This doctoral thesis argues that Gadamer’s hermeneutical ontology is grounded in part in Plato’s ontology of ideas. In making this argument, this thesis will aim to substantiate the following claims on the basis of Gadamer’s sustained focus on the principles of his hermeneutical ontology and Plato’s ontology of ideas, and the hypothesis that the former has a substantial basis in the latter: one, that the hermeneutical object maintains both a unitary and multiple existence; two, that the unity and plurality of the hermeneutical object presuppose their speculative unity within a single, ontological framework; and three, that language functions as the medium between the unitary and multiple existences of the hermeneutical object following their logical separation. Overall, this thesis aims to make an original contribution to Gadamer studies and his views on language and hermeneutical experience by arguing that his understanding of the ontology of the hermeneutical phenomenon shares a common philosophical ground with Plato’s theory of ideas. This thesis begins, therefore, with the idea that the essential finitude of human knowledge necessitates that the conception of truth in Gadamer’s hermeneutics rests upon the principles of unity and multiplicity in order to be meaningful. From there, we illustrate that Gadamer locates these principles in Plato’s late ontology, and that in developing the central concepts of his hermeneutics he remains faithful to the Socratic turning toward the ideas. Plato clarifies for Gadamer how, in recognizing the internal limits of our knowledge, we efface ourselves in light of the unlimited scope of the ideas that constitute our understanding of the world, and necessitate that this understanding is shared and developed with others. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this dissertation has five chapters. Chapter one demonstrates that the hermeneutical object has both a unitary and multiple existence, and that the truth that hermeneutical reflection obtains must therefore attend to both the essential unity and multiplicity that belong to this object. Chapter two uncovers Gadamer’s approach to Plato’s theory of ideas, principally through his understanding of Plato’s participation thesis and the arithmos structure of the logos. Chapter three demonstrates that, because of its essential historicity, hermeneutical consciousness does not require a standard of objective certainty in order to validate its truth-claims extra-historically or extra-linguistically. It is shown, rather, that such standards are known historically and are therefore subject to change in light of our shared experiences of them. Chapter four elaborates Gadamer’s characterization of hermeneutical understanding as theoretical, i.e. as a mode of participation in the intelligible structures of reality that implies the practical activity of the participants. This chapter also examines the speculative structure of language that Gadamer applies to his hermeneutics, and how he uses this structure to situate the Platonic One and Many historically. Finally, chapter five further elaborates Gadamer’s identification of hermeneutics as a practical activity as a way to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic experience. In light of this distinction, this chapter demonstrates that authentic experience necessarily implies a justificatory demand toward others that secures solidarity and goodwill in social and political institutions.

This thesis claims that temporality can provide a novel means through which to distinguish between different types of judgment. Specifically, it focusses upon how the adjudicative process determines factual construction and argues that the resultant construction is, at least in part, contingent upon temporality. As the first of two starting points, the thesis begins by rejecting the subsumption thesis of judgment which states laws simply subsume facts that they ‘correspond to’. It attributes this rejection to the generality of laws and their flexibility as either rules or standards. Second of the two starting points, though related to the first, is what the thesis refers to as the ‘Kantian axiom’ which argues that time shapes consciousness. Extending this, the thesis posits that, filling in the lacuna created by the shortcomings of the subsumptive theory of judgment, adjudication’s temporality shapes its factual construction. Having established these preliminary points, the thesis describes the different ends of a spectrum of judgment in which legal decisions can tend toward. Adjudication as Cognition (abstract judgment), predicated I argue on a spatial-temporality at one end, and Adjudication as Understanding (concrete judgment), grounded on a creative reading of Bergsonian and Gadamerian temporality at the other. The main differences between these forms of judgment is the qualitatively different types of fact they produce, made possible through the temporalities upon which they are contingent. This results in different constructions of the subject and event (facts which law gives meaning to) which may impact upon ascriptions of responsibility. In addition, it is with adjudication as understanding that a potentially transformative form of judgment is possible and in which the radical difference of the subject and event of law emerges. Temporality is thus capable of reframing old problems of jurisprudence as well as articulating new ones. It argues that factual construction, in particular subjectivity is, in part, predicated upon time, and that temporality, as unproblematised, may conceal an exercise of judicial power. It also highlights the general marginalisation of temporality in (legal) modernity and reveals the ‘temporal trap’ of legal subjectivity in which futures are bound and pasts are arbitrarily selected.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation raises the question of the political world, and pursues it as central theme in the political thought of Hannah Arendt and the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Within the phenomenological tradition, world refers to a referential context of relations between beings, within which those beings appear as meaningful. Since Heidegger, the concept of world has been inextricably linked with that of understanding, the disclosedness that guides any interpretation of beings and allows them to appear as what they are. In what sense is the world political? In what sense does the political constitute a world? For Arendt, the political concerns human beings in their plurality. It concerns the relations between members of a polis, who are related to each other by the world that they share in common in action and speech. The polis is not simply a city or a political entity, but a space within which both things and human beings appear according to a distinctively political mode of disclosedness, a plural understanding. In this, Arendt operates within a hermeneutical ontology, though it is often unthematized or underdeveloped within her work. Gadamer’s hermeneutical philosophy makes it possible to explicate and develop this ontology, illuminating the complex reciprocal relationship Arendt develops between the worldliness of human beings and the space of appearance that arises out of the exchange of interpretive judgments: the political world. The central theme of the political world serves to uncover the hermeneutical underpinnings of Arendt’s political thought, as well as the political implications of Gadamer’s philosophy. Part I shows how an embryonic and unthematized concept of the political world arises from the analysis of being-with [Mitsein] in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Part II proposes a novel systematic interpretation of The Human Condition, situating the conceptual distinctions of the vita activa within a hermeneutical ontology, with particular emphasis on Arendt’s appropriation and development of the concept of world. Part III turns to Gadamer’s treatment of tradition and historically-effected consciousness [wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein] in Truth and Method, arguing that the handing-down of tradition describes an historical activity of plural understanding, from which the political world emerges. Part IV traces the development of Arendt’s theory of judgment in tandem with her account of δόξα, the discursive mode proper to plural understanding, and proposes a revisionist interpretation of her mature theory of judgment. Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, rather than a Kantian extended mentality, emerges as an apt description of the space of appearance that emerges within plural interpretive discourse. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Avant tout réputé pour avoir hissé l’herméneutique au premier plan du paysage philosophique contemporain, H.-G. Gadamer est aussi reconnu pour l’originalité de ses écrits en histoire des idées et notamment pour la grande singularité des travaux qu’il a consacrés à la philosophie de Platon. Mais s’agit-il là de deux registres théoriques distincts, l’herméneutique d’un côté et l’exégèse de Platon de l’autre ? Ou bien s’agit-il de deux facettes d’un même projet concerté, deux ouvertures sur un même objet philosophique ? C’est cette deuxième option que notre étude a pour objectif de défendre. Pour ce faire, nous approfondissons, à la lumière de ses écrits sur Platon, les raisons qui poussent Gadamer à développer, dans Vérité et Méthode, son idée de dialogue herméneutique en référence constante à la dialectique platonicienne, pour ensuite montrer comment l’ontologie herméneutique qu’esquisse la dernière partie de Vérité et Méthode est solidaire, voire tributaire, de l’interprétation de la pensée platonicienne que défend généralement Gadamer, et ce, malgré l’instrumentalisme du langage qu’il dénonce chez Platon. / Known above all to have raised hermeneutics in the foreground of contemporary philosophy, H.-G. Gadamer is also renowned for his original contributions to the history of ideas, notably because of his characteristic reading of Plato. However, a question arises: are these two distinct parts of his thought, with his philosophical hermeneutics on the one hand and his exegesis of Plato on the other? Or are they the two facets of a same project, two perspectives on a same philosophical object? Our study aims to defend this second option. In the first place, we present, in light of Gadamer’s reading of Plato, the reasons why in Truth and Method Gadamer develops his own idea of hermeneutical dialogue in reference to Plato’s dialectic. Then we will show how the hermeneutical ontology sketched in the last chapter of Truth and Method remains strongly related to Gadamer’s general reading of Plato, even if Gadamer refuses the instrumentalism of language that he finds in Plato’s thought.

A interpretação musical, enquanto campo de pesquisa, trava ainda importantes embates em torno da epistemologia. A sua auto-compreensão alterna-se entre posturas subjetivas e normatividades estanques, deixando em estado latente os pressupostos históricos que validam as possibilidades interpretativas. Como a hermenêutica estuda as condições de validade da interpretação, propusemo-nos apresentar uma formulação da interpretação musical baseada nessa vertente filosófica tal qual é elaborada por Hans-Georg Gadamer. A consciência hermeneuticamente formada propõe uma sistematização que visa tanto à obra quanto ao intérprete, no potencial de crítica e superação dos limites normativos que a discussão de sua estrutura prévia de compreensão permite. Dois estudos de caso exemplificam o ganho interpretativo que a abordagem hermenêutica oferece: um manual técnico de Andrés Segovia e uma obra de Domenico Scarlatti, transcrita para violão por Sérgio Abreu / Performance, as research field, takes an argumentation about epistemology. Its self-comprehension changes from a subjectivity to fixed normativities, letting hidden the historic pre-supositions that makes valid the statements of validly. Since hermeneutics, in the proposition of Hans-Georg Gadamer, studies the conditions of validly of interpretation, we propose think musical interpretation based on this philosophical approach. The conscience hermeneutically formed makes systematic study of the interpreter as well as the work, in the potential critics and overwhelming of the normativity limits that the discussion about the previous structure of comprehension allows. Two cases give the examples of the interpretative gain of hermeneutic offers: a manual of technics by Andrés Segovia, and a Domenico Scarlatti\'s work transcribed for guitar by Sérgio Abreu.

A interpretação musical, enquanto campo de pesquisa, trava ainda importantes embates em torno da epistemologia. A sua auto-compreensão alterna-se entre posturas subjetivas e normatividades estanques, deixando em estado latente os pressupostos históricos que validam as possibilidades interpretativas. Como a hermenêutica estuda as condições de validade da interpretação, propusemo-nos apresentar uma formulação da interpretação musical baseada nessa vertente filosófica tal qual é elaborada por Hans-Georg Gadamer. A consciência hermeneuticamente formada propõe uma sistematização que visa tanto à obra quanto ao intérprete, no potencial de crítica e superação dos limites normativos que a discussão de sua estrutura prévia de compreensão permite. Dois estudos de caso exemplificam o ganho interpretativo que a abordagem hermenêutica oferece: um manual técnico de Andrés Segovia e uma obra de Domenico Scarlatti, transcrita para violão por Sérgio Abreu / Performance, as research field, takes an argumentation about epistemology. Its self-comprehension changes from a subjectivity to fixed normativities, letting hidden the historic pre-supositions that makes valid the statements of validly. Since hermeneutics, in the proposition of Hans-Georg Gadamer, studies the conditions of validly of interpretation, we propose think musical interpretation based on this philosophical approach. The conscience hermeneutically formed makes systematic study of the interpreter as well as the work, in the potential critics and overwhelming of the normativity limits that the discussion about the previous structure of comprehension allows. Two cases give the examples of the interpretative gain of hermeneutic offers: a manual of technics by Andrés Segovia, and a Domenico Scarlatti\'s work transcribed for guitar by Sérgio Abreu.

[pt] A presente tese apresenta uma reflexão sobre como poderia ser desenvolvida uma abordagem filosófica no ensino, procurando pensar a sua importância no contexto atual, e com que objetivos ela deveria ser proposta como modo de ensinar. Para tanto, a pesquisa se debruçou sobre o pensamento de Friedrich Nietzsche e de Hans-Georg Gadamer, dois autores que partem de um olhar perspectivista e interpretativo do conhecimento, porém pensando a partir de épocas e com propostas educacionais significativamente diferentes. Após um introdutório panorama acerca do desenvolvimento da hermenêutica, com vistas a contextualizar e explicitar as vinculações históricas e filosóficas entre os dois autores, o movimento seguinte desta investigação procura compreender e contrabalançar as ideias que ambos apresentam em relação à nossa lida com a linguagem e com o arcabouço de conhecimentos já existentes, os quais configuram a nossa conjuntura (história, tradição) e constituem aspectos basilares para qualquer reflexão sobre conhecimento e formação. A noção de formação é justamente o foco da sequência deste trabalho. Nesse momento são contrastadas as propostas formativas de Nietzsche e de Gadamer a partir das análises que estes fazem de suas épocas e dos objetivos que cada um defende para o ensino. A partir desse ponto torna-se possível uma decisão sobre que tipo de abordagem filosófica se justifica como modo de ensinar para os dias atuais. Em seu momento final, o trabalho procura delimitar tal proposta de abordagem filosófica e ressaltar quais aspectos e práticas devem fazer parte das experiências de ensino que a tomem como modelo. / [en] This thesis reflects on how a philosophical approach to learning could be developed, its importance in the current context and the aims that justify this proposal as a way of teaching. The analysis explores Nietzsche s and Gadamer s work, authors who start from a perspectivist and interpretative standpoint on knowledge. However, they wrote in different historical periods and, consequently, developed different educational proposals. A panoramic introduction on the hermeneutical perspective intends to contextualize and to clarify the historical and philosophical connections between both authors. The next stage of the analysis is to confront Nietzsche s and Gadamer s ideas about language and the prior knowledge that configures our historical tradition, both of which constitute fundamental features for any analysis of knowledge and education. The concept of education (formation) then establishes the focus of the rest of this work. Nietzsche s and Gadamer s proposals for education are contrasted in relation to their contextualized analyses and the objectives each one defends for education. Based on this discussion, a decision becomes possible about which philosophical approach is justified as a basis for teaching nowadays. The thesis then delimits such a philosophical approach and emphasizes which aspects and practices should constitute the learning experience that appropriates the proposed philosophical approach as an ideal.

Presented as the author's Thesis--Umeå University, Sweden. / Includes bibliographical references ((p. 203-213)).

Thesis (doctoral)--Freiburg im Breisgau, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [245]-253) and indexes.