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With regards to Swedish succession rights, and the distribution of the inheritance as such, there is an underlying conflict of a fundamental nature betweenthe deceased´s former interest in how the estate should be distributed on theone hand, and the interest of the primary heirs in the preservation of theinheritance on the other. The deceased´s interest can be derived from the rightto private ownership, while the interest of the primary heirs rests upon thestatutory minimum portion of the inheritance (laglott) which they are entitled to by law. The statutory minimum portion of the inheritance is half of the sharethat is due by law (arvslott) to the primary heirs if there is no will, i.e. if theintestate succession (legala arvsordningen) is followed. Furthermore, this conflictof interest can provoke an individual to plan their estate with the intention ofminimizing the inheritance of one or more of their primary heirs. This pertainsespecially to children who are not the offspring of the surviving spouse,considering that they are entitled to receive their statutory minimum portion ofthe inheritance immediately upon the deceased’s – their parent's – death. Thedispositions at hand for someone who wants to plan their estate (dödsrättshandlingar) according to Swedish law are of two particular types. Wills (testamenten)and beneficiary designations (förmånstagarförordnanden). Gifts made in contemplation of the donor’s impending death (gåvor för dödsfalls skull), ties into thiscategory as well. Namely, gifts of this nature are in this respect equated to wills.Another rationale for sorting these three different dispositions together can befound in their common purpose, i.e. to benefit someone else with all or someof the estate. In the most abstract terms, these three categories could be called,gratuitous legal dispositions made ad mortis causa, (benefika dispositioner fördödsfalls skull). In light of this the thesis explores and examines whether a primaryheir´s legal protection – especially if the statutory minimum portion of theinheritance – has an equal efficiency in relation to this broad category –constituted of the three aforementioned subsets – accessible to someone whowants to plan their estate. The result of the thesis is primarily that such adifference in fact does exist and secondarily that this inconsistency to some extent is unjustifiable considering (1) the similar nature and purpose of these dispositions, and (2) the presence and function of the legal institute of forcedheirship in Swedish law.