Chinese urban villages which have grown over time have difficulty to operate as a healthy urban environment. As a consequence, residents are often forced to move to the boundary of the city although many prefer its narrow streets and the informality of life. This thesis proposes a modern infrastructural architecture to collaborate with the fabric of the urban village and infuse the environment with new possibilities and potentials. / Master of Architecture

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Nesta Tese, nossos objetos de estudo s?o as hipersuperf?cies tipo-espa?o imersas num espa?o-tempo com alguma curvatura de ordem superior constante. Em rela??o a estas hipersuperf?cies, abordamos quest?es como exist?ncia, unicidade e estimativa de quantidades geom?tricas associadas as mesmas. Mais precisamente, desenvolvemos f?rmulas tipo-Minkowski para hipersuperf?cies tipo-espa?o compactas com bordo imersas no espa?o de De Sitter e tendo alguma curvatura de ordem superior constante. Em seguida, aplicamos estas f?rmulas para estabelecer uma rela??o entre a curvatura m?dia e a geometria do bordo. Obtemos, tamb?m, uma estimativa sharp para a fun??o altura de hipersuperf?cies tipo-espa?o compactas imersas no espa?o de Lorentz-Minkowski Ln+1 com alguma curvatura de ordem superior constante n?o-nula. Como aplica??o desta estimativa,tratamos sobre a natureza de um fim de uma hipersuperf?cie tipo-espa?o completa de Ln+1. Finalmente, estudamos a exist?ncia e unicidade de gr?ficos verticais completos com curvatura m?dia constante tanto no Steady State space Hn+1 como no espa?o hiperb?lico Hn+1. Como consequ?ncia deste estudo, obtemos resultados tipo-Bernstein em H3 e H3.

This master´s thesis deals with the possibility of restoration of lake or pond ceased to exist and its influence on surrounding landscape. The author focusses on the restoration of particular pond and possibilities of it´s use and economical evaluation of the project.

La philosophie nous dit Pascal ne vaudrait pas même une heure de peine si elle ne rendait la vie moins tragique. Quoi de plus tragique que la maladie d’Alzheimer ? Cette maladie neurodégénérative va modifier l’ identité sédimentée depuis la naissance qui s’étiole au point de ne plus reconnaitre les visages familiers, de se perdre dans des endroits familiers, et ne plus être capable de parler, d’exprimer ses émotions. Comment interroger le sentiment d’exister ? Comment révéler le souffle de l’esprit qui murmure encore une envie de vivre ? Pour se sentir exister ne faut- il pas non seulement ressentir des émotions, mais les analyser, les communiquer et méta-communiquer ? Mais quand il s’agit de malades d’Alzheimer qu’en est-il puisqu’ils sont de-mens ? Pour que l’esprit se manifeste nous prendrons des chemins de traverse dans cette sollicitation sensorielle : le goût sera réveillé par le goût des autres, le toucher par cette main noueuse dans la notre et le toucher du cœur, la vue par le regard et la perception de soi, l’odorat dans les parfums de la mémoire, l’ouïe par les sons, les cris, la parole, la prosodie et la musique qui berce les chagrins et qui nous émeuvent. Autant d’interrogations que de questions d’éthiques du quotidien: Esprit qui es-tu ? Esprit es-tu là dans ce visage figé? Esprit es-tu là dans ces mots qui butent ?, dans ces traits d’humour, dans ces rêves ? Esprit es-tu là dans ce corps qui lui aussi se délite ? Cet être précaire, fragile et vulnérable interroge les limites, les frontières, les confins entre la de-mens-folie et la démence dégénérative, la philosophie, l’anthropologie et les sciences humaines et les trois spécialités médicales que sont la psychiatrie, la neurologie et la gériatrie. C’est dans ce tissage imparfait, dans ce travail d’équilibriste qui interroge, les lisières de l’altérité que nous forgerons notre concept d’ontologie des confins. Riche de ces partages qui viennent interroger les liens de l’esprit et de l’âme, du corps et de la chair, notre travail proposera, à la manière kantienne une anthropologie philosophique des patients atteints de la maladie d’Alzheimer et tentera de répondre à ces quatre questions : Que puis-je savoir? Que puis-je faire et comment faire? Que m'est-il permis d'espérer ? En partant de ce que nous percevons mais aussi de ce que « nous apercevons» nous conceptualiserons une éthique des petites perceptions reprenant ici les théories de Leibniz qui accorde à l’humain « la potentialité de la raison, une certaine raison par intermittence, une raison à éclipse », que l’on peut retrouver chez les malades d’Alzheimer, au point qu’elle soit imperceptible pour la plupart des hommes.Alors esprit es-tu là? La réponse jaillit pleine de surprises et de joies dans ces pages. / The philosophy says Pascal would not be worth even a sentence of time if it made the least tragic life. What could be more tragic than Alzheimer's disease? For this neurodegenerative disease will alter identity sedimented from birth that is fading to the point of not recognizing familiar faces, not to be able to perform simple gestures, to get lost in familiar places, and not being able to speak, to express emotions, out of the human world to take root in the plant world. How to query the sense of existence? How to reveal the breath of the spirit which still murmur and until the end. To feel alive must we do to be able to listen to oneself, not only feel emotions, but analyze, communicate and meta-communicate; but when it comes to Alzheimer's patients that is it because they are de-mens? What makes sense it is precisely the senses and emotions. For the spirit is manifest we will take short cuts in this sensory solicitation: the taste will be awakened by the taste of others, by touching this gnarled hand in our and touch the heart, view the look and self-perception, smell the scents in the memory, hearing by sounds, cries, speech, prosody and music that rocks the sorrows and that move us. So many questions that ethical issues of daily life: Spirit who are you? Spirit are you there in these words stumble? In those flashes of humor in these dreams? Esprit are you here in this body also disintegrates? This being precarious, fragile and vulnerable challenge the limits, borders, the borders between the de-mens-madness and degenerative dementia, philosophy, anthropology and humanities and three medical specialties such as psychiatry, neurology and geriatrics. It is in this imperfect weaving in this work balancing questioner, edges of otherness that we will develop our confines of ontology concept. Rich those shares that come to question the bonds of spirit and soul, body and flesh, our job offer, like Kant's philosophical anthropology of patients with Alzheimer's disease and attempt to answer these four questions: What do I know? What can I do and how to do? What may I hope? Starting from what we perceive but also that "we see" conceptualiserons us an ethical perceptions of small repeating here the theories of Leibniz which grants the human 'potentiality of reason, some reason intermittently, one reason to eclipse "that can be found in Alzheimer's patients, so that it is imperceptible to most men.So mind are you there? The answer springs full of surprises and joy in these pages.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 433232.pdf: 897156 bytes, checksum: 11c028286588b23d3ae74e3bb1410516 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-19 / A concep??o de Deus como causa sui revoluciona a metaf?sica, pois todas as verdades s?o, absolutamente, criadas pela vontade de Deus que n?o se sujeitou a nenhuma predetermina??o. Defendemos que o conceito de raz?o, totalmente subordinada ? vontade divina, ao inv?s de significar o dom?nio absoluto do universo por parte da res cogitans implica que o homem deve ter consci?ncia do poder, radicalmente, absoluto da incompreensibilidade divina sobre os seres criados. Assim, a trancend?ncia n?o ? algo secund?rio que gravita ao redor de outras verdades claras e distintas dentro do projeto epistemol?gico cartesiano. Descartes critica, atrav?s de seu ceticismo, as formas medievais de fundamentar o conhecimento e defende a evid?ncia como crit?rio para o reconhecimento da verdade, pois sua preocupa??o fundamental n?o era o que ? a verdade, mas como podemos justific?-la atrav?s do m?todo. A certeza da ideia de Deus como causa sui tem prioridade sobre a verdade do mundo exterior, portanto o que passa a ter valor ontol?gico, indubitavelmente, s?o as ideias que fazem a media??o, clara e distintamente, com o mundo. Mostramos que as tr?s provas da exist?ncia de Deus s?o necess?rias, pois cada uma delas exerce uma fun??o metaf?sica muito importante para justificar a certeza da verdade de Deus como causa sui, n?o sendo redundantes. As verdades que existem no mundo t?m sua exist?ncia, totalmente, determinada pela vontade soberana de Deus que, livremente, as criou de uma forma causal. A cria??o divina ? incompreens?vel para a raz?o finita, dessa forma a trancend?ncia na metaf?sica cartesiana n?o pode ser negada ou mitigada como defendem alguns int?rpretes do cartesianismo.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 464250.pdf: 443912 bytes, checksum: 5aa71f054c86ca739b56e8d32700b345 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-12-05 / Most if not all arguments that purport to demonstrate that God does not exist or that the probability of His existence is low depend, explicitly or implicitly, on the idea that there are gratuitous evils or that, if God existed, He would have created a better world. The goal of this MA thesis is to evaluate the difficulties that the consequential complexity of history could pose to the formulation of this type of arguments. Additionally, I seek to briefly investigate how the molinist model of divine providence, which postulates God s knowledge of what became known in the literature as counterfactuals of freedom, incorporates or should incorporate the question of the causal complexity of the world. / A maioria ou talvez mesmo todos os argumentos que procuram demonstrar a n?o exist?ncia ou a baixa probabilidade da exist?ncia de Deus a partir do mal existente no mundo dependem, explicita ou implicitamente, da ideia de que h? males gratuitos no mundo ou da ideia de que, se Deus existisse, Ele teria criado um mundo melhor que este. O objetivo desta disserta??o ? avaliar as dificuldades que a complexidade consequencial da hist?ria coloca para a formula??o desses tipos de argumentos. Adicionalmente, procuro investigar brevemente como o modelo providencial molinista, que pressup?e o conhecimento por Deus dos chamados contrafatuais da liberdade, incorpora ou deveria incorporar a quest?o da complexidade causal do mundo.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DaxFMPN_TESE.pdf: 2164638 bytes, checksum: ccd3b7aedb84ae6ada999a52ddec9d0b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-30 / Common understanding about what freedom means has always been more or less related to the power to realize something intended, desired, a capability. Therefore, being free is commonly interpreted under the concept of free-will and the category of possibility to act. Although there are predecessors in History of Philosophy, Schopenhauer refuses the thesis of free will proposing otherwise the denial of willing (to live) as the ultimate possibility for human freedom, if not the only one left. The thesis that would make him famous was deeply misunderstood and so miscarried somewhat due to the way it was many times presented by the means of exotic examples wrapped in a mystical mood besides exaltations to Eastern traditions, which may satisfy anthropological curiosity instead of being capable to satisfy the reader in a philosophical way. It seems to result from Schopenhauer s thought a kind of pessimism against life. Otherwise, typical readings on the Schopenhauerian thesis are found full of inconsistencies once closely regarded, which blame does not belong to the author but to his interpreters. A new reading about the denial of willing as the ultimate possibility for human freedom demands a criticism on the inconsistencies and prejudgments deep grounded. For this, we firstly clarify the ways of understanding the willing nothing , which cannot be reduced to the mere refusal or conformism, being instead positively understood as a special manner of willing: the admission of oneself for the sake of one is. A few more than a century later The world as will and representation came to light, Heidegger proposes in his fundamental ontology that the proper being-free concerns to originary decision by which, in anguish of being suspended in nothingness, Dasein renders itself singular as the being who is in-a-world and to-death, concluding that the ultimate possibility of freedom is being-free-to-death. Developing the hypothesis that freedom, properly understood, concerns to nothingness as to indeterminate possibilities, we seek for a dialogue between Schopenhauer s thought and existential philosophy aiming to reconstitute and overcome Metaphysics tradition turning the question about freedom into a matter of Ontology. From the factual existence perspective, as we must show, every human activity (or inactivity) is ordinarily mediated by representations, in which me and world appear as distinct entities. So, each one among determininate individuals finds itself connected to the things in the world by interest, which proper concept must be sufficiently explored. Starting from this point, we may proceed to detailed analysis of usual representations of freedom aiming their destruction by Ontology and then reaching existential thesis according to Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Turning back to the analysis of Schopenhauer s work, we conclude existential understanding of freedom as will-to-be can also be found in Schopenhauer. In this way, denial of willing means ultimate freedom once the Will turns back to its own essence by suppressing the world as representation, which means the originary absolute indetermination of the extreme possibility to-be / A compreens?o usual de liberdade sempre esteve mais ou menos vinculada ao poder de efetiva??o ou realiza??o, de uma inten??o, de um desejo, de uma capacidade. Assim, ser livre ? comumente interpretado ? luz do conceito de livre-arb?trio e sob a categoria da possibilidade de agir. Embora n?o sem precedentes na Hist?ria da Filosofia, Schopenhauer, refutando a tese do livre-arb?trio, prop?e a nega??o da vontade (de viver) como possibilidade m?xima, se n?o ?nica, da liberdade humana. A tese que o deixou famoso foi, contudo, profundamente mal compreendida e mesmo mal recebida um tanto gra?as ? pr?pria forma como ? apresentada, por meio de exemplos muitas vezes ex?ticos envoltos em ares de misticismo e exalta??es a tradi??es orientais que, incapazes de satisfazer filosoficamente o leitor, s?o antes curiosidades antropol?gicas. O saldo final do pensamento schopenhaueriano parece ser um pessimismo inimigo da vida. No entanto, examinada de perto, a leitura t?pica da tese schopenhaueriana se mostra repleta de inconsist?ncias que, deve-se mostrar, n?o pertencem ao autor, mas a seus int?rpretes. Uma nova leitura sobre a nega??o da vontade como possibilidade m?xima da liberdade humana exige uma cr?tica das inconsist?ncias e preconceitos j? enraizados. Para tanto, em primeiro lugar, elucida-se as maneiras de se compreender o nada querer , que n?o se reduz ? mera recusa ou ao conformismo, podendo ser positivamente interpretado como um modo especial de querer: a admiss?o de si mesmo pelo que se ?. Pouco mais de um s?culo ap?s vir ? luz O mundo como vontade e representa??o, Heidegger prop?e em sua ontologia fundamental que o serlivre pr?prio diz respeito ? decis?o origin?ria pela qual, na ang?stia da suspens?o no nada, o Dasein singulariza-se como o ente que ? em-um-mundo e para-a-morte, concluindo que a possibilidade extrema da liberdade ? ser-livre-para-a-morte. Desenvolvendo a hip?tese de que a liberdade, propriamente compreendida, ? pertinente ao nada e a possibilidades indeterminadas, busca-se um di?logo entre o pensamento de Schopenhauer e a filosofia existencial em um movimento de reconstitui??o e supera??o da tradi??o metaf?sica por meio de que o problema da liberdade converte-se em uma quest?o de Ontologia. Do ponto de vista da exist?ncia de fato , conforme se mostra em seguida, toda atividade (ou inatividade) humana ? ordinariamente mediada por representa??es, segundo as quais eu e mundo aparecem como entidades distintas, encontrando-se cada indiv?duo dado ligado ?s coisas do mundo pelo interesse, cujo conceito adequado deve ser suficientemente explorado. Partindo-se desta base, procede-se ao exame suficientemente pormenorizado das representa??es usuais da liberdade em vista de sua destrui??o pela Ontologia, atingindo-se, enfim, a proposta existencial conforme as formula??es de Kierkegaard e Heidegger. Retomando a an?lise da obra de Schopenhauer, chega-se ao resultado de que a compreens?o da liberdade como querer-ser, peculiar ?s filosofias da exist?ncia, tamb?m se aplica ? filosofia de Schopenhauer. Nesse sentido, a nega??o da vontade corresponde ao m?ximo de liberdade na medida em que a Vontade, pela ruptura como o mundo como representa??o, retorna a si mesma naquilo que tem de mais essencial: a absoluta indetermin?ncia origin?ria da possibilidade extrema para-ser

Sitting in a Stranger's Bathtub is a collection of poetry interested in the relationship between grief and time. It seems the more grief "happens" or rather, reiterates or transforms itself (a birth provoked by something unknown and can only be attributed to time and its maturing), the more grief splinters and splits off creating alternate dimensions in which things went a little bit differently, where something grand can be imagined like being present for a mother's death. These poems consider these worlds half by choice, in order to let those lives continue in their mundane yet miraculous ways, and half by possession. These poems seek to represent the horrible pang of deja vu that proves the existence of alternate happenings, and also justify deja vu as a sensation intended to fill the fragments of memory. In keeping with the tradition of the Confessional movement, these poems aim toward honesty, toward revealing the truth, only possible by showing the failures of memory, particularly in the presence of grief. / Master of Fine Arts / Sitting in a Stranger’s Bathtub is a poetry collection.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:54:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 408012.pdf: 801797 bytes, checksum: 9906ff5e37e894c7393934ecc6b1aec9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-12-16 / Esta disserta??o tem como principal objetivo examinar aquele que pode ser considerado o termo fundamental da sem?ntica tomista: o conceito de exist?ncia. O Aquinate, em sua Teologia natural, utiliza os termos Deus e Exist?ncia como estritamente sin?nimos. Desse modo, cabe evidenciar os aspectos mais importantes de sua reflex?o metaf?sica, a fim de chegar ao conceito de Deus como A Exist?ncia (Ipsum esse subsistens). S?o Tom?s, para atingir esse resultado, deve demonstrar que, se todos os entes acess?veis ? percep??o humana existem por outro (ab alio), ent?o deve haver pelo menos um ser que exista por si (ens a se). ? este ser que responde pela causa primeira de tudo o mais que se possa afirmar, com verdade, que exista, no sentido forte do termo.