transparence du système fiscal sont des facteurs important dans les décisions des citoyens de consentir à payer la taxe. Nous avions également montré que la présence de ressources naturelle dans un pays, ainsi que le nombre d’habitant dans un pays jouent un rôle dans le consentement à payer la taxes des citoyens. Aussi l’importance accordé aux facteurs déterminant est différent selon la particularité des pays (peuplé ou pas, possédant ou pas des ressources naturelles). / This work is organized in three (3) chapters. the first chapter, « Electoral Institutions and Political Polarization: An Experiment on Approval Voting in Benin » coauthored with J-F Laslier, K.Van Der Straten and L. Wantchekon, focus on the institutions ‘s goal in the division of societies. The main idea is that political institutions can shape political preferences and influence the formation of groups within societies. Some system such Simple plurality and runoff majoritarian voting systems tend to force voters to “choose sides,” potentially exacerbating political, social, ethnic, or religious divisions. Voting rules that allow voters to simultaneously select several candidates should, in theory, avoid these drawbacks, and might thus lead to less polarized political outcomes. This chapter provides experimental evidence in support of this insight. Our data originates from an experiment on Approval Voting that took place during the 2011 presidential election in Benin, a democratic, multi-ethnic country in western Africa, with a political landscape characterized by a strong social and political north-south divide. In contrast to the official runoff rule used in Benin for this presidential election, we proposed Approval Voting to voters, whereby they can vote simultaneously for several candidates. We find that this electoral institution leads to an increase in the overall support for more consensual candidates. We also find that, under Approval Voting, like under Proportional Representation systems, ethnic voting does not disappear, and might even increase. The second chapter continue in the logic of voting motivation by doing some laboratory experiment about electoral clientelism. We focus on the vote buying and electoral promises. We wanted to show the impact on electoral clientelism on the election outcome in one way and in the second way, see if there is a link between modernization and clientelism. We did experiment in two different places (Burkina Faso and France) show that the impact of electoral clientelism is more relevant in Africa countries than in developed countries. The third chapter investigates on tax compliance in Africa by using data from about 29 African countries. The goal is to analyze the citizens’s behaviors when they have to contribute to public funding by paying tax. We want to know which factors may motivate people have a compliance attitude with tax. The main contribution of this research is the effect of country population and the existence of natural resources. We found that citizens living in countries with natural resources are less willing to pay taxes than citizens living in countries without natural resources. Also, we showed that the population matters. Indeed, in the most populated countries, fraud is higher than less popular countries. We then establish for each group of countries the factors for which they should act to have a tax compliance of their citizens. This can help countries to have a great public finance and become more independent from foreign aid.

Cette recherche étudie le passage d’une confrérie soufie au politique, avec pour exemple la Kasnazâniyya au Kurdistan d’Irak (1979-2014). Elle tente de saisir et d’analyser, dans le contexte irakien, les éléments de conjoncture qui ont conduit d’abord à la politisation de la confrérie comme une étape de « prédisposition », ensuite à son passage direct au politique. Dans une perspective historique, cette recherche vise à comprendre les racines du phénomène de l’implication des cheikhs et des confréries en politique au Kurdistan dès le 19e siècle. Cette démarche s’impose en effet pour déchiffrer les caractéristiques originelles du phénomène et les examiner ensuite à travers le cas de la Kasnazâniyya. Du point de vue de la politisation de la confrérie, nous étudions dans un premier temps au cours de l’histoire récente de la confrérie son impact socio-politique tout en examinant sa doctrine, ses branches, les modalités de succession au pouvoir de son cheikh, et l’impact de ce dernier sur l’orientation de la confrérie. Puis nous traitons dans un deuxième temps du phénomène de « rationalisation », à partir de la question de l’organisation et de la « bureaucratisation » de la confrérie. Du point de vue de l’articulation entre la Kasnazâniyya et le politique, nous étudions d’abord le phénomène des rapports de « clientélisme politique », puis analysons le parti politique créé par la confrérie dans son histoire, ses idées, son mode d’organisation et ses stratégies sociales, politiques et électorales pour parvenir au pouvoir. / In this research we study the transition of a Sufi order to the political field, taking as example the Kasnazâniyya in Iraqi Kurdistan (1979-2014). We first try to capture and analyse, in the Iraqi context, the elements that led first to the politicisation of the order to reach a stage of “predisposition”, then to its direct transition to the political field. In a historical perspective, this research looks at understanding the roots of the phenomenon of the shaykhs’ involvement in politics in Kurdistan from as soon as the 19th century. Such an approach is indeed necessary if we are to decipher the original characteristics of the phenomenon and then look into them through the case of the Kasnazâniyya. Concerning the politicisation of the order, we first study during its recent history its social and political imprint while looking at its doctrine, its branches, the handling of the succession of its shaykh to power, and the impact of the latter onto the orientation of the order. Then in a second stage we look at the phenomenon of “rationalisation” of the order, starting from the question of its organisation and bureaucratisation. Concerning the articulation between the Kasnazâniyya and the political field, we first study the phenomenon of “political clientelism” then analyse the political party created by the order through its history, its ideas, its organisation and social, political and electoral strategies to attain power.

No description available.

No description available.

<p>The purpose of this thesis is to examine clientelism in the Thai social, political and economic system during the period from 1947 to 1963. There are two important factors causing the emergence and maintenance of clientelism in Thailand: 1) the confined structure of political competition and economic control; and 2) the absence of formal institutions that can guarantee the individuals' wealth, status and position. Both Thai rulers and Chinese entrepreneurs have used clientelism as their "personal security mechanism."</p> <p>Clientelism also serves as an instrument of acquiring the high central command positions in the Thai armed forces. Some of the Thai military officers try to affiliate themselves with influential military-politicos. They will offer their political support and personal loyalty in exchange for appointments to the command of strategic army garrisons, and especially to the positions of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the Army Commander-in-Chief.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T20:23:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alderico Jose Santos Almeida.pdf: 1416731 bytes, checksum: 22b16d2cf0acd39ca37d5d096f454104 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-06 / Through this study, we propose to describe the political and electoral process in a poor state such as Maranhão, highlighting its main political forces and understand how they work, are reproduced and legitimated. However, the core of our research is to examine how the process of modernization and the actual progress of capitalist relations contributed to the evolution of the Colonels to sophisticated forms of political patronage, or the conversion of the vote in a bargaining tool, in which the transaction state is used, most often, as a middleman. Another goal of our work is to understand, too, why do Maranhão unable to develop economically, despite having potential conditions for growth. That is why we propose to also demonstrate the two faces of Maranhão, the first modern, in which each part of "big projects" that promise great results for the state's economy and the second of the delay, the extreme poverty of its population, as the social indicators, which we believe to be the locus for the persistence of political and electoral practices and the reproduction of oligarchic groups. For this work we made use of desk research, consultation with professional literature and field work, to characterize, mainly clientelist practices. We have reached a different result than found in most of the studies on practical electoral politics in the North and Northeast, which deny the exercise of electoral bargaining as a determinant for the politicians to win elections. The persistence of poverty in Maranhao and living conditions of the population, demonstrated by the dismal social indicators seem to explain the maintenance of patronage in the state, although this is not restricted only to people who fall into this situation. The population considered to be "literate" contributes to the consolidation of such practices in an attempt to obtain benefits and privileges / Através do presente estudo, nos propomos a descrever o processo político-eleitoral em um estado pobre como o Maranhão, destacando suas principais forças políticas e compreender como atuam, se reproduzem e se legitimam. Contudo, o cerne da nossa pesquisa está em examinar como o processo de modernização e os próprios avanços das relações capitalistas contribuíram para a evolução do coronelismo para formas sofisticadas de clientelismo político, ou seja, a conversão do voto em um instrumento de barganha, em cuja transação o Estado é utilizado, na maioria das vezes, como elemento intermediário. Outro objetivo do nosso trabalho é compreender, também, a razão do Maranhão não conseguir se desenvolver economicamente, apesar de possuir condições potenciais de crescimento. Daí porque nos propomos ainda demonstrar as duas faces do Maranhão: a primeira moderna, na qual si insere os grandes projetos que prometem ótimos resultados para a economia do estado e a segunda a do atraso , da extrema pobreza da sua população, medida pelos indicadores sociais, que acreditamos ser o lócus para a persistência de práticas político-eleitorais e para a reprodução dos grupos oligárquicos. Para este trabalho fizemos uso da pesquisa documental, consulta à bibliografia especializada e do trabalho de campo, visando à caracterização, principalmente, das práticas clientelistas. Chegamos a um resultado diferente do encontrado em boa parte dos estudos sobre práticas políticas eleitorais no Norte e Nordeste do país, os quais negam o exercício da barganha eleitoral como fator determinante para os políticos vencer as eleições. A persistência da pobreza no Maranhão e as condições de vida da população, demonstrada através dos péssimos indicadores sociais, parecem explicar a manutenção do clientelismo no estado, embora isso não se restrinja apenas às pessoas que se enquadram nessa situação. A população tida como letrada contribui para a consolidação de tais práticas na tentativa de obter vantagens e privilégios

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T14:58:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alderico Jose Santos Almeida.pdf: 1416731 bytes, checksum: 22b16d2cf0acd39ca37d5d096f454104 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-06 / Through this study, we propose to describe the political and electoral process in a poor state such as Maranhão, highlighting its main political forces and understand how they work, are reproduced and legitimated. However, the core of our research is to examine how the process of modernization and the actual progress of capitalist relations contributed to the evolution of the Colonels to sophisticated forms of political patronage, or the conversion of the vote in a bargaining tool, in which the transaction state is used, most often, as a middleman. Another goal of our work is to understand, too, why do Maranhão unable to develop economically, despite having potential conditions for growth. That is why we propose to also demonstrate the two faces of Maranhão, the first modern, in which each part of "big projects" that promise great results for the state's economy and the second of the delay, the extreme poverty of its population, as the social indicators, which we believe to be the locus for the persistence of political and electoral practices and the reproduction of oligarchic groups. For this work we made use of desk research, consultation with professional literature and field work, to characterize, mainly clientelist practices. We have reached a different result than found in most of the studies on practical electoral politics in the North and Northeast, which deny the exercise of electoral bargaining as a determinant for the politicians to win elections. The persistence of poverty in Maranhao and living conditions of the population, demonstrated by the dismal social indicators seem to explain the maintenance of patronage in the state, although this is not restricted only to people who fall into this situation. The population considered to be "literate" contributes to the consolidation of such practices in an attempt to obtain benefits and privileges / Através do presente estudo, nos propomos a descrever o processo político-eleitoral em um estado pobre como o Maranhão, destacando suas principais forças políticas e compreender como atuam, se reproduzem e se legitimam. Contudo, o cerne da nossa pesquisa está em examinar como o processo de modernização e os próprios avanços das relações capitalistas contribuíram para a evolução do coronelismo para formas sofisticadas de clientelismo político, ou seja, a conversão do voto em um instrumento de barganha, em cuja transação o Estado é utilizado, na maioria das vezes, como elemento intermediário. Outro objetivo do nosso trabalho é compreender, também, a razão do Maranhão não conseguir se desenvolver economicamente, apesar de possuir condições potenciais de crescimento. Daí porque nos propomos ainda demonstrar as duas faces do Maranhão: a primeira moderna, na qual si insere os grandes projetos que prometem ótimos resultados para a economia do estado e a segunda a do atraso , da extrema pobreza da sua população, medida pelos indicadores sociais, que acreditamos ser o lócus para a persistência de práticas político-eleitorais e para a reprodução dos grupos oligárquicos. Para este trabalho fizemos uso da pesquisa documental, consulta à bibliografia especializada e do trabalho de campo, visando à caracterização, principalmente, das práticas clientelistas. Chegamos a um resultado diferente do encontrado em boa parte dos estudos sobre práticas políticas eleitorais no Norte e Nordeste do país, os quais negam o exercício da barganha eleitoral como fator determinante para os políticos vencer as eleições. A persistência da pobreza no Maranhão e as condições de vida da população, demonstrada através dos péssimos indicadores sociais, parecem explicar a manutenção do clientelismo no estado, embora isso não se restrinja apenas às pessoas que se enquadram nessa situação. A população tida como letrada contribui para a consolidação de tais práticas na tentativa de obter vantagens e privilégios

Cette présente étude se propose d’actualiser la problématique des relations entre religieux et politique (dans l’espace sénégambien), en s’appuyant sur le cas des relations entre prédicateurs (saltigi) sereer et acteurs politiques. L’objet à partir duquel nous nous proposons d’analyser ces interrelations est le xoy, littéralement « l’appel » en sereer-siin. Les xoy sont des réunions de prédiction convoquées dans les localités sereer-siin à l’approche ou (plus rarement encore) pendant la saison des pluies. Les prédictions tenues (localement) par les saltigi et autres voyants sont en principe censées porter sur des questions tournant essentiellement autour de l’hivernage : pluie, récoltes, tempêtes, invasions de criquets, maladies etc. Cette forte orientation des xoy autour des questions d’hivernage, tout comme leur caractère communautaire ou local, semblent en revanche trancher d’avec le caractère associatif, « extracommunautaire », médiatique et national d’une réunion en particulier, celle organisée depuis 1981 par l’ONG PRO.ME.TRA dans la localité de Fatick et plus exactement dans un Centre de Médecine traditionnelle nommé Malango. Dans ce xoy auquel assistent des représentants locaux ou nationaux de l’Etat, les prédictions sont notoirement axées sur les questions de succession au sommet de l’Etat sénégalais. Ainsi, par une démarche de recherche associant en permanence données empiriques et éléments de littérature, nous analysons le sens et les fondements de ces prédictions axées sur le politique. Nos données nous conduisent à envisager ces prédictions comme l’expression et la conséquence d’un clientélisme discret entre acteurs politiques et saltigi du xoy de Malango. / This study is aiming to update the problem of the relationships between religion and politics in Senegambia. It is not based on the already well documented case of the relations between marabouts and modern politicians, but on the relation between sereer preachers (saltigi) and politicians. This research is based on an analysis of the xoy, meaning “the call” in sereer-siin language. Xoy are prediction reunions convened before or (more rarely) during the rainy season in sereer-siin localities. Predictions provided (locally) by saltigi and other seers are supposed to be about wintering: rain, harvests, tempests, grasshopper invasions, diseases, etc. This strong focus of xoy toward wintering questions, just as their local or community aspect, seems however to sever with the associative, extracommunal, mediatical and national dimensions of a particular meeting held by the NGO PRO.ME.TRA since 1981, that take place in Fatick (west-central Senegal) and more exactly in a traditional medicine center named Malango. This xoy is attended by local and national government representatives and predictions are notoriously focused on succession issues at the top of the Senegalese state. Thus, through empirical data (from 31 interviews and observations of xoy Malango) and elements of literature, we analyze the meaning and the basis of these political predictions. Our data show that these predictions are the expression and the consequence of a discrete clientelism between politicians and saltigi of the Malango’s xoy.

Male parliamentary dominance, rather than the corresponding female parliamentary underrepresentation, is the object of study in this thesis. This shift in focus implies a gendered analysis centered on men and men’s practices. The thesis contributes to our understanding of how male dominance is maintained and reinvented by empirically studying male parliamentary dominance in clientelist settings. Worldwide trends of parliamentary representation are analyzed statistically and constitute the starting-point for a case study of male political networks in Thailand. Clientelism is a strategy used by political actors to increase predictability in politically unpredictable settings. The thesis shows that clientelism is an informal political practice that requires the building and maintenance of large and localized networks to help distribute services, goods and/or money in exchange for political support. Where political parties also use candidate selection procedures that are informal, exclusive and localized, there are ample openings for clientelist practices to translate into political power and ultimately parliamentary seats. This study also coins and develops a new concept: homosocial capital. It shows that clientelist networks are and continue to be male dominated because homosocial capital, a political capital accessible only to men, is needed for electoral success. Homosocial capital has two main components: a perceived pragmatic necessity to build linkages to those with access to important resources in society and a more psychological desire to cooperate with individuals whose behavior can be understood, predicted and trusted.

Political success in semi-democratic countries has two aspects: shifting the balance of power in one’s favor and maintaining it. This thesis seeks to examine how the AKP has succeeded in shifting the balance of power in its favor while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not. Focusing on electoral success, existing research primarily lists center-periphery conflict, moderation, class struggle, party organization, and failures of others as the main determinants. Yet the significance of reining in the power of the Kemalist state structure has been mostly disregarded. Therefore, with a comparison of the AKP (2002-2007) and the Welfare Party (1996-1997) governments, this study tests one assertion using most-similar systems research design that in semi-democratic political settings with strong authoritarian actors, political parties that build broad coalitions via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections.