The aim of this thesis is to answer the question whether the U.S. policy on targeted killings with combat drones is compatible with the legal doctrine of just war theory, applicable international law, and human rights law. Moreover, this paper intends to examine the legal issues arising from the U.S. practice of international law in relation to the justification of targeted killings. The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether the practice of targeted killings can be considered lawful and, if not, to provide knowledge about how the method violates applicable international law and the ethics of war. The focus is placed on relevant treaties and customary international law, and just war theory is used as a theoretical complement to explain the meaning and purpose of selected laws in order to determine their applicability to the research problem. Furthermore, this procedure has been conducted by using a legal method to identify the legal problem and interpret relevant sources of law in order to determine their applicability to the research problem. The thesis has determined that the U.S. policy on targeted killings with combat drones is not consistent with applicable international law and fundamental human rights law. In particular, the practice of targeted killings violates the principle of distinction.

This research aims to illuminate how and why war challenges the limits of poetic representation, through an analysis of non-combatant poetry of the Second World War. It is motivated by the question: how can one portray, represent, or talk about war? Literature on war poetry tends to concentrate on the combatant poets of the First World War, or their influence, while literature on the Second World War tends to focus on prose as the only expression of literary war experience. With a historicist approach, this thesis advances our understanding of both the Second World War, and our inherited notions of 'war poetry,' by parsing its historiography, and investigating the role critical appraisals have played in marginalising this area of poetic response. This thesis examines four poets as case studies in this field of research-W.H. Auden, Louis MacNeice, Dylan Thomas, and Stevie Smith-and evaluates them on both their individual explorations of poetic tone, faith systems, linguistic innovations, subversive performativity, and their collective trajectory towards a commitment to represent the war in their poetry. The findings from this research illustrate how too many critical appraisals have minimised or misrepresented Second World War poetry, and how the poets responded with a self-reflexivity that bespoke a deeper concern with how war is remembered and represented. The significance of these findings is breaking down the notion of objective fact in poetic representations of war, which are ineluctably subjective texts. These findings also offer insight into the 'failure' of poetry to represent war as a necessary part of war representation and prompt a rethinking of who has the 'right' experience-or simply the right-to talk about war.

The United States Military is currently organized along the lines of regional combatant commands (COCOMs). Each COCOM is responsible for all U.S. military activity in their designated area of responsibility (AOR). They also deal with diplomatic issues of a wide variety with the countries within their respective AORs. Among these COCOMs, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), whose AOR encompasses all of Central and South America (less Mexico) and the Caribbean, is one of the smallest in terms of size and budget, but has the longest history of activity among the COCOMs as it is the successor to the first joint command, the United States Caribbean Defense Command (CDC 1941-1947). Existing from 1941 to 1947, the CDC was tasked with protecting the Panama Canal, the Canal Zone, and all its access points as well as defending the region from Axis aggression and setting up a series of U.S. bases throughout the Caribbean from which to project U.S. military power after World War II. Throughout its short history, however, the CDC was plagued with the same types of resource scarcity that its successor commands would later experience. Early successes, as well as the progress of the war saw to it that the original mission of the Command was quickly rendered moot. Ironically, it was partially the success of the U.S. war effort that kept the CDC from ever reaching its full potential. Nevertheless, the CDC evolved into something different than had originally been envisioned. In the end, it became the model that other COCOMs would follow after November 1947 when the system of regional combatant commands was formally established. Although some research has been conducted into the history of these commands, this dissertation is the first academic attempt to chronicle the history of the United States Caribbean Defense Command. Research into this topic involved combing through the Archives of the United States Southern Command in its offices in Miami, Florida (SOUTHCOM Archives), as well as the CDC archives in Record Group 548 in the U.S. National Archives II in Suitland, Maryland. Secondary sources as well as references regarding treaties and international agreements were also consulted as necessary.

Avant les Conventions de Genève de 1949, seuls les conflits armés internationaux étaient réglementés par le droit de la guerre. Ce dernier ne pouvait s’appliquer dans les guerres civiles qu’après la reconnaissance des forces rebelles comme partie belligérante. Or, depuis la Seconde guerre mondiale on a assisté à une multiplication des conflits armés non internationaux. Mais les Conventions de Genève de 1949 leur ont consacré seulement l’article 3 commun ; puis le Protocole II additionnel de 1977 est venu le compléter. Ces deux textes comportent de nombreuses lacunes, notamment l’absence de définition des « combattants » et des « civils », rendant ainsi difficile le respect du principe de distinction pourtant essentiel à la protection des populations civiles. Ces dispositions ne réglementent pas non plus les moyens et méthodes de guerre. Outre les lacunes normatives, il y a des problèmes matériels qui compliquent la mise en œuvre efficace des règles pertinentes. Il s’agit notamment de la participation des populations civiles aux hostilités, y compris les enfants-Soldats et les mercenaires. L’absence du statut de combattant dans les conflits armés non internationaux apparaît comme le problème principal compromettant l’efficacité du DIH. Celle-Ci ne contribue-T-Elle pas au non respect de ce droit par les groupes armés ? Faudrait-Il conférer ce statut à ces derniers en vue de les amener à appliquer le droit international humanitaire ou envisager d’autres moyens ? Lesquels ? / Before the Geneva Conventions of 1949, only the international armed conflicts were regulated by the law of the war. This last one could apply in the civil wars only after the recognition of the rebel forces as belligerent party. Now, since the Second World War we attended an increase in non-International armed conflicts. But the Geneva Conventions of 1949 dedicated them only the common article 3; then the additional Protocol II of 1977 came to complete it. These two texts contain numerous gaps, in particular the absence of definition of the "combatants" and the "civilians", making so difficult the respect for the principle of distinction nevertheless essential for the protection of the civil populations. These rules do not regulate either the means and the war methods. Besides the normative gaps, there are material problems which complicate the effective implementation of the relevant rules. It is in particular about the participation of the civil populations in the hostilities, including the children-Soldiers and the mercenaries. The absence of combatant's status in the non-International armed conflicts appears as the main problem compromising the efficiency of the international humanitarian law. Does not this one contribute to the non compliance with this law by the armed groups? Would it be necessary to confer this status to these last ones to bring them to apply the international humanitarian law or to envisage the other means? Which one?

This study examines the phenomenon of abusive violence (AV) in the context of the American Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency campaigns. Previous research into atrocities by states and their agents has largely come from examinations of totalitarian regimes with well-developed torture and assassination institutions. The mechanisms influencing willingness to do harm have been examined in experimental studies of obedience to authority and the influences of deindividuation, dehumanization, context and system. This study used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine the lived experience of AV reported by fourteen American military and intelligence veterans. Participants were AV observers, objectors, or abusers. Subjects described why AV appeared sensible at the time, how methods of violence were selected, and what sense they made of their experiences after the fact. Accounts revealed the roles that frustration, fear, anger and mission pressure played to prompt acts of AV that ranged from the petty to heinous. Much of the AV was tied to a shift in mission view from macro strategic aims of CT and COIN to individual and small group survival. Routine hazing punishment soldiers received involving forced exercise and stress positions made similar acts inflicted on detainees unrecognizable as abusive. Overt and implied permissiveness from military superiors enabled AV extending to torture, and extra-judicial killings. Attempting to overcome feelings of vulnerability, powerlessness and rage, subjects enacted communal punishment through indiscriminate beatings and shooting. Participants committed AV to amuse themselves and humiliate their enemies; some killed detainees to force confessions from others, conceal misdeeds, and avoid routine paperwork. Participants realized that AV practices were unnecessary, counter-productive, and self-damaging. Several reduced or halted their AV as a result. The lived experience of AV left most respondents feeling guilt, shame, and inadequacy, whether they committed abuse or failed to stop it.