Choses in action are valuable assets. This has compelled (and been facilitated by) the development of legal devices such as equitable assignment to allow holders of choses to deal with them, inter vivos. This thesis makes two claims. First, equitable assignments are best conceived as a composite of a bare trust and an atypical agency where the assignee is authorised to invoke the assignor's entitlements against the obligor to the chose assigned, as the assignee pleases. On this conception, equitable assignments merely entail generation of a new set of jural relations as between assignor and assignee. Though these affect how the jural relations between assignor and obligor are to be discharged, those jural relations are left intact and unchanged, unless the requirements for 'statutory' assignments have been satisfied. Second, 'statutory' assignments are regulatory in effect. Where a debt or other chose in action has been validly equitably assigned and the requirements in s 136(1) Law of Property Act 1925 are satisfied, the specific entitlements set out in sections 136(1)(a), (b) and (c) will be passed from the assignor and transferred to the assignee. But that is only true with regards entitlements falling within those provisions, and the set of entitlements listed therein is not exhaustive. The composite model of equitable assignment, and the clarification of the nature of 'statutory' assignment, reduces confusion over their operation and effects. Accordingly, this thesis tempers the urge towards legislative reform of the law of assignment: reform may not be needed since the law is not incoherent, though it is certainly complex. And if targeted law reform to simplify the law on assignment be thought desirable, it is as well to know what one is reforming.

The sources of law, as we know them, have been designed under the concept of law of the romangerman system tradition. But, what is the role andposition of the sources of law in a Constitutional State   of   Law,   taking   into   account   that   theConstitution has, according to the author, its originon the Common Law System? Do the sources oflaw lose their utility or have to be rethought?In this article, the author introduces a succession of sources that come from the Constitution, with the aid of jurisprudence, as an undulatory effect thatirradiates all the constitutional legal order. / Las fuentes del Derecho, tal y como las conocemos,han sido pensadas bajo la concepción del Derechodentro de un sistema de tradición romano germánico. Pero, ¿cuál es el rol y posición de las fuentesdel derecho en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho, en la medida que la Constitución tiene, parael autor, origen en el sistema jurídico anglosajón?¿Acaso las fuentes de Derecho pierden utilidad otienen que ser repensadas?En el presente artículo, el autor presenta una su- cesión de fuentes que se desprende desde la Constitución, con la ayuda de la jurisprudencia, como una especie de efecto ondulatorio que irradia atodo el ordenamiento jurídico constitucional.

Submitted by Tomas Barros Martins Comino Comino (tomascomino@hotmail.com) on 2015-03-31T21:56:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Versao UPLOAD.pdf: 1077138 bytes, checksum: 863caeac5a0a10d25b9351f92d298894 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2015-03-31T22:14:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Versao UPLOAD.pdf: 1077138 bytes, checksum: 863caeac5a0a10d25b9351f92d298894 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-01T12:35:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Versao UPLOAD.pdf: 1077138 bytes, checksum: 863caeac5a0a10d25b9351f92d298894 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-06 / Firstly, the paper briefly describes the common law tradition, setting the duty to mitigate the loss into the context of its own. Then, the paper draws the general lines that identify the mitigation doctrine in common law jurisdictions. Attention is given to the justifications of the duty to mitigate the loss and the roles it plays, including in the cases subject to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). In its context, the duty to mitigate the loss is primarily justified by causation and functions as a limit to compensation; it is not a 'duty'; it is applicable to the plaintiff; reasonableness of the mitigation steps and reimbursement of expenses are essential features to the mitigation doctrine. Secondly, the paper studies the duty to mitigate the loss in Brazil, from selected works of commentators and from decisions of the Superior Court of Justice and various state courts. Research has shown that the duty to mitigate the loss, under the equivalent name of 'mitigation doctrine', entered into Brazil by the work of commentators but little reflected in court decisions. Deprived of this earlier influence, the duty to mitigate the loss returned to Brazil through an 'enunciado' of the Federal Council of Justice, submitted in a document whose content is subject to criticism in this work, especially on the matter of the close connection between the duty to mitigate the loss and good faith (in its objective sense). Once the Superior Court of Justice invoked the 'enunciado' and the document in which it is based to decide a specific case, the duty to mitigate the loss rapidly expanded in Brazil. In São Paulo, it has gained the status of principle and aphorism. In the Superior Court of Justice, it has been considered a sub-principle of good faith and has been applied to adjective and substantive criminal cases. Comparatively, the common law notion of the duty to mitigate the loss is quite different to the Brazilian notion of it. This work indicates these differences and concludes with a classification of the roles that the duty to mitigate the loss plays in Brazil and with a draft proposal aimed at modifying the current version of the 'enunciado' of the Federal Council of Justice. / Primeiramente, o trabalho descreve sinteticamente a tradição common law, inserindo o o duty to mitigate the loss em contexto próprio. Então, traça as linhas gerais que, naquele cenário, conformam o instituto. Atenção é dada aos fundamentos do duty to mitigate the loss e às funções por ele desempenhadas, inclusive nos casos subordinados à United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). No contexto próprio, o duty to mitigate the loss tem por fundamento primeiro a causation e funciona como um limitador do quantum indenizatório; não trata de um 'dever'; cabe ao demandante; tem na razoabilidade das medidas mitigadoras e no reembolso das despesas incorridas características essenciais. Em segundo lugar, a dissertação investiga o duty to mitigate the loss no Brasil, a partir da doutrina selecionada e de decisões do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e de diversos tribunais estaduais. As pesquisas demonstram que o duty to mitigate the loss, sob o nome de mitigation doctrine, ingressou no Brasil pela doutrina, mas desta forma repercutiu pouco nos tribunais. Desprovido desta influência doutrinária anterior, o duty to mitigate the loss retornou ao Brasil por meio de enunciado do Conselho da Justiça Federal, proposto em documento cujo conteúdo é objeto de reflexões neste trabalho, notadamente na questão da íntima relação entre o duty to mitigate the loss e a boa-fé objetiva. A partir do leading case no Superior Tribunal de Justiça, que adotou o enunciado e o documento que lhe serviu de proposta, o duty to mitigate the loss expandiu rapidamente no Brasil. Em São Paulo, foi alçado à princípio e brocardo. No Superior Tribunal e Justiça, foi considerado sub-princípio da boa-fé e aplicado em questões adjetivas e substantivas criminais. Comparativamente, o duty to mitigate the loss no Brasil guarda remotas semelhanças ao instituto homônimo da common law. Este trabalho aponta as diferenças entre os intitutos e concluí com a sistematização das funções que o duty to mitigate the loss desempenha no Brasil, formulando proposta para a reedição de enunciado do Conselho da Justiça Federal.

Text in Afrikaans / In hierdie ondersoek word gepoog om 'n regswetenskaplike basis vir "Die Verslag van die Maatskaplike Werker ingevolge artikels 14(4) en 15(1) van die Wet op Kindersorg as 'n Juridies Gefundeerde Hulpmiddel vir die Kinderhof' daar te stel. Die studie fokus onder andere op vroeere wetgewing rakende sekere regte van kinders voor die instelling van kinderhowe in Suid-Afrika, die aard en instelling van die kinderhof, die posisie van kinderhowe binne die hierargie van howe en die kinderhof se handeling. Ooreenkomstig die administratiefreg word die klem veral geplaas op die regsvereistes wat vir alle administratiewe handelinge geld - soos deur Wiechers (1984) gesistematiseer en deur Eckard (1988) op kinderhofondersoeke van toepassing gemaak is. Regswetenskaplike begrippe met inagneming van die relevante gemeneregtelike beginsels, die tussentydse Grondwet, ander relevante wetgewing en regspraak word ontleed ten einde die betekenis en invloed daarvan vir die verslag van die maatskaplike werker duidelik te maak. By implikasie hied hierdie ontleding ook riglyne vir die skryf van die verslag vanuit 'n regsperspektief. Aan die hand van genoemde regsperspektiewe word 'n voorlopige model binne 'n bepaalde struktuur vir die skryf van hierdie verslag voorgestel. Die regsbeginsels wat ontleed is, word doelgerig en planmatig aangewend in 'n poging om uitvoering aan die doelstellings van die kinderhof te verleen en die bewyswaarde van inligting maksimaal te verhoog. Kritiese stellings asook verskeie dilemmas waarmee die maatskaplike werkers in die praktyk te make het, word aangespreek en word nuwe betekenis aan die begrippe "maatskaplike werker" en "verslag" rakende kinderhofaangeleenthede verleen. By wyse van 'n beperkte verkennende empmese ondersoek binne die Christelike Maatskaplike Raad van Noord-Transvaal, word bestaande kritiek betreffende die verslae wat maatskaplike werkers aan kinderhowe lewer asook die maatskaplike werker se beperkinge rakende relevante regskennis bevestig. Spesifieke behoeftes aan kennis word geldentifiseer en 'n hernieude maatskaplikewerkperspektief rakende kinderhofwerk as 'n spesialiteitsgebied binne die maatskaplikewerkterrein word bevestig. Verder word die regsvereistes asook ander relevante vereistes wat op die verslag van toepassing behoort te wees, en soos vanuit die literatuurstudie bepaal is, beaam. Hierdie ondersoek is 'n nuwe bydrae tot die maatskaplikewerkvakliteratuur en baan die weg tot verdere navorsing en ontwikkeling op hierdie terrein. / This investigation attempts to establish a jurisprudential basis for the "The Report of the Social Worker according to articles 14(4) and 15(1) of the Act on Child Welfare as a Juridically Based Aid for the Children's Court". The study focuses inter alia on earlier legislation concerning certain rights of children prior to the establishment of children's courts in South Africa; the nature and institution of children's courts; the position of children's courts within the hierarchy of courts, as well as actions of the children's court. In accordance with Administrative Law the accent falls especially on legal requirements for all administrative actions as systematised by Wiechers (1984) and as applied by Eckard (1988) to examination in such courts. An analysis is made of jurisprudential concepts such as Common Law principles, the Interim Constitution, and other relevant acts of parliament and court verdicts in order to clarify their meaning and influence for this report. By implication this analysis also furnishes guidelines for writing the report within jurisprudential perspectives. With the aid of these perspectives a preliminruy model is presented within a specific structure for the writing of this report. The jurisprudential principles analysed, are purposively and methodically applied in an attempt to satisfy the goals of the children's court and maximise the value of evidence given. Critical statements and several dilemmas confronting social work practice are addressed, and in the court situation new meaning is accorded to concepts such as "social worker" and "report". By means of a limited exploratory empirical investigation within the confines of the Christian Social Services of the Northern Transvaal the present criticism of reports delivered to courts by social workers as well as their jurisprudential limitations have been confirmed. Specific knowledge deficiencies have been identified and a renewed social work perspective on children's courts as specialist field in social work has been established. Legal and other relevant requirements for this report - as found in the literature study - have been confirmed. This investigation constitutes a new contribution to social work literature and opens the way to further research and development in this field. / Private Law / D. Phil. (Social Work)

Summaries in English and Afrikaans / Text in Afrikaans / Until 1988, hearsay-evidence in our legal system was governed by common law. During this period resistance developed regarding the practice that hearsay which complied with certain exceptions could indeed be allowed. Case law excluded further exceptions being added. Legislation was enacted in 1988 in which hearsay was defined, a total exclusionary rule retained, but the Courts given a wide discretion to allow hearsay. Via this legislation a more accommodating stance towards hearsay was introduced. This dissertation aimed at measuring whether the legislation achieved its objectives and consisted of analysing case law and interviewing Judges and Advocates. The conclusion arrived at is that the legislation has only marginally changed the usage of hearsay in our legal system. The major obstacle lies in the attitude of practitioners who continue to distrust hearsay and do not utilize the mechanism provided by statute. / Tot en met 1988, is hoorse-getuienis in ons regstelsel gemeenregtelik beheer. In die tydperk bet besware egter geleidelik ontwikkel veral oor die gekunstelde wyse waarop hoorsê as aan bepaalde uitsonderings voldoen is wel toegelaat is. Regspraak het voorts ook bepaal dat geen verdere uitsonderings toegevoeg kon word nie. In 1988 is wetgewing uitgevaardig waarin hoorsê-getuienis omskryf word, 'n algehele uitsluitingsreel behou word maar aan die howe 'n wye diskresie verleen word om na oorweging van voorgeskrewe faktore, hoorsê wei toe te laat. Die oogmerk van hierdie wetgewing was om 'n meganisme daar te stel om soos by die civil regstelsels en sekere ander Iande, 'n meer toeskietlike houding jeens hoorsê te bewerkstellig. Hierdie verhandeling se hoofdoel was om te bepaal of die wetgewing in die doel geslaag bet. Om tot 'n bevinding te kom is regspraak ontleed, en is onderhoude gevoer beide met Regters en die Advokatuur. Die slotsom bereik dui daarop dat die wetgewing maar weinig verander bet in die gebruikmaking van hoorse-getuienis in ons regstelsel. Wat die wetgewing self betref, hoewel daar sekere besware te make is oor sekere bepalings, verskaf dit tog 'n bruikbare instrument. Die grootste struikelblok is gelee in die instelling van die praktisyns wat bly vasklou aan 'n gevestigde vrees vir hoarse en nie gebruikmaak van die nuwe geleentheid nou deur die wetgewing daargestel nie. / Law / LL.M.

Mercantile Law / LL. M. (Commercial Law)

Esta tese tem por objeto o estudo do direito sucessório dos companheiros na união estável, tema que, cada vez mais, tem despertado grande interesse da sociedade. O ser humano, em decorrência de sua falibilidade e suscetibilidade a doenças, ferimentos e velhice, está sujeito à morte, fim inexorável de sua existência. A pessoa fenece, enquanto seus bens remanescem, sendo transmitidos a seus herdeiros, legítimos ou testamentários, e legatários. A sucessão legítima é aquela que se dá de acordo com a ordem preferencial estabelecida na lei; a testamentária, a que ocorre de acordo com a declaração de última vontade do falecido, expressa em testamento. Os herdeiros legítimos podem ser necessários ou facultativos: estes podem ser afastados da herança pelo fato de o falecido dispor de seus bens sem contemplá-los; aqueles, entretanto, não podem ser privados de parcela mínima da herança, a que têm direito, chamada de legítima, a não ser que sejam excluídos da sucessão por ato de indignidade ou deserdados pelo testador, em decorrência de ato atentatório à sua pessoa, nas hipóteses previstas em lei. O Código Civil de 2002 modificou profundamente a sucessão decorrente dos vínculos conjugal e convivencial. O cônjuge passou a concorrer não só com os descendentes do autor da herança, dependendo do regime de bens, mas também com os ascendentes, neste caso independentemente do estatuto patrimonial adotado. Ademais, foi elevado à categoria de herdeiro necessário, à qual antes só pertenciam os descendentes e ascendentes do de cujus. O companheiro supérstite, por outro lado, não foi declarado expressamente herdeiro necessário, embora também concorra à herança com os descendentes e ascendentes do morto. A presente pesquisa examina a posição sucessória daqueles que vivem em união estável, considerada entidade familiar pela Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, em contraste com a sucessão do cônjuge, a fim de perscrutar, por meio de ampla investigação bibliográfica, legal e jurisprudencial, se o companheiro deve ou não ser considerado herdeiro necessário, do que dependerá seu direito à legítima. / The objective of this thesis is to examine succession law in connection with common law marriage (stable union), an issue that has garnered increasing public attention. Due to their intrinsic fallibility and vulnerability to disease, injury, and old age, human beings are subject to death, to the inexorable end of their existence. Yet while human beings are destined to meet their end, their property and assets remain behind, transferred to their heirs, either legitimate or testamentary, and legatees. Legitimate succession is based on the order of preference, as prescribed in law; testamentary succession is based on a statement of last wishes by the deceased, as expressed in a will. Legitimate heirs may be necessary or optional: although the latter may be left out of the inheritance by the deceased upon disposition of his or her property and assets, the former may not be deprived of a minimum share of the inheritance, to which they have a right, also known as legitime, unless they are excluded as a consequence of an act of indignity or disinherited by the testator by virtue of an offense against such person, as provided for by law. The 2002 Brazilian Civil Code significantly modified succession for cases of marriage and cohabitation. The spouse may now claim a share of the inheritance alongside the testators descendants, depending on the particular marital property system applied, and ascendants as well, in this case irrespective of the specific property division system invoked. In addition, spouses are now classified as necessary heirs, a category previously reserved for descendants and ascendants of the deceased. However, the Civil Code does not expressly include surviving partners as necessary heirs, although they are entitled to claim a share of the inheritance alongside the ascendants and descendants of the deceased. This study considers the succession rights of individuals in common law marriage, considered a family entity under the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, in contrast to spousal succession, with a view to examining, through a detailed investigation of the existing legal literature and jurisprudence, if partners should or should not be deemed necessary heirs, a determination on which their right to legitime largely depends.

Les institutions d’Estate Planning, issues des droits anglais et américain, permettent à une personne physique de transférer un bien, à son décès, à un bénéficiaire antérieurement désigné par lui, autrement que par succession. Il est apparu opportun d’analyser ces mécanismes juridiques dans leur contexte d’origine afin de mettre en oeuvre la qualification téléologique-fonctionnelle. Cette dernière n’a pas permis d’assimiler les institutions anglo-américaines à celles de l’ordre juridique français : elles sont exorbitantes du for.A l’issue de cette démonstration, il a fallu identifier la loi qui leur est applicable. Pour cela,les propositions doctrinales contemporaines ont été éprouvées. En raison des spécificités constitutives de ces institutions d'"Estate Planning", que sont le "right of survivorship", le "life interest" et le contournement de la procédure de "probate", la transposition des actuelles règles de conflits de lois est peu pertinente : les limites du système conflictuel ont été dévoilées. La seule voie qui pouvait encore être explorée, pour accueillir ces institutions dans l’ordre juridique français, était celle de l’émanciper du droit international privé du droit interne. Afin de vérifier la pertinence de l’élaboration d’une catégorie autonome et d’un critère de rattachement qui lui est propre, il a été nécessaire de s’interroger sur l’existence de lois de police et le contenu de l’ordre public international. Aucun de ces procédés alternatif et correctif de la méthode conflictuelle ne constitue un empêchement à l’énoncé de notre proposition de règle de conflit de lois spécifique aux institutions d’"Estate Planning". / Estate Planning institutions, from english and american laws, allow an individual to transfer property at death to a beneficiary previously designated by him, other than by succession. It became necessary to analyse these mechanisms in their original context so as to implement the teleological-functional qualification. This one failed to assimilate anglo-american and french laws institutions. Therefore, they are exorbitant institutions. Following this demonstration, we had to identify the law that is applicable to them. This is the reason why the contemporary doctrinal propositions were tested. Due to the specificities of the Estate Planning institutions –the right of survivorship, the life interest, and bypass the probate process, the implementation of the current rules of conflict of laws is irrelevant. The only way that could be further explored to accommodate these institutions with the french legal system was the international private law empowered the domestic law. In order to verify the relevance of the development of an autonomous category and its connecting factor, it was necessary to consider the mandatory rules and the content of the international public order. None of these methods, neither alternative nor corrective, constitute an obstacle for our proposed specific rule on conflict of laws to the Estate Planning institutions.

Magister Legum - LLM / Directors of companies are the forerunners in overseeing and strategically managing a company.1 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act) gives the board of directors the legislative obligation for a company to be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.2 The board of directors have a central role in the decision making and operation of a company; this position also applies to the board of directors of State owned Companies (SOC). This dissertation explores methods to hold directors of SOCs personally liable for irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure Irregular expenditure is defined as expenditure that does not comply with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), the State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968 or any legislation that provides for provincial government procedure.3 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure is defined as ‘expenditure which was made in vain and would have been avoided had reasonable care has been exercised’.This research aims to analyse legislative mechanisms put in place that hold directors of SOCs personally liable for irregular, reckless, wasteful and fruitless expenditure. Section 77(2)(b) and 218(2) of the Companies Act contains the legislative basis for the personal liability of directors of SOCs for irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure.

The general objective of this study is to lay out the bases for an assessment of the impact of foreign and local investment on indigenous people in East Africa. For this purpose it will explore the current and systematic practice of violations of human rights as against the obligation of states to promote and to protect human rights and to guarantee effective remedies for victims in cases where those rights have been violated under the international human rights law jurisprudence in an African context. Reveals how State sponsored investments in Maasai traditional land, particularly creation of national parks, game reserves and game controlled areas have changed the way of life of the Maasai as a “people” aggravating their marginalization. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Dr Lorite Alejandro of the Department of Law, American University - Cairo Egypt. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM