Posterbeitrag, welcher das Datenmanagement im Rahmen eines geplanten Transregios zwischen der Universität Leipzig, der TU Chemnitz und des Leibniz Instituts für Oberflächenmodifizierung skizziert.

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Der gelehrte Politiker und Diplomat Johann Christian von Boineburg baute seit seiner Jugend eine umfangreiche Bibliothek auf, die mit mehr als 10.000 Titeln zu den großen privaten Sammlungen des 17. Jahrhunderts zählte.Inhalt und Struktur der Boineburgica zum Zeitpunkt seines Todes sind durch einen Katalog bekannt, den der junge Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz erstellte. Durch die Stiftung seines Sohnes, Philipp Wilhelm von Boineburg, wurde die Bibliothek in weiten Teilen für die Nachwelt erhalten. Auf der Grundlage des überlieferten Buchbestandes und des erhaltenen Kataloges der Bibliothek sowie des heute bekannten Briefwechsels entwirft die Arbeit ein Bild des Büchersammlers und -lesers Boineburg in seiner Zeit. Die Einbeziehung der überlieferten Drucke mit ihren handschriftlichen Einträgen ermöglicht die Rekonstruktion der Genese der Sammlung und die Analyse der Textaneignung durch ihren Besitzer. Gezeigt wird, inwieweit Boineburgs produktive Interessen und seine wissenschaftlichen Ambitionen neben seiner beruflichen politischen Tätigkeit und seinen mäzenatischen Aktivitäten die Zusammensetzung seiner Bibliothek begründen. Deutlich wird dabei auch Boineburgs Verwurzelung im Späthumanismus insgesamt. Im Kontext der privaten Büchersammlungen der Respublica literaria zwischen dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg und dem Beginn des letzten Drittels des 17. Jahrhunderts werden die individuellen Merkmale von Boineburgs polyhistorisch ausgerichteter Bibliothek dargestellt. / As a young man the politician and diplomat Johann Christian von Boineburg started to collect books. At the end of his life this collection with its 10,000 titles was one of the largest private collections of the seventeenth century. Today the content and the structure of the Boineburgica are known by a catalogue which was developed by the young Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. By the donation of Boineburgs son Philipp Wilhelm the library was received until today. The dissertation sketches a picture of the book collector and reader Boineburg based on the volumes, the catalogue of the library as well as Boineburgs correspondance that remained till today. The use of the volumes with the handwritten notes of Boineburg makes it possible to reconstruct the increase of the collection and to analyse how Boinebur was reading his books. It is shown to what extent Boineburgs interests, his political activity and his activities as a patron cause the content of his collection. His rootage tin the late humanism becomes evident. The characteristics of the library of the polymath Boineburg are described.

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The subject of this work is the analysis of the content of the fictional and essayistic production from the writer Jorge Luis Borges, mainly that one made during the 1930s and 1940s and thematizing metaphysical subjects. The aim is to investigate if is there a philosophical project underlying it, and what are the general lines of this project. The introduction includes brief remarks about the importance of the work of Borges to Western thought in the second half of the twentieth century. The first chapter discusses the limitations that are imposed to a philosophical project included in a fictional work, and of its critical efficacy. The next chapter investigates the metaphysical essays Borges wrote during the period in analysis, searching for their philosophical roots. This effort focuses on interpretations by Borges of the systems built by George Berkeley, David Hume and Francis Herbert Bradley, and leads to the discussion of the refutation of the conception of time that permeates British idealism, promoted by the writer through the application of the principle of the indiscernibility. The borgian refutation of time, however, undermines the notion of personal identity, which is self-evident. The third and final chapter shows up that Borges tried to solve this paradox by means of a critical plunge in Gottfried Leibniz´s philosophical system, no longer by means of the essayistic discourse , but through fictional prose. Accordingly, the final chapter includes an outline of the method by which Borges, drawing on the resources of modal fictional discourse, contests speeches such as philosophy itself, supposed to have higher truth- value. It includes, as well, the review of those short stories written by Borges which reverberate leibnizian categories, in order to show the application of that method and hence the meaning of those narratives, which is, according to our hypothesis, to display, each under a different point of view, the fundamental contradiction of Leibniz´s conceptual system. This contradiction is that, despite all the efforts of the philosopher in safeguarding human freedom before a perfect and infinite mathematical cosmology, and of the assertion of the independence of the individual monad, the human condition which emerges from this order is humiliating for men, reducing them to a single piece in a stiff cosmic system. / A presente dissertação tem por objeto o conteúdo da produção ficcional e ensaística do escritor Jorge Luis Borges, mais especificamente aquela composta durante as décadas de 1930 e 1940 e que tocam ou tematizam temas metafísicos. O objetivo é investigar se existe ali, subjacente, um projeto filosófico, e quais são as linhas gerais desse projeto. A introdução inclui breves considerações a respeito da importância da obra de Borges para o pensamento ocidental da segunda metade do século XX. O primeiro capítulo discute as limitações que se impõem a um projeto filosófico inscrito numa obra ficcional, e o horizonte de sua eficácia crítica. No capítulo seguinte, investigam-se os ensaios metafísicos que o escritor redigiu ao longo do período analisado, em busca de suas raízes filosóficas. Esse esforço concentra-se nas interpretações feitas por Borges dos sistemas edificados por Georges Berkeley, David Hume e Francis Herbert Bradley, e conduz à discussão da refutação, promovida pelo escritor por meio da aplicação do princípio dos indiscerníveis, da concepção de tempo que permeia a corrente idealista britânica. A refutação borgiana do tempo traz consigo, no entanto, o solapamento da noção de identidade pessoal, noção que, no entanto, é autoevidente. Tal paradoxo, demonstra-se no terceiro e último capítulo, Borges tentará resolvê-lo por meio de um mergulho crítico no sistema de Gottfried Leibniz, não mais pela via do discurso ensaístico, mas por meio da prosa ficcional. Nesse sentido, o capítulo final inclui um esboço do método pelo qual Borges, valendo-se dos recursos modais do discurso ficcional, coloca em discussão discursos de valor veritativo pretensamente superior, como é o caso da filosofia; bem como a resenha de contos escritos por Borges que ecoam categorias integrantes do sistema de Leibniz, com o objetivo de evidenciar a aplicação desse método e, por conseguinte, o sentido daquelas narrativas, que é, segundo nossa hipótese, de exibir, cada qual sob um ponto de vista diferente, a contradição fundamental do organismo conceitual leibniziano. Essa contradição consiste em que, malgrado todos os esforços do filósofo em resguardar a liberdade humana diante de uma cosmologia matemática perfeita e infinita, e não obstante a afirmação da independência individual da mônada, a condição humana que decorre dessa ordem é humilhante e nulificadora para o homem, pois o reduz a uma simples peça de um rígido sistema cósmico. / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Enéias Forlin / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-16T15:26:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nolasco_FabioMascarenhas_M.pdf: 1121338 bytes, checksum: 679280a1fe00df842faf6eedecac94db (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: Tentou-se nesta dissertação apresentar um ponto de vista - fragmentário e inacabado como necessariamente deve ser - acerca do percurso histórico do imbricamento entre matemática e filosofia que marcou intensamente o séc. XVII, imbricamento este assinalado pelos termos more geometrico, mathesis universalis, algebra, dentre outros. Isto com o intuito distante de abordar, posteriormente, a questão mais genérica de situar tal imbricamento específico do séc. XVII perante outras conformações da relação entre filosofia e matemática, notadamente, as que presentemente mais nos interessam, a do idealismo alemão do início do séc. XIX e a dos princípios do que veio a se chamar de filosofia analítica, do início do séc. XX. Para tanto, desta forma, buscamos apresentar dois momentos desse imbricamento especificamente seiscentista entre matemática e filosofia que, em nossa opinião, abrangem uma vastíssima gama de temas sintomáticos do período: (i) a conformação cartesiana entre matemática e filosofia, dita inauguradora da modernidade, tipificada pelo conceito de intuicionismo, e (ii) a conformação leibniziana, tipificada pelo conceito de formalismo. Julgamos que a apresentação do percurso apenas tocando estes dois pólos do movimento, mesmo que incompleta por não tratar de temas da filosofia de Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza, Locke, dentre outros, apresenta, todavia, os contornos gerais do desenvolvimento buscado: como se o momento da crítica de Leibniz a Descartes, e a re-formulação leibniziana do dito imbricamento, pudesse ser tomado como uma caracterização exemplar do percurso do imbricamento de matemática e filosofia do séc. XVII / Abstract: Our effort in this dissertation was to present a point of view - fragmentary and unachieved as it ought to be - concerning the historical development of the conjunction between Mathematics and Philosophy which has so characteristically marked the XVIIth century; a conjunction denoted by the terms more geometrico, mathesis universalis, algebra, to name but a few. And this, due to the further goal of approaching, afterwards, the more generic question of situating such a conjunction, specific of the XVIIth century, in regards to other conformations of the relation between Philosophy and Mathematics, namely the ones which are of our present interest, that of the German Idealism of the early XIXth century, and that of the first moments of what came to be called as Analytic Philosophy, of the first years of the XXth century. So as to approach the more basic part of this goal, we have thus tried to present two moments of this specifical XVIIth century conjunction between Mathematics and Philosophy which, in our opinion, touch a very large array of symptomatic questions of the period: (i) the cartesian conformation between mathematics and philosophy, said to be the inauguration of modernity, typified by the concept of intuitionism, and (ii) the leibnizian conformation, typified by the concept of formalism. We claim that such an exposition, which only touches the two poles of the movement, even if incomplete for not treating themes from Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza and Locke's Philosophy, in among others, nevertheless presents the general outlines of the development we are trying to enlighten: as if the moment of Leibniz' criticism to Descartes, and the leibnizian re-conformation of the said conjunction, could be taken as an exemplary characterization of the development of the relation between mathematics and philosophy of the XVIIth century / Mestrado / Historia da Filosofia Moderna / Mestre em Filosofia

La doctrine leibnizienne de la science repose-t-elle sur une théorie de la connaissance? Après avoir montré, dans des travaux préalables, qu’une telle dépendance ne se rencontre pas dans l’œuvre de la maturité, nous nous intéressons ici aux premiers écrits de Leibniz. La Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) dresse, suivant l’exemple de Bacon, un inventaire raisonné des disciplines que doit réunir la nouvelle encyclopédie. Comme dans les projets leibniziens ultérieurs, cet inventaire est précédé de la distinction entre types de savoir en fonction des critères logiques selon lesquels les propositions se répartissent entre histoires, observations et théorèmes. Nous nous attachons en particulier à la définition de ceux-ci comme propositions « démontrables ex terminis ». Cette norme de la science étant posée, quels fondements in re Leibniz entend-t-il donner au savoir démonstratif ? Prenant pour fil conducteur sa polémique avec l’humaniste Marius Nizolius, nous étudions sa tentative pour fonder la validité des propositions de vérité éternelle sur des universaux subsistant indépendamment de l’existence des individus. Ce n’est cependant que dans les premiers écrits parisiens (1672-1673) que se dégage sa réponse définitive à ce problème : apparue d’abord comme un autre nom de la signification qu’« exprime » une définition, la notion d’idée y prend consistance en tant qu’archétype subsistant en Dieu. Les principaux traits de la théorie leibnizienne de la science sont ainsi fixés, indépendamment de toute « doctrine de l’entendement ». / Does Leibniz’s doctrine of demonstrative knowledge rest upon a theory of cognition? Having shown in previous articles that such was not the case in his mature works, we now turn to his early writings. The Nova Methodus discendae docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667) contains a reasoned inventory of the disciplines that should constitute the new encyclopaedia. As in later projects, Leibniz precedes this inventory with a classification of the types of knowledge based on the logical criteria according to which propositions are divided in histories, observations and theorems. Particular attention is given to the definition of the latter as propositions « demonstrable ex terminis ».This norm of scientific necessity once defined, what real (in re) foundation does Leibniz give to demonstrative knowledge? Following the various threads offered by his polemic against the Italian humanist Marius Nizolius, we study Leibniz’s attempt to ground the validity of propositions of eternal truth on universals subsisting independently of the existence of individuals. But one has to wait until the first Paris writings (1672-1673) to see the emergence of his mature answer to that problem: first conceived after the model of the significatio which a definition « expresses », the notion of idea reaches its latter ontological status as an archetype subsisting in God’s mind. The principal features of Leibniz’s theory of demonstrative knowledge are thus in place, prior to and independently of what he will later call his « doctrine of the understanding ».

Bibliographical references at end of each chapter / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)