Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / This project takes up the old question of the nature of truth by seeking to say, at one stroke, both what enables truth and falsity and what lets them matter to us so centrally. Somehow, we as human beings are fundamentally connected to a world in which the truth of statements and the genuineness of things can matter to us deeply and coherently. And yet, I try to show, this coherent unity between being and thinking can also be radically (if not always permanently) broken in the experience of psychosis. I argue that the source of that vulnerable unity must be a contingent event in which I find myself disposed trustingly toward the world, and therein find the world disclosed as trustworthy. Such primitive trust is phenomenally related to trusting a person, and Freudian psychoanalysis shows us that it develops psychologically through relation to a person. As what fundamentally structures self and world, however, this kind of attunement transcends psychology. Our very access to the being of things, i.e., to their compelling importance and organized significance, depends upon it. Thus, I support Martin Heidegger's account of the essence of truth as what first makes accessible the comparisons (between word and thing, for example) on which more traditional theories of truth are based. Yet I also confront Heidegger's phenomenological version of trust by highlighting what is at stake ontologically in our interpersonal psychic development, which psychoanalysis reveals to take place by way of seduction. Heidegger assumes that being must show itself, even if in a concealed way, and thus always takes absence as withdrawal or absencing, rather than as a radical break. By attending to the meaningful phenomena of psychosis, I defend the thesis that our relation to the world is instead opened up and sustained by a fundamental affective attunement (trust) that can dramatically fail. In other words, I try to show that we are exposed to a more radical kind of concealment than Heidegger's thinking of truth seems able to do justice to, a failure of being that can thoroughly overwhelm us. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

L'être demeure encore et toujours aujourd'hui un objet extrêmement mystérieux et polémique pour les philosophes comme pour l'individu que nous sommes. Face à la réapparition perpétuelle de cet objet sous la forme d'une interrogation fondamentale, la question est celle de savoir si nous sommes face à un problème insoluble pour la raison ou bien confrontés à un problème méthodologique qu'il convient de relever. Au-delà d'une nouvelle tentative de destruction de la Métaphysique sous toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses dimensions chez les postmodernes, nous devons tenter de réfléchir aujourd'hui sur la véritable positivité du questionnement de l'être. Allant de Kant à Bachelard nous voyons alors s'ouvrir progressivement au cours de l'histoire le chemin d'une autre pratique qui peut se définir ici comme une poïétique de soi.

This thesis carries out a comparative analysis of Harold Pinter&#039 / s &quot / The Birthday Party&quot / , &quot / The Caretaker&quot / , and &quot / A Slight Ache&quot / and Edward Albee&#039 / s &quot / The Zoo Story&quot / and &quot / A Delicate Balance&quot / . It achieves this by exploring how the dramatic structure, characterization, and use of language in these plays display the playwrights&#039 / tendency to employ similar themes of existentialist philosophy / existential resistance to life and man&#039 / s seld-quest in the face of existential anxiety and despair. Man shows a variety of inauthentic responses in order to escape the lack of meaning in life, freedom to choose and burden of responsibility. The aim of this study is to discuss these inauthentic responses given by the characters in the above mentioned plays. They are classified as active and passive forms and analyzed while the parallelism and differences between these two playwrights&#039 / approaches are explored.

This thesis presents a recollection of the relation of “being” and thinking through an articulation of the gesture of etho-poetic thinking. Part I marks out a path towards such a thinking through an encounter with Martin Heidegger’s “sketch” of the self as Dasein, where his description of being-there is read as an originary language of inquiry – one which attempts to respond to the issue of being, to the questionability and groundlessness of existence stemming from simply being-in-the-world. Part I follows out a description of this language of inquiry as a pre-conceptual, pre-cognitive, attuned, bodily understanding, through chapters which unfold this sketch of Dasein. This language of inquiry is construed as a two-fold action of being begun, being sketched, and beginning, sketching-out. The final chapter of part I connects Heidegger’s articulation of “Care” to the ancient practice of “care of the self” and the transformative, etho-poetic potentiality of thinking. As the thesis proffers, it is this pre-conceptual language of inquiry which must be repeated in a resolute thinking, as Heidegger articulates it in Being and Time, seeking not to objectivise the world, to represent it, but to resonate with it. In this sense, the “purpose” of thinking is not so much the obtainment of knowledge as it is an attempt to come back into “Care” for the questionability of one’s existence. As the thesis gestures to in the conclusion, part of the attempt of the thesis is, thus, an implicit critique of the contemporary situation and discourse on thinking with its emphasis on outcomes and outputs. The thesis itself follows the two-fold structure of the language of inquiry. Whilst part I depicts Heidegger’s sketch of this originary language of inquiry, part II sketches-out this language, seeking to articulate how an etho-poetic language of inquiry can occur in writing by bringing the sketch of part one into conversation with other etho-poetic thinkers; Walter Benjamin, Henri Meschonnic, Jan Zwicky, Giorgio Agamben, Lisa Robertson. In this way, through the textual composition of the writing, the thesis presents itself as the primary example of such a language of inquiry, making it not an investigation which objectifies an etho-poetic thinking, but makes an attempt at its own performance of it.

Bien que de nos jours nous parlons aisément du monde lui-même en le différenciant de la nature, nous sommes tentés de croire que le «monde» où nous nous engageons est la nature immédiate, celle des objets inanimés. Cependant, nous sommes également tentés de défendre l'idée selon laquelle le monde est historico-culturel. Dans notre étude, nous analysons les conceptions hégéliennes et heideggériennes de l'historicité du monde. Deux questions principales dirigent notre étude : 1. Comment doit-on aborder la différence entre ce qui est toujours déjà là (la nature) et le monde ? 2. Et dans quelle mesure faut-il imputer au sujet (ou à l'esprit ou au Dasein) le pouvoir de donner forme au monde ou le pouvoir de constituer le monde? A partir de ces deux questions notre étude cherche à mettre en évidence ce qu'est l'historicité du monde chez Hegel et Heidegger. Enfin nous comparons leur conception de l'historicité du monde. / Though, in our time, we readily speak of the world as distinct from nature, we are nevertheless tempted to believe that the "world" in which we engage is the immediate nature consisting of inanimate objects. However, we are also tempted to defend the idea that the world is historical. In our study, we analyze the Hegelian and Heideggerian conceptions of the historicity of the world. Two main questions will guide our study: 1. How should we approach the difference between what is always already there (nature) and the world ? 2. And to what extent does the subject (or spirit or Dasein) have the power to shape and constitute the world? From these questions, our study tries to expIain what the historicity of the world is in Hegel and Heidegger and then to compare their conception of the historicity of the world.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:06:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Fundamento Heidegger.pdf: 840915 bytes, checksum: e63295921f12650e9333ded7a5b86f67 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-05 / A questão filosófica do fundamento está, de alguma forma, vinculada com a possibilidade de sua negação, ou seja, a necessidade de elevar o fundamento à ordem da objetividade revela justamente que o absurdo, o acaso, a contingência, a finitude, o acidente entre outros põe em questão a própria exigência fundacionista. Neste sentido, há uma real necessidade de discutir quais são as condições de possibilidade da fundamentação. Para tanto, toma-se os escritos de Heidegger pós Ser e Tempo e antes da chamada viragem (1927-1930). Estes textos apresentam uma discussão com o Princípio de Razão Suficiente como foi formulado por Leibniz, na medida em que este princípio é conhecido pela tradição filosófica como o princípio fundamental dos raciocínios . Contudo, a questão norteadora desta pesquisa não está em simplesmente apreender a compreensão heideggeriana do princípio leibniziano e sua função fundamentadora, mas em discutir se, a partir da proposta heideggeriana de um fundamento sem fundamento (Abgrund), pode-se justificar um niilismo ou, ao contrário, o esforço filosófico de pensar o fundamento em sua radicalidade, sem, no entanto, conduzi-lo à fundamentação última.

The topic of the master thesis is the interpretation of "freedom" in the existential ' from the "metaphysics of subjectivity" to a ' " " as the " " '

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Fernando Costa Mattos / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, São Bernardo do Campo, 2017. / O presente trabalho tem como ponto de partida a constituição existencial do Dasein que, factualmente, está lançado no mundo e aí deve constituir-se em forma de projeto, possibilidade. Heidegger não pensa o ser humano senão radicado no mundo e, por isso, todas as relações que envolvem a existência humana acontecem a partir do momento em que esta é lançada ao mundo. Por estar lançado no mundo, o Dasein mistura-se com as coisas e os entes simplesmente dados, "perdendo" sua autenticidade e assumindo um ser-impróprio. A perspectiva de uma leitura ética na análise existencial do ser humano ¿ Dasein ¿ como ser-no-mundo, desvela uma ética originária. Não uma ética das normas, deveres e prescrições. Mas uma ética da responsabilidade. O Dasein tem que responder por aquele que é. Enquanto essencialmente livre, ele é responsável por seu próprio ser, ou seja, ele é cuidado. O ser humano ou Dasein é essencialmente poder-ser como liberdade. Diante dessa facticidade, Heidegger aponta a angústia como "sentimento" responsável por revelar ao Dasein o seu ser autêntico, próprio, aberto e consciente do fato de que é um ser-para-morte, e que sua constituição, enquanto um ser que aí está, deve ser sempre em forma de projeto, sempre aberta às possiblidades que a existência lhe oferece. Existir, para o Dasein que encontra o ser autêntico, é nunca estar fechado. / The present paper has as its starting point the existential constitution of the Dasein that, factually, is launched in the world and there must be constituted as a project, a possibility. Heidegger does not think the human being unless rooted in the world and therefore all the relationships that involve human existence happen from the moment it is launched into the world. By being cast into the world, Dasein mixes up with things and entities simply given, "losing" its authenticity and assuming a being-improper. The perspective of an ethical reading in the existential analysis of the human being - Dasein - as being-in-the-world, reveals an original ethics. Not an ethic of norms, duties, and prescriptions, but an ethics of responsibility. Dasein has to answer for who it is. While essentially free, it is responsible for his own being, that is, it is care. The human being or Dasein is essentially power-being as freedom. Faced with this facticity, Heidegger points to anguish as a "feeling" responsible for revealing to Dasein its authentic, selfopened, conscious being of the fact that it is a being-to-death, and that its constitution, as a being there , Must always be in the form of a project, always open to the possibilities that existence offers. To exist, for the Dasein who finds the authentic being, is never to be closed.

The thesis deals with the issue of authentic or inauthentic work of art in the context of philosophy of authentic / inauthentic mode of existence (Dasein) as it was developed by Martin Heidegger in his Time and Being. The reason for addressing this issue is an effort to open the possibility of understanding authenticity or inauthenticity of individual Dasein in the manner which grasps it in the act of its performance, i.e. as a singular event. Thinking of authentic / inauthentic work of art demonstrates the limits of approach which understands authenticity only as certain originality or "selfness" which should belong to something authentic or inauthentic, almost like its accident. This thesis is therefore concerned with what is revealed if the concept of authenticity is transposed to a work of art. Since it is the subject who can make the act of performance of authenticity happen, the author and the recipient of the authentic / inauthentic work of art are problematized as well. When dealing with the work of art with respect to its temporality (historicality) or its being, the thesis also provides room for the issue of perception of the work of art. The resemblance of the author and the recipient is thus revealed and so is the necessity to learn to see not only artworks as such but to see them...

Ce travail a pour objectif d'élaborer une description phénoménologique de l'amour en suivant pour cela trois axes d'investigation : dans une première partie, il s'agit d'analyser l'amour comme modalité de l'intentionnalité, telle que la thématisent chacun de leur côté Scheler et Husserl, ce qui suppose l'élucidation du rapport de l'amour aux valeurs qu'il dévoile pour l'un ou constitue pour l'autre. Dans une deuxième partie, à travers la reprise du débat entre Heidegger et Binswanger quant au statut de l'amour dans la constitution existentiale du Dasein, l'expérience de l'amour est comprise comme un mode original de configuration du monde : l'horizon est alors l'articulation de l'amour et de la question de l'être. Enfin, dans une troisième partie, il s'agit de combiner ces deux approches dans la perspective d'une phénoménologie de l'existence qui s'efforce de saisir le phénomène de l'amour dans son sens humain, c'est-à-dire détaché de tout horizon théologique. / Our purpose in this work is to build a phenomenological description of human love through three ways of investigation. First, we describe love as a mode of intentionnality, with Scheler's and Husserl's analysis, in order to elucidate how love reveals or constitutes values. Then, in the second part, we approach the phenomenological problem of love as configuration of a new world, by reconsidering the debate between Heidegger and Binswanger about his function within the Dasein existential analysis. By doing so, the problem of love appears in his connection with ontology. In the third part of this work, we finally try to expose the human meaning of love, which appears in Sartre's phenomenology. By including love in a phenomenology of existence, Sartre allows us to understand how it must be described with the opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity, that is to say without including any theological presupposition in the phenomenological description.