This study aims to trace points of intersection between the too often divorced disciplines of literature, continental philosophy, and the hard sciences in Angela Carter’s “The Lady of the House of Love.” In short, this thesis will not only explore how such conversations surface within the short story, but will also serve as an explication of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of body and space, and the theory of epigenetics. Through these explications, the thesis itself will also gear one discipline towards the other as both theories intimately bind the environment with the body, and the body with the environment. Thus, the body and the environment are not separate and passive, but active and intertwined in a manner much like the aforementioned disciplines I posit are. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to first postulate that such conversations between literature, philosophy, and science are already occurring, and as such, stress that such conversations need further discussion and exploration.

本論文作為對《存有與時間》的一個探究，其研究焦點主要是針對《存有與時間》第一部的寫作計畫──藉由時間性詮釋此在，解說時間之為存有問題的超越界域──探究為何任何一種存有理解皆必須以時間為其可能界域?我首先闡釋了存有理解的可能性條件──此在的時間性，而其所綻出的超越界域，乃是存有的時間狀態，此在理解投設存有之所在。不過，在海德格的前期思路中，尚未超出界域思維，徹底達致存有自身，對於這部分我將從後期思維加以補充說明。

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die Lebensweise von Alleinstehenden sowie ihre Selbstinterpretationen und ihre Argumentationen zu ihrer Lebensform untersucht und beschrieben. Mein Vorhaben ist eine vergleichende Beschreibung und Analyse der Lebensform Single in Berlin und Budapest. Es wird ein besonderer Schwerpunkt auf jene biographischen Wendepunkte gelegt, die im Bezug auf die heutige Lebensform der Singles relevant sein könnten. In Ungarn kann keine scharfe Trennlinie zwischen weiblichem und männlichem Singleleben gezogen werden. Selbstverständlich unterscheidet sich die Erfahrung des Singledaseins zwischen beiden Geschlechtern. Doch die allgemeine familienfreundliche Einstellung der Ungarn, und die Tatsache, dass Singles ihre gegenwärtige Lebensform meistens wohl als eine Übergangsphase ansehen, denn sie streben zweifellos nach Familiengründung, machen ungarische Singlefrauen und Singlemänner eher ähnlich als unterschiedlich. In Deutschland scheinen Geschlechterunterschiede im Erfahren des Alleinseins wiederum nicht relevant zu sein. Die partnerschaftliche Orientierung hat allem Anschein nach ihre Kraft nicht verloren und die Liebe, die Partnerschaft, bleibt nach wie vor ein lebensführendes Prinzip. Nichtsdestotrotz zeigen die Statistiken, dass ein bedeutsamer Anteil von Frauen und Männern die Lebensform Single mit oder ohne Partner sowie weitere neue, weniger konventionelle Arrangements, wie die Partnerschaft in getrennten Haushalten, für sich als gewünschte Lebensformen bezeichnen, da sie einen breiten Raum für Individualität und Selbstverwirklichung bieten. / My paper examines the specific phases and turning points of the life course, which can influence the decision of young people to choose singleness as a way of life or become single by virtue of structural conditions. The research focuses on a group of young, urban singles from Berlin and Budapest. Singles are understood as those young adults at an age (30-40) typically devoted to family, living alone in their own household and having neither a durable partnership nor children. The population I studied is that of urban singles in their thirties from the upper social strata, having (at least) a university degree and being active in the labor market. The methodology used for this empirical research was conducting life course interviews, and based on this, working with the discourse analysis as a tool for analyzing narration. Experiencing a turning point is often perceived as an individual issue. However, there are some common features and types to be identified. I am not employing an individual perspective, but rather constructing typologies and inquiring about the common aspects of some important life occurrences, which to some extent explain the decision for singleness. Being single when one’s age cohort is building a family is not seen as a landmark or milestone, even less an achievement. Rather, in spite of its demographic growth, singleness is best understood as a hiatus or a period between turning points. Such turning points are: events in the family life in childhood, primarily divorce of the parents; degree of detachment from the parents; labour market entry and work arrangements; the experience of past partnerhip(s). Some of these occurrences are relevant for the way young people interpret personal autonomy and independence. Other factors, especially labor market uncertainties represent a structural reason eventually accounting for the status of single.

Submitted by Maykon Nascimento (maykon.albani@hotmail.com) on 2016-05-31T17:56:41Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao Gabriela Deptulski.pdf: 872653 bytes, checksum: 3c08e06c352d0d9a09a5dc8711038bea (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Patricia Barros (patricia.barros@ufes.br) on 2016-06-30T13:29:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao Gabriela Deptulski.pdf: 872653 bytes, checksum: 3c08e06c352d0d9a09a5dc8711038bea (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-30T13:29:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao Gabriela Deptulski.pdf: 872653 bytes, checksum: 3c08e06c352d0d9a09a5dc8711038bea (MD5) / A investigação da presente dissertação tem como meta desarticular uma possível ambiguidade com relação ao termo ―linguagem‖ no livro Ser e Tempo de Martin Heidegger. Essa ambiguidade consiste em: a linguagem é posterior à abertura de mundo do ser-aí; em oposição à interpretação de que a linguagem é um dos constituintes essenciais dessa abertura. A meta principal do texto é mostrar argumentos a favor desta última opção, ou seja, apreender o lugar ontológico da linguagem como um dos momentos constitutivos da abertura de mundo do ser-aí: abertura essa denominada ―ser-em‖. Para isso, mostraremos ser inviável apreender o fenômeno linguístico em sua inteira originariedade se o tratarmos como o acontecer de entes que não possuem o modo de ser do ser-aí, a saber: como um instrumento utilizável ou como um subsistente. / The research of this text aims to disarticulate a possible ambiguity about the term ―language‖ in Martin Heidegger‘s Being and Time. This ambiguity arises from: the language is subsequent to the Dasein world‘s opening, as opposed to the view that language operates as an essential constitutive of this opening. The primary goal is to show arguments in favor of the latter viewpoint, that's means we will grasp the ontological place of language as a constitutive moment in the Dasein world‘s opening: the so-called ―being-in‖. For this purpose we will show that is impossible to grasp the entire originality of the linguistic phenomenon by treating it as a separate entity with a ―way of being‖ that differs from the Dasein's ―way of being‖, i.e., as a available instrument or as a occurrent subsistent.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIL - Silvia Cristina S Strake.pdf: 674639 bytes, checksum: 502bc5379adce8d3e5650852bd62eb34 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-11-10 / This study intends to present historicity [or historicality] as discussed in the work Being and Time by Martin Heidegger. We understand that this author presents an original discussion about the meaning of history in opposition to the conceptions developed by the Historicism. In order to do so we described the considerations presented in Heidegger s thoughts in 1927, which reinforce his overcoming the epistemological approach and proposing the ontological understanding of history. According to him, the comprehension of what history means should not be defined by the attempts to establish it as a science, but an ontological comprehension of history is revealed by describing the fundamental human condition as Dasein. Based upon daily human existence Heidegger inquiries the significance of history, namely the mode-of-being of history - called historicity [historicality]. We tried to accomplish the exposition of the mode-of-being of history by means of the fundamental elements description as inserted in the Analytics of Dasein, because these elements (being-with-others, temporality, understanding, care, being-towards-death, state-of-mind, etc), along with the description of the phenomenologic-hermeneutical methodology, bring into light the original ontological perspective by Heidegger s thoughts to discuss the problem of history / O presente estudo pretende explicitar a historicidade discutida na obra Ser e Tempo de Martin Heidegger. Entendemos que o autor apresenta uma discussão original do sentido da história, contrapondo-se às concepções desenvolvidas pela Escola Histórica [Historicismo]. Para tanto, descrevemos as considerações presentes no pensamento de Heidegger de 1927 que corroboram para a superação da abordagem epistemológica propondo, assim, uma compreensão ontológica da história. A compreensão do que seja a história, segundo o autor, não se caracteriza pela tentativa de estabelecê-la como ciência, mas a compreensão ontológica da história se revela na explicitação da condição fundamental do homem como Dasein. É a partir da existência humana cotidiana que Heidegger problematiza o sentido da história, ou seja, o modo de ser da história denominado de historicidade. Para realizar a exposição do modo de ser da história, utilizamos a descrição dos elementos fundamentais contidos na Analítica do Dasein, pois estes elementos (ser-com-os-outros, temporalidade, compreensão, cuidado, ser-para-a-morte, disposição, etc), juntamente com a descrição do método fenomenológico-hermenêutico, evidenciam a perspectiva ontológica original do pensamento de Heidegger para discutir o problema da história

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silvio Moreira Barbosa Junior.pdf: 458094 bytes, checksum: 12f90be7301736f9b6f3e79d4952c0ad (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-23 / This work follows the way in wich Martin Heidegger surpasses the proposition of a Phylo sophic Antropology through his project of a Fundamental Ontology. The Phylosophic Antropology he has in sight is the one of Max Scheler, and the specific problem from wich he takes over is the constitution of a unitary idea of man. Through the analisys of existence, Heidegger shows that so the detrmined object determined by the Phylosophic Antropology, the man, as the way of adressing the question about it, wields within the domain of Traditional Metaphysisc and, by this interven tion, are not capable to offer the desired unity. The modus operandi of Phylosophic Antropology underlines a indetermined character of the questio about man that it ignores on it importance, dealing this indetermination of what man is as an obstacle to be overcomed. This work stabilishes this indetermination, made present in the question for the unity of man with the structural unity of Dasein put uncoverd in anguish. Through this relation it s shown not only the reason why Phylosophic Antropology can not offer a unitary idea of man, but also the way in wich Fundamental Ontology overdoes the proposal of a Phylosophic Antropology / Este trabalho acompanha o modo pelo qual Martin Heidegger supera a proposta de uma antropologia filosófica a partir do seu projeto de ontologia fundamental. A antropologia filosófica que tem em vista é a de Max Scheler, e o problema específico do qual parte é o problema em se constituir uma idéia unitária de homem. Através da analise da existência, Heidegger mostra que tanto o objeto determinado pela antropologia filosófica, o homem, quanto o modo de dirigir a pergunta sobre ele, exercem-se dentro do âmbito da metafísica tradicional e, em decorrência disto, não são capazes de oferecer a unidade almejada. O modo de operar da antropologia filosófica evidencia um caráter indeterminado na pergunta sobre o homem, que ela ignora em sua importância, tratando a indeterminação do que seja o homem como obstáculo a ser superado. Este trabalho relacionará esta indeterminação, feita patente na pergunta pela unidade do homem, com a unidade estrutural do Dasein posto a descoberto na angústia. Através desta relação fica patente não só porque a antropologia não pode oferecer uma idéia unitária de homem, como o modo pelo qual a ontologia fundamental supera a proposta de uma antropologia filosófica

Résumé : « Wege, nitch Werke ». L’exergue de la Gesamtausgabe donne une indication précieuse pour quiconque souhaite lire et comprendre la pensée de Heidegger. Son œuvre se distingue des classiques de la tradition philosophique par le fait qu’elle ne cherche pas à établir une doctrine. Elle vise plutôt à reprendre à bras-le-corps une seule et même question : la Seinsfrage. Heidegger l’a retournée de maintes façons, parfois en puisant dans les préjugés au sujet de l’Être, parfois en empruntant des chemins de pensée plutôt inexplorés, mais à chaque fois il étonne. Le lecteur habitué à la rigidité conceptuelle, aux évidences cartésiennes et aux règles logiques de l'esprit, trouve peut-être en Heidegger son plus grand défi parce qu’il adhérait à une pensée-en-chemin (Zu Denken Wege) qui accueille l'errance et la pause, le silence et le tournant. Il invite le lecteur à prendre le pas, à risquer les chemins qui ne mènent nulle part ― Holzwege ―, à ne pas hésiter à faire un pas en arrière (Schritt zurück). La Gesamtausgabe oblige un certain inconfort pour la pensée. Ce mémoire de maîtrise est consacré à l’examen de la fonction phénoménologique des humeurs (Stimmungen) et à l’importance que leur accorde Heidegger, à partir d’une lecture de Sein und Zeit, tout particulièrement. La recherche a pour hypothèse de travail qu’on y retrouve une théorie des humeurs appréciable, bien que ne lui soit pas réservée une analyse systématique dans l’œuvre. Malgré cela, ce mémoire fait la démonstration, en quelques chapitres, que Sein und Zeit contient des éléments théoriques qui permettent de fonder cette théorie. Au final, le mémoire explore brièvement les humeurs analysées par Heidegger. C’est l’occasion de voir comment la théorie des humeurs s’inscrit véritablement dans la pensée du philosophe. La thèse défendue dans ce mémoire pourrait être reprise et approfondie par une étude doctorale, ce qui donnerait peut-être une clef supplémentaire pour contribuer à l'élaboration d'une lecture intégrale de la Gesamtausgabe. / Abstract : The highlight of the Gesamtausgabe gives a valuable indication for anyone who wants to read and understand Heidegger's thought. His work part from the philosophical tradition in that does not seek to establish a doctrine. Rather, it is intended to tackle the question of Being (Seinsfrage). Heidegger has posed it in many ways, sometimes by challenging our common sense about the “Being”, sometimes by exploring new paths of thinking, each time surprising us. Someone familiar with rational assertion, methodological pattern and logical rule, may find Heidegger really hard to understand because he assumes what he calls a « thought-in-way » (Wege Zu Denken), which welcomes silence and wandering. Heidegger invites the reader to try pathways that lead nowhere at first sight — Holzwege —, and sometimes to take a step back (Schritt zurück) from what he thinks. The Gesamtausgabe is definitively a challenge for the thought. The main goal of this master’s thesis is to examine the phenomenological function of moods (Stimmungen) and the importance we should give to them, from a reading of Sein und Zeit, especially. The aim is to find in it a theory of moods, even if Heidegger did not analyze them systematically. Nevertheless, this essay outlines, in just a few chapters, the reasons why we can pretend there is a such theory and why the moods have a significant phenomenological function. Finally, we explore the moods analyzed by Heidegger so we can see how his theory is truly embodied. This research could be taken further in a doctoral study, which would perhaps contribute to a more comprehensive interpretation of the Gesamtausgabe.

Philosophy & Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Systematic Theology)

Philosophy and Systematic Theology / D. Th. (Systematic Theology)