Cette thèse de doctorat se fixe tout particulièrement pour objectif d’apporter un éclairage sur la problématique de la production des éléments de terres rares aux États-Unis. Ces minéraux, aux qualités nucléaire très particulières, constituent des intrants cruciaux dans certaines technologies et industries stratégiques : technologies « vertes », technologies d’information et de communication, ainsi que dans les technologies militaires. Ces minéraux stratégiques constituent aujourd’hui un enjeu géoéconomique mais aussi géopolitique et environnemental majeur. En 2011, 97 % des éléments de terres rares dans le monde proviennent de la Chine (qui dispose donc d’un monopole), selon l’United States Geological Survey. Cette position de la Chine a soulevé des inquiétudes chez les responsables américains concernant l’accès à ces ressources minérales, de manière évidente depuis 2010. Cette recherche questionne le rôle crucial joué par les acteurs au sein des agences étatsuniennes dans l’objectif d’élaborer une politique solide pour faire face au risque géopolitique lié à la vulnérabilité des États-Unis face au risque de ruptures d’approvisionnement de ces minéraux stratégiques. Ces minéraux sont donc une source de conflit international, surtout en raison de la montée de la Chine comme un nouveau joueur sur la scène internationale, dotée d’un quasi monopole sur les terres rares. Situé à la croisée des préoccupations géoéconomiques et géopolitiques et environnementales, il a semblé nécessaire de comprendre quels enjeux essentiels soulèvent ces minéraux stratégiques : enjeux géoéconomiques, défis géopolitique ou danger écologique ? C’est donc en ces termes que nous examinerons la question des minéraux de terres rares par les États-Unis. / This doctoral dissertation particularly aims at shedding light on the issue of U.S. rare earth production, a group of minerals with very special qualities nuclear, which are vital inputs in certain strategic industries and technologies: green technologies, information and communication technologies, as well as in military technologies. These strategic minerals constitute nowadays one of the major challenges associated with geo-economic, geopolitical and environmental issues. In 2011, China has provided approximately 97 percent of the world’s rare earth minerals (near-monopoly) according to U.S. Geological Survey data. This position of China has raised concerns about access to these mineral resources among American officials, obviously since 2010. This research discuss the crucial role played by actors within the U.S. Agencies to develop a robust policy to deal with the geopolitical risks about U.S. vulnerability to a supply disruption of these critical strategic minerals, as part of a source of international conflict, especially with the rise of China as a new player on the international stage. Located at the crossroads of geo-economic, geopolitical, and environmental concerns, it seems necessary to understand what key impasses constitute rare earths strategic minerals, economic power or geopolitical challenges or ecological danger? It is in these terms that we will deal with the issue of rare earths as considered by the United States.

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本文第一個研究目的，是解釋17、18世紀荷蘭「如何」（how）決定面對英國崛起威脅的策略。這裡指的策略不是短期單一政策，而是「大戰略」（grand strategy）。若將此問題抽離「荷蘭面對英國崛起」的背景，則本文命題便是：「一國崛起的過程裡，其他國家如何決定面對該國威脅的策略？」而本文第二個研究目的，即對此命題提出一套通則理論，該理論適用的「其他國家」包括原有霸權以及其他任何的大國與小國（本文稱這些國家為非崛起國）。然後本文將運用該理論解釋荷蘭面對英國崛起的個案，藉此初步驗證該理論。 　　本文理論認為，非崛起國會採取「抗衡」（balancing）或「順從」（bandwagoning）策略，取決於其對國家利益的界定。首先，非崛起國國內行為者的偏好與實力，將因非崛起國和崛起國在國際體系中相對位置的變化，以及兩國間的互動而改變。接著，非崛起國國內的政經制度與行為者的合縱連橫，會影響各行為者能否有效向「國家」（state）施壓。最後，非崛起國的國內行為者與國家將在正式政策場域中議價，決定對國家利益的界定。之後，非崛起國執行經由國內政治過程選擇的策略，於國際層次與崛起國進行新階段的互動。 　　根據本文研究，本文理論確實能妥善解釋17、18世紀時，荷蘭的對英政策由抗衡到順從的轉變。也因為荷蘭面對英國崛起的個案，能類比當代各國面對中國崛起時的種種政經問題。故以此個案初步驗證的本文理論，應可運用在當代中國與其他國家關係的發展上，包括台海兩岸關係的發展。

本論文以守勢現實主義的論點，觀察中共建構「中美新型大國關係」的相關作為，證明中共自冷戰後期以來，是以尋求防禦為主的國家。同時，近年中共領導人提出中美新型大國關係的倡議，符合以「溝通合作」和「維持現況」為主的守勢現實主義論述，以應對美國重返亞太政策，並藉此消除「中國威脅論」與「修昔底德陷阱」的疑慮，為中共創造出安全的國家發展空間。 針對守勢現實主義的論述，本論文設訂「溝通合作」、「維持現況」與「威脅平衡」三個項目，作為驗證中共對美外交政策的指標。同時，分別針對「中美軍事交流」、「南海問題」與「臺灣問題」三個熱點案例予以探討，以中共具體的作為加以驗證。最終發現依據守勢現實主義的觀點，可由先前設定的三個指標，來解釋中共現行推動「中美新型大國關係」的相關作為，符合守勢現實主義的論點。 最後，本文得到的結論是：一、中共推動中美新型大國關係可避免安全困境的發生。二、中共建構中美新型大國關係訴求維持現況的局面。三、中美新型大國關係下的臺灣問題易邊緣化。四、中美新型大國關係下的兩軍關係是未來發展重點。 / This dissertation, based on the arguments of defensive realism, observes China's efforts to construct "a new type of great power relations between China and the United States," and proves that China has been seeking a defense-oriented country since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, the Chinese leaders proposed the new type of great power relations between China and the United States, defensive realism based on "communication and cooperation" and "maintaining the status quo" in response to the United States policy of returning to the Asia-Pacific region and thereby eliminating the "China threat theory" and " Thucydides trap "suspicions for China to create a safe space for national development. In view of defensive realism, this article sets three items of "communication and cooperation", "maintaining the status quo" and "threat balance" as the indicators to verify China's foreign policy toward the United States. Three cases of "Sino-US military exchange", "South China Sea issue" and "Taiwan issue" were explored. Finally, according to the viewpoint of defensive realism, the three indicators set beforehand can be used to explain the relevant current China's efforts to promote the " new type of great power relations ," and to conform to defensive realism. Finally, the conclusion of this article is: First, China's promotion of the relations between the new type of great powers can avoid the security dilemma. Second, the new-type relations between China and the United States appeal to maintain the status quo. Third, the Taiwan issue under the relations between the new big powers of China and the United States is easily marginalized. Fourth, the relations between the two armies under the relations between the new great powers of China and the United States are the focus of future development.

This dissertation analyzed the internal incoherence of China’s grand strategy. To do so, it used the cultural driver of honor to explain the contradictory behavior of China, which ranges from peaceful, responsible international actor to assertive, revisionist rising power with hegemonic ambitions. The central research question asked why China often diverges from Peaceful Development, thus leading to major contradictions as well as possible misperceptions on the part of other nations. Honor was the standard of reference that was utilized and examined in order to establish congruence and coherence between deed and praxis. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this study posited that if policy diverges from or is incongruent with China’s standard of national honor, then the grand strategy is internally incoherent. Second, two further hypotheses posited that China will tend to use peaceful means if its goal is to enhance external legitimacy, whereas it will tend to use assertive means if its goal is to enhance internal legitimacy. This dissertation began by broadly tracing the cultural driver of honor and the link between honor and legitimacy in Chinese history. The second part of the dissertation looked at the six most salient events within a six-year timeframe (2009-2015) by way of the focused, comparative single-case-study method. For each grand strategy policy input (military strategy, economic policy, and diplomatic policy), the two most salient events were carefully chosen. A fourth grand strategy input, legitimacy (both internal and external), was evaluated for each of these events as well. Methodologically speaking, this study used process tracing in these within-case studies of the single case of China’s grand strategy. Results showed that China’s grand strategy manifestations are by and large legitimacy-driven and that, therefore, peaceful or assertive actions may be differentiated in terms of relation to external or internal legitimacy. In sum, this dissertation advanced an innovative means of inquiry into the grand strategy of a non-Western country, contributed valuable information for the policy community, and offered results that enable a re-evaluation of the debate on the peaceful or violent rise of China.

Structural Violence and Great Power Competition: The Effects of Sino-U.S. Geopolitical Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Abstract This paper examines the effects of the ongoing strategic rivalry between China and the United States for influence over the Indo-Pacific in order to demonstrate the negative impacts upon structural violence within the region. Using an amalgamation from various authors, this paper establishes a definition and set of criteria for the presence of structural violence which are then applied to the cases of Vietnam, Myanmar, and Japan. By correlating the mechanisms with which China and the United States garner influence with the specific consequences for the prevalence and severity of structural violence, this paper illustrates that the ongoing geopolitical rivalry poses considerable threats to all Indo-Pacific nations regardless of their development status or social, political, economic, and geographic characteristics. Results indicate that the extent of each country's structural violence was directly or indirectly affected by the presence of foreign involvement, and that different levels of alignment or independence can serve to reduce or exacerbate these effects. Furthermore, evidence indicated that China's methods pose a more immediate threat to induvial countries, but that the United...

One of the most frequent questions in the study of Chinese foreign policy is whether China can be regarded as a responsible member of international society. It is the aim of the presented thesis to look more closely at China's behaviour in the present international society in terms of responsibility. The thesis utilizes the concept of international society developed by the English school of international relations and interconnects it with the concept of responsibility in international relations to determine a set of criteria which an ordinary state or great power must meet in order to be regarded as responsible in the present international society. In order to determine whether China behaves as a responsible ordinary state or great power on the international level, the thesis utilizes the method of the most likely and the least likely case studies. The analysis of China's behaviour in the World Trade Organization and within the nuclear non-proliferation regime can provide sufficient evidence of China's acceptance of primary institutions forming the backbone of the present international society. The findings have serious implications for thinking of contemporary China as a status quo state respecting institutions and rules of the present international society.

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Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study explores the claim that Great Power Wars are a necessary condition for successful hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system, primarily from the standpoint of World- Systems Analysis. This study advances the conception of hegemony primarily in economic and state terms, and it was investigated, by way of a historical case study, how the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) impacted the economic domains of agro-industrial production, commerce, and finance of the United Provinces of the Netherlands, and its main rival for systemic leadership, Hapsburg Spain. The variables utilised in the study were Great Power War, and the ‘material base’ of the state involved (both independent), the three abovementioned economic domains (intervening), and hegemony or defeat (dependent). The case study was primarily descriptive and explanatory, with the use of process-tracing in its compilation, and a method of within-case structured, focused comparison was utilised with the aim of tentatively producing standardised, generalised knowledge concerning the wider link between Great Power War and hegemony beyond the Dutch case. The findings of the study, although derived from only one historical case of hegemonic ascent in the modern world-system, strongly support the argument that Great Power War is necessary to secure the hegemony of the leading insular core state, which is physically removed from the fighting during the conflict, since the full mobilisation of its economy is effected, while the economies of most other core states are impaired, especially the main continental rival for hegemony. However, the ascending hegemon must also possess the requisite favourable ‘material base’. Further research on this topic is called for, given the potential destructiveness of a future Great Power War, and its role in establishing hegemony in the modern world-system. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die bewering dat Groot Moontheid Oorloë ‘n noodsaaklike vereiste is vir suksesvolle hegemoniese bestyging in die moderne wêreld-sisteem, hoofsaaklik vanaf die standpunt van Wêreld-Sisteem Analise. Hierdie studie bevorder die konsepsie van hegemonie hoofsaaklik in ekonomiese en staat terme, en dit het ondersoek, deur middel van ‘n historiese gevallestudie, hoe die Dertig Jaar Oorlog (1618-1648) ingewerk het op die ekonomiese arenas van agri-industriële produksie, handel, and finansies van die Verenigde Provinsies van Nederland, en hul mededinger vir sistemiese leierskap, Spanje. Die veranderlikes wat in die studie ingespan was, was Groot Moontheid Oorlog, en die ‘materiële basis’ van die state in kwessie (onafhanlik), die drie bogenoemde ekonomiese arenas (albei tussenkomend), en hegemonie of nederlaag (afhanklik). Die gevallestudie was hoofsaaklik beskrywend en verduidelikend, en proses-nasporing (oftewel ‘process-tracing’) is in die samestelling daarvan benut, en ‘n metode van gestruktureerde, gefokusde vergelyking (oftewel ‘structured, focused comparison’) is gebruik binne die gevallestudie met die doel om tentatiewe gestandardiseerde en veralgemeende kennis te genereer wat bydra tot die verduideliking van die wyer skakel tussen Groot Moontheid Oorlog en hegemonie buite die geval van die Verenigde Provinsies. Die bevindinge van die studie, hoewel gegenereer aan die hand van slegs een historiese geval van hegemoniese bestyging in the moderne wêreld-sisteem, het sterk steun verleen aan die argument dat Groot Moontheid Oorloë nodig is om die hegemonie van die vernaamste insulêre kern staat te bewerkstellig, wat fisies verwyderd van die gevegte is tydends die oorlog, aangesien die volle mobilisasie van die ekonomie van hierdie staat bewerkstellig word, terwyl die ekonomieë van die meerderheid van die ander kernstate benadeel word, veral die vernaamste kontinentale mededinger om hegemonie. Die opkomende hegemoon moet egter ook oor die vereiste gunstige ‘materiële basis’ beskik. Verdere navorsing in hierdie veld word benodig, gegewe die waarskynlike vernietiging wat gesaai kan word deur ‘n toekomstige Groot Moontheid Oorlog, en die rol daarvan in die daarstelling van hegemonie in die moderne wêreld-sisteem.

This dissertation seeks to conceptualise and operationalise the concept of soft balancing in international relations by articulating a “theory of tripartite strategic balancing” which is applicable to both international and regional unipolar systems. It has a twofold purpose: one theoretical and the other empirical. First, it seeks to develop a theory of tripartite strategic balancing which encompasses three forms of strategic balancing: internal, external, and soft balancing. The second part seeks to test the theory’s utility in explaining international political outcomes in the post-Cold War international system. In particular, it seeks to ascertain whether and how “second-tier great powers” have strategically balanced against the United States on a global level since the end of the Cold War. The analyses will focus largely on the foreign policies of Russia and France – the chief soft balancers. However, this dissertation also seeks to extend the concept of soft balancing into the regional level of analysis by examining whether and how minor-regional powers soft balance against regional unipolar leaders. For instance, it will examine whether and how the Russian Federation has been soft balanced against by states in the “European Near Abroad.” The analyses will focus primarily on the foreign policies of Poland – the chief soft balancer in the region. The dissertation will employ three in-depth case studies – the Kosovo Crisis (1999), the Iraqi wars (1991-2003), and the Georgia Crisis (2008) – to verify whether or not tripartite strategic balancing is actually occurring as the theory predicts. It will heavily rely on sources and interviews conducted during my time working at the United Nations Security Council and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These findings seek to contribute a more nuanced strand of thinking to the realist paradigm in international relations, and they offer practical implications for both US and Russian foreign policymaking.