Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Köln, 2003/04.

La présente recherche vise à analyser l’essence de la fantaisie considérée comme un vécu intentionnel à partir de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En quel sens pouvons-nous affirmer que la fantaisie, généralement associée à la liberté et à la création, est en effet productrice ? Il nous faut remarquer que la question de la fantaisie s’inscrit parmi les problématiques qui ont contribué à la consolidation du répertoire thématique de la phénoménologie naissante. Cependant, la définition de la fantaisie à laquelle Husserl aboutit à partir de 1904/1905 ne tient pas compte de son aspect libre et productif, mais la considère comme fantaisie re-productrice. Pour arriver à une définition plus large et précise de l’essence morphologique de la fantaisie, sans abandonner la phénoménologie de Husserl, cette recherche propose les objectifs suivants. En premier lieu, montrer les explications que Husserl met à l'épreuve et pourquoi il les rejette. Parmi celles-ci, en plus des explications propres, il faut souligner celles de Brentano et de Twardowski. Deuxièmement, expliciter comment les analyses de la conscience interne du temps et du souvenir ont conduit à la définition canonique de la fantaisie en tant que modification de neutralité appliquée au souvenir. Ensuite, une critique de cette définition est effectuée. Enfin, il est proposé de surmonter les difficultés soulignées à partir d’éléments de la phénoménologie de Husserl, tels que les fonctions que la fantaisie remplit, entre autres dans l’intuition des essences, l’expérience d’autrui et l’expérience esthétique, où la fantaisie opère par la production d’analogues qui ont un effet « harmonisant » sur l’expérience. / The present research is framed in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and aims to analyse the essence of phantasy considered as an intentional experience. In what sense can it be sustained that phantasy, generally associated with freedom and creation, is indeed productive? It should be noted that the question of phantasy appears among the issues that contributed to the consolidation of the thematic agenda of nascent phenomenology. However, Husserl’s definition of phantasy, which is attained in1904/05, does not take into account its free and productive aspect, but rather regards it in a re-productive way. To arrive at a broader, yet precise, definition of the morphological essence of phantasy, without leaving Husserl’s phenomenology, the following objectives are pursued. Firs, I present the possible explanations of phantasy that Husserl puts to the test (among which those of Brentano and Twardowski must be highlighted) as well as the reasons why he rejects them. Second, I explain how the analyses of the internal time consciousness and memory led to the canonical definition of phantasy as a neutrality modification applied to memory. A critique of this definition is subsequently established. Finally, I propose that those difficulties may be overcome by considering other elements of Husserl’s phenomenology, such as the functions that phantasy fulfills, for instance in the intuition of essences, in the experience of others and in the aesthetic experience i.a., where phantasy operates by the producing of analogues which have a “harmonizing” effect on experience.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / In the 1960s, a debate has begun in Epistemology about a problem raised by Edmund Gettier in relation to the traditional conception of knowledge. Nowadays the cases presented by Gettier don t seem resolved what makes them even more relevant in current epistemological debates. According to these cases, some scenarios are possible in which necessary and sufficient conditions (belief, truth and justification) are satisfied in order to the traditional definition of knowledge. However, in these cases the subject (a candidate for knowledge) isn t in possession of knowledge. The mainly discussions about it are relative to the concept of epistemic justification, because justification, as an element that identifies the truth of a belief, is supposed not to be sufficient to carry on this function. This insufficiency allows, therefore, the subject be in possession of justification for her/his beliefs and, at the same time, have no knowledge yet. Gettier cases are considered a problem by some theories that defend the standard conditions to the definition of concept of knowledge. Many efforts have been tried to solve these cases with the establishment of an anti-Gettier condition to the definition of knowledge. This way of solution takes to the development of some theories of justification subjected to additional Gettier cases. Unlike this, Laurence Bonjour publishes a critic called The Myth of Knowledge, in which Gettier cases are read like some epistemological pseudoproblems. Bonjour defends that such cases and also the Lottery Paradox are introduced to Epistemology as a result of the adoption of a fallibilist view of knowledge, particularly in relation to the concept of justification. According to him, fallibilists have been failed in their efforts to solve Gettier cases and, hence, they have been complicated the possibility of a coherent concept of knowledge. Furthermore, a mistake in relation to support a fallible justification involves a myth, namely, a worthy philosophical conception of knowledge that can be found in common sense. The fallibilist view, consonant Bonjour, is philosophically unsustainable. His suggestion concerns the abandonment of the myth, because only with this way epistemological pseudoproblems would be dissolved, like those problems set by Gettier counterexamples. / Na década de 60, inicia-se um debate, no âmbito epistemológico, em torno de um suposto problema proposto por Edmund Gettier a respeito da definição tradicional de conhecimento. Até a atualidade, os casos apresentados por Gettier parecem não ter sido resolvidos, o que torna a discussão relevante nos atuais debates epistemológicos. De acordo com esses casos, é possível postular cenários em que as condições (crença, verdade e justificação) necessárias e suficientes para a definição tradicional de conhecimento são satisfeitas; entretanto, o sujeito, candidato a conhecedor, não está de posse de conhecimento. As principais discussões sobre isso ocorrem em torno do conceito de justificação epistêmica, pois se supõe que a justificação, entendida como o elemento que identifica a verdade da crença, não é suficiente para realizar essa função; permitindo, assim, situações em que o sujeito esteja de posse de justificação para suas crenças e, mesmo assim, não tenha conhecimento. Para as teorias que mantêm as condições-padrão para a definição do conceito de conhecimento, os casos de Gettier são postos como um problema, e muitas tentativas de superá-lo acontecem por meio do estabelecimento de uma condição anti-Gettier para a definição de conhecimento. Essa via de solução leva ao desenvolvimento de teorias da justificação que incorrem em adicionais casos de tipo-Gettier. Diferentemente disso, Laurence BonJour publicou uma crítica denominada O Mito do Conhecimento, em que os casos de Gettier são entendidos como pseudoproblemas epistemológicos. BonJour argumenta que tais casos, e também o Paradoxo da Loteria, são introduzidos à epistemologia como resultado da adoção de uma visão falibilista do conhecimento, particularmente com relação ao conceito de justificação. O que se evidencia é que os falibilistas têm fracassado nas tentativas de soluções para casos tipo-Gettier, e com isso inviabilizam a possibilidade de um conceito coerente de conhecimento. O equívoco da sustentação de uma justificação falível para o conhecimento radica num mito, a saber, que pode ser encontrado no senso comum uma concepção de conhecimento que seja digna de preocupação filosófica. Para BonJour essa visão falibilista do conhecimento é filosoficamente insustentável. Sua sugestão é de que se abandone o mito que a sustenta, pois somente assim se dissolveriam os pseudoproblemas epistemológicos, como aqueles engendrados pelos contraexemplos de Gettier.

Esta dissertação procura discutir como a obra de Edmund Burke, Uma Investigação Filosófica sobre a Origem de nossas Idéias do Sublime e do Belo, introduz um sentido novo de sublime, distinto daquele presente nas poéticas e retóricas clássicas, a partir do rompimento dos paradigmas da clareza e do prazer. Ao caracterizar a experiência do sublime como marcada por incertezas, ambigüidades e contradições, em que os objetos da contemplação são vistos apenas de maneira parcial e obscura, Burke descreve uma experiência que não depende do primado da visão e que, portanto, abrange os demais órgãos do sentido e seus vocábulos. Essas questões são pensadas a partir do modo como o autor reorganiza três antigas dicotomias do pensamento clássico: dor e prazer, corpo e mente, palavra e coisa. No capítulo primeiro, acerca dos pressupostos da experiência do sublime em Burke, (as paixões violentas e mistas e o sentimento de autopreservação), discutimos como prazer e dor não se articulam no autor como ganho e perda, mas enquanto relações efetivas de oposição, e como isso se mostra na fruição do espectador, sobretudo em relação aos espetáculos trágicos, sejam eles fictícios ou reais. No capítulo segundo, a descrição das paisagens vastas e ilimitadas servem de argumento para a restrição de Burke à atuação da visão na experiência do sublime. Ao ser incapaz de estabelecer os contornos do objeto que contempla o espectador se vê diante de um jogo de expectativa e surpresa (tensão e relaxamento) que mais se assemelha às ascensões e quedas de uma peça musical, ou aos movimentos respiratórios do corpo, criada por edifícios arquitetônicos e jardinspaisagens. No capítulo terceiro, discutimos a defesa de Burke de uma linguagem não imagética, que não comunica ou afeta por idéias sensíveis. Não mais vista como imagem, ou representação, a palavra ganha um estatuto de coisa em sua dimensão concreta, áspera e irregular. A poesia e a retórica também estão entre os temas debatidos, sobretudo a partir de seu contraste com a pintura e em oposição ao princípio humanista do Paragone, ou a comparação entre as artes. / This dissertation aims to make a discussion on how Edmund Burkes A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful introduces a new sense of the sublime, distinct from the one conceived by classical poetics and rhetoric, due to its opposition to the paradigm of clarity and pleasure. Once Burke portrays the sublime experience as being tinged with uncertainties, ambiguities and contradictions, where the objects of contemplation are only seen partially and obscurely, the experience he describes doesnt depend on the supremacy of vision and, as such, comprises the other senses. These questions are tackled by looking at the way the author rearrange three old dichotomies in classical thinking: pain and pleasure, body and mind, word and thing. In the first chapter we make a discussion on the grounds of Burkes sublime experience (the violent and mixed passions and the sense of self-preservation), and how pleasure and pain are no longer thought by the author as a loss and gain relation, but as truly and effectively oppositions. This is also shown in the pleasure the spectator feels while contemplating a scene from a real or a fictitious tragedy. In the second chapter, the descriptions of vast and boundless landscapes serve Burke as a further argument on the restricted role vision plays in the sublime experience. Incapable of setting the bounds to the contemplated object, the spectator sees himself winded in a game of expectation and surprise (stress and relief) which somehow resembles the rises and falls of a musical piece, or the breath movements of the body, created by buildings and landscape gardens. In the third chapter, we discuss Burkes attack on the opinion that words communicate and affect by sensible images. Disentangled from the image, or representation, words can then be seen as things, in their tangible, rough and irregular shapes. Poetry and rhetoric are also among the topics discussed in this chapter, especially from their contrast with painting, and from Burkes opposition to the humanistic Paragons principle.

Levinas s’intéresse à la notion du concret de la phénoménologie de Husserl. En 1930, Levinas montre que la notion de l’être a son origine dans l’expérience concrète de l’être qui est l’intuition immanente philosophique. Dans les années 1940, d’une part, Levinas met en relief que la phénoménologie consiste à rechercher dans les vécus concrets l’origine du phénoménologue et de sa vie ; et d’autre part, il détermine l’esprit humain par sa puissance de coïncider avec l’origine de sa vie et de lui-même. À l’époque de Totalité et infini, Levinas clarifie que la description phénoménologique de l’expérience concrète d’une entité est à la fois l’événement même de la révélation de l’être concret de cette entité et l’événement même de l’effectuation de cette entité. D’où Levinas met en évidence, d’une part, la méthode de concrétisation qui lie les expériences concrètes les unes aux autres et, d’autre part, le perspectivisme qui décrit l’expérience concrète telle qu’elle est vécue maintenant. Dans Totalité et infini, Levinas effectue la description phénoménologique comprise par lui. En décrivant les expériences concrètes du moi, il les distribue en deux séries : celle du besoin (vie naïve) et celle du désir (critique de soi). Dans la série du besoin, sur la base de l’habitation se fondent les expériences du moi naïf : le travail, la possession et la représentation. Et dans la série du désir se distribuent les expériences avec autrui : la parole, l’amour avec la femme et la fécondité. Ces deux séries d’expériences constituent la forme originaire de l’expérience du moi personnel. Totalité et infini est en ce sens la description phénoménologique du moi personnel par excellence. / Levinas brings out the notion of the concrete from Husserl’s phenomenology. In his 1930 book, Levinas shows that the notion of the being has its origin in the concrete experience of the being that is philosophical immanent intuition. In two articles published in the 1940s, Levinas reveals that the phenomenology searches in concrete experiences the origin of the phenomenologist himself and his life. On the other hand, he determines the human spirit by its power to coincide with the origin of his life and himself. In four articles published around 1960, Levinas clarifies the phenomenological description of the concrete experience of an entity is the very event of revelation of the concrete being of this entity and the very event of the effectuation of the entity. Hence, Levinas brings out the method of concretization which connects together concrete experiences as well as the perspective which describes concrete experience as it is now experienced. In Totality and infinity, Levinas practices the phenomenological description understood by himself. By describing concrete experiences of the “I”, Levinas categorizes them into two series of experience: that of need (naive life) and that of desire (self-criticism). In the series of need, the experiences of the naive “I” relies on the dwelling : labor, possession and representation. And in the series of desire, experiences with the other are distributed: speech, love with woman and fecundity. These two series of experiences constitute the proto-form of the experience of the personal “I”. Totality and infinity is in this sense the phenomenological description of the personal “I” par excellence.

Cette thèse examine la phénoménologie en tant que philosophie-en-travail, en tant que projet ouvert de recherche. Sa tâche principale consiste à déterminer la façon d’accomplir le travail phénoménologique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, nous examinons les analyses de la doctrine phénoménologique de l’attitude (Partie I.), de la doctrine de la méthode (Partie II.) et de l’architectonique « flexible » (Partie III.) de la phénoménologie. Ces élaborations nous permettent de thématiser la dé-limitation de la conscience, l’enrichissement de sens et l’institution du nouveau en tant que traits caractéristiques de la manière phénoménologique d’opérer. Cette recherche exige une oscillation constante entre une systématique ouverte de la philosophie d’Edmund Husserl et des analyses phénoménologues particulières. / This dissertation examines phenomenology as working philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie), that is, as an open research project. The main aim of the study consists in determining the mode of performance (Vollzugsweise) of the phenomenological work in progress. To achieve this goal we provide an analysis of the doctrine of attitude (Part I.), the doctrine of method (Part II.), and then the “flexible” architectonics (Part III.) of phenomenology. These elaborations enable us to thematize the de-limitation of consciousness (Entschränkung), the enrichment of sense (Sinnbereicherung) and the institution of the new as the characteristic features of the phenomenological method of operating. This research project requires a constant oscillation between an open systematization of Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and particular phenomenological analyses. / Diese Dissertationsforschung hat zwei parallellaufende Aufgaben vor sich. Die erste besteht darin, die allgemeine Form und die spezifische Vollzugsweise der phänomenologisch philoso-phischen Arbeit zu bestimmen; die zweite besteht ihrerseits darin diese Arbeit im Verlauf – auf ihrem Weg zu zeigen. Dafür hat dieser Dissertationstext zwei Einleitungen: die systematische Einleitung, die die offene Systematik (die sog. «flexible Architektonik») der phänomenologi-schen Philosophie darstellt, und die propädeutische Einleitung, die die Grundintuitionen der phä-nomenologischen Philosophie (z. B. das Unverständlichwerden des Selbstverständlichen – das philosophische Erstaunen, die Enttäuschung bei der Trugwahrnehmung etc.) formuliert. Anders gesagt, das Ziel besteht darin, das Spezifische der phänomenologischen Arbeit zu verstehen und zu vollziehen.

No description available.

The purpose of this study has been to determine the ways Edmund S. Muskie used identification in five speeches which he delivered during his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1971. Kenneth Burke's rhetorical concepts of identification and combustiality are used to analyze the speeches. Chapter I includes an introduction to Muskie's political life and an examination of the basic principles of Burke's rhetorical philosophy of indentification. Chapter II delves into the nature of Muskie, the man. Chapter III examines the texts of the speeches and reveals the strategies of identification which he used. Chapter IV summarizes Musikie's use of Burkeian identification in relation to himself and the times.

This thesis endeavors to show how Edmund Spenser used classical mythology, and his variations from it, in his work The Faerie Queene.

Zugl.: Hamburg, Hochsch. für Wirtschaft und Politik, Diss.