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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T14:16:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 leibniz e o direito brasileiro.pdf: 772172 bytes, checksum: 000fb9a08a28ebbc2007e9d8d8b16d0a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-05-05 / The dissertation is a investigation of the possibilities that the law works of Leibniz could exercise influence on the brazilian law, specially in the XIX century and specially on the work of Teixeira de Freitas / Trata-se de uma investigação sobre as possibilidades de que a obra jurídica de Leibniz tenha influenciado a ciência jurídica brasileira, especialmente na época de sua formação, o século XIX, e especialmente considerando o trabalho de Teixeira de Freitas

1734 var Emanuel Swedenborg en hårt arbetande, rationalistisk vetenskapsman i tidens anda. Detta år utgav han ett av sina mest ambitiösa vetenskapliga och naturfilosofiska verk, Principia Rerum Naturalium. Han försökte här skapa en cosmologia generalis – enallomfattande kosmologisk beskrivning från elementarpartiklarnas uppkomst och konstruktionupp till stjärnornas och planeternas formande. Denna uppsats utreder den ontologiska grundenför Swedenborgs naturfilosofi och lyfter fram tidigare ofta förbisedda aspekter, som hansspekulationer om multiversum. Swedenborgs kosmologi visar sig vara starkt påverkad av ennaturfilosofisk tradition från Gottfried Leibniz.

This is a dissertation about the Halle method, or the visual pedagogies of the Pietist Orphanage as they were developed in the German university town of Halle from 1695 until 1730. A “Pietist” was someone who was affiliated with an evangelical reform movement first initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener in the 1670s. A long and deeply entrenched historiographical tradition has portrayed the Halle proponents of this movement—especially their leader August Hermann Francke—as zealous, yet practical, Lutheran reformers who were forced to directly confront the ideals of early Enlightenment in conjunction with the state-building mandate of Brandenburg-Prussia. This has led to a persistent tendency to see Halle Pietists as “others” who cultivated their collective identity in opposition to so-called Enlightenment intellectuals, like Christian Wolff, at the same time as they exerted a marked influence on these same persons. As a result of this dichotomous portrayal over the years, the impact of the Halle method on educational reform, and on the meanings eighteenth-century Europeans attached to philanthropy more generally, has been misunderstood. I argue that the Pietist Orphanage holds the key to remedying several problems that have impeded our ability to understand the significance of Pietist pedagogy and philanthropy. This was a site specifically designed to introduce children to the conciliatory knowledge-making strategies of the first Berlin Academy of Science members and their associates. These strategies championed the status of the heart as an assimilatory juncture point and were refined in the schools of the Pietist Orphanage, which itself functioned as a visual showplace that viewers could observe in order to edify and improve themselves. It was the material expression of Halle Pietists’ commitment to a “third way” and marked their attempt to assimilate experience and cognition, theology and philosophy, absolutism and voluntarism. The dissertation examines several personalities who had a direct bearing on this conciliatory project: namely E. W. von Tschirnhaus, Johann Christoph Sturm, Leonhard Christoph Sturm, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. It also examines how the method was applied in the Halle Orphanage schools and extended elsewhere.

The body of critical literature on Kant's philosophy of history and religion is examined and criticized for its failure to recognize the consistency of Kant's thought. In opposition to it, a new interpretation based on the critical ideas of freedom, morality and teleology is proposed. The transition from the Critiques to history and religion is justified in terms of the notion of "a priori end" and through the recognition of evil. Kant's ideas are viewed in the historical context of Leibniz, Lessing and Herder. / Kant conceives history as the process of self-creation whereby man overcomes the split within his being between the rational and sensible. Providence and freedom are complementary grounds of this process. Kant's views on biology and history rely on a revolutionary conception of time as a principle of internal development in life. The development of political wisdom and religious symbols add to rational thought an essentially historical dimension.

This is a dissertation about the Halle method, or the visual pedagogies of the Pietist Orphanage as they were developed in the German university town of Halle from 1695 until 1730. A “Pietist” was someone who was affiliated with an evangelical reform movement first initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener in the 1670s. A long and deeply entrenched historiographical tradition has portrayed the Halle proponents of this movement—especially their leader August Hermann Francke—as zealous, yet practical, Lutheran reformers who were forced to directly confront the ideals of early Enlightenment in conjunction with the state-building mandate of Brandenburg-Prussia. This has led to a persistent tendency to see Halle Pietists as “others” who cultivated their collective identity in opposition to so-called Enlightenment intellectuals, like Christian Wolff, at the same time as they exerted a marked influence on these same persons. As a result of this dichotomous portrayal over the years, the impact of the Halle method on educational reform, and on the meanings eighteenth-century Europeans attached to philanthropy more generally, has been misunderstood. I argue that the Pietist Orphanage holds the key to remedying several problems that have impeded our ability to understand the significance of Pietist pedagogy and philanthropy. This was a site specifically designed to introduce children to the conciliatory knowledge-making strategies of the first Berlin Academy of Science members and their associates. These strategies championed the status of the heart as an assimilatory juncture point and were refined in the schools of the Pietist Orphanage, which itself functioned as a visual showplace that viewers could observe in order to edify and improve themselves. It was the material expression of Halle Pietists’ commitment to a “third way” and marked their attempt to assimilate experience and cognition, theology and philosophy, absolutism and voluntarism. The dissertation examines several personalities who had a direct bearing on this conciliatory project: namely E. W. von Tschirnhaus, Johann Christoph Sturm, Leonhard Christoph Sturm, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. It also examines how the method was applied in the Halle Orphanage schools and extended elsewhere.

This dissertation is aimed to set up a Confucian-style religious philosophy on the basis of Zhū Xī’s ideas. It seeks to articulate and highlight what has existed previously in some form in Zhū Xī’s Confucianism in a language which appears to be more precise for modern readers. Leibniz’s interpretations of Chinese philosophy and culture, as well as many resources in his own philosophy and Christian theology, serve to promote the realization of this aim. Zhū Xī’s religious philosophy in our reconstruction is a philosophy containing a theology of Heaven at its core, and this theology is certainly not a revealed one. These following issues are covered: 1) a theology of deities, 2) a metaphysics of the supreme being (Heaven), 3) an appropriate treatment of the ontology of lǐ2 and qì in relation to Heaven, and 4) a suitable interpretation of transcendence and immanence within human beings. The dissertation has three major parts. The first part is to argue that the worship of Heaven is special and superior to any reverence contained in the “polytheism” (which is finally philosophized by Zhū Xī as the reverence towards manifold pneuma) revealed in the Confucian sacrificial system. At the same time, it explores how the faith in various spirits or deities can be consistent with a belief in Heaven. The second part shows that it is fundamental to see Zhū Xī’s Heaven as a substance, so that one is able to attribute to it qualities and properties, even before there is any decision about whether or not to regard Heaven as a person. Among Heaven’s qualities, we choose its work (gōng) and virtuousness (dé) as its most prominent features to expound. In the light of Heaven’s virtuousness, a theodicy of Heaven is constructed. The third part is devoted to a discussion of the nature of human beings as well as of our fellows in the natural world, especially in relation to Heaven. Zhū Xī offers two perspectives for understanding humanness: one by studying the nature of xīn (“heart-mind”), and the other, the composite nature of hún-pò (or guǐ-shén, “souls”). We choose to plunge into the latter perspective, something comparable with Leibniz’s theories of soul. In the concluding chapter major features or facets of this reconstruction of Zhū Xī’s religious philosophy and its relevance to modern times are stated in a concise and relatively bold way.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3163.pdf: 1370527 bytes, checksum: d0b0191eb4d9d05d62107cc782b08b7c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-19 / In order to understand the concepts of space and matter in the physics of Leibniz we should consider the metaphysical concept of substance. Such is the fundamental hypothesis of our inquiry. The problem is to conciliate the mechanical causality with an universe consisting of immaterial simple substances. Taking into account the principles of Leibniz s cosmology, the dynamic conception of substance, the refutation of the vacuum, the continuum and the infinite, the matter appears to be an aspect of the substance susceptible of infinite divisibility, without thereby invalidating the indestructibility and unity of substance. From this it arises that the space is full and relational. / A hipótese fundamental da nossa investigação é que há uma relação de dependência entre os conceitos de espaço e matéria e a metafísica leibniziana centrada na substância, o que implica a importância dessa metafísica para a compreensão da física de Leibniz. A partir da relação entre esses conceitos entende-se sua posição perante problemas de ordem metafísica e sobretudo física. Do ponto de vista metafísico, vem à tona o tradicional problema da conciliação entre o uno e o múltiplo. Do ponto de visto físico, o problema é aliar a explicação mecanicista dos fenômenos a um universo constituído de substâncias simples imateriais. Para entender como os conceitos de espaço e matéria dependem do conceito de substância foi tomada uma linha de análise específica. Primeiro, era preciso esclarecer os princípios constituintes da cosmologia de Leibniz; em seguida, sua concepção dinâmica de matéria, a refutação do vazio, o continuum e o infinito. A partir daí, a substância define-se sob perspectivas diversas que respondem a problemas diferentes, mas cujas soluções não são incompatíveis. Leibniz busca na dinâmica a determinação física da substância: de sujeito lógico passa a ser concebida como força. Através do dinamismo, a matéria pode ser concebida como um aspecto da substância que admite infinita divisibilidade, sem que isso invalide a indestrutibilidade e unidade das substâncias; em função dessa matéria, há o espaço pleno e relacional.

This is a dissertation about the Halle method, or the visual pedagogies of the Pietist Orphanage as they were developed in the German university town of Halle from 1695 until 1730. A “Pietist” was someone who was affiliated with an evangelical reform movement first initiated by Philipp Jakob Spener in the 1670s. A long and deeply entrenched historiographical tradition has portrayed the Halle proponents of this movement—especially their leader August Hermann Francke—as zealous, yet practical, Lutheran reformers who were forced to directly confront the ideals of early Enlightenment in conjunction with the state-building mandate of Brandenburg-Prussia. This has led to a persistent tendency to see Halle Pietists as “others” who cultivated their collective identity in opposition to so-called Enlightenment intellectuals, like Christian Wolff, at the same time as they exerted a marked influence on these same persons. As a result of this dichotomous portrayal over the years, the impact of the Halle method on educational reform, and on the meanings eighteenth-century Europeans attached to philanthropy more generally, has been misunderstood. I argue that the Pietist Orphanage holds the key to remedying several problems that have impeded our ability to understand the significance of Pietist pedagogy and philanthropy. This was a site specifically designed to introduce children to the conciliatory knowledge-making strategies of the first Berlin Academy of Science members and their associates. These strategies championed the status of the heart as an assimilatory juncture point and were refined in the schools of the Pietist Orphanage, which itself functioned as a visual showplace that viewers could observe in order to edify and improve themselves. It was the material expression of Halle Pietists’ commitment to a “third way” and marked their attempt to assimilate experience and cognition, theology and philosophy, absolutism and voluntarism. The dissertation examines several personalities who had a direct bearing on this conciliatory project: namely E. W. von Tschirnhaus, Johann Christoph Sturm, Leonhard Christoph Sturm, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. It also examines how the method was applied in the Halle Orphanage schools and extended elsewhere. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Müller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T02:57:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nolasco_FabioMascarenhas_D.pdf: 3414306 bytes, checksum: 857e1ec40f00d14e035ffde5b811e521 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: Foi o objetivo do presente trabalho apresentar os pressupostos histórico-filosóficos da crítica de Hegel ao cálculo infinitesimal, bem como acompanhar de perto praticamente todos os aspectos dessa crítica, tal como ela se apresenta no capítulo intermediário da Doutrina do Ser da Ciência da Lógica. A primeira tarefa, pois, foi levada a cabo através da análise interpretativa de três capítulos da Fenomenologia do Espírito (Força e Entendimento, Consciência de Si e a primeira subdivisão do capítulo da Razão), bem como através de um confrontamento com alguns aspectos da filosofia de Kant (a doutrina das grandezas negativas), Fichte e Schelling. Buscou-se mostrar como faltava à filosofia transcendental um conceito não quantitativo da qualidade em decorrência de uma proximidade fundamental à maneira tal como Leibniz inventara o cálculo infinitesimal. Além disso, coube observar como já na Fenomenologia do Espírito o tema da crítica ao cálculo infinitesimal se faz notar de maneira notável, preparando (no Força e Entendimento) e concluindo (na Observação da Natureza) o conceito dialético da consciência de si. A segunda tarefa foi, por sua vez, levada a cabo através de uma leitura minunciosa dos capítulos da Qualidade e da Quantidade da Ciência da Lógica, onde se pode mostrar como os temas trazidos à tona de maneira introdutória na Fen. do Espírito eram então consumados nas duas versões da obra máxima do método dialético especulativo hegeliano. Um confrontamento radical com a filosofia de Leibniz foi, portanto, uma das principais linhas de força do presente esforço. Nisso, mostrou-se igualmente necessário elaborar, a partir de Hegel, uma reconstrução dos contornos históricos que guiaram as práticas matemáticas infinitesimais desde Pitágoras até Cauchy, bem como propor, para além de Hegel, baseando-se porém, em seu diagnóstico, alguns prognósticos a respeito do desenvolvimento da análise matemática nos sécs. XIX e XX / Abstract: It was the goal of the present work to elucidate the historic-philosophical presuppositions of Hegel¿s critique of infinitesimal calculus and to follow very closely the way in which this critique was effectively carried forth in the intermediary chapter of the Doctrine of Being of the Science of Logic. The first of these two tasks was approached by an interpretative analysis of three chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit (Force and Understanding, Self-consciousness and the first of the subdivisions of Reason: Observation of Nature), just as by a confrontation with some aspects of Kant¿s philosophy (the doctrine of the negative magnitudes) and the further developments of this conceptual starting point in the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. By doing so it was attempted to show how the transcendental philosophy, due to a fundamental binding to the manner with which Leibniz had invented infinitesimal calculus, lacked a non-quantitative concept of quality; furthermore, it was aimed at showing how the theme of infinitesimal calculus critique can be observed, already in the Phenomenology of Spirit, as noticeably preparing (in Force and Understanding) and essentially resolving (in Observation of Nature) the dialectical concept of self-consciousness. The second task was, on its turn, carried forth by a detailed reading of the chapters Quality and Quantity of the Science of Logic, through which it became possible to show how the themes brought to light in an introductory manner in the Phenomenology of Spirit were then resolved in the two versions of the first volume of the most important work of Hegel¿s speculative dialectics. A radical confrontation with the philosophy of Leibniz was, therefore, one of the main red-lines of the present enterprise. In this regard, it became equally necessary to elaborate, departing from Hegel, a reconstruction of the outlines of the historical development of mathematical infinitesimal praxis from Pythagoras to Cauchy, just as propounding ¿ now beyond the scope of Hegel¿s diagnosis, but essentially based upon it ¿ some observations regarding the development of mathematical analysis in the 19th and 20th centuries / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia