On 1 November, 1954 an armed insurgency against French rule commenced with a large scale terrorist attack throughout various parts of Algeria. France responded by sending troops from the continent to Algeria and was soon involved in a full out counterinsurgency against the Front Liberé National (FLN), a revolutionary movement organised in a classical communist insurgent pattern. Many of the experiences the French gained conducting counterinsurgency in Algeria have been examined by writers of COIN literature. The conclusions have been incorporated into counterinsurgency doctrines of many countries, and the works of Galula, who experienced the war, is considered basic literature for many counterinsurgency courses. This has been inherited by modern COIN literature. The US FM 3.24 draws from the French experiences and theorists in its main body. This essay examines whether modern counterinsurgency literature derived from French experiences and theories gained, fighting FLN fails to address the question on how the insurgent organisation is structured. It provides a few arguments why we should know this, such as knowing your enemy’s structure will help you understand his vulnerabilities. To archive this and lay a foundation for the argumentation it first compares the Algerian FLN to modern day Taliban to establish if their organisational structures are different or similar.

Inom ramen för ISAF genomförs nu en massiv utbildningsinsats i counterinsurgency, detta för att den nya strategin som tillämpas skall få stort genomslag. Den doktrin som används vid utbildning och vid genomförande är den amerikanska FM 3-24. Den bygger på flera andra doktriner, men är som egen helhet ny och relativt oprövad. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om faktorer i doktrinens operationslinjer bidrar till framgång. Detta görs genom att besvara frågan: I vilken utsträckning var det faktorer som framgår av FM 3-24 ”logiska operationslinjer” som gav framgång vid försvenskningen av Skånelandskapen? Designen för undersökningen är en fallstudie, där operationslinjerna i doktrinen har översatts och operationaliserats och sedan jämförts med ett urval av litteratur om försvenskningen av Skånelandskapen. Resultatet stödjer att utifrån detta enskilda fall leder användandet av FM 3-24 operationslinjer till ökad sannolikhet för framgång. Vilket ger en ökad legitimitet i doktrinens nyttjande. Uppsatsen har även ett underliggande syfte, att påvisa att det finns svenskt nationellt exempel på COIN.

Les savoirs contre-insurrectionnels regroupent un ensemble de documents de nature distincte : notes de travail, textes publiés, cours distribués dans les écoles de guerre, doctrines officielles ou officieuses qui constitue un « sens commun stratégique » à l’intérieur duquel se développent, se diffusent et se reproduisent les connaissances en matière de contre-insurrection. Ces savoirs cependant, ne sont pas restés ceux de l’institution militaire et ont souvent empruntés aux disciplines des sciences sociales, l’anthropologie et l’ethnologie pour commencer, les outils à même d’organiser et de formaliser leur contenu. Avec la guerre froide, ces savoirs prennent une autre dimension à mesure de leur rapprochement avec des disciplines telles que la sociologie et les théories de la communication et de l’information. Dans une perspective généalogique qui emprunte aussi bien à la tradition philosophique française qu’aux approches théoriques critiques des relations internationales ses outils méthodologiques, cette thèse montre que les savoirs contre-insurrectionnels véhiculent une représentation du monde particulière et qu’ils sont ainsi moins le produit d’un apprentissage issu de l’expérience qu’un enchevêtrement d’idéologies politiques que viennent justifier des développements scientifiques ayant vocation à promouvoir une lecture pacifiée de l’ordre social international. / The counter-insurgency knowledge encompasses a variety of documents of different nature: work notes, published pieces, courses given at military schools, official or unofficial doctrines, all of which constitutes a “strategic common sense”. This knowledge however has not been built within military institutions alone: social sciences, chiefly anthropology and ethnology, have provided suitable tools to organise and formalise its content. During the Cold War, this knowledge evolved as it drew closer to sociology and communication & information theories.The chosen genealogical perspective borrows methodological tools from the french philosophical tradition as well as from the critical approaches to international relations. This dissertation demonstrates how counter-insurgency knowledge conveys a specific world representation and that it is not as much obtained from learning and experience as it is a product of intertwined political ideologies justified by scientific demonstrations aiming at promoting a pacified view of the international world order.

David Galula var en fransk officer som 1964 skrev ner sina teorier om upprorsbekämpning.Dessa teorier har därefter fått ett enormt stort utrymme i både utbildningar och itillämpningar på konflikter världen över. Uppsatsen avhandlar skillnader och likhetermellan Galulas åtta operationella steg och NATO:s nya doktrin för COIN-operationer från2011.Syftet med uppsatsen är att studera de två verken för att utröna hur mycket Galulas teorieranvänds i en modern handbok gällande upprorsbekämpning. Kopplat till användet avGalula i doktrinen vill uppsatsen bedöma hur mycket plats Galulas teorier bör få i denmoderna svenska officersutbildningen.Uppsatsen har nyttjat sig av en kvalitativ textanalys samt en komparativ del där de tvåverken jämförs. NATO:s doktrin för COIN-operationer har analyserats med hjälp avGalulas åtta steg. Resultatet visar att Galulas teorier till viss del går att finna i doktrinen,men det är även mycket som ej går att koppla mellan verken.

Contemporary peace operations are deployed to increasingly complex, high-risk environments where localised armed groups, often those that can influence the trajectory of the conflict are not at the table, at the same time militaries are mandated to facilitate social, economic and political transformative processes in recovered areas. By the opening of the twenty-first century, the distinction between peacebuilding and military interventions converged both in policy and practice and increasing pressure are placed on the troop-contributing countries to adapt to the dynamics of ‘multidimensional peace operations. Drawing upon the intersection between the academic bodies of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, this research argues that there is a growing amount of empirically grounded literature that seeks to critically assess missions’ peacebuilding capability, and more specifically its impact on local settings. Yet, most studies tend to be framed in relation to conflict abatement along reductionist approaches to development rather than analysing how and in what ways such missions aid in providing a stable polity, thus suggesting a need of further investigation about the phenomena. In contribution to the community of practice(s), this research draws upon the latest theoretical trend of peacebuilding, abiding to a system perspective of the 5 Capabilities Framework (5Cs). This, in order to attain an increased understanding of military actors’ involvement and ability to undertake early peacebuilding tasks, by studying the case of the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Jubbaland region. Moreover, the research was operationalised through an on-ground collection of data in Kenya and Somalia, using unstructured and semi-structured interviews and draws upon a purposive sampling method to gather perspectives from a variety of actors involved in peace operation affairs. The study finds that the AMISOM KDF has played a key role in shaping the organisation’s peacebuilding policy, with a diverse portfolio engagement of both top-down and bottom-up character. Working predominantly through informal structures, much of their engagement is not aligned with the AMISOM civilian headquarters, in response to an environment with many challenges, resulting in a patchwork of practices with sectoral difference. Analytically, the 5Cs framework posit that an organisation must strike a balance between all capabilities in order to produce social value, something that the Kenyan contingents have struggled to achieve. While this unpacks a view of moderate, to low capacity for peacebuilding, it also generates an overall critique to the framework as it promotes a scenario which seems impossible to realise. Despite its ‘system-wide’ contribution, questions remain regarding the value of the framework in analysing local peacebuilding engagement in peace operations.

Contemporary peace operations are deployed to increasingly complex, high-risk environments where localised armed groups, often those that can influence the trajectory of the conflict are not at the table, at the same time militaries are mandated to facilitate social, economic and political transformative processes in recovered areas. By the opening of the twenty-first century, the distinction between peacebuilding and military interventions converged both in policy and practice and increasing pressure are placed on the troop contributing countries to adapt to the dynamics of ‘multidimensional peace operations’. Drawing upon the intersection between the academic bodies of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, this research argues that there is a growing amount of empirically grounded literature that seeks to critically assess missions’ peacebuilding capability, and more specifically its impact on local settings. Yet, most studies tend to be framed in relation to conflict abatement along reductionist approaches to development rather than analysing how and in what ways such missions aid in providing a stable polity, thus suggesting a need of further investigation about the phenomena. In contribution to the community of practice(s), this research draws upon the latest theoretical trend of peacebuilding, abiding to a system perspective of the 5 Capabilities Framework (5Cs). This, in order to attain an increased understanding of military actors’ involvement and ability to undertake early peacebuilding tasks, by studying the case of the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Jubbaland region. Moreover, the research was operationalised through an on-ground collection of data in Kenya and Somalia, using unstructured and semi-structured interviews and draws upon a purposive sampling method to gather perspectives from a variety of actors involved in peace operation affairs. The study finds that the AMISOM KDF have played a key role in shaping the organisation’s peacebuilding policy, with a diverse portfolio engagement of both top-down and bottom-up character. Working predominantly through informal structures, much of their engagement is not aligned with the AMISOM civilian headquarters, in response to an environment with many challenges, resulting in a patchwork of practices with sectoral difference. Analytically, the 5Cs framework posit that an organisation must strike a balance between all capabilities in order to produce social value, something that the Kenyan contingents have struggled to achieve. While this unpacks a view of moderate, to low capacity for peacebuilding, it also generates an overall critique to the framework as it promotes a scenario which seems impossible to realise. Despite its ‘system-wide’ contribution, questions remain regarding the value of the framework in analysing local peacebuilding engagement in peace operations.

The United States was throughout the history engaged in several conflicts which had a character of counterinsurgency. These are - among others- War in Vietnam and second War in Iraq. These two conflicts are examined in this diploma thesis. Author poses a question how did counterinsurgency tactics evolved in both conflicts. The second question is whether the United States implemented counterinsurgency experiences from Vietnam War in Iraq War and if so, how they were implemented. The United States developed several counterinsurgency programs and the most of them were successful - they prevented Vietcong from spreading its influence in South Vietnam. However these programs were often poorly financed, or they did not gain enough support from The US Army, because the Army prefered conventional approach in fighting against communists. The United States fought a conventional warfare in the first few years of Iraq War and it had not succeeded in garnering popularity among civilians. The change came with a new commander- general David Petraeus. Petraeus was inspired by the experiences from the Vietnam War (and other conflicts) and he concentrated his effort on providing safety to Iraqi population. This strategy paid off and the Army had much less losses during his command then during the pre - 2007 period....

Insurgencies have been a nuisance for modern armies to deal with for centuries and recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland supports that claim. Counterinsurgency theories present different solutions for the same problems and old proven theories get challenged by modern ones. Researchers therefore differ in their opinions whether the classical proven theories are still relevant to guide modern counterinsurgency. A lot of modern counterinsurgency doctrines are still heavily based on these classical theories which leads to the purpose of this study, to investigate if an old theory still can explain the outcome of modern counterinsurgency operations. A fitting theory for this goal is the British theorist Thompsons which’s influence still can be observed in modern counterinsurgency doctrines. The study’s findings indicate that an old theory such as Thompsons still contributes to explain the outcome of modern counterinsurgency operations. The analysis illuminates that the greater extent of observance according to the principles of the theory will result in a more successful counterinsurgency overall. Though further research is required to consolidate these affirmations.

Counterinsurgency warfare has had an ambiguous position in the American military tradition. After the Vietnam experience, the population-control-oriented doctrine of David Galula was almost forgotten. Current war of the United States of America in Afghanistan turned out to be a conflict where application of the doctrine comes in question. It is codified in the 2006 FM 3-24 counterinsurgency manual. The author of the thesis Spojené státy americké a protipovstalecký boj: Afghánistán asks a question whether the behavior of American armed forces in Afghanistan was in compliance with the COIN doctrine of David Galula. The author looks at the conflict through lens of Galula's eight counterinsurgency steps, as defined in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. The author of the thesis looks for factors that could influence fulfilment of the steps and he gives the factors in perspective with American strategic culture, as defined in the thesis. The analysis shows that the fulfilment of Galula's eight steps has never occurred. Traditional military thinking partially locked successful adaptation of American armed forces to the environment of Afghanistan. However, the author comes to the discovery that in terms of strategic culture, there were some shifts in Afghanistan.

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