The following thesis deals with the question of ideological conflict between the Eastern Bloc and the Chilean military junta. The author of the thesis investigates the media portrayal of Czechoslovakia in Chile and analyses the Czechoslovak media propaganda against the Chilean military government. The qualitative analysis is accompanied by the memories of four Czechs who lived in Chile during the period. The main focus is on the years 1973, 1988 and 1989. The first year marks the beginning of the military dictatorship, the year of the biggest shock. The years 1988 and 1989 mark the end of the nondemocratic governments in both countries, Chile and Czechoslovakia. The daily journals chosen for the analysis were the most important newspapers in the countries of interest. These were El Mercurio and La Segunda in Chile, and Rudé právo and Mladá fronta in Czechoslovakia. The media analysis is accompanied by interviews with Milan Syruček, the foreign editor at Mladá fronta (1973), and Bohuslav Borovička, a Rudé právo reporter in Havana who travelled to Chile in 1988. The thesis offers a theoretical part with a summary of modern Chilean history and the question of ideologies in the Latin American state. There was conservative anticommunism with roots already at the beginning of the 20th century. On the...

Orientador: Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T17:33:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 BrisoNeto_JoaquimLuizPereira_M.pdf: 1314143 bytes, checksum: 6a9e5a48cce59d1ac6fe4368a3e8a7a8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Esta pesquisa procura demonstrar que havia um projeto conservador de governo ¿em construção¿ no período de crise do desenvolvimentismo (1961-1964), apoiado nos trabalhos do Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES) e de outros pólos contrários ao nacional-reformismo. Precisamente, discorre sobre um momento importante da ¿construção¿ desse projeto conservador: o Congresso Brasileiro para a Definição das Reformas de Base (1963) ¿ evento realizado em São Paulo reunindo políticos, empresários e acadêmicos com vistas à elaboração de uma plataforma de políticas públicas modernizadoras do capitalismo no Brasil. Mediante a análise dos Anais do ¿Congresso¿, descreve como se desdobraram os debates e as resoluções relacionadas à temática das Reformas Financeiras: o Conselho Monetário (CM), Banco Central (BC), Banco Rural, Legislação Bancária, Sistema Financeiro. Compara tais debates e resoluções aos que resultaram na Lei nº. 4595 de 31 de dezembro de 1964 ¿ a qual dispôs sobre a criação do Conselho Monetário Nacional (CMN), como órgão normativo da política monetária, e a transformação da Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC) em Banco Central do Brasil (BCB), como órgão executivo. A conclusão a que chega é que resistências e interesses setoriais similares permearam o encaminhamento das Reformas Financeiras no Congresso Nacional e no Congresso Brasileiro para a Definição das Reformas de Base, e ¿soluções de compromisso¿ equivalentes foram acordadas para preservar a aliança conservadora. Essas ¿soluções de compromisso¿ consistiram numa redistribuição das funções de BC entre o BCB e o Banco do Brasil (BB). Aquele herdou, entre outras, as funções de fiscalização dos bancos, do redesconto, da emissão e da guarda dos depósitos compulsórios; este permaneceu com as funções de Agente Financeiro do Governo, crédito rural e comércio exterior / Abstract: The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that it had a conservative governmental project ¿being elaborated¿ in the period of crise do desenvolvimentismo (1961-1964), supported on the work of Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES) and others poles contrary to nacional-reformismo. Precisely, it discusses an important moment of the conservative project¿s ¿elaboration¿: the Congresso Brasileiro para a Definição das Reformas de Base ¿ an event which took place in São Paulo and brought together politicians, businessmen and academics with the aim of elaborating a platform of public policies for the modernization of Brazil¿s capitalist system. Through the analysis of the event¿s archives, it describes how the debates and resolutions related to Financial Reforms unfolded: the Monetary Council (CM), Central Bank (BC), Rural Bank, Banking Legislation, Financial System. It compares these debates and resolutions with those which resulted in Law nº. 4595 of December 31st, 1964 ¿ which set up the National Monetary Council (CMN) as a normative organ of monetary policy, and effected the transformation of the Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC) at the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB) into an executive organ. The conclusion it reaches is that resistance and similar sectoral interests permeated the direction of Financial Reforms in the National Congress and in the Congresso Brasileiro para a Definição das Reformas de Base, and equivalent ¿solutions of compromise¿ were negotiated to preserve the conservative alliance. These ¿solutions of compromise¿ consisted in a redistribution of the functions of the Central Bank between the BCB and Banco de Brasil (BB). The former inherited, among others, the functions of bank supervision, the discount rate, the issuance and holding of compulsory deposits; the latter retained functions as the Government¿s Financial Agent, of rural credit and foreign trade / Mestrado / Historia Economica / Mestre em Desenvolvimento Econômico

Cette thèse porte sur l’opinion publique et la démocratie. Elle s’intéresse particulièrement aux Guatémaltèques et à leur faible propension à appuyer la démocratie et certains des principes associés à celle-ci. Entre des explications qui associent ce comportement à un artéfact et à une culture autoritaire, des éléments contextuels et d’importantes nuances prévalent. Ce travail montre qu’il est nécessaire de traiter l’appui à la démocratie comme un objet multiface et malléable. En puisant dans les théories des perspectives et des bifurcations, un instrument d’analyse est élaboré sous le libellé de « temps court de l’appui à la démocratie ». Ce dernier nous permet de comprendre pourquoi, en période de crise politique, les points de vue sur la démocratie sont susceptibles d’évoluer. Sensibles aux circonstances extraordinaires, les opinions peuvent aussi, dans des périodes plus calmes, connaître une certaine stabilité. Les théories de l’ambivalence permettent d’élaborer un deuxième instrument, le « temps long de l’appui à la démocratie », qui aide à expliquer pourquoi les sondés offrent souvent des réponses « contradictoires » en matière de droits et de libertés. Aussi ambivalents que les autres Centraméricains, les Guatémaltèques se démarquent cependant par une forte tendance à esquiver les questions de sondage, à s’opposer aux droits des gens qui critiquent le gouvernement et à évaluer négativement le travail des institutions. Ces caractéristiques mettent en lumière des tensions entre les demandes et l’évaluation de l’offre en démocratie que font les citoyens. Cette thèse débute en étudiant les dimensions de la culture politique guatémaltèque et en proposant une typologie des indicateurs employés dans les grandes enquêtes internationales. / This thesis deals with public opinion and democracy. It mainly focuses on Guatemalans and on their weak propensity to support democracy and some of its dimensions. Between explanations that tie this behaviour to an artifact and to a culture of authoritarianism, contextual factors and important nuances can be found. We thus argue that it is advisable to deal with support for democracy as a multifaceted and malleable object. Drawing from perspectives and bifurcation theories, we develop an analytical instrument that we refer to as the "short-run of support for democracy". The latter allows us to understand why and how, in times of crisis, citizens’ viewpoints on democracy can easily become volatile. The fact that opinions are sensitive to extraordinary circumstances does not prevent them, under usual circumstances, from being relatively stable. Building on theories on ambivalence, we elaborate another instrument, the "long-run of support for democracy", which allows us to explain why survey respondents often give "contradictory" answers to questions dealing with rights and freedoms. While as ambivalent as other Central Americans, Guatemalans stand apart for their likelihood to avoid certain survey questions, to prefer limiting the rights of people who criticize the government, and to be particularly distrustful of state institutions. As background to those opinions and other paradoxical attitudes, we highlight existing tensions between citizens’ demands and their evaluation of the offer in democracy. This thesis first examines the various dimensions of the Guatemalan political culture and proposes a typology of indicators used in international barometer surveys.

Du Ier décembre 1958 au 15 décembre 2014, l'évolution constitutionnelle, institutionnelle, et sociopolitique de la République Centrafricaine est caractérisée par une instabilité chronique. [...] Tandis que la Constitution Française de la Cinquième République brille depuis le 4 octobre 1958 par sa longévité, le Centrafrique totalise 6 Constitutions en 56 ans (soit en moyenne une Constitution tous les neuf ans), plusieurs Révisions Constitutionnelles, douze Actes Constitutionnels, et une Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition adoptée le 18 juillet 2013, sans oublier l'adoption projetée de la Constitution de la septième République en 2015. Les six Constitutions successives ont établi chacune un régime parlementaire, sauf que celui-ci est hétérodoxe, et n'a jamais fonctionné dans un système parlementariste, mais plutôt dans un système présidentialiste, caractérisé par une hypertrophie de la fonction présidentielle, une concentration et une personnalisation du pouvoir au profit du Chef de l’État. Contrairement à la logique parlementaire, le Chef de l’État nomme et révoque ad nutum le Premier Ministre, et même les Ministres ignorant le pouvoir de proposition du Premier Ministre en la matière. Ce présidentialisme prégnant et omniprésent constitue à n'en pas douter le principal facteur explicatif de l'échec de la greffe du parlementarisme en Centrafrique depuis la première Loi Fondamentale, la Constitution du 16 février 1959. Tout en constituant une des caractéristiques d'une pratique institutionnelle et politique inadéquate et non démocratique, le présidentialisme est source de déformation du pouvoir exécutif. L'effet de contagion jouant, il est aussi facteur de déformation institutionnelle générale. La déformation institutionnelle est également le fait d'une insuffisante considération de l'environnement sociologique sur le plan constitutionnel et institutionnel, d'un défaut de conscience citoyenne favorable, et d'un mimétisme constitutionnel et institutionnel tronqué. Des pans entiers de la Constitution apparaissent souvent comme virtuels. L’exécutif centrafricain dans son ensemble souffre d'un déficit de légitimité, mais est pourtant très puissant et pratiquement quasi-irresponsable. C'est l'évidence du déséquilibre au sein du triptyque constitutionnel pouvoir-légitimité-responsabilité. Le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs reste formel, donc illusoire. Grâce au culte qui lui est voué, le Chef de l’État investit les autres institutions et capte leurs pouvoirs. C'est alors l 'assainissement du Premier Ministre et des Ministres, la domestication des pouvoirs législatif et judiciaire, et même le ravalement du pouvoir médiatique. Cette thèse se veut une modeste contribution à une ingénierie constitutionnelle et institutionnelle adéquate, une nécessité exigée par ce qui est unanimement reconnu en 2014 comme un État complètement failli, et donc un État Centrafricain à refonder. Sous ce rapport, il est clair que c'est la Constitution qui devra être non seulement la fondation et le pilier principal du nouvel État, mais aussi la sève irriguant et nourrissant les futures institutions. Or, les réflexions et analyses menées dans cette Thèse sont susceptibles d'inspirer les rédacteurs de la Constitution de la septième République dont l'adoption est projetée en 2015. / From December 1st, 1958 to December 15th, 2014, constitutional, institutional and socio-political evolution of the Central African Republic is characterised by a permanent instability. […] While the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic is still applying since its adoption on October 4th, 1958, Central Africa totalizes no less than 6 Constitutions within only 56 years (for a life's duration of 9 years in average for each one). Central Africa counts several constitutional reviews, 12 Constitutional Acts, and a Constitutional Charter of Transition adopted on July 18th, 2013. Furthermore, the country planned to adopt by 2015 another Constitution for the Seventh Republic in place. The 6 successive Constitutions established each one a parliamentary regime, however the latter is strange and never worked as a real parliamentary system but as a presidential one where the President of the Republic concentrates all the powers in his hands as well as he practices a form of personalisation of the presidential function. Contrary to the parliamentary logic, the Chief of State appoints and dismisses ad mitum the Prime Minister, and even the Ministers who actually ignore the power allocated to the Prime Minister to make proposals in the process of appointing the Ministers. This strong and omnipresent presidentialism constitutes the main factor that explains the failure of the idea of a parliamentary system in Central Africa since the first Fundamental Law known as the Constitution of February 16th, 1959. The presidentialism in Central Africa constitutes one of the characteristics of a non­democratic and political inadequacy in the practice of powers, and at the same time, it is also the origin of the deformation of the executive power. This situation produces a contagion's effect. It contributes to a general deformation of the political institutions. The institutional deformation is also the fact of an insufficient consideration of the sociological environment in terms of respect of the Constitution and the normal functioning of institutions, and of a lack of awareness of citizens in favour of it, and of a shortened constitutional and institutional imitation. Some entire provisions of the Constitution often appear as virtual. The Central African executive as a whole suffers a deficit of legitimacy, but nevertheless it is a powerful State and mostly practically irresponsible. This is clearly the fact of the imbalance of the necessary constitutional triptych Power-Legitimacy-Responsibility. The principle of separation of powers remains formal, and so imaginary. Because of his personality cult well celebrated, the Chief of State vests the other institutions with his authority and at the same time takes their powers. Then this is the subjection of the Prime Minister and Ministers, the domestication of legislative and judiciary powers, and even the media suffer the same fate. This thesis that aims to be modest is a contribution to a constitutional and institutional engineering that is appropriate and necessary for Central Africa, which is considered in 2014 as a State completely failed, and then as a country to be rebuilt. Under this report, it is clear that this is the Constitution that shall be not only the foundation and the cornerstone of the New State, but also the sap irrigating and feeding the future institutions of the country. Yet, the reflexions and analyses raised in this thesis may inspire the writers of the future Constitution of the Seventh Republic which adoption is planned for 2015.

Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de investigar o cinema de propaganda política produzido por duas associações de caráter ideológico, entre os anos 1961 e 1964: o Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (Ipês), dirigido principalmente por ricos empresários liberais e anticomunistas; e o Centro Popular de Cultura (CPC da UNE), constituído por jovens artistas influenciados pelas idéias marxistas. Para tanto, busquei articular informações provenientes da análise intrínseca de seus filmes com as do contexto histórico em que foram feitos e exibidos e, em especial, as extraídas da documentação a que tive acesso, com o intuito, então, de compreender os modelos cinematográficos aos quais essas obras se alinharam. Ao estudar como ipesianos e cepecistas foram adversários em meio às instabilidades de um Brasil próximo ao Golpe de 1964, foi possível constatar como os dois grupos financiaram a atividade cinematográfica com a expectativa de intervir nos rumos socioeconômicos e culturais do país a partir de projetos conflitantes que, por um lado, pretendiam fortalecer o poder da elite com um capitalismo de base liberal e, por outro, romper com as estruturas de poder capitalistas. Nesse sentido, mesmo com essas divergências, a pesquisa demonstra como ambos utilizaram um discurso próximo em suas filmografias, repleto de similaridades, que se manifesta no uso de técnicas e linguagens idênticas, como é o caso das experiências estéticas didáticas e das representações do povo com a finalidade de concretizar um programa ideológico para a nação. Assim, esse mestrado procura defender a hipótese de que, mesmo politicamente opositores, Ipês e CPC manusearam um referencial cinematográfico com diversas semelhanças. / The present dissertation aims the investigation of the political propaganda film industry production between 1961 and 1964 by two ideological character associations: the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais Ipês (Research and Social Studies Institute), managed especially by liberal and anticommunist rich businessmen; and the Centro Popular de Cultura CPC da UNE (Culture Popular Center), constituted of young artists influenced by marxist ideas. And to do so, I tried to join information provided by the intrinsic analysis of their films and the historic context in which they were produced and released and, especially, the information taken from the documentation I had access to, with the purpose of understanding the cinematographic models to which these films attached. By studying how ipesianos (term used to refer to the members of Ipês) and cepecistas (term used to refer to the members of CPC) were opponents in the instable Brazil near the 1964 coup detat, it was possible to observe how both groups financed their cinematographic activity, expecting to exercise some influence on the country cultural and socioeconomic course, by producing conflicting projects intended to, on the one hand, strengthen the power elite by supporting liberal based capitalism, and on the other hand, bring the capitalist power structures to an end. Nevertheless, even showing divergences, this research makes evident how both groups made use of analogue methodology on their filmographies, full of similarities, expressed in their identical techniques and languages, which can be seen in their didactical esthetic experiences and representations of the people with the purpose of concretize an ideological program for the nation. Therefore, the main goal of this masters degree is to support the hypothesis that, even being politically opposite, Ipês and CPC made use of very similar cinematographic referential.

République du Congo, l’armée, en tant qu’ensemble de structures et de moyens militaires institutionnellement affectés à la mise en œuvre de la politique décidée par les autorités politiques pour assurer et garantir la défense nationale, est loin d’être l’auteur exclusif des coups d’Etat, même si, systématiquement, elle profite des conséquences politiques attachées à ceux-ci. En réalité, les coups d’Etat y sont la résultante d’une lutte entre plusieurs champs. Dans cette lutte, les acteurs des coups d’Etat, en fonction de leurs corpus idéologiques respectifs, mettent en place des stratégies dont la particularité n’est pas de se limiter au champ bureaucratique mais d’engager également la société appréhendée au regard de leurs groupes ethniques ou régionaux d’appartenance. Ainsi, mobilisent-ils, non seulement leurs propres capitaux (diplômes, profession), mais aussi les ressources de leurs groupes ethniques ou régionaux en vue de réaliser la conquête ou la conservation du pouvoir. Par le jeu complexe des solidarités idéologiques, ethniques ou corporatistes, les acteurs politiques tissent des alliances et, selon le cas, participent ou s’opposent à l’exécution des coups d’Etat. Sous ce rapport, les coups d’Etat, qui supposent une importante mobilisation stratégique, politique et matérielle de la part de ceux qui en forment le projet, se confondent à un mode de conquête du pouvoir assimilable formellement à l’élection, et s’inscrivent dans ce que Marcel Mauss nomme les faits sociaux totaux. Les leaders politiques appartenant aux ethnies minoritaires, ne pouvant accéder au pouvoir par voie démocratique, élaborent une stratégie de conquête de pouvoir prenant appui sur l’armée. Ainsi, détournée de sa mission traditionnelle de protection du territoire national face aux agressions extérieures, l’armée voit sa valeur opérationnelle diminuée. / In Republic of Congo, the army, as a whole of structures and average soldiers institutionally assigned to the implementation of the policy decided by the political authorities to ensure and guarantee national defense, is far from being the exclusive author of the coups d'etat, even if, systematically, it benefits from the political consequences attached to those. Actually, the coups d'etat are there the resultant of a fight between several fields. In this fight, the actors of the coups d'etat, according to their respective ideological corpora, set up strategies whose characteristic is not to limit themselves to the bureaucratic field but to also engage the company apprehended taking into consideration their ethnic or regional group of membership. Thus, they mobilize, not only their own capital (diplomas, profession), but also resources of their ethnic or regional groups in order to carry out the conquest or the conservation of the power. By the complex play of ideological solidarity, ethnic or corporatists, the political actors weave alliances and, according to the case, take part or are opposed to the execution of the coups d'etat. Under this report, the coups d'etat, which suppose an important strategic mobilization, political and material on behalf of those which form the project of it, merge with a mode of conquest of the power comparable formally to the election, and fit in what Marcel Mauss names the total social facts. The political leaders belonging to the minority ethnic groups, not being able to reach the power by democratic way, work out a strategy of conquest of fascinating power support on the army. Thus, diverted its traditional mission of protection of the national territory vis-a-vis the external aggressions, the army sees its decreased operational value.

Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de investigar o cinema de propaganda política produzido por duas associações de caráter ideológico, entre os anos 1961 e 1964: o Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (Ipês), dirigido principalmente por ricos empresários liberais e anticomunistas; e o Centro Popular de Cultura (CPC da UNE), constituído por jovens artistas influenciados pelas idéias marxistas. Para tanto, busquei articular informações provenientes da análise intrínseca de seus filmes com as do contexto histórico em que foram feitos e exibidos e, em especial, as extraídas da documentação a que tive acesso, com o intuito, então, de compreender os modelos cinematográficos aos quais essas obras se alinharam. Ao estudar como ipesianos e cepecistas foram adversários em meio às instabilidades de um Brasil próximo ao Golpe de 1964, foi possível constatar como os dois grupos financiaram a atividade cinematográfica com a expectativa de intervir nos rumos socioeconômicos e culturais do país a partir de projetos conflitantes que, por um lado, pretendiam fortalecer o poder da elite com um capitalismo de base liberal e, por outro, romper com as estruturas de poder capitalistas. Nesse sentido, mesmo com essas divergências, a pesquisa demonstra como ambos utilizaram um discurso próximo em suas filmografias, repleto de similaridades, que se manifesta no uso de técnicas e linguagens idênticas, como é o caso das experiências estéticas didáticas e das representações do povo com a finalidade de concretizar um programa ideológico para a nação. Assim, esse mestrado procura defender a hipótese de que, mesmo politicamente opositores, Ipês e CPC manusearam um referencial cinematográfico com diversas semelhanças. / The present dissertation aims the investigation of the political propaganda film industry production between 1961 and 1964 by two ideological character associations: the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais Ipês (Research and Social Studies Institute), managed especially by liberal and anticommunist rich businessmen; and the Centro Popular de Cultura CPC da UNE (Culture Popular Center), constituted of young artists influenced by marxist ideas. And to do so, I tried to join information provided by the intrinsic analysis of their films and the historic context in which they were produced and released and, especially, the information taken from the documentation I had access to, with the purpose of understanding the cinematographic models to which these films attached. By studying how ipesianos (term used to refer to the members of Ipês) and cepecistas (term used to refer to the members of CPC) were opponents in the instable Brazil near the 1964 coup detat, it was possible to observe how both groups financed their cinematographic activity, expecting to exercise some influence on the country cultural and socioeconomic course, by producing conflicting projects intended to, on the one hand, strengthen the power elite by supporting liberal based capitalism, and on the other hand, bring the capitalist power structures to an end. Nevertheless, even showing divergences, this research makes evident how both groups made use of analogue methodology on their filmographies, full of similarities, expressed in their identical techniques and languages, which can be seen in their didactical esthetic experiences and representations of the people with the purpose of concretize an ideological program for the nation. Therefore, the main goal of this masters degree is to support the hypothesis that, even being politically opposite, Ipês and CPC made use of very similar cinematographic referential.

Fundação de Apoio a Pesquisa e à Inovação Tecnológica do Estado de Sergipe - FAPITEC/SE / The Civil-Military Coup, which deposed the president of the Republic João Goulart in Brazil in 1964, sought the support of institutions such as the Institute for Research and Social Studies / Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IPES-IBAD), Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), evangelical churches, the mass media and broad sectors of the urban middle classes, with the objective of guaranteeing the ascendancy and permanence of the military in power and providing it with the minimum Of legitimacy. The city of Aracaju / SE hosted the Crusade Cristo Esperança Nossa, from September 20 to 27, 1964, an evangelical campaign interdenominacional, that is, promoted and directed by several Protestant churches of the State, but idealized by Presbyterians with the support of missionaries North Americans. This event was based on the preservation of moral and Christian values, in the midst of the establishment of the new political-institutional order in the country marked by authoritarianism. The crux of this crusade, based on the idea of "political field", "symbolic power" and habitus of Pierre Bourdieu (1996), is investigated to prove the hypothesis that this event contributed to the diffusion of the anti-communist ideology in Sergipe, Context of the Cold War. Through the press and oral testimony, some manifestations of popular religious and popular evangelical leaders have been able to find a position, often discreetly stated, in favor of the takeover of power in 1964 and in defense of Christian morality, although Christ Esperança Nossa Has not been, a priori, a political event in its essence. Actions such as these also fit into the political environment conducive to marches, such as the "Family March with God for Freedom", and other evangelization campaigns that represented the defense of conservative postulates typical of the society of that period. / O Golpe Civil-Militar, que depôs o presidente da República João Goulart em 1964, no Brasil, buscou o apoio de instituições como o Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais / Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (IPES-IBAD), Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB), Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB), igrejas evangélicas, meios de comunicação de massa e de amplos setores das classes médias urbanas, com o objetivo de garantir a ascensão e permanência dos militares no poder e proporcionar-lhe o mínimo de legitimidade. A cidade de Aracaju/SE sediou a cruzada Cristo Esperança Nossa, nos dias 20 a 27 de setembro de 1964, uma campanha evangélica interdenominacional, ou seja, promovida e dirigida por várias igrejas protestantes do Estado, porém idealizada por presbiterianos com o apoio de missionários norte-americanos. Este evento se fundamentou na conservação de valores morais e cristãos, em meio à instauração da nova ordem político-institucional no país marcada pelo autoritarismo. Investiga-se os desdobramentos dessa cruzada, com base na ideia de “campo político”, “poder simbólico” e habitus de Pierre Bourdieu (1996), para comprovar a hipótese de que este evento colaborou para a difusão do ideário anticomunista em Sergipe, no contexto da Guerra Fria. Foi possível constatar em algumas manifestações de líderes religiosos e populares evangélicos, através da imprensa e de depoimentos orais, um posicionamento, muitas vezes explicitado de forma discreta, a favor da tomada do poder em 1964 e em defesa da moralidade cristã, embora Cristo Esperança Nossa não tenha sido, a priori, um evento político em sua essência. Ações como essas se enquadram, também, no ambiente político favorável às marchas, como a “Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade”, e outras campanhas de evangelização que representaram a defesa de postulados conservadores típicos da sociedade daquele período.

Submitted by isabela.moljf@hotmail.com (isabela.moljf@hotmail.com) on 2017-05-16T15:27:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 danielcerqueirapinto.pdf: 959426 bytes, checksum: 68a859bd7a3781bd34b6919537bf9464 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-05-16T15:57:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 danielcerqueirapinto.pdf: 959426 bytes, checksum: 68a859bd7a3781bd34b6919537bf9464 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-16T15:57:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 danielcerqueirapinto.pdf: 959426 bytes, checksum: 68a859bd7a3781bd34b6919537bf9464 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-17 / Golpe Civil-Militar de 1964 foi um acontecimento muito importante na história recente no Brasil. No contexto do início dos anos de 1960, após a renúncia do Presidente Jânio Quadros e posse de João Goulart, notou-se intensas conspirações de militares, políticos e dos setores produtivos contra o Presidente Goulart, incluindo propaganda política variada com capitais gerenciados pelo IPES e pelo IBAD visando à desestabilização final do governo. A participação do General Olympio Mourão Filho foi muito marcante para o sucesso destes acontecimentos. Ele teria agido como grande articulador, ou seja, um dos condutores das ideias que preparou o movimento por onde ele passou. Em 31 de março de 1964, o general Mourão Filho, que comandava a 4ª RM/4ª DI, em Juiz de Fora – MG, teria deslocado as tropas revoltosas em direção ao Rio de Janeiro a fim de depor o Presidente João Goulart e os generais legalistas e implantar novo governo a partir de 1º de abril. Mourão Filho iniciou seus trabalhos conspiratórios ainda em 1962, quando comandou a 3ª Divisão de Infantaria, em Santa Maria – RS, passando em seguida para São Paulo. No momento final, teria desprezado a articulação de outros setores, revoltando as tropas mineiras. A partir desta hipótese, procura-se destacar as relações entre segmentos da elite direitista nacional e dos militares com o próprio Presidente João Goulart, a fim de compreender a participação de Mourão Filho na articulação e nos rumos dos acontecimentos. / The Civil-Military Coup of 1964 is a very important happening in Brazil’s recent history. In the context of the beginning of the 1960’s, after the renunciation of President Jânio Quadros and after João Goulart took office, it has been noted intense conspirations from the military, politician and productive sectors against president Goulart, including varied politic propaganda sustained by IPES and IBAD, with eyes to finalize the destabilization of the government. The participation of General Olympio Mourão Filho was very important for the success of these events. He would have acted as the great articulator, i.e. one of the conductor of the ideas that prepared the movement through where he passed. In March 31, 1964 General Mourão Filho, who commanded the 4th Military Region/ 4th Infantry Division, in Juiz de Fora – MG, would have moved the revolting troops in direction to Rio de Janeiro with the meaning to depose President João Goulart and the legalist generals and establish a new government in April 1st. Mourão FIlho started his conspiratory works still in 1962, when he commanded the 3rd Infantry Division, in Santa Maria – RS, then moving to São Paulo. In the final moment, he would have despised the articulation of other sectors, revolting the Minas Gerais troops. From this hypothesis on, this work intends to highlight relations between segments of the rightist national elite and of the military and their relation with President João Goulart, in order to understand the participation of Mourão Filho in the articulation and the flow of the events.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.