Aristotle (4th century B.C.E/1925) described eudaimonia as “the good life”, and is today commonly understood as eudaimonic well-being (EWB) within research. Despite the long history, the definitions and operationalizations of EWB are diverse and no coherent description or explanation for the biology of EWB exist. Hence, the present thesis reviews current neuroscientific- and additional biological research on EWB. This review reveals EWB to be most frequently operationalized as psychological well-being (PWB) (Ryff, 2014), and is here used as basis for an attempt to explain the biological and psychological profiles of EWB as high PWB. High PWB was characterized by brain activity linked to the reward circuitry, dorsolateral and left prefrontal cortex (PFC) and grey matter (GM) volume in areas of the brainstem and insular cortex. High PWB was also positively related to lower levels of several harmful biomarkers. The proposed psychological profile of high PWB included the psychological functions goal directed behaviour and emotional control. It is hoped that the proposed profiles will serve as inspiration for further exploration of the biology and psychology of human well-being (WB).

Doctor Educationis / Three questions are central to this thesis: First, can the practice of teaching be made safe from luck through the controlling power of knowledge and reason? Second, even if it can be made safe from luck, should it be? Third, if it is neither possible nor desirable to exclude luck from teaching, what knowledge and personal qualities will put practitioners in the strongest position to face the contingencies of luck and, more especially, to face those conflicts which arise as a consequence of circumstances beyond the practitioner's control? Martha Nussbaum's account of luck and ethics in Greek philosophy and tragedy prompts the questions and provides, with Aristotle, many of the conceptual tools for answering them; Thomas Nagel's work on moral luck provides the categories for a more refined account of luck and its place in teaching. With respect to the first two questions, I argue that as a human practice teaching is open to the vicissitudes of fortune and cannot be made safe from luck, except at the expense of its vitality. Like other human practices, teaching is mutable, indeterminate and particular. Both its primary and secondary agents (teachers and pupils) and the practice itself are vulnerable to luck in four categories: constitutive, circumstantial, causal and consequential. But teaching is not just a matter of luck; it is a public practice in which some people are put into the hands of others for specific purposes, usually at public expense. If we have no way of holding practitioners accountable for their actions, the practice loses credibility. Any money or trust put into it is simply a gamble. For these and other reasons, the drive to exclude luck from practice is strong. Yet strong luck-diminishment projects are themselves a threat to the vitality of the practice. During the twentieth century two strong luck-diminishment projects have been especially detrimental to teaching: one rooted in the science of management, the other in the empirical sciences. Both have resulted in a proliferation of unfruitful and often trivial research projects, to misconceived programmes of teacher education, to distorted notions of knowledge and excellence in teaching, and to self-defeating and impoverished practice. Luck-diminishment projects rooted in logic are more or less threatening to vital practice, depending on how far they are committed to instrumental reasoning and a science of measurement. These are blunt and controversial claims. A central task of the thesis is to refine and defend them. The refinement proceeds by way of a contrastive analysis of strong luck-diminishment projects and others which are more responsive to the indeterminacy of practice. With respect to the final question, I argue that there are at least three sets of necessary conditions for a flourishing practice in the face of luck. One concerns what Aristotle calls the virtues of intellect and character. Central among these are practical rationality (conceived non-instrumentally), situational appreciation, and the knowledge required for an intelligent pursuit of the definitive ends of teaching. A second set concerns enabling institutions. A third concerns the kind of community best able to nurture those qualities necessary for vital and excellent practice. All three sets are themselves vulnerable to reversal. Keeping the practice of teaching alive and ensuring that it remains true to its definitive ends is thus a matter of sustained struggle.

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This article reviews the presence of family theory in health-care research. First, we demonstrate some disconnect between models of the patient, which tend to focus on the individual, and a large body of research that finds that relationships influence health. We summarize the contributions of family science and medical family therapy and conclude that family science models and measures are generally underutilized. As a result, practitioners do not have access to the rich tool kit of lenses and interventions offered by systems thinking. We propose several possible ways that family scientists can contribute to health-care research, such as using the family as the unit of analysis, exploring theories of the family as they relate to health, and suggesting greater involvement of family scientists in health research.

Hierdie studie, wat handel oor die Griekse tragedieskrywers en die deugde-etiek, val in vier hoofdele uiteen. In die eerste plek (afdeling 2) begin dit met ’n bespreking van die werk van die drie belangrikste tragedieskrywers – Aischulos, Sophokles en Euripides – en die sosiopolitieke tydsgewrig waarin dit geskryf is. Hierna word drie tekste van elke skrywer bespreek: Sewe teen Thebe van Aischulos; Antigone van Sophokles en Hippolutos van Euripides. Teen hierdie histories-vergelykende agtergrond volg ’n tematiese bespreking van die Griekse tragedieskrywers in die tweede plek (afdeling 3). Temas wat aan die bod kom sluit in: 1) Die rol van die antieke teater in die breë Griekse identiteit, veral met betrekking tot die tema van die individu binne die gemeenskap, en die verhouding tussen gehoor en kunswerk. 2) Die tema van die tragiese mens – en meer spesifiek die tragiese individu en sy/haar identiteit. 3) ’n Bespreking van die verhouding tussen die private (oikos) en openbare (polis) in antieke Griekeland. Hierdie tematiese bespreking dien dan as aanknopingspunt vir ’n bespreking van Aristoteles se deugde-etiek wat in die derde plek (afdeling 4) aan die beurt kom. In die laaste gedeelte van hierdie studie (afdeling 5) word gepoog om die verskeie temas soos behandel deur die Griekse tragedieskrywers, die politieke ruimte van die tragiese teater en Aristoteles se deugde-etiek, in gesprek te plaas met die estetiese en politieke implikasies van Gadamer se filosofiese hermeneutiek. Uiteindelik poog die studie om ‘n alternatief te formuleer op die gedepolitiseerde individu, wat in ons eie tyd ‘n probleem geword het. Teen die agtergrond kan dit verhelderend wees om te gaan kyk na hoe die klassieke tragedies, op die vooraand van Aristoteles se deugde-etiek, oor die kwessie van die verhouding tussen mens en samelewing nagedink het. Een van die punte wat hierdie werkstuk aanspreek, is dat die oorbeklemtoning van die individu in vandag se wêreld ʼn verlies aan tragiese wêreldbeskouing meebring, en dat dit ‘n verlies is wat die lewe van die individu en van die gemeenskap ten nouste raak. As alternatief word aangevoer dat die herstel van ’n holistiese, esteties-etiese lewensbeskouing tot groter politieke vervulling vir die mens kan lei as wat die eietydse mens beskore is. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / gm2015 / Philosophy / MPhil / Unrestricted

In Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes the assumption that there are five states of the soul through which we interact with truth. He continues Book VI with a discussion of his intended meaning of each of these states of the soul. In this study the relevant discussions on each state are extracted from the text to enable a clearer understanding of these states, as Aristotle presents them. Subsequently, the role of each state is studied in the context of the entire Nicomachean Ethics. The primary focus is directed at a clearer understanding of Aristotle’s proposed intellectual virtues, and on their respective roles in the ethical life. Simultaneously, the ethical life that Aristotle presents, and its ultimate end eudaimonia, or happiness, are approached from this perspective. Aristotle argues that reason is the distinguishing feature of humans, and that man’s excellence must include the excellent use of this capacity. This study investigates how Aristotle proposes that the rational intellect should reach its completion, and comes to the conclusion that true mastery of the intellect can only result from the cooperation of the five states of the rational soul. It becomes evident that each state of the soul has a different nature and function, and that through directed cooperation they do not compete with one another, but are mutually enhanced. However, Aristotle repeatedly emphasises the importance of extending thought into action. This makes Aristotle’s ethical theory so attractive: he manages to consolidate his theorizing with the value of experienced reality. This is his essential key to happiness, which is experienced both in perception and in action. By approaching the Nicomachean Ethics from the perspective of the five states of the rational soul, an appreciation is acquired for the fine balance by which action and reason may combine to result in man’s fulfilment of his highest potential. It is in this balance that one finds the secret to eudaimonia. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Ancient Languages / unrestricted

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Text in German / Cosmology and sociology show that animism is the predominant worldview of Japan. Concepts of God, the issue of controlling mana-power, implications of the Japanese soul-concept, the orientation of the conscience and ancestor veneration are critically discussed with Christian beliefs. When compared to the Biblical peace-concept the Japanese peace-concept shows an aesthetic bias that has to be overcome by adding the concept of justice. Japanese soteriology has no reference to God the Creator, whose proclamation is the basis of understanding man's misfortune as rebellion against God and his salvation as reconciliation with Him. Cosmologically speaking, man experiences his misfortune as fear of super-human powers. Salvation is sought through defensive magic and fortunetelling. Christianity acknowledges security as a basic human need but seeks protection and guidance from God. The main focus of Japanese soteriology is in the field of sociology, which in Japan also includes the relationship with the living dead. Misfortune is mainly experienced as shame and ostracism, salvation as rehabilitation. Defilement of naturally good humans is a central theme in Japan's understanding of man's misfortune. The Christian concept of sin, on the contrary, has a theological and an ontological dimension as well. In Japan salvation is understood solely as this-worldly benefits such as health, happiness, prosperity, fertility, and longevity. But in Christianity suffering is a central theme. An overly strong orientation on "this world" can lead to ethical shallowness, overemphasizing the "coming world" to a dangerous ethical relativism. Christian soteriology must keep the tension between these two extremes. The hope of the coming world must neither be robbed of its historical truth by its transformation into a principle, nor must it be historically ineffective.As for his relationship with God, man is solely the object of God's salvation. But as for Christian acts, man is called to act "in the Lord". / Ausführungen zur Kosmologie und Soziologie zeigen, daß das vorherrschende Weltbild Japans das des Animismus ist. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Christentum werden der Gottesbegriff, der Gebrauch der Mana-Kraft, Implikationen des Seelenbegriffs, die Gewissensorientierung und die Ahnenverehrung diskutiert. Die Gegenüberstellung mit dem biblischen Friedensbegriff zeigt, daß der japanische Friedensbegriff seine ästhetische Einseitigkeit durch die Erweiterung um den Aspekt der Gerechtigkeit überwinden muß. In Japan hat die Soteriologie keinen Bezug zu Gott, dem Schöpfer, dessen Verkündigung die Grundlage für das Verständnis des Unheils als Rebellion gegen ihn, des Heils als Versöhnung mit ihm ist. Kosmologisch wird das Unheil in Japan als Angst vor übermenschlichen Mächten erfahren, das Heil durch Schutzzauber und Wahrsagerei gesucht. Das Christentum erkennt das Grundbedürfnis der Sicherheit an, sucht Schutz und Führung aber bei Gott. Das Schwergewicht japanischer Soteriologie liegt im Bereich der Soziologie, zu der in Japan auch die Beziehung zu den living dead gehört. Unheil wird vor allem als Beschämung und Ächtung, Heil als Rehabilitation erfahren. Im japanischen Unheilsverständnis nimmt Verunreinigung des an sich guten Menschen einen hohen Stellenwert ein. Das christliche Sündenverständnis hat dagegen auch eine theologische und ontologische Dimension. Heil wird in Japan rein diesseitig als Gesundheit, Glück, Reichtum, Fruchtbarkeit und langes Leben verstanden. Dagegen spielt in der christlichen Heilslehre das Leiden eine zentrale Rolle. Eine zu starke Orientierung auf "diese Welt" kann zu ethischer Seichte, eine zu starke Orientierung auf die "kommende Welt" zu einer gefährlichen ethischen Relativierung führen. Die christliche Soteriologie muß die Spannung zwischen beiden Polen aufrechterhalten. Die Hoffnung auf die kommende Welt darf weder durch ihre Erhebung zum Prinzip ihrer geschichtlichen Wahrheit beraubt werden, noch darf sie selbst geschichtlicher Wirklichkeit entbehren. Was die Beziehung des Menschen zu Gott angeht, ist der Mensch ganz und gar Objekt des göttlichen Heilshandelns. Was aber das christliche Handeln angeht, ist der Mensch zum Handeln "im Herrn" berufen. / Christian Spirituality, Church History and Missiology / D.Th. (Missiology)

O tema central da Ética Nicomaquéia é a investigação do sumo bem humano, a eudaimonia ou boa vida. Aristóteles define a eudaimonia em EN I.7 1098a1719 como “atividade da alma [racional] segundo a virtude ( arete ), e se houver mais de uma virtude ( aretai) , segundo a melhor e mais perfeita (t eleiotanton )”. A virtude ( arete ) de algo é aquilo que permite a este algo realizar corretamente sua função própria. A função do homem consiste em uma atividade em acordo com a razão, logo a atividade humana virtuosa será aquela atividade (ou mesmo um conjunto delas) na qual o homem expresse um uso excelente da razão. A concepção de arete, portanto, tem um papel fundamental na definição de eudaimonia. Se o filósofo deseja investigar adequadamente o fim último dos seres humanos, ele precisa incluir nessa investigação o estudo das virtudes. No presente trabalho, nos dedicamos a esclarecer e definir a virtude da parte desiderativa da alma (que não é racional, mas pode ouvir e obedecer a razão): a virtude moral. Para isso, analisamos os principais pontos apresentados pelo Estagirita com relação à aquisição e caracterização dessa virtude. Ao longo do trabalho, mostramos que a virtude de caráter é uma disposição para escolher aquilo que é correto e bom nas ações e paixões (aquilo que é intermediário em relação a nós) conforme determinado pela razão prudencial. / The main subject in the Nicomachean Ethics is the inquiry on the highest human good, eudaimonia or good life. Aristotle defines eudaimonia in EN I.7 1098a1719 as “activity of [racional] soul in conformity with excellence ( arete ), and if there are more than one excellence ( aretai) , in conformity with the best and most perfect (t eleiotaton) ”. The virtue ( arete ) of something is what allows it to properly accomplish its own function. The function of man consists in an activity in accordance with reason, thus virtuous human activity is that (or those) in which a man shows excellent use of reason.The notion of arete, therefore, has a fundamental role on the definition of eudaimonia. If Aristotle wants to properly investigate the final end of human beings, he should include in this inquiry the study of virtue. In this work we are devoted on making clear and defining the desiderative part of the soul (which isn’t rational, but can listen to and obey reason): moral virtue. For that, we analyzed the main points presented by Aristotle related to the acquirement and description of this virtue. Throughout this work, we show that character virtue is a tendency for chosing what is right and good in our actions and passions (that which is intermediary regarding ourselves) according to what is established by prudential reason.

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