Beginning in the early nineteenth century, American jurisprudence grappled with the issue of marital property. States under the Anglo-American legal tradition of common law revised marital property allocations to allow wives to hold certain categories of property separate from their husbands. These changes were enacted, in part, to insulate a wife's property from the vagaries of the market but the judicial response reveals a larger narrative of ambivalence and anxiety about women, property, and the suggested mobility of separately held possessions. Marital property reform begins in an historical moment when the question of what a woman could own in marriage morphed into larger cultural anxieties such as the very meaning of ownership and things themselves in the face of new intangible properties. Writers of fiction also captured these anxieties, and created imagined scenarios of marriage and property to expose constructions of ownership, property, womanhood, and marriage. Edna Pontellier in Kate Chopin's The Awakening attempts her withdrawal from her marriage by dismantling the Pontellier home and removing what she believes she owns to a separate physical space. The tragedy of her story can be understood for its legal impossibility under common law, as well as the restricted meanings of marriage and separate property under Louisiana's civil law jurisdiction. At the end of Edith Wharton's Summer, Charity Royall chooses to secretly reclaim a brooch that was a gift from her lover. Her action suggests a desire for privacy and could be viewed as fraudulent to her marriage vows. Pauline Hopkins's character Hagar in Hagar's Daughter repossesses material spaces in which she was forbidden to own and control because of her race and gender, and uses the American justice system to support her claims to ownership and contractual rights. In contrast to Hopkins's tenuous but nonetheless optimistic portrayal of contract, Marìa Amparo Ruiz de Burton's novel Who Would Have Thought It? describes contract and the American legal system overall as empty promises. Marriage and property in Ruiz de Burton's novel work as tropes through which to critique nineteenth-century American society and the destructive force of capitalism within its most intimate spaces.

Le travail examine la part des représentations du droit dans la construction des cultures juridiques, illustrées par des situations relatives aux rapports à la terre. Trois contextes juridiques différents, la France, et deux de ces anciennes colonies, le Québec et le Sénégal, soulignent le rapport entre la légitimité du droit et la production normative. En se référant à la notion juridique de propriété, l'étude met en évidence les difficultés de diffusion du modèle et de la culture juridique française d'inspiration civiliste au Québec et au Sénégal et montre que le droit n'est pas l'objet de représentations et pratiques universelles, en examinant les mécanismes d'interprétations de ce modèle par les populations et les élites québécoises, amérindiennes et sénégalaises. La perspective historique, nécessaire pour étudier la culture juridique et les processus juridiques, permet d'envisager les pratiques du droit de l'époque contemporaine sous l'angle des relations entre les cultures juridiques que ce soit en terme de confrontation ou en terme d'échange. Deux questions émergent : celle de la nature du droit qui résulte des échanges et celle du rapport entre légalité et légitimité du droit produit. Les rencontres juridiques conduisent-elles à une situation de métissage du droit ou à une situation de pluralisme juridique ? La lecture théorique de cette question ne peut être dissociée du questionnement sur la légitimité de la production normative et conduit à examiner les pratiques des populations en présence.

In recent times, the Supreme Court of Canada has utilized the ancillary powers doctrine as a means of expanding police powers at common law. Less apparent is the fact that the proliferation of these coercive powers has been achieved solely on the basis of the Court’s unorthodox—and, indeed radical—use of precedent. Put shortly, it is my thesis that the ancillary powers doctrine has precipitated the undemocratic expansion of both state and judicial power. The actual powers created by the Court are, in themselves, fraught with deficiencies and incapable of delivering on the twin promises of providing fairness and predictability in the law. This is due to the fact that any ad hoc judge-made power will be created retrospectively and shown to lack comprehensiveness. Correspondingly, the constitutional protections available to Canadians have waned in strength, leaving them more susceptible to governmental intrusion. In constructing this thesis, I have reviewed both the historic and contemporary case law that has forged the ancillary powers doctrine in Canada. Significantly, the emergence of this doctrine could not have occurred without Parliamentary acceptance and condonation of the Court’s actions. However, it is on the basis of the Court’s perception that Parliament has failed to close off supposed “gaps” in police powers that the Court has been willing to enter the lawmaking fray. Moreover, the Court’s actions have effectively obviated the need for government to legislate and prospectively stipulate the powers possessed by its agents. Therefore, I have situated this institutional interplay within the “theory of gaps” devised by Hans Kelsen. This model is offered as a plausible explanation for how Waterfield/Dedman became conceived in Canada and, why, it has been permitted to take root. Importantly, the Kelsenian analysis that I advance is explanatory only. It does not present a defence or justify for the proliferation of common law powers in favour of the police or judiciary. The lawmaking paradigm, as described above, has had a pernicious effect upon constitutionalism in Canada. It is for this reason, I argue that the ancillary powers doctrine holds an illegitimate place in Canadian law, and should be reversed.

This thesis examines Bitzer's model of the rhetorical situation by using it, in combination with elements of Bormann's fantasy theme analysis to perform a criticism of radical right rhetoric. First, it identifies the exigencies that give rise to the sovereignty rhetoric employed by members of the radical right. This analysis then determines whether the speech meets the needs of its intended audience. To accomplish this task, two websites are analyzed: the Posse Comitatus/Christian Identity website and that of the Republic of Texas, a secessionist, common law/sovereign citizen's site. These websites claim to be the official websites of the two organizations. The analysis is a generative analysis, combining Bitzer's model of rhetorical situation with aspects of Bormann's fantasy theme analysis. Through performing the analysis, weaknesses and areas for improvement in Bitzer's model will be identified.Sovereignty and common law rhetoric comes in many variations, but all revolve around a central principle - that there are two classes of citizenship. United States citizenship is conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment and is accepted by participation in programs such as social security (Nagle, 1996). This form of citizenship is subject to extensive regulation and taxation. However, sovereignty rhetoric focuses on state citizenship. This type of citizenship is conferred by common law and can be recaptured by rejecting U.S. citizenship. Advocates of sovereignty argue that state citizens are not subject to most federal laws and cannot be taxed by the federal government.Why study common law/sovereign citizen rhetoric? There is broad crosspollination among extremist groups, and sovereignty rhetoric is a consistent theme for many of these groups (Shapiro, 1995). For example, individuals convicted of abortion bombings have had militia ties, and tax protestors attend preparedness expos' (Tharp & Holstein, 1997). Likewise, events such as the death of Randy Weaver's wife in the 1992 Ruby Ridge standoff, and the 1993 Branch Davidian fire are cited by extremists of numerous ideologies as evidence of a government conspiracy (Dyer, 1997).2 Furthermore, for every camouflage-clothed militia member, there are several amateur attorneys studying old law books, the Constitution and each other's websites in an effort to unravel the meaning of the "true" Constitution (Abanes, 1996).The Posse Comitatus and Republic of Texas websites are useful artifacts because they are clear examples of the types of rhetoric addressed in this study. The present incarnation of the Posse Comitatus merges Posse Comitatus and Christian Identity rhetoric, allowing exploration of the common law rhetoric of both groups through one website. While claiming not to be a militia website, the Republic ofI Preparedness expos offer survivalist training and equipment, firearms, ammunition and common law materials (Tharp & Holstein).Extremists are particularly fascinated by the date April 19, a date on which events ranging from the Revolutionary War to the Branch Davidian fire took place (Stern). In some circles, this date is called Militia Day and has assumed almost religious significance.Texas maintains at least three separate militias and features extensive discussions of common law and sovereign citizen rhetoric.To understand these groups, it is necessary to understand the exigencies that brought them into existence. Bitzer's model of rhetorical situation, with its focus on exigencies, is an excellent tool for understanding the social and economic factors contributing to the growth of these types of groups. However, Bitzer offers only limited insight into how the messages are spread and why people accept them. Bormann's fantasy theme method of analysis helps answer the questions of how the sovereignty/common law message satisfies the rhetorical and psychological needs of the group members. / Department of Communication Studies

This essay investigates the integral linkages between Gothic spaces and Gothic masculinities in three texts: Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto (1764), Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813), and Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights (1847). At the core of this examination is architecture, or more specifically, the physical constructions and built environments that comprise a man’s property. I explore how a man uses his property to construct, legitimize, and perform his identity. In the Female Gothic, the home is a place of anxiety for women, where patriarchal dominance and violence reign to constrain female agency. I argue that the home is also an anxiety-ridden space for men, who are similarly tyrannized by a force they have limited power to fight against: legality. The issue of legally legitimized property ownership as a means of defining masculine selfhood in these texts lead men to extreme, and arguably unnatural, resorts to cling to their coveted status as autonomous property holders and virile men. In short, I aim to define a specifically Gothic masculinity. Yet, by using Pride and Prejudice, I will argue that this Gothic masculinity is not limited to Gothic texts.

In Mabo v. State of Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, the majority of the High Court held that ???native title??? had survived the acquisition of sovereignty over the Australian continent and is ???recognised??? by the common law. However, all the judgments failed to articulate clearly either the nature of native title as a legal form, and the relationship of that legal form to the common law, or what is meant by ???recognition???. Twelve years later the High Court has still not provided a satisfactory understanding of any of these matters. The central problem investigated by this thesis is the nature of that relationship and of the legal interest of native title. It is contended that this relationship can be understood and ordered as a matter of jurisdiction. This thesis seeks to recuperate a substantive concept of jurisdiction, and specifically of a particular jurisdiction, that of the common law, and to demonstrate how the interest of native title results from the jurisdictional relationship between common law and indigenous law. Part I is a genealogy of native title, drawn out through a history of ideas about common law jurisdiction. It is an account of the legal practice of jurisdiction, through a conceptual elaboration of a particular jurisdiction: the common law. This part traces the history of the common law from its origins in a pluralistic, fragmented, jurisdictional landscape, to its current position as the ???law of the land???. It considers the traditional mechanisms and techniques through which the common law has ordered its relationships with other jurisdictions, and how it has appropriated matters traditionally within the purview of other jurisdictions, accommodating them within the common law as ???custom???. The thesis demonstrates that the same gestures and practices can be seen in modern native title decisions, and contends that the ordering which underpins both native title, and the Australian legal system, is jurisdictional. Part II examines the practice of jurisdiction through an examination of three technologies of jurisdiction, all of which contributed to the construction of the legal entity of native title as an act of jurisdiction: mapping, accommodation and categorisation.

Univ., Diss.--Passau, 2003. / Literaturverz. S. [383] - 394.

Habil.-Schrift Univ. Köln, 2007/2008.

Le Code civil permet à ceux qui souhaitent partager leur existence d'opter pour l'une des voies suivantes : vivre en concubinage, conclure un P.A.C.S. ou s'unir par le mariage. Tout à fait distinctes en 1999, ces trois formes de conjugalité sont de plus en plus souvent appréhendées de façon unitaire par la règle de droit, au point de pouvoir évoquer l'émergence d'un véritable droit commun des couples. Cette tendance à l'harmonisation, voire à l'uniformisation, a été clairement perçue par la doctrine et a été expliquée de plusieurs façons. Témoin d'une emprise des principes d'égalité et de non-discrimination pour les uns, ce droit commun s'expliquerait, pour d'autres, par la prise en compte de la seule communauté de vie. Ces explications nous ont toutefois semblé insatisfaisantes et c'est en observant les rapports entretenus entre couple et politique que cet élan unificateur nous a paru compréhensible: le droit commun des couples existe en raison de l'utilité qu'il présente pour la réalisation des fonctions étatiques, qu'il s'agisse de ses fonctions sociales ou économiques. De lege Lata, la règle de droit, moyen d'action du politique, ne reconnaît donc les couples unitairement que si cette appréhension est utile à l'Etat. Cette utilité est toutefois perçue ponctuellement, ce qui conduit à un droit commun lacunaire, construit par strates successives et incohérentes. Une réflexion d'ensemble sur l'utilité des couples pour la mise en œuvre des fonctions étatiques, associée à la défense essentielle d'une préservation · : du pluralisme, permettrait de reconstruire, de lege ferenda, un droit commun des couples plus cohérent et plus logique. / The civil code allows those who wish to share their lives to choose one of the following ways: to live a concubines, sign a P.A.C.S or to be united in marriage. Distinctly different from each other in 1999, these thee forms of union are more and more similar under the rule of law to the extent that a true common law for couples seems to have emerged. This trend towards harmonisation and standardisation was clearly perceived by the doctrine and was explained in several ways. Proof of the influence of the principles of equality and of non-discrimination for some, this common law would be explained by others as the taking into account of the only lifepartnership. These explanations seemed unsatisfactory to us and it was in observing the relations between couples and politics that this unifying momentum seemed comprehensible to us: the common law of couples exists due to the utility that it presents to establish state functions, whether they be social or economic. De lege lata, the rule of law, the means of political action only recognizes couples individually if this apprehension is useful to the State. This utility is perceived from time to time, which leads to a Jack of common law, built by successive and incoherent levels. A review of the usefulness of couples for the implementation of state functions, in association with the essential protection of the preservation of pluralism, would allow for the reconstruction, de lege ferenda, of a more coherent and more logical common law for couples.

In this article, the author tell us about the job of the constitutional judge and the importance that this takes in a context of crisis. Also, he highlights the conventionalization of law as the central task of constitutional judges. Likewise, he details the difficulties involved in this task and the challenges to be faced for the consolidation of a common law in Latin America. / En el presente artículo el autor nos habla sobre la labor del juez constitucional y la importancia que adquiere está en un contexto de crisis. Asimismo, resalta la convencionalización del Derecho como tarea central de los jueces constitucionales. De igual manera, detalla las dificultades que acarrea esta tarea y los retos a enfrentar para la consolidación de un derecho común en América Latina.