Submitted by Maria Creuza Silva (mariakreuza@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-07-13T12:40:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DISS FINAL. ERICK LISBOA. 2015.pdf: 1371259 bytes, checksum: 89f43c3cc44bcf76ef36c54dc733eec1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Creuza Silva (mariakreuza@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-07-13T14:40:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DISS FINAL. ERICK LISBOA. 2015.pdf: 1371259 bytes, checksum: 89f43c3cc44bcf76ef36c54dc733eec1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-13T14:40:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DISS FINAL. ERICK LISBOA. 2015.pdf: 1371259 bytes, checksum: 89f43c3cc44bcf76ef36c54dc733eec1 (MD5) / A judicialização da saúde é um fenômeno importante, que tem motivado a realização de inúmeros estudos no país. A Constituição do país estabelece o direito de todos e o dever do Estado em prover acesso universal as ações e serviços de saúde. Ao longo dos 25 anos do SUS houve uma ampliação do acesso a medicamentos, e a cada ano, novos fármacos vem sendo lançados no Brasil pelas indústrias farmacêuticas. A judicialização do acesso a medicamentos tem causado impactos na estruturação, no financiamento e na organização da assistência farmacêutica. Na Bahia, houve uma alta exponencial de ações judiciais entre 2002 e 2008 e nesse período uma grande demanda por insulinas análogas. Assim, considerando que o estado conta com o Centro de Referência para Diabetes, que dispensa gratuitamente medicamentos para esta patologia, é importante saber por que as pessoas estão recorrendo ao Judiciário. O presente estudo, tem por objetivo analisar as ações judiciais impetradas contra a Secretaria da Saúde do Estado da Bahia, para se obter o acesso ao tratamento da diabetes, em especial, os argumentos ou as motivações do autor da ação e do réu. Trata-se de um estudo, cuja unidade de análise foi à ação judicial movida contra a Secretaria da Saúde da Bahia para o fornecimento de medicamentos para o tratamento da diabetes entre os anos de 2010 e 2013. Nesse período, foram impetradas 154 ações judiciais que solicitaram medicamentos para diabetes no estado da Bahia, para atender 158 pessoas. Prevaleceram autores do sexo feminino (51,9%), de faixa etária maior que 60 anos (27,2%) e com renda mensal de até um salário mínimo (38,3%). A Defensoria Pública foi o representante jurídico responsável por 44,1% das ações e as individuais foram majoritárias (98%). As insulinas análogas representaram 91% dos medicamentos prescritos, com 52,6% das prescrições originadas do setor privado. O principal motivo que levou os autores a recorrerem à Justiça foi a hipossuficiência financeira, seguido da necessidade do uso das insulinas análogas. Os autores com renda mais baixa têm recorrido mais à Justiça e a Defensoria Pública tem atuado de forma ativa na defesa do direito à saúde. A prescrição é o elemento que respalda o deferimento das liminares pela Justiça. A alta demanda por insulinas análogas levou à sua incorporação pelo estado da Bahia, apesar de não recomendada pela Conitec. Enfim, recorre-se ao Judiciário porque a maioria dos médicos crê que as insulinas análogas são melhores do que a insulina humana regular e a NPH, o sistema público de saúde não as dispensa regularmente e os usuários consideram não dispor de condições financeiras que lhes permitam adquirir diretamente essas insulinas. Neste cenário é importante que os prescritores preservem a racionalidade terapêutica e ao Poder Judiciário desenvolva um olhar crítico aos artifícios utilizados pela indústria farmacêutica na pressão pela incorporação de novos medicamentos pelo SUS. Palavras-chave: decisões judiciais, diabetes mellitus, assistência farmacêutica, direito à saúde.

Hyperbole is the common response in the wake of any Supreme Court decision, but which cases have a lasting negative impression and why? This work seeks to clarify which rulings of the Court cause consternation among several different audiences. Through an experimental framework I conduct an examination of reactions to rulings in controversial cases among political scientists, legal scholars, and the public. I discover that there are some commonalities among the respondents, but also significant disagreement along issue areas, particularly cases decided based on economic property rights. Additionally I observe that partisan ideology has little impact on the perception of historic decisions, but in contemporary rulings the opposite is discovered. This finding suggests that time serves to mitigate partisan bias in evaluating the Supreme Court. Ultimately this work details information concerned with responses to previous Court decisions, but also provides context clues for predicting various reactions to future controversial rulings.

The manner by which courts view performance appraisals in relation to the outcome of case is certainly a topic worthy of discussion. Utilizing the framework used within the work of Werner and Bolino (1997), the following study was able to accomplish two main goals: (1) update the information of Werner and Bolino (1997) by evaluating modern cases, and (2) to evaluate new data regarding age discrimination utilizing the same framework as Werner and Bolino (1997). Utilizing chi-square analysis to test all of the hypotheses, it was demonstrated that there was statistical significance in performance appraisals with the presence of a job analysis regarding court outcome. Other variables such as appraisal basis (trait, behavioral, MBO), triangulation, and appraisal frequency did not have any statistical significance. Out of the six new hypotheses tested, all showed statistical significance except for one. These hypotheses showcased the immense differences in how different forms of discrimination are viewed by the court even with respect to the performance appraisal. This was especially true with age discrimination in comparison to every other form of discrimination. In conclusion the following study accomplished its two main goals by displaying consistency with Werner and Bolino’s work and successfully evaluating new variables to support the hypotheses that involve differences between different forms of discrimination and the outcome of the court case.

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

This investigation is concerned with determining the impact of the United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision upon the state and federal courts. The first chapter discusses the background behind the 1973 decision and outlines the basic issues. The second chapter examines the decision's impact upon opinions in the federal courts and concludes that Rodriguez has become a significant precedent. While school finance reform is dormant in the federal tribunals as a result of the decision, the third chapter concludes that reform is still possible in the state courts. However, there has been a deceleration in the rate of cases overturning school funding statutes since 1973. The final chapter examines some of the state legislatures and concludes that statutory reform is not necessarily linked to action in the courts.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renato Romeu Renck.pdf: 847067 bytes, checksum: cc4077af3099f7e2dd49656f8ce62b9e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-12-04 / This doctoral dissertation aims at checking if the Brazilian Supreme Court uses recurrent paradigms, determined from a specific and defined nucleolus of intelligibility, when judging parts involved in quantifying the tax base of the income tax for legal person. The Constitution through the concept of income, establishes limits to the taxing power which must be observed in order not to risk constitutional violation. To formulate such limits, it is paramount the formulation of a verifying procedure of what income means, to confront it with the standards determined by law. Through the jurisprudence research, structuring and reasoning of judicial theses, we want to investigate if the Supreme Federal Court establishes such limits. This reasoning must be present in decision making paradigms justified by rational criteria and accepted by the judicial community. We refute the structure of rationality which justifies the theory of the national tributary law by pointing out its flaws. We use the Hermeneutic Phenomenology which is the most adequate theory to the application of the institutional regulations and it also allows for the inference of the universal tributary concepts into single concepts. It defines the limits of each individual taxation. From the results of this research the following is justified: when the Supreme Court rejects as several judged antecedents and permits that the income be determined by the legislator, it is not taking into account the formation of a judging paradigm for the evaluation of income. As it states that the legislator has autonomy to determine what tribute income is for the legal person, the Federal Supreme Court renounces the constitutional duty to establish an applicable paradigm to the income evaluation procedure which institutes the limits to the power of tribute. Such renunciation empowers the legislator to institute whatever pleases him or her, removing from the context of the income tax any remains of the existence of the Rule of Law / A presente tese tem como objetivo verificar se a Suprema Corte brasileira adota paradigmas recorrentes determinados, firmados a partir de um núcleo de inteligibilidade específico e definido, quando julga processos de apuração e quantificação da base impositiva do imposto de renda pessoa jurídica. Para formular, em teses paradigmáticas, limites ao poder de tributar, impõe-se a pré-formulação de um procedimento verificatório do que é renda pelo STF, para confrontá-lo com os standards determinados pela lei. Busca-se verificar, pela pesquisa de jurisprudência e pela estruturação e fundamentação das teses jurídicas, se o STF estabelece tais limites e se repousam em paradigmas de decisões, justificados a partir de critérios racionais e aceitos pela comunidade jurídica. Refuta-se a estrutura de racionalidade, que justifica a teoria do direito tributário nacional, apontando suas deficiências e se adota a fenomenologia hermenêutica, que permite a inferência dos conceitos universais tributários em conceitos singulares; possibilitando concretizar os limites constitucionais em cada tributação individual. Pelo resultado da pesquisa justifica-se: o STF ao permitir que a renda seja livremente fixada pelo legislador, não apresenta um paradigma de julgamento em relação a um procedimento de verificação da renda. Portanto, ao afirmar que o legislador tem autonomia para estabelecer o que é renda tributável da pessoa jurídica, a Suprema Corte renunciou tacitamente ao seu dever constitucional, não estabelecendo um paradigma aplicável ao procedimento de apuração da base de cálculo do Imposto de Renda, que institua limites ao poder de tributar. Tal renúncia outorga ao legislador estabelecer o que quiser, removendo do contexto do imposto sobre a renda a existência do Estado de Direito

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

The work deals with the constitutional protection of freedom of conscience , religion and autonomy of churches and religious societies (hereinafter Freedoms). The work defines the concept and sources of cofession law . The work defines a framework of constitutional freedoms set out in Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter . The fact that the confession law is not purely theoretical discipline , even in its constitutionally level, is best evident in the next chapter of this work, which deals with the case law of the Constitutional Court concerning Articles 15 and 16 of the Charter . The Essentials focus of this work was to collect and capture the basic content of the decision of the Constitutional Court , in which the above-mentioned articles of the Charter were applied. Decision are arranged according to their content and through their interpretations suggestions for improvements to the existing legislation.are made.

Qu’évoque la motivation ? Comment le droit répressif appréhende-t-il la motivation des décisions de justice ? Le concept de motivation renvoie à plusieurs aspects qui changent son sens suivant le rôle assigné à la fonction juridictionnelle. S’il est compréhensible qu'une seule et unique approche ne s'impose pas, la motivation doit être reconsidérée.Elle est en effet généralement perçue comme un instrument contentieux, l’objectif étant de limiter l’arbitraire du juge. A cette fin, elle appelle un ensemble de règles devant s’imposer au juge. L'examen de ces règles dans le domaine du droit répressif aboutit à un résultat peu satisfaisant. Si la motivation est imposée au juge dans certains cas, elle est en revanche écartée dans d’autres, sans qu’on puisse imposer un critère unique légitimant une telle distinction. La nature objective de son contenu est marquée par des lacunes qui alimentent l’approche subjective de la motivation. C'est lorsqu'il est question de méthode que les contournements sont les plus visibles : la motivation à phrase unique, le copier-coller ou encore la pratique de la motivation pré-rédigée. Au demeurant, le contrôle de la motivation, fut-il exercé par le juge européen, laisse au juge répressif une marge d'appréciation, voire parfois une totale liberté. Du droit de la motivation des décisions pénales, le résultat est finalement contrasté.Ne faut-il pas alors aller plus loin et dépasser cette approche contentieuse de la motivation des décisions pénales ? La réponse est évidemment positive. Pour mieux préserver les intérêts du justiciable, la motivation doit se transformer. Cette transformation se marque par un rapprochement de plus en plus fort entre la motivation et les droits fondamentaux du justiciable. La motivation se révèle en effet être la condition de l'exercice des droits de la défense, en même temps qu’elle s’intègre dans le concept plus large du droit au procès équitable. Dans la dynamique de cette évolution, la motivation -en vue de la compréhension et de l’acceptation de la décision par le justiciable- doit occuper une place centrale. Cela implique d'entrevoir, au-delà des règles imposées au juge de motiver la décision, certaines améliorations afin de parvenir à la reconnaissance d’un véritable droit du justiciable à la motivation de la décision, de sa décision. / What evokes motivation? How criminal law grasps motivation of judicial decisions ?The concept of motivation refers to several aspects that change its meaning depending on the role assigned to the judicial function. While it is understandable that a single approach does not compel, motivation should be reconsidered.Motivation is in fact generally perceived as a litigation instrument for the judge, the main aim being to limit its arbitrary power. To this end, a set of rules are binding on the judge. The review of these rules in the field of criminal law leads to an unsatisfactory result. If motivation is imposed on the judge in certain judicial decisions, it is however rejected in others, and a single criterion justifying such a distinction may not appear relevant. The objective nature of its contents is marked by gaps which feed the subjective approach to the motivation. It is when it is about method that the bypassing is the most visible : the motivation with unique sentence, the copy and paste or the practice of the pre-drafted motivation. Moreover, even exercised by the European Court, control of motivation leaves the criminal judge many appreciation margins, even sometimes a total freedom. Concerning the analysis of the criminal decisions, the right of the motivation ends in a contrasted result.Should we then go further and beyond this litigating approach of motivation? The answer is obviously positive. To better safeguard the interests of citizens, motivation must be transformed. This transformation is marked by an increasing connection between motivation and fundamental human rights. The motivation turns out to be the condition for the exercise of the rights of defense, while it fits into the category of the right to fair trial. In the dynamics of this evolution, the motivation - with the aim of the understanding and of the acceptance of the decision by the citizen - has to occupy a central place. It involves to glimpse, beyond rules compulsory for the judge to motivate the decision, certain improvements in order to achieve the recognition of a genuine right of the defendant for the motivation of the decision, its decision.

Text in Afrikaans / Alhoewel die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika die bestaande reg op regsverteenwoordiging uitgebrei het tot sy logiese eindpunt, is daar geen vaste inhoud aan hierdie reg gegee nie en sal die howe die omvang daarvan moet ontwikkel. Hierdie reg kan weens die heersende sosiale en ekonomiese omstandighede nie 'n absolute reg wees nie. Indien 'n beskuldigde nie 'n regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie, sal een op staatsonkoste aan horn verskaf word, maar slegs indien <lit andersins tot wesentlike onreg sal lei. In so 'n geval het die beskuldigde nie die reg op 'n regsverteenwoordiger van sy keuse nie. Effektiewe regsverteenwoordiging word ook nie gewaarborg nie. Daar word derhalwe steeds nie aan die sine qua non van 'n volledige strafregplegingstelsel soos <lit oor tyd in die Verenigde State van Amerika ontwikkel het, <lit is die verskaffing van kostelose regsverteenwoordiging aan elke behoeftige persoon beskuldig van 'n emstige misdaad, voldoen nie / Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has extended the existing right to legal representation to its logical conclusion, no definitive substance has been given to this right and the courts will have to develop the purview thereof. This right cannot be an absolute right because of ruling social and economic circumstances. Should an accused not be able to afford a legal representative, one will be supplied to him at state expense, but only if substantial injustice would otherwise result. In such an event the accused is not entitled to a legal representative of his choice. Effective legal representation is also not guaranteed. There is therefore still not compliance with the sine qua non of a comprehensive criminal justice system as has developed over time in the United States of America, that is the provision of free legal representation to every indigent person accused of a serious crime / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Straf en Prosesreg)