Is Socrates in the Protagoras a sincere hedonist? The decipherment of the latter question is fundamental to the unraveling of key aspects of Plato’s ethical thought. It has been suggested that Socrates in the Protagoras finds hedonism philosophically attractive for it functions as a necessary anti-akrasia premise and therefore it fits his moral psychology. At the same time quantitative hedonism provides for commensurability of moral value and, in turn, for a more straightforward, quantifiable, and action-guiding Platonic ethical theory. Although initially appealing, the latter hypothesis is deeply problematic. On the one hand, hedonism is not a necessary theoretical tool either for commensurability of value or for a quantifiable eudaimonistic ethical theory. On the other hand a hedonistic interpretation of the Protagoras would result in a plethora of blatant anomalies for Platonic ethical theory as it is exhibited in the early and middle period dialogues. In particular, the endorsement of quantitative hedonism comes tied with an apotheosis of sophistic education and also with a purely instrumental conception of virtue which contradicts cardinal components of Socrates’ and Plato’s virtue theory. Therefore, a prohedonistic approach of the Protagoras is untenable and has to be rejected. As a result, a sufficiently plausible defense of the Socratic doctrine “no one does wrong willingly” needs to be constructed on non-hedonistic grounds. My suggestion is that we should recast Plato’s treatment of akrasia in terms of two – commonly defended by early Plato- descriptive theses of human psychology; that is, psychological eudaimonism and motivational intellectualism. This move will lead us to the conclusion that the traditional conceptualization of akrasia as a single and unified phenomenon is incomplete as it does not pay justice to the richness of Plato’s moral psychology. Rather, as I will maintain, there are two types of akrasia implicit in Plato’s treatment of the phenomenon: synchronic akrasia and diachronic akrasia. On this revisionary theoretical basis, the differences between early Plato and later Plato on akrasia can be understood as variations in the adherence or not to psychological eudaimonism and motivational intellectualism.

Can Philosophers make a genuine and substantive contribution to the theory and practice of moral education? Contrast the following two answers. According to one approach, analytic moral philosophy is concerned with constructing moral theories. As such, moral education is a secondary concern of the moral theorist and a moral theory will, at most, only have implications for moral education. Call this the strict theoretical approach. An alternative account holds that moral education is a central topic of moral philosophy. As such, moral theorists who ignore questions of moral education are offering incomplete theories. Call this the educative approach. In this dissertation, I argue that moral philosophers need to take the educative approach more seriously. In part one, I argue that the educative approach is well grounded in the western tradition of moral philosophy (particularly in the eudaimonist tradition of ethics). In part two, I show how recent work in virtue theory can make a genuine and substantive contribution to the interdisciplinary field of moral education.

Most philosophical work on ethical questions concerning disability and impairment, human vulnerability and the cycles of life is found within feminist care ethics and the philosophy of disability. When it comes to eudaimonist virtue ethics, a discussion of such truths about our human condition usually falls within an account of external goods. Alasdair Macintyre's work is the most notable exception. In his book, Dependent Rational Animals, Macintyre argues that the cultivation of the virtues of acknowledged dependence is necessary for living a eudaimon life. Rather than focus, as Macintyre and some care ethicists do, on our often contingent dependence, I argue that it is a right orientation toward our interdependence which allows us to live with the vulnerabilities inherent in the human condition and live well. To that end, I put forward a hitherto unspecified virtue which I call Proper Interconnection and argue for its necessary role in sustaining human flourishing in an interdependent world. I establish that Proper Interconnection is a legitimate virtue in its own right by demonstrating that it meets the conditions which Rosalind Hursthouse in "Environmental Virtue Ethics," and Macintyre in After Virtue specify must be met in order for a trait to qualify as a virtue. In accordance with Hursthouse's conditions, I show that Proper Interconnection is a deep-seated disposition of character comprised of four cognitive and emotional components: recognition, compassion, acceptance and shared responsibility. Proper Interconnection is integral to the acquisition of practical wisdom, can be inculcated in children and plausibly fits within an account of human nature. Turning to Macintyre's conditions, I provide several examples from anthropology which I argue suggest that Proper Interconnection is both central to and helps sustain particular practices and traditions—such as the practice of hospitality and traditions of kinship. Macintyre argues that, just as the virtues help sustain practices and traditions, they also enable us to flourish by sustaining the integrity of our character and, by extension, our life narratives. We are both the authors of our lives and inextricably interconnected with those whose life narratives intertwine with our own. As our individual flourishing cannot exist apart from the flourishing of the whole, we cannot live an integrated life narrative by engaging in just any form of interconnection. We need to cultivate the virtue of Proper Interconnection, as we search and strive for both our own good and the good of humankind.

Throughout life, man seems to seek a happy life, which seems to be something more than a static feeling of pleasure. Life is something we create and form ourselves and due to this our welfare can go better or worse. Virtue Ethics asserts that we, through actions and disposition, can form our life and that ethics gives guidance on how to do it. Something that also calls for rational consideration. Happiness and virtue, two terms that we, during life, learn to understand and act in union with. Rather than something static or simply theoretical, the terms are practical and therefore demand skill and practice. Happiness includes certain actions, something virtue ethics give guidance in. In this way the two terms are connected and share nature. I will, during this paper, argue that virtue ethics gives a better picture, and is a necessary part, of happiness, which is in opposition to the hedonic claim that happiness is pleasure.

Ancient Greek philosophical schools are said to share a common structure in their ethical theories which is characterized by a eudaimonistic teleology based in an understanding of human nature. At first glance, the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus as described in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism seems to fit into this model insofar as he describes the end of the skeptic as ataraxia, a common account of the expression of human happiness. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of Sextus’s philosophy for several reasons. “The end of skepticism” cannot be eudaimonistic or teleological in the way that other ancient ethical theories are typically understood; moreover, ataraxia is not an end derived from a theory about human nature. For these reasons, the skeptical way of life is radically different than the ethical theories proposed by other schools. I argue that this difference is a result of the character of the skeptical enterprise which involves the implicit rejection of norms in both the epistemological and the ethical spheres.

There is a lacuna in the field of positive psychology as far as the conceptualisation of influences of environmental contexts on psychological well-being is concerned, and there is also a lack of credible empirical findings on the dynamics of processes involved. The aim of the current study was to test various models on the possible mediating role of subjective perceptions of health, personality factors and spirituality in the dynamics of context and psychological well-being. Psychological well-being was conceptualised and measured multi-dimensionally as defined from a general psychological well-being, hedonic, and eudaimonic perspective. Context was defined in terms of the historical stratification in South African society by socioeconomic differentials pertaining to race, socioeconomic indices and infrastructural resources. An availability sample of 5 14 participants from Potchefstroom (n=384) and Mafikeng (n=130) completed questionnaires on psychological well-being, subjective perceptions of health, personality factors and spirituality after informed consent was obtained. Psychological well-being was measured with the Affectometer 2 (Kammann & Flett, 1983), the Sense of Coherence Scale (Antonovsky, 1987) and Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Larsen and Griffin, 1985). General psychological well-being was defined and operationalised in terms of the degree of sense of coherence, satisfaction with life and affect balance; hedonic well-being in terms of the degree of satisfaction with life and affect balance, and eudaimonic well-being in terms of the degree of sense of coherence and satisfaction with life. Subjective perceptions of physical health was measure with the General Health Questionnaire of Goldberg and Hillier (1979); Agreeableness and Extraversion as personality factors with the NEO- Personality Inventory - Revised of Costa and McCrae (1992); and Spirituality with the Spiritual Well-being Scale of Paloutzian and Ellison's (1979). The findings indicate, firstly, that perceptions of physical health (article I), personality factors (article 2) and spirituality (article 3) mediate the relationship between contexts and psychological well-being. Secondly, that the hedonic model of psychological well-being (albeit variably conceptualised in article 1 and articles 2 and 3) overall, yielded the highest amounts of variance. Thirdly, the results also indicated differences among the two predominantly black and white samples in terms of the roles played by subjective perceptions of health, personality factors and spirituality in the relationship between contexts and psychological well-being. It is concluded that due consideration must be given to social context and the dynamics of interaction between social ecology and individual factors in order to make a meaningful contribution to the understanding and promotion of psychological well-being. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are indicated. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Psychology))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006.

There is a lacuna in the field of positive psychology as far as the conceptualisation of influences of environmental contexts on psychological well-being is concerned, and there is also a lack of credible empirical findings on the dynamics of processes involved. The aim of the current study was to test various models on the possible mediating role of subjective perceptions of health, personality factors and spirituality in the dynamics of context and psychological well-being. Psychological well-being was conceptualised and measured multi-dimensionally as defined from a general psychological well-being, hedonic, and eudaimonic perspective. Context was defined in terms of the historical stratification in South African society by socioeconomic differentials pertaining to race, socioeconomic indices and infrastructural resources. An availability sample of 5 14 participants from Potchefstroom (n=384) and Mafikeng (n=130) completed questionnaires on psychological well-being, subjective perceptions of health, personality factors and spirituality after informed consent was obtained. Psychological well-being was measured with the Affectometer 2 (Kammann & Flett, 1983), the Sense of Coherence Scale (Antonovsky, 1987) and Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Larsen and Griffin, 1985). General psychological well-being was defined and operationalised in terms of the degree of sense of coherence, satisfaction with life and affect balance; hedonic well-being in terms of the degree of satisfaction with life and affect balance, and eudaimonic well-being in terms of the degree of sense of coherence and satisfaction with life. Subjective perceptions of physical health was measure with the General Health Questionnaire of Goldberg and Hillier (1979); Agreeableness and Extraversion as personality factors with the NEO- Personality Inventory - Revised of Costa and McCrae (1992); and Spirituality with the Spiritual Well-being Scale of Paloutzian and Ellison's (1979). The findings indicate, firstly, that perceptions of physical health (article I), personality factors (article 2) and spirituality (article 3) mediate the relationship between contexts and psychological well-being. Secondly, that the hedonic model of psychological well-being (albeit variably conceptualised in article 1 and articles 2 and 3) overall, yielded the highest amounts of variance. Thirdly, the results also indicated differences among the two predominantly black and white samples in terms of the roles played by subjective perceptions of health, personality factors and spirituality in the relationship between contexts and psychological well-being. It is concluded that due consideration must be given to social context and the dynamics of interaction between social ecology and individual factors in order to make a meaningful contribution to the understanding and promotion of psychological well-being. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are indicated. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Psychology))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006.

Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of normative virtue ethics. The virtue ethical literature, however, does not contain much information on the meta-ethical roots of virtue theories. The present paper seeks to address this deficiency by examining the neo-Aristotelianism of Rosalind Hursthouse in an effort to ascertain what meta-ethical commitments are most consistent with her theory; these commitments are shown to be cognitivism, objectivism, and (in some form) naturalism. These positions are then put into dialogue with Moore’s seminal metaethical arguments against naturalism and agent-relative value. Ultimately I show that the literature on normative virtue ethics is rich enough to provide powerful responses to Moorean criticisms.

El propósito de esta tesina consiste en realizar un análisis literario y filosófico de la novela La familia de Pascual Duarte, escrita por Camilo José Cela. En esta investigación se busca explorar los principios éticos y morales presentes en la ética nicomáquea de Aristóteles, destacando conceptos fundamentales como la felicidad, la virtud, la justicia y la prudencia. Posteriormente, se analizará la conexión entre estos principios filosóficos y las acciones y decisiones del protagonista de la novela, Pascual Duarte. / The purpose of this essay is to conduct a literary and philosophical analysis of the novel La familia de Pascual Duarte, written by Camilo José Cela. This research aims to explore the ethical and moral principles found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, emphasizing fundamental concepts such as happiness, virtue, justice and prudence. Subsequently, the connection between these philosophical principles and the actions and decisions of the novel's protagonist, Pascual Duarte, will be analysed.

Cette thèse présente l’ingénierie sociale de l’économiste, sociologue et philosophe autrichien Otto Neurath (1882-1945). Une première partie s’intéresse aux aspects biographiques qui éclairent sa volonté d’une intervention ciblée et planifiée dans l’ordre social. La technique de l’histoire conceptuelle permet ensuite de mettre à jours les représentations mentales à l’œuvre dans l’ingénierie sociale : le topos de la « modernité » – avec une nouvelle conception de la société, du temps et du rôle potentiel de la société civile – suggère la possible gestion du groupe social selon les principes d’une rationalisation de la vie. La Gesellschaftstechnik de Neurath est enfin reconstruite par la méthode de l’histoire intellectuelle, qui révèle l’importance du contexte viennois, des dynamiques à l’œuvre dans la Révolution de Novembre et des questionnements économiques du moment dans l’élaboration de sa pensée et de son eudémonisme social. / This thesis presents the social engineering as devised by Otto Neurath (1882-1945), an Austrian economist, sociologist, and philosopher. The introductory first part highlights certain issues of his biography which turned out significant in his subsequent idea of the necessity of a targeted and planned intervention in the social order. In part two, the technique of conceptual history reveals the mental representations at work in social engineering : the topos of "modernity" – built on a new concept of society, of time, and of the potential role of civil society – suggests the feasibility of managing a social group according to principles of rationalization of life.Neurath’s Gesellschaftstechnik is then reconstructed by the method of intellectual history, which shows the Viennese context, the dynamics involved in the 1918-19 German Revolution, and the economic concerns of the time as being essential for the development of his thought and his programme of social eudaimonism.