Includes supplemental material. / Disaster relief operations, such as the 2005 Tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, and wartime operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, have identified the need for a standardized command and control system interoperable among Joint, Coalition, and Interagency entities. The Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 9 (SEA-9) Rapid Response Command and Control (R2C2) integrated project team completed a systems engineering (SE) process to address the military’s command and control capability gap. During the process, the R2C2 team conducted mission analysis, generated requirements, developed and modeled architectures, and analyzed and compared current operational systems versus the team’s R2C2 system. The R2C2 system provided a reachback capability to the Regional Combatant Commander’s (RCC) headquarters, a local communications network for situational assessments, and Internet access for civilian counterparts participating in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations. Because the team designed the R2C2 system to be modular, analysis concluded that the R2C2 system was the preferred method to provide the RCC with the required flexibility and scalability to deliver a rapidly deployable command and control capability to perform the range of military operations.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--RAND Graduate School, 2000. / "RAND Graduate School." Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-120). Also available on the internet via WWW in PDF format.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 5, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Syftet med studien är att förstå de upplevda förutsättningarna för att utöva ledarskap och ledning som individer på mellanchefsnivå i armén har att hantera i sin vardag. Studien är en kvalitativ, induktiv studie där empirin inhämtats genom intervjuer och respondenterna utgörs av ett antal individer på mellanchefsnivå i Armén. Resultatet av studien visar att Försvarsmakten har ett flertal organisatoriska utmaningar som skapar en upplevd känsla av tidsbrist hos respondenterna. Vilket i sin tur påverkar deras möjligheter att utöva det ledarskap och den ledning de önskar. Studiens övergripande slutsats är att kraftkampen mellan Försvarsmaktens maskinbyråkratiska styrning och viljan av att leda genom professionen och uppdragstaktiken, ger en otydlig ram för chefernas arbete. De tvingas, i sitt chefskap, in i en kontrollerande roll där de i stället vill vara mer i agerande eller ledande roller. Därmed uppstår en upplevd känsla av tidsbrist när de inte har möjlighet att utöva ledning på det sätt de önskar. Genom att i stället låta den professonella adhokratin utgöra den styrande kraften skulle det leda till en större balans i chefernas vardag. / The purpose of this study is to understand the perceived conditions for exercising leadership and command that middle line commanders in the Swedish army faces in their daily work. This is a qualitative, inductive study that has collected data from a number of middle line commanders in the Swedish army through the use of interviews. The results show that the Swedish Armed Forces has a number of organizational challenges that creates a perceived lack of time in the respondents. This in turn affect their possibilities to exercise the type of leadership and command style the wish. The study’s overall conclusion is that the power struggle between the Swedish Armed Forces machine-bureaucratic control and the will to lead by profession and mission-based tactics, creates a vague frame for the commanders’ jobs. They are forced into a controlling role when their wish is to work in a leading or acting role. Hence a perceived sense of lack of time is created when they are unable to exercise command in the way they wish. By instead letting the professional adhocracy be the governing force, commanders will experience a more balance in their everyday work.

No one worked harder on his own image than Bernard Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard for publicity. They were two very different types of personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills and operational strategic insights which enabled them to compensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armour in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts of logistical employment, which they replaced with beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or on superior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely as much - if not more - on the personalities of the commanders. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The overall aim of this study is to explore how people who have experienced events in the past re-contextualize these same events in the present. We analyse the discourse of the public trial in 1985 against the members of the first three Argentine military juntas in the most recent dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983). The study focuses on the discursive construction of civil responsibility. We examine the discourses of the witnesses that were called to testify at the trial by the defence attorneys of the accused Jorge Rafael Videla and Roberto Eduardo Viola, former de facto presidents of Argentina. The analysed testimonies concerned a specific event during the dictatorship, namely the meetings between the military junta and civil actors that were held in 1979 and 1980 with the declared purpose to create political dialogue between the military and selected parts of the civil society. Prior to the trial, these political dialogue meetings had not been considered to be particularly important in the history of the dictatorship, but the testimonies at the trial draw attention to the responsibility of civil actors in the crimes committed during the military dictatorship. In this study we investigate this theme in a novel way, focusing on the discursive tools used by civilians at the trial to explain their involvement in the dictatorship. We adopt the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). To establish relationships between social and linguistic aspects, we include the concepts of intertextuality, discursive strategies, appraisal and legitimation. The main research questions are: 1) How do people represent linguistically a historical event when they find themselves in a new historical context? 1a) What discursive representation of the latest Argentinean dictatorship are made by the participants (witnesses, judge, defence and prosecutor) in the trial against the military junta leaders in 1985?; 1b) What intertextual influences are present in the interactants’ discourses during the interrogations, and in what way do these discourses contribute to legitimise the historical past?; 1c) What language resources do the civilian witnesses use to represent the Armed Forces and the armed rebel groups)? and 2) In what way do the witnesses reconstruct their role in the political dialogue meetings, or more specifically, what linguistic resources do the witnesses use to represent themselves in relation to the responsibility of civilians in the military dictatorship? The results show that the witnesses, in general, interpreted the recent past of Argentina using discourses that on the one hand condemned the violence caused by the armed rebel groups and on the other hand justified the interference of the Armed Forces. These discourses were used in the construction of a positive identity of both the witnesses as individuals and the institutions to which they belonged. Furthermore, their discourses legitimized their own actions, when these supported the Armed Forces in their “war on subversion”. The overwhelming majority of the witnesses tried to evade the questions meant to clarify their responsibility on the events of the dictatorship. Most of the witnesses, during the interrogation tried to find discursive strategies and linguistic resources that could hide their support to the Armed Forces during the regime and they did not reveal clearly their position regarding the military illegal actions during the dictatorship. / Este trabajo tiene como objetivo general estudiar cómo sujetos que han vivido eventos en el pasado recontextualizan estos mismos eventos en el presente. Más específicamente queremos estudiar la construcción discursiva de la responsabilidad civil en la más reciente dictadura argentina, en el contexto del juicio a los excomandantes, realizado en 1985. Analizamos los discursos de los partidos políticos, los sindicatos y el sector empresarial (representado por la Cámara de Comercio Argentina). Estos actores fueron citados a declarar como testigos en el juicio a pedido de las defensas de los acusados Jorge Rafael Videla y Roberto Eduardo Viola. El tema principal en los interrogatorios fueron las reuniones de apertura del diálogo político, convocadas por el expresidente de facto Videla, a fines de 1979. Estas reuniones se proponían iniciar el proceso de redemocratización del país y revisar los hechos de la dictadura. En este trabajo, queremos contribuir a la comprensión de cómo se construyen eventos del pasado en el marco de una práctica discursiva particular; asimismo, queremos hacer un aporte en lo que se relaciona con la construcción discursiva de periodos traumáticos sobre los que no hay consenso. El enfoque adoptado se sustenta en el Análisis Crítico del Discurso (ACD) (Fairclough 1992b, 1997; van Dijk 1993, 1999; Wodak 1997) y en la Lingüística Sistémico-Funcional (LSF) (Halliday 1994), de donde surge la Teoría de la Evaluación (Martin 2001; White 2001; Martin y White 2005). Incluimos, además, la noción de representación de actores sociales (van Leeuwen 1996). Asimismo, con el objetivo de ampliar los alcances del análisis, incluimos la noción de intertextualidad (Kristeva [1966] 1986; Bakhtin 1981 y Fairclough 1992a, 1992b) y estrategias discursivas (Reisigl y Wodak 2001). Las preguntas que guían la investigación son: 1) ¿Cómo hacen actores que han participado en un acontecimiento histórico en el pasado la representación discursiva de esos mismos eventos en otro momento histórico?; 1a) ¿Cómo construyen discursivamente los actores involucrados en el juicio a los excomandantes la representación de la más reciente dictadura argentina?; 1b) ¿Qué influencias intertextuales predominan en los discursos de los interactuantes durante los interrogatorios y de qué modo legitiman esos discursos la última dictadura en Argentina?; 1c) ¿Mediante qué recursos lingüísticos realizan los testigos civiles la representación de los actores sociales protagonistas de esa historia (a saber, las Fuerzas Armadas y los grupos armados)?; 2)¿De qué modo llevan a cabo los testigos la reconstrucción discursiva del papel que desempeñaron en las reuniones de apertura del diálogo político o, más específicamente, mediante qué recursos lingüísticos se representan a sí mismos los testigos en relación con la responsabilidad civil en la dictadura, en el contexto del juicio? Los resultados muestran que el rol institucional de los participantes en el juicio enmarcó el modo de recontextualización de los sucesos del pasado y la representación de los actores sociales involucrados en ellos. De un modo general, los testigos hicieron la interpretación del pasado reciente de la Argentina utilizando discursos que condenaban la violencia practicada por los grupos armados, por un lado, y justificaban la interferencia de las Fuerzas Armadas, por otro. El uso de estos discursos contribuyó a la construcción de una identidad positiva de los interactuantes tanto a nivel individual como institucional, dependiendo de quién narraba los eventos. La evocación de discursos paralelos al juicio legitimaba al gobierno de facto y, al mismo tiempo, las acciones de los testigos, toda vez que estas estuviesen relacionadas con el apoyo dado a las Fuerzas Armadas en lo actuado durante la “guerra antisubversiva”. Una gran mayoría de los testigos intentó evadir las preguntas que querían elucidar cuestiones en torno a la responsabilidad que pudieran haber tenido bajo la dictadura. Concluimos que la mayor parte de los testigos se posicionó de manera poco clara en cuanto a su relación o postura acerca de la actuación militar ya que durante todo el interrogatorio intentaron encontrar recursos y estrategias discursivas que encubriesen el apoyo que habían dado a las Fuerzas Armadas durante la dictadura.

Military command is the single most important factor in the conduct of warfare. To understand war and military success and failure, historians need to explore command structures and the relationships between commanders. In World War I, a new level of higher command had emerged: the corps commander. Between 1914 and 1918, the role of corps commanders and the demands placed upon them constantly changed as experiences brought illumination and insight. Yet the men who occupied these positions were sometimes unable to cope with the changing circumstances and the many significant limitations which were imposed upon them. Of the World War I corps commanders, William Birdwood was one of the longest serving. From the time of his appointment in December 1914 until May 1918, Birdwood acquired an experience of corps command which was perhaps more diverse than his contemporaries during this time. He is, then, an ideal subject for a prolonged assessment of this level of command. This thesis has two principal objectives. The first is to identify and assess those factors which limited Birdwood???s capacity and ability to command. The second is to explore the institutional constraints placed on corps commanders during the 1914-1918 war. Surprisingly, this is a comparatively barren area of research. Because very few officers spent much time as corps commanders on their way to higher command appointments and because the role of the corps commanders in military planning and in the conduct of operations was not immediately apparent, their role has been practically ignored. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Army and divisional levels creating a deficient view of higher military command in World War I. However, corps commanders could and did play an important part in planning operations and in military affairs generally. Birdwood???s experience at Gallipoli and in France reflect some of the changes to command structures that were prompted by the successes and failures of operations directed at the corps level. In as much as these two theatres of war were vastly different and Birdwood was confronted with dissimilar problems, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of higher command after 1914. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources located in Australian and British archives, this thesis traces Birdwood???s career as a corps commander at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It also examines his tenure as G.O.C. of the A.I.F.

Military command is the single most important factor in the conduct of warfare. To understand war and military success and failure, historians need to explore command structures and the relationships between commanders. In World War I, a new level of higher command had emerged: the corps commander. Between 1914 and 1918, the role of corps commanders and the demands placed upon them constantly changed as experiences brought illumination and insight. Yet the men who occupied these positions were sometimes unable to cope with the changing circumstances and the many significant limitations which were imposed upon them. Of the World War I corps commanders, William Birdwood was one of the longest serving. From the time of his appointment in December 1914 until May 1918, Birdwood acquired an experience of corps command which was perhaps more diverse than his contemporaries during this time. He is, then, an ideal subject for a prolonged assessment of this level of command. This thesis has two principal objectives. The first is to identify and assess those factors which limited Birdwood???s capacity and ability to command. The second is to explore the institutional constraints placed on corps commanders during the 1914-1918 war. Surprisingly, this is a comparatively barren area of research. Because very few officers spent much time as corps commanders on their way to higher command appointments and because the role of the corps commanders in military planning and in the conduct of operations was not immediately apparent, their role has been practically ignored. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Army and divisional levels creating a deficient view of higher military command in World War I. However, corps commanders could and did play an important part in planning operations and in military affairs generally. Birdwood???s experience at Gallipoli and in France reflect some of the changes to command structures that were prompted by the successes and failures of operations directed at the corps level. In as much as these two theatres of war were vastly different and Birdwood was confronted with dissimilar problems, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of higher command after 1914. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources located in Australian and British archives, this thesis traces Birdwood???s career as a corps commander at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It also examines his tenure as G.O.C. of the A.I.F.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

No one worked harder on his own image than Bernard Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard for publicity. They were two very different types of personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills and operational strategic insights which enabled them to compensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armour in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts of logistical employment, which they replaced with beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or on superior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely as much - if not more - on the personalities of the commanders. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)