This thesis analyses the United States Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency strategy in Vietnam between March 1965 and November 1968, filling a major gap in the existing literature by forensically examining the primary source records maintained by the United States Marines to produce an assessment of the effectiveness of the strategy. It provides a useful corollary to the diplomatic and military histories of the war because not only does it examine operational-level thinking about the war but it analyses the intellectual antecedents of the Marines’ counterinsurgency strategy to answer the important questions about why the Marines chose to emphasis pacification and the ‘ink blot’ strategy rather than conducting a more conventional campaign that focused upon the destruction of enemy forces. The Marines’ own experience of counterinsurgency in the early part of the 20th Century, as well as the work of counterinsurgency theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, had a considerable impact upon their approach to the Vietnam War. The decision of the senior Marine commanders to adopt a pacification strategy along the lines of the ‘ink blot’ approach promulgated by these French and British counterinsurgency experts was partly the result of their view of the political nature of the war and partly the result of the reality they faced on the ground. At the time the Marines deployed to Vietnam their mission was to protect three bases on the coast in the northern provinces of South Vietnam and the Marines realised that the security of these establishments could be greatly improved if the population supported the Marines (and, by extension the South Vietnamese government) rather than the insurgents. Therefore, the ‘spreading ink blot’ of pacification was a product of the need to improve security as well as an attempt to challenge the political nature of communist revolutionary warfare. The metrics used to measure progress in the war were flawed, but there are other indicators within the Marines’ records that show they were conducting an effective and appropriate counterinsurgency campaign, within the limitations imposed by lack of resources and general inability to influence the war as a whole. When the Tet Offensive was launched in early 1968, the Marines use of pacification as ‘defence in depth’ allowed them to successfully defend the coastal enclaves by countering both the political and military efforts of the North Vietnamese in those areas.

Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om teorin för ”Hearts and Minds” kan nå framgång med militär vilseledning. De teorier som finns sedan tidigare berör inte hur teorierna om att vinna befolkningens stöd skall gå till när militär vilseledning och upprorsbekämpning används. För att undersöka om militär vilseledning kan användas framgångsrikt inom arbetet att vinna ”Hearts and Minds” blir teorier för militär vilseledning och teorier för upprorsbekämpning beskrivna. Undersökningen analyserar den genomförda vilseledning som finns inom konflikterna på Nordirland, Algeriet 1954-1962 och Malaysia 1948-1960 för att belysa de fall av vilseledning som funnits inom upprorsbekämpningen i konflikterna. Slutsatserna av uppsatsen visar att vilseledning sannolikt inte hjälper arbetet med ”Hearts and Minds” på ett framgångsrikt sätt. Dock kan vilseledning skapa förutsättningar för ”Hearts and Minds”-operationer om det går att säkerställa att effekten av vilseledningen är isolerad till rebellerna och inte befolkningen. / The purpose of this essay is to explore whether or not military deception can aid the work with “Hearts and Minds”. The theory that already exist do not deal with the incorporation of how the work with “Hearts and Minds” should be done with regards to military deception. Theorys for counterinsurgency and military deception are described in order to explore whether deception could be used usefully within a “Hearts and Minds”-operation. The study analyzes the executed deception found in the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Algeria and Malaysia, 1954-1962 1948-1960, to show the cases of military deception within the insurrectionperformed by the counterinsurgent. The conclusions of the thesis shows that deception is unlikely to help work on "Hearts and Minds" in a successful manner. However, deception may create conditions for "Hearts and Minds" operations if it is possible to ensure that the effect of deception is isolated to the rebels and not to the people.

The war in Iraq is neither won, nor lost. To achieve US objectives in Iraq it is critical to understand not only the Iraqi Sunni components of the ongoing conflict, but also the Salafi-Jihadist elements as well. This thesis uses a social mobilization approach to study of the Salafi-Jihadi insurgent group, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) describing the group's political opportunities, mobilizing structures, frames and repertoires of action. The result of this analysis shows an internationally-supported ideologically-motivated, militant group with few Iraqi-specific political or social strengths. This thesis applies this knowledge to established counterinsurgency methods to highlight organizational strengths and weaknesses in comparison to a normative counterinsurgency effort. This relational analysis views the conflict through a six dimensional framework to examine where the insurgents have significant strength and where they are vulnerable to counterinsurgency actions. We then examine the current status of the counterinsurgency operations and stabilization effort in Iraq. Trend-analysis tracks changes in key indicators through time underscoring areas for concern and areas of positive movement. Based on the nature of AQI and the current trends, this thesis will draw general conclusions and provide recommendations based on the AQI threat designed to undercut its strengths and exploit its weaknesses.

This thesis aims to develop a better understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare through a thorough analysis of the nature and strategies of insurgency and a comparative examination of the current strategic approaches to counterinsurgency warfare. Toward this end, a systems model approach, which views insurgent organizations as open systems, is adapted to the insurgent environment. Popular support, external support, and insurgent organization are determined as the major variables of the insurgency system. The evolution of French counterrevolutionary doctrine and its implementation in the Algerian rebellion is examined under the light of the major variables of the system and strategies of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. After an analysis of the F.L.N. tactics and French countermeasures, three important propositions are offered: First, popular support is the primary condition for the success of the insurgent organization; second, political, social, economic, and administrative factors have a primacy over military factors; and, third, domestic factors have a primacy over external factors in the outcome of a rebellion.

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / The insurgency in Iraq has continued despite the determination of U.S. and Iraqi forces. U.S. counter-insurgent strategy has operated from the premise that the main thrust behind anti-U.S. activities is a combination of Sunnis desiring a return to their former privileged position and tribal collective actors with long-standing grievances fuelled by radical Islam. Yet an analysis incorporating insights from gang theory illuminates the diverse, practical, and local motivations of those involved in insurgent networks. Gang theory is uniquely suited to illuminate the street-level dynamics that drive insurgent violence. Through this, a more precise picture of the relevant networks and their operative motivations can be drawn, allowing finer tuned policies targeted to the differentiated factors behind non-state violence. I first consider the origins of and interactions between the armed groups operating in Iraq for discernable trends in development, paying particular attention to factors consistent with gang models. I then alter the gang model for the context of Iraq, and present an integrated model that articulates the likely effects of state-insurgent interaction on stability and security there. I conclude with recommendations demonstrating the model's relevance for strategic use in other regions.

This thesis develops a model for understanding and conducting war at the level of grand strategy. Grand strategy seeks the seamless integration of all aspects of national power to achieve a desired policy goal. The model is named the "Instrument-Element Model" because it focuses on the essential elements which underlie the instruments of power by which belligerents contend with each other. Each belligerent is modeled by three elements: the people, the government and the military. Belligerents affect each other using the instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military force, economic leverage, and this thesis argues, ethical principles. This thesis argues that successful grand strategies can focus on the people, the government or the military. The Instrument-Element Model is tested and illustrated by an analysis of three wars in which a successful grand strategy focused on each of the three elements: the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (focusing on the Military), the 1999 Kosovo War (focusing on the Government) and the Algerian Revolution (focusing on the People). This thesis also considers how to apply the Instrument-Model to terrorist and insurgent groups, and concludes with three recommendations to help our Republic think, fight and win grand-strategically.

In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counterinsurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army's formal military educational training system. This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army's professional education curriculum.

The modern battlefield is a changing environment where new ideas and technology are being tried and implemented. One such technology that has brought recent changes to the battlefield is the Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAV), commonly (and often incorrectly) referred to as “drones”. UCAV can be considered the new weapon of choice to deal with irregular opponents or terrorist organisations, such as those in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the use of UCAV is not without contradictory elements and leads to debate. It is within this debate that this study takes foothold. This study will be analysing the debate and issues surrounding this by evaluating four contrasting variables, measuring impact through different means and aiming to increase the understanding of UACV in the field. There are several crossovers in the analysis of all four variables citing the strengths and weaknesses of UCAV provisions in conflict. The analysis, however, conclude that a sole, holistic use of UCAV strikes would not resort in a termination of threats, such as the Taliban or Al-Qaida. This means that both the positive and the negative aspects of UCAV are seen in the conflict and do not contradict one another. Regretfully, this implicates that even if the Taliban and Al-Qaida becomes less effective due to the UCAV strikes, they will not perish.

O presente trabalho visa abordar as características do sistema político mexicano que permitiram o passo silencioso de um Estado com traços autoritários para um contrainsurgente. O sistema político mexicano, derivado da Revolução popular iniciada em 1910 e da criação do Partido Revolucionario Institucional(PRI), propiciou uma cultura política que fortaleceu a figura presidencial. Esta extrapolava as atribuições constitucionais e se legitimava tanto na política interna como na externa através do \"nacionalismo revolucionário\". Os governos de Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Luis Echeverría e José López Portillo (1964-1982) estão marcados pela crise hegemônica evidenciada na radicalização das organizações de esquerda. Entre outros motivos, pelo esgotamento do modelo econômico desenvolvimentista, pela crise de representatividade do partido e falta de espaços para a participação política, pela corrupção das instituições e a escalada de violência do Estado contra a oposição. Nesses dezoito anos localizamos uma transformação nas formas de violência institucional pela assimilação da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional e a Doutrina Contrainsurgente dos Estados Unidos da América, por exemplo, na consolidação de grupos paramilitares pagos pelo Estado e treinados em norte-américa. O nacionalismo revolucionário possibilitou então que a submissão à ideologia estadunidense não fosse explícita, gerando dinâmicas repressivas (qualitativamente) similares às vivenciadas nas ditaduras latino-americanas. Ainda que o México tenha sido considerado uma democracia exemplar alheia às guerras sujas e aos golpes de Estado que comoveram o continente na segunda metade do século XX. O objetivo deste trabalho é salientar os elementos contraditórios existentes entre o discurso público, analisado a partir dos informes presidenciais, e o discurso elaborado desde os órgãos de segurança, isto é, os relatórios da Dirección Federal de Seguridad. Nessas contradições podemos ir avaliando as formas de alinhamento às doutrinas de segurança estrangeiras. / The main objective of this Master\'s project is to address the characteristics of the Mexican political system that allowed the silent step from a state with authoritarian traits to a counterinsurgent one. The Mexican political system, derived from the popular revolution that began in 1910 and from the creation of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, maintained a political culture that strengthened the figure of president. This went beyond the powers permitted by the constitution and legitimized both internal and external policies through \"revolutionary nationalism.\" The governments of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Luis Echeverría, and José López Portillo (1964-1982) are marked by a hegemonic crisis seen in the radicalization of leftist organizations. Other motives for this shift include: the depletion of the developmentalist economic model, the crisis of representation in the party and a lack of spaces for political participation, the corruption of institutions, and the escalation of state violence against the opposition. In these eighteen years, a transformation occurs in the form of institutional violence through the assimilation of the National Security Doctrine of the United States; for example, the consolidation of paramilitary groups paid by the state and trained by northern neighbors. Revolutionary nationalism then allowed the non-explicit submission to American ideology, generating results (qualitatively) similar to those experienced in the repressive dynamics of Latin American dictatorships. Still, Mexico has been considered an exemplary democracy, despite dirty wars and coups that shocked the continent in the second half of the twentieth century.The aim of this study is to highlight the contradictory elements between the public discourse, analyzed from the presidential reports, and the discourse developed from the security organs, in other words, the reports of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad. These contradictions we can to evaluated the alignment of forms to foreign security doctrines.

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