This dissertation explains why Taiwan and South Korea experienced democratic breakthrough in the late 1980s, when Singapore failed to do so. It explains this variation in democratic outcomes by specifying the causal mechanisms underpinning the international-domestic political interface of democratic development in these cases. New empirical evidence discovered in the course of this research has confirmed that transnational networks of nonstate and substate actors were an indisputable source of external pressures on the authoritarian governments of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore during the late 1970s and early 80s. Foreign human rights activists, Christian missionaries and ecumenical workers, members of overseas diaspora communities, journalists, academics and students, along with legislators in key democratic countries allied to the target governments, were found to have raised the international profile of political repression by flagging them as reprehensible human rights abuses. Within the context of an international normative environment where human rights was increasingly considered a legitimate international concern, these transnational actors generated a negative international opinion of the target governments. Such grassroots pressures had the potential to raise the cost of political repression for these target governments with the effect of curbing repressive state behavior, thereby protecting key domestic actors with the potential to effect democratic breakthrough. The extent to which these external pressures could effectively constrain repressive state behavior depended, however, on the immediate geopolitical circumstances of each case. Geopolitical circumstances were also important because they could affect the strength of the protection regime. Thus, the exposition of the transnational protection regime as the causal mechanism underpinning the international-domestic political interface of democratic development requires that we specify the exact role of agency within the international normative and geopolitical contexts in which they operate. This dissertation develops such an abstracted causal model for the purposes of application in other cases and for policy analysis.

This dissertation explains why Taiwan and South Korea experienced democratic breakthrough in the late 1980s, when Singapore failed to do so. It explains this variation in democratic outcomes by specifying the causal mechanisms underpinning the international-domestic political interface of democratic development in these cases. New empirical evidence discovered in the course of this research has confirmed that transnational networks of nonstate and substate actors were an indisputable source of external pressures on the authoritarian governments of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore during the late 1970s and early 80s. Foreign human rights activists, Christian missionaries and ecumenical workers, members of overseas diaspora communities, journalists, academics and students, along with legislators in key democratic countries allied to the target governments, were found to have raised the international profile of political repression by flagging them as reprehensible human rights abuses. Within the context of an international normative environment where human rights was increasingly considered a legitimate international concern, these transnational actors generated a negative international opinion of the target governments. Such grassroots pressures had the potential to raise the cost of political repression for these target governments with the effect of curbing repressive state behavior, thereby protecting key domestic actors with the potential to effect democratic breakthrough. The extent to which these external pressures could effectively constrain repressive state behavior depended, however, on the immediate geopolitical circumstances of each case. Geopolitical circumstances were also important because they could affect the strength of the protection regime. Thus, the exposition of the transnational protection regime as the causal mechanism underpinning the international-domestic political interface of democratic development requires that we specify the exact role of agency within the international normative and geopolitical contexts in which they operate. This dissertation develops such an abstracted causal model for the purposes of application in other cases and for policy analysis.

This dissertation contributes to an increased understanding of democracy promotion. Empirically, the study focuses on the multi-faced democratisation process in Macedonia; the official Swedish policy for democracy promotion; and actual Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia in the period 2000–2006. Theoretically, the study advances an analytical framework, which serves to bring clarity to democracy promotion as a concept. It is argued that democracy promotion embodies six structural components, and should be understood as activities adopted and/or supported by foreign actors, as part of a relationship between the democracy promoter and the recipient country, based on a set of motives and shaped through the use of different strategies, methods and channels. Moreover, the issue of impact is investigated. The analytical framework is used to investigate the character of Swedish democracy promotion, and to develop a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes. It is argued that the Swedish policy for democracy promotion is permeated by a Swedish democratic self-image, eclectic theoretical reflection, and flexibility. In addition, it is argued that Sweden is primarily driven by altruistic and ideological motives, and acts to promote legal and societal democracy, and that the allocation of democracy promotion resources is based on theoretical as well as practical considerations. Macedonia’s democratisation process is analysed, and on the basis of the Swedish attempts to promote democracy in Macedonia, the study advances a typology of the roles of democracy promotion in democratisation processes, these being: educator, initiator, and supporter. Together with the analytical framework, this role typology provides new possibilities to study, and understand, democracy promotion. / Denna avhandling bidrar till ökad förståelse av demokratifrämjande aktiviteter. Empiriskt fokuserar studien på den flerdimensionella demokratiseringsprocessen i Makedonien, den officiella svenska policyn för demokratifrämjande aktiviteter, och de faktiska svenska försöken att främja demokratiutvecklingen i Makedonien under perioden 2000-2006. Teoretiskt bidrar studien med ett analytiskt ramverk, som ämnar ge ökad insikt om demokratifrämjande aktiviteter som begrepp. Det hävdas att dessa aktiviteter är uppbyggda av sex beståndsdelar, och bör förstås som aktiviteter verkställda eller understödda av utländska aktörer, som del av en relation mellan den demokratifrämjande aktören och mottagande land, baserat på en uppsättning motiv och format genom olika strategier, metoder, och kanaler. Betydelsen av effekt inkluderas även i studien. Det analytiska ramverket används för att undersöka den svenska policyn för demokratifrämjande aktiviteter, samt för att utveckla en typologi av de roller som sådana aktiviteter har i demokratiseringsprocesser. Studien visar att den svenska policyn för demokratifrämjande aktiviteter är genomsyrad av en svensk demokratisk självbild, eklektisk teoretisk resonerande, samt pragmatism. Studien visar även att Sverige som demokratifrämjare primärt driva av altruistiska och ideologiska motiv, och strävar efter att främja etableringen av en konstitutionell och samhällelig demokrati, samt att fördelning av demokratifrämjande resurser görs utifrån teoretiska såväl som praktiska överväganden. Makedoniens demokratiseringsprocess analyseras, och med utgångspunkt i de svenska försöken att främja demokratiutvecklingen i Makedonien utvecklas en typologi över de roller som demokratifrämjande aktiviteter kan ha i demokratiseringsprocesser, nämligen: pedagog, initierare, och understödjare. Tillsammans med det analytiska ramverket, skapar denna roll typologi nya möjligheter att studera, och förstå, demokratifrämjande aktiviteter.

Serbia is said to enter the European Union (EU) in 2025 and a criteria for inclusion in the EU are the Copenhagen criteria’s. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the EU as an external and international actor acts to further the implementation of the first Copenhagen criteria concerning democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities. Through a qualitative theory consuming study this thesis investigates the EUs aims and actions in Serbia, a country outside the boards of the EU by applying a theoretical framework based on Lawrence Whiteheads theory on international dimensions of democratization. As a result the thesis finds that the European Union has an interest in democracy promotion in Serbia as defined in the Copenhagen criteria. The EU uses several different methods such as economic aid, learning resources, diplomacy and normative contagion to attain its purpose. But the true reason behind the EUs interest is Serbia is discussed among scholars as well as the effective ways of implementing EUs strategies and the development of sanctions against states that do not comply with the democratic values of the Copenhagen criteria.

The intention of this master-thesis is a critical assessment of the European Union´s (EU) approach to external democracy promotion in Morocco. The study follows a comparative approach and compares the approach pursued by the EU within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), incepted in 2004, with the approach that it had developed up until then under the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The comparison is done with the intention to analyse, to what degree it is justified to speak of a new impetus for democratisation through the ENP in partner countries. The analysis takes into consideration the range of possible instruments for external democracy promotion in the categories „diplomacy“, „conditionality“ and „positive instruments“. For the comparison of democracy promotion under the EMP and the ENP it is suggested to compare the implemented measures in respect to three distinct dimensions: As a first dimension, instruments of democracy promotion are analysed with respect to the focus on indirect vs. direct instruments, e.g. those which aim at establishing socio-economic preconditions favourable to successful democratisation, vs. those which immediately intervene in the processes of political reform. As a second dimension, it is asked whether there has been a shift in the democracy promotion approach on a continuum between consensual cooptation and coercive intervention. As a third dimension, finally, it is analysed whether the approach has undergone a general intensification of efforts, e.g. whether the approach to democracy promotion has become a more active one. The analysis in this master-thesis comes to the conclusion that since the inception of the ENP the EU is indeed pursuing a slightly more direct and certainly a more active approach to democracy promotion in Morocco, while no significant change can be observed in comparison to the strictly partnership-oriented and consensual approach of the EMP. It can be argued that, under the ENP, relations to Morocco have indeed become somewhat more “political”, although at the same time they are still not pro-actively oriented at a political liberalisation of the political regime. Reforms promoted by the EU in Morocco are modest and largely in line with the reform agenda of the Morrocan government itself – e.g. a still largely authoritarian monarchy. Concrete reform steps directed at an opening of the political space, which is largely reserved to the king and its administration, are neither demanded nor supported by democracy promotion instruments, also under the ENP. / Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit untersucht den Ansatz der Europäischen Union (EU) zur Demokratieförderung in Marokko. Die Arbeit folgt einem vergleichenden Ansatz und vergleicht die Strategie der EU, die unter der 2004 ins Leben gerufenen „Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik“ (ENP) verfolgt wird, mit der, die sich bis dahin unter der „Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft“ (EMP) herauskristallisiert hatte. Der Vergleich wird mit dem Ziel durchgeführt herauszuarbeiten, inwiefern es berechtigt ist, neue Triebkraft und neue Anstöße für Demokratisierung durch die ENP zu erwarten. In der Arbeit werden alle Instrumente der Demokratieförderung berücksichtigt, die in die Kategorien Diplomatie, Konditionalität und positive Unterstützungsleistungen fallen. Die durchgeführten Maßnahmen werden auf drei Ebenen verglichen: Auf der ersten Ebene wird untersucht, ob sich der Schwerpunkt verschoben hat zwischen indirekten Maßnahmen, die insbesondere darauf zielen, die sozioökonomischen Voraussetzungen für erfolgreiche Demokratisierung zu schaffen, und direkten Maßnahmen, die unmittelbar in politische Reformprozesse eingreifen. Auf einer zweiten Ebene wird gefragt, ob sich der Ansatz der Demokratieförderung auf einem Kontinuum zwischen Konsens und Zwang verschoben hat. Auf einer dritten Ebene schließlich wird untersucht, ob sich das Engagement generell intensiviert hat und der Ansatz der Demokratieförderung aktiver geworden ist. Die Analyse in dieser Arbeit führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass seit der Initiierung der ENP tatsächlich ein leicht direkterer und aktiverer Ansatz verfolgt wird, während sich an dem streng partnerschaftlichen und auf Konsens ausgerichteten Ansatz der EMP nicht signifikant etwas verändert hat. Es wird jedoch auch deutlich, dass politische Reformen von Instrumenten der Demokratieförderung zwar häufiger anvisiert werden. Die Reformen, die von der EU gefördert werden, sind jedoch ausschließlich Teil des von der marokkanischen Regierung eingeleiteten und begrenzten Reformprozesses. Reformen die eine signifikante Öffnung des politischen Raumes bewirken könnten, der für die autoritäre Monarchie reserviert ist, werden auch im Rahmen der ENP von der EU weder gefördert noch gefordert.

No description available.

<p><strong> </strong></p><p>In this essay the aim was to investigate how the EU is trying to function as a democracy promoter in three particular countries, the so called candidate-countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey. The aim was also to analyze if there exist any differences in how the EU functions in these countries as a democracy promoter with a focus on how acts of democracy promotion is taken place. In order to fulfil the purpose of the essay two questions were addressed, how does the EU perform in promoting democracy in the three candidate-countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey? And also, is it possible to identify any differences in how the EU functions as a democracy promoter in those three countries?</p><p>The method used to fulfil purpose and answering research-questions was qualitative text-analysis.  The results of the study were that the EU does perform in a number of ways to promote democracy in the three countries. The main differences are that the EU is using primarily political tools in Croatia and Macedonia which are channelized top-down and economic tools in Turkey channelized mainly top-down to promote democracy. The extent between the tools used differs.</p><p> </p><p><strong> </strong></p>

No description available.

Ao longo do governo Cardoso (1995-2002), o tema da democracia esteve no topo da agenda internacional do Brasil. Nesse período, o país engajou-se em iniciativas e advogou medidas para a promoção e defesa da democracia no Cone Sul, na América do Sul, no sistema interamericano e além. Participou, de forma protagônica, da criação de instrumentos de defesa da democracia no âmbito de arranjos de integração econômica e concertação política. Encabeçou ou apoiou grande número de declarações, acordos, consensos e compromissos que tinham por objetivo promover os valores democráticos. Envidou esforços para impedir ou reverter golpes de Estado e solucionar crises políticas provocadas pela manipulação de eleições em diversas ocasiões, a maioria delas envolvendo países vizinhos. Ademais, no governo Cardoso, a promoção e defesa da democracia estiveram entre as diretrizes e os objetivos centrais da política externa brasileira. Consoante com isso, tornaram-se o ponto focal do projeto de integração sul-americana e receberam a atenção da diplomacia presidencial. Por esses aspectos quantitativos e qualitativos, assim como pelo fato de o Brasil não ser um tradicional ‘exportador’ de democracia, o envolvimento do governo Cardoso na promoção e defesa desse modelo de organização política é paradigmático. Tendo isso em vista, mais a constatação de que, até o momento, o assunto não foi sistematicamente investigado, o objetivo geral desta dissertação é melhorar nossa compreensão das razões da ‘agenda democrática’ da política externa do governo Cardoso, conforme a chamamos. Para tanto, no capítulo de introdução, revisamos as principais obras que, direta ou indiretamente, tratam do assunto. Ao cabo desse exercício, elaboramos nossa hipótese: As iniciativas e medidas de promoção e defesa da democracia levadas a cabo pelo governo Cardoso tinham por objetivos imediatos a preservação da estabilidade política no entorno regional e o aumento da credibilidade do Brasil perante os vizinhos e o mundo e por objetivo último o aumento do poder do país, em termos soft e de barganha. A seguir, no segundo capítulo, abordamos o paradigma de política externa do governo Cardoso, a ‘autonomia pela participação’, com ênfase nas percepções sobre o papel da integração e os planos para o entorno regional. No terceiro, quarto e quinto capítulos, respectivamente, analisamos o discurso da ‘agenda democrática’ e as iniciativas e medidas de promoção e defesa da democracia. Por fim, no sexto capítulo, retomamos nossa hipótese e apresentamos nossa interpretação das razões da agenda democrática da política externa do governo Cardoso. / During the Cardoso administration (1995-2002), the issue of democracy was on the top of the international agenda of Brazil. In that period, the country engaged in initiatives and advocated measures to promote and defend democracy in the Southern Cone, in South America, in the American System and beyond. He took a leading role in the creation of tools for the defense of democracy in the context of arrangements for economic integration and political cooperation. He led or supported many declarations, agreements, consensus and commitments that aimed to promote democratic values. He made efforts to prevent or reverse coups and resolve political crisis triggered by the manipulation of elections in several occasions, most of them involving neighboring countries. Moreover, during the Cardoso administration, the promotion and defense of democracy were among the main objectives and guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy. Consistent with this, they became the focal point of the project for South American integration and received the attention of presidential diplomacy. For these quantitative and qualitative aspects, as well as the fact that Brazil is not a traditional ‘exporter’ of democracy, the Cardoso administration’s involvement in the promotion and defense of this model of political organization is paradigmatic. Taking this into account, plus the fact that, until now, the issue has not been systematically investigated, the general objective of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of the reasons for the ‘democratic agenda’ of the Cardoso administration’s foreign policy, as we call it. To this end, in the introduction chapter, we review the major works that, directly or indirectly, deal with the issue. After this exercise, we develop our hypothesis: The initiatives and measures to promote and defend democracy carried out by the Cardoso administration had as immediate goals the preservation of political stability in the regional environment and the increase of the credibility of Brazil before the neighborhood and the world, and as ultimate goal the increase of the country’s power, in terms soft and of bargaining. Then in the second chapter, we discuss the foreign policy paradigm of the Cardoso administration, the ‘autonomy through participation’, with an emphasis on perceptions of the role of integration and the plans for the regional environment. In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, respectively, we analyze the discourse of the ‘democratic agenda’ and the initiatives and measures to promote and defend democracy. Finally, in the sixth chapter, we return to our hypothesis and present our interpretation of the reasons for the ‘democratic agenda’ of the Cardoso administration’s foreign policy.

Ao longo do governo Cardoso (1995-2002), o tema da democracia esteve no topo da agenda internacional do Brasil. Nesse período, o país engajou-se em iniciativas e advogou medidas para a promoção e defesa da democracia no Cone Sul, na América do Sul, no sistema interamericano e além. Participou, de forma protagônica, da criação de instrumentos de defesa da democracia no âmbito de arranjos de integração econômica e concertação política. Encabeçou ou apoiou grande número de declarações, acordos, consensos e compromissos que tinham por objetivo promover os valores democráticos. Envidou esforços para impedir ou reverter golpes de Estado e solucionar crises políticas provocadas pela manipulação de eleições em diversas ocasiões, a maioria delas envolvendo países vizinhos. Ademais, no governo Cardoso, a promoção e defesa da democracia estiveram entre as diretrizes e os objetivos centrais da política externa brasileira. Consoante com isso, tornaram-se o ponto focal do projeto de integração sul-americana e receberam a atenção da diplomacia presidencial. Por esses aspectos quantitativos e qualitativos, assim como pelo fato de o Brasil não ser um tradicional ‘exportador’ de democracia, o envolvimento do governo Cardoso na promoção e defesa desse modelo de organização política é paradigmático. Tendo isso em vista, mais a constatação de que, até o momento, o assunto não foi sistematicamente investigado, o objetivo geral desta dissertação é melhorar nossa compreensão das razões da ‘agenda democrática’ da política externa do governo Cardoso, conforme a chamamos. Para tanto, no capítulo de introdução, revisamos as principais obras que, direta ou indiretamente, tratam do assunto. Ao cabo desse exercício, elaboramos nossa hipótese: As iniciativas e medidas de promoção e defesa da democracia levadas a cabo pelo governo Cardoso tinham por objetivos imediatos a preservação da estabilidade política no entorno regional e o aumento da credibilidade do Brasil perante os vizinhos e o mundo e por objetivo último o aumento do poder do país, em termos soft e de barganha. A seguir, no segundo capítulo, abordamos o paradigma de política externa do governo Cardoso, a ‘autonomia pela participação’, com ênfase nas percepções sobre o papel da integração e os planos para o entorno regional. No terceiro, quarto e quinto capítulos, respectivamente, analisamos o discurso da ‘agenda democrática’ e as iniciativas e medidas de promoção e defesa da democracia. Por fim, no sexto capítulo, retomamos nossa hipótese e apresentamos nossa interpretação das razões da agenda democrática da política externa do governo Cardoso. / During the Cardoso administration (1995-2002), the issue of democracy was on the top of the international agenda of Brazil. In that period, the country engaged in initiatives and advocated measures to promote and defend democracy in the Southern Cone, in South America, in the American System and beyond. He took a leading role in the creation of tools for the defense of democracy in the context of arrangements for economic integration and political cooperation. He led or supported many declarations, agreements, consensus and commitments that aimed to promote democratic values. He made efforts to prevent or reverse coups and resolve political crisis triggered by the manipulation of elections in several occasions, most of them involving neighboring countries. Moreover, during the Cardoso administration, the promotion and defense of democracy were among the main objectives and guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy. Consistent with this, they became the focal point of the project for South American integration and received the attention of presidential diplomacy. For these quantitative and qualitative aspects, as well as the fact that Brazil is not a traditional ‘exporter’ of democracy, the Cardoso administration’s involvement in the promotion and defense of this model of political organization is paradigmatic. Taking this into account, plus the fact that, until now, the issue has not been systematically investigated, the general objective of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of the reasons for the ‘democratic agenda’ of the Cardoso administration’s foreign policy, as we call it. To this end, in the introduction chapter, we review the major works that, directly or indirectly, deal with the issue. After this exercise, we develop our hypothesis: The initiatives and measures to promote and defend democracy carried out by the Cardoso administration had as immediate goals the preservation of political stability in the regional environment and the increase of the credibility of Brazil before the neighborhood and the world, and as ultimate goal the increase of the country’s power, in terms soft and of bargaining. Then in the second chapter, we discuss the foreign policy paradigm of the Cardoso administration, the ‘autonomy through participation’, with an emphasis on perceptions of the role of integration and the plans for the regional environment. In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, respectively, we analyze the discourse of the ‘democratic agenda’ and the initiatives and measures to promote and defend democracy. Finally, in the sixth chapter, we return to our hypothesis and present our interpretation of the reasons for the ‘democratic agenda’ of the Cardoso administration’s foreign policy.