This paper introduces Denotational Proof Languages (DPLs). DPLs are languages for presenting, discovering, and checking formal proofs. In particular, in this paper we discus type-alpha DPLs---a simple class of DPLs for which termination is guaranteed and proof checking can be performed in time linear in the size of the proof. Type-alpha DPLs allow for lucid proof presentation and for efficient proof checking, but not for proof search. Type-omega DPLs allow for search as well as simple presentation and checking, but termination is no longer guaranteed and proof checking may diverge. We do not study type-omega DPLs here. We start by listing some common characteristics of DPLs. We then illustrate with a particularly simple example: a toy type-alpha DPL called PAR, for deducing parities. We present the abstract syntax of PAR, followed by two different kinds of formal semantics: evaluation and denotational. We then relate the two semantics and show how proof checking becomes tantamount to evaluation. We proceed to develop the proof theory of PAR, formulating and studying certain key notions such as observational equivalence that pervade all DPLs. We then present NDL, a type-alpha DPL for classical zero-order natural deduction. Our presentation of NDL mirrors that of PAR, showing how every basic concept that was introduced in PAR resurfaces in NDL. We present sample proofs of several well-known tautologies of propositional logic that demonstrate our thesis that DPL proofs are readable, writable, and concise. Next we contrast DPLs to typed logics based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism, and discuss the distinction between pure and augmented DPLs. Finally we consider the issue of implementing DPLs, presenting an implementation of PAR in SML and one in Athena, and end with some concluding remarks.

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The domestic production activities deduction (DPAD) was created to incentivize U.S. firms to produce within the U.S. and thereby increase domestic investing. I test whether the DPAD is a large enough incentive for firms to invest in the U.S. I used a simulation, and I found that without the DPAD incentive the firms never chose to produce within the U.S. With the DPAD incentive, only firms with relatively low costs of labor will produce domestically. These firms are rare and will not have a large impact on domestic investment and these firms increasing their production in the U.S. will not have a large impact on our employment rates. Therefore, the U.S. government is losing out on tax revenue without a large benefit to the economy. I also analyzed the DPAD at the state level. Currently 25 states allow the DPAD, but since it is a broad domestic deduction, these states might not be gaining the benefit of increased investing in their own state. Through a separate simulation and ANOVA tests on archival data, I found that states do not benefit from the DPAD.

The project of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment consists in providing a ground for judgments of taste so that we are justified in claiming that everybody else can agree with our judgment (subjective universality) and that all others ought to agree with us (subjective necessity, normativity). This justification is supposed to be accomplished in the Deduction of judgments of taste. The section that carries this title (38) is surprisingly short and for this and various other reasons (some of them textual) commentators have often wondered about the precise location where Kant provides the deduction, whether it is really contained in that short paragraph or whether the argument might actually extend beyond 38. In my thesis, I want to reinvigorate the discussion about the location of the deduction and its interpretation by arguing that it takes place between 30-42.

Along with an increasing understanding of the harmful effects on the environment of a wide range of pollutants has come the need for more sensitive, faster and less expensive detection methods of identification and quantitation. Many environmental pollutants occur in low levels and often in complex matrices thus analysis can be difficult, time consuming and costly. Because of the availability and easy cultivation of the microorganisms with potentially high specificity, there is considerable interest in the use of living microorganisms as the analytical component (the biocomponent) of sensors for pollutants. While a number of biosensors using bacteria have been developed, yeast has been comparatively rarely used as the biocomponent. Yeast are attractive because they are easy to culture and they are eukaryotes which means their biochemistry is in many respects closer to that of higher organisms. This thesis describes the development of whole cell bioassays that use yeast cells as a sensing element and redox mediators to probe the intracellular redox reactions to monitor the catabolic activity of the yeast resulting from the external substrate, steady-state voltammetry is utilised as the electrochemical detection technique. The isogenic differential enzyme analysis (IDEA) concept of Lincoln Ventures Limited, lead NERF funded research consortium uses bacteria that have been cultured using specific organic pollutants as the carbon source which are the biocomponent in sensors. The use of wild type yeast Arxula adeninivorans that has the ability to use a very wide variety of substrates as sources of carbon and nitrogen was used as an alternative to bacteria to validate the “IDEA” concept. Naphthalene and di-butyl phthalate were chosen as model target contaminant molecules. The performance, detection limits and the usefulness of yeast based biosensor applications for environmental analysis are discussed. This thesis also describes the development and optimisation of a simple, cost effective in vivo estrogens bioassay for the detection of estrogens using either genetically modified or a wild type yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. In this study, catabolic repression by glucose was exploited to achieve specificity to estrogens in complex environmental samples that eliminates the requirement for conventional sample preparation. This is the first time that the use of wild type yeast to quantify estrogens has been reported. The attractive features of the bioassay are its use of a non-GMO organism, its speed, its high specificity and sensitivity with a detection limit of 10-15 M. The similarity of binding affinities for major estrogens to those of human estrogens receptors makes this in vivo estrogen bioassay very useful for analytical/screening procedures. The electrochemical detection method also makes it easy to interface with a variety of electronic devices.

O presente trabalho é uma investigação histórica, genética e sistemática sobre as metáforas jurídicas da Crítica da Razão Pura, contidas, implicita ou explicitamente, na imagem do tribunal da crítica como tribunal da razão. O objetivo de fundo é analisar como a terminologia jurídica e a jurisprudência influíram na estrutura metodológica da Crítica da Razão Pura e em seu surgimento no desenrolar da tradição filosófica da modernidade e, de forma mais específica, no desenvolvimento do pensamento do próprio Kant. De modo a investigar como as múltiplas metáforas jurídicas da Crítica da Razão Pura apontam, todas, para uma origem metodológica jurídica do criticismo, o presente trabalho divide-se em três grandes partes, cada uma delas abordando um dos três aspectos interpretativos mencionados, a saber, o histórico, o genético e o sistemático. Na primeira parte é apresentada a história das fontes e dos conceitos determinantes para a compreensão jurídica da Crítica, a saber, a ideia de um tribunal e legislação da razão e os conceitos jurídicos de dedução e de antinomia. Na segunda parte é esboçada uma reconstrução da história de surgimento da filosofia crítica cujo objetivo é ressaltar a gênese de alguns motivos críticos que dizem diretamente respeito à constituição jurídica da Crítica e se ligam à preocupação metodológica nela envolvida, a saber, a representação de um juiz que julga imparcialmente sobre as pretensões de conhecimento e a ideia de uma nomotética da razão pura. Na terceira e última parte do trabalho empreende-se uma análise sistemática da metafórica jurídica da Crítica cujas raízes históricas e genéticas foram reveladas anteriormente. Mediante a interpretação da Disciplina da Razão Pura, da dedução metafísica e transcendental como procedimento jurídico de justificação de pretensões além da resolução da antinomia como pressuposto para a validade da legislação da razão, mostra-se como a investigação sistemática das metáforas jurídicas da Crítica da Razão Pura permite compreender a filosofia crítica como a exposição da legislação negativa e ao mesmo tempo positiva da razão. / This thesis provides a historical, genetic and systematic study of the legal metaphors in the Critique of Pure Reason, which are, implicitly or explicitily, contained in the image of the Tribunal of the Critique as the Tribunal of Reason. The main purpose of this work is to examine how legal terminology and jurisprudence influenced the methodological framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. Furthermore, this study seeks to address how these elements played a role in the emergence of the Critique in the course of the philosophical tradition of modernity and, more specifically, in the development of Kants thought. In order to investigate how the legal metaphors in the Critique of Pure Reason indicate a legal methodological origin of criticism, this work is divided into three parts. Each one of these parts addresses one of the three interpretative aspects mentioned above, namely, the historical, genetic and systematic. The first part deals with a history of the sources and of the concepts which underlie the legal understanding of criticism, namely, the idea of a tribunal and legislation of reason as well as the legal concepts of deduction and antinomy. The second part reconstructs the emergence of the critical philosophy. In this part, the goal is to highlight the genesis of some critical motives which have a bearing on the legal constitution of the Critique and express its methodological concern. More specifically, it addresses both the representation of a judge which reaches an impartial verdict on the pretensions of knowledge and the idea of a nomothetic of pure reason. The third and final part of the work undertakes a systematic analysis of the legal metaphors in the Critique relying on the historical and genetic roots described in the previous parts. It provides an interpretation of the Discipline of Pure Reason as the methodological core of the Critique, of the metaphysical and transcendental deduction as a legal procedure and of the resolution of the antinomy as a precondition for the validity of the legislation of reason. By doing so, this part shows how the systematic investigation of the legal metaphors of the Critique of Pure Reason allows for the understanding of the critical philosophy as the exposition of the negative and positive legislation of reason.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / O objetivo desta dissertaÃÃo à investigar a faculdade de imaginaÃÃo na obra CrÃtica da RazÃo Pura do filÃsofo Immanuel Kant. Para tanto, os principais capÃtulos a serem explorados da referida obra, serÃo: o da DeduÃÃo dos conceitos puros do entendimento e o do Esquematismo dos conceitos puros do entendimento. AtravÃs do nosso primeiro capÃtulo poderemos constatar a aÃÃo da imaginaÃÃo em trÃs tipos de sÃntese, a saber, apreensÃo, reproduÃÃo e recogniÃÃo. No segundo capÃtulo, poderemos notar a posiÃÃo da imaginaÃÃo na segunda ediÃÃo da DeduÃÃo dos conceitos puros do entendimento. Jà o terceiro capÃtulo, terà como funÃÃo explorar os esquemas, enquanto produtos da faculdade de imaginaÃÃo, que servirà para uma melhor compreensÃo da ligaÃÃo entre intuiÃÃes e conceitos. Partimos, entÃo, da atividade sintÃtica da imaginaÃÃo, que perpassa a ediÃÃo de 1781 da referida obra. A partir disto, fazemos uma anÃlise da imaginaÃÃo na ediÃÃo de 1787 investigando possÃveis semelhanÃas e diferenÃas entre as duas versÃes citadas. Por fim, perceberemos a importÃncia da faculdade de imaginaÃÃo para a constituiÃÃo do conhecimento transcendental, principal finalidade de nossa pesquisa / The aim of this dissertation is investigate the capacity of imagination in work Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) by philosopher Immanuel Kant. For this purpose, the main chapters to be explored in mentioned work will be: Deduction of the pure concepts of understanding and Schematisms of the pure concepts of understanding. Through our first chapter we will note the action of imagination in three kinds of synthesis, namely, apprehension, reproduction and recognition. In the second chapter, we will note the position of the imagination en the second edition of Deduction of the pure concepts of understanding. Already the third chapter will have the function of explores the schemes as products of capacity to imagination that will serve to a best comprehension of the link between intuitions and concepts. We start from the synthetic activity of imagination which passes through the edition of 1981 of the mentioned work. From this, we analyze of the imagination in edition of 1987 and investigate the possible the similarities and differences between the two versions mentioned. Finally, we note the importance of the capacity to imagination to the constitution of the transcendental knowledge, which is the purpose of our research.

What, if any, kind of inferential reasoning can be a legitimate source of justified aesthetic belief? Looking at deductive and inductive reasoning respectively, this paper concludes that only the latter can be formulated so that there is reason to accept the premises as true and thus justify the conclusion. This follows from considerations about the type of generalisations that the arguments rely on. Universal generalisations, on which the type of deductive reasoning under consideration relies, are always victim to counterexamples. Also, they are incompatible with a reasonable conception of the relationship between an aesthetic property and its correlating set of non-aesthetic properties. The generalisations that inductive aesthetic reasoning relies on, however, evade the problems faced by deduction as well as are compatible and a natural complement to the common aesthetic practice of acquaintance having epistemic authority over reasoning. These considerations lead to the conclusion that inductive, while not deductive, aesthetic reasoning is a legitimate source for justified aesthetic belief.

Ända sedan införandet av de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningarna, som kan leda till nekat avdrag för räntekostnader inom intressegemenskapen beroende på mottagarens skattesituation och syftet bakom transaktionen, har reglernas förenlighet med EU-rättens etableringsfrihet varit ett omdiskuterat ämne. Syf-tet med denna uppsats är att utröna reglernas förenlighet med EU-rätten på denna grund.EU-rätten förbjuder vanligtvis alla former av hinder mot etableringsfriheten. Avsteg får dock göras i särskilda fall om hindrande åtgärder kan motiveras mot bakgrund av art. 52(1) FEUF eller ett trängande allmänintresse. De hindrande åtgärderna måste vidare ha till syfte att uppnå de anförda rättfärdigandegrun-derna samt inte gå utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå dess mål.EU-kommissionen menar att reglerna särskilt missgynnar gränsöverskridande verksamhet. Vidare anser EU-kommissionen att reglerna går utöver vad som är nödvändigt, trots att reglerna förvisso skulle kunna motiveras. Regeringen menar att reglerna inte utgör ett hinder mot etableringsfriheten, eller att reglerna i vart fall kan motiveras och är proportionerliga.Vid en granskning av de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningarna finner författar-na att det föreligger hinder för etableringsfrihetens utövande, men att detta hinder kan motiveras med stöd av behovet att motverka skatteflykt och beho-vet att upprätthålla en väl avvägd fördelning av beskattningsrätten mellan medlemsstaterna. Det svenska regelverket går dock utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå dessa mål, särskilt avseende rättssäkerhet och det totala nekandet av avdrag, och måste därför anses vara oförenliga med unionsrätten. / The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules have been a topic of discussion ever since they were approved. Questions have been raised as to whether the rules restrict the freedom of establishment within EU law. The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the rules are compatible with EU law in this matter.Restrictions to the freedom of establishment are generally prohibited according to EU law. Such restrictions are warranted only if they adhere to art. 52(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or if they pursue a legitimate objective compatible with EU law and are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest, in which case they must be suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to do so (rule of reason).The EU Commission claims that the Swedish rules restrict cross border activity and the freedom of establishment. The Commission initially states that the rules could potentially be justified by the rule of reason doctrine, but ultimately concludes that the rules go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of the justification grounds. Upon an examination of the rules, the authors find that the rules restrict the freedom of establishment, but that they can be justified by the need to combat tax avoidance and evasion and need to preserve the balanced allocation be-tween Member States. The rules do, however, go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective, especially when it comes to the principle of legal certainty and the denying of the entire expense instead of adjusting it to market value, and are therefore not compatible with EU law.