[pt] A presente dissertação é um estudo sobre o conceito do ponto de vista interno, elaborado e aplicado ao direito por H. L. A. Hart no livro O Conceito de Direito. Para tanto, é analisado a relação desse conceito com outros tópicos da teoria hartiana, como: a crítica às teorias baseadas em sanções, a existência de regras sociais, a norma de reconhecimento e a ideia de obrigação jurídica. Com isso, o objetivo é analisar o conceito do ponto de vista interno não de forma isolada, mas relacionada com o contexto geral da obra de Hart. / [en] This dissertation is a study on the concept of the internal point of view, which was applied to the law by H. L. A. Hart in his book The Concept of Law. Therefore, it is analyzed the relationship of this concept with other topic in Hart´s theory, such as: a critique of sanction-centered theories of law, the existence of social rules, the rule of recognition and the idea of legal obligation. Thus, the objective is to analyze the concept of the internal point of view not in isolation, but related to the general context of the Hart´s work.

Den här uppsatsen behandlar det delområde inom rättsfilosofin som benämns straffteori och i det här fallet vad som rättfärdigar straff utifrån frågan om varför vi ska straffa. Frågan behandlas genom särskiljandet av juridiskt- och moraliskt straff samt straffteoretisk tolkning, värdering och analys. Utgångspunkten är de av Gertrude Ezorsky tre givna straffteoretiska kategorierna till rättfärdigande av straff: teleologisk-, retributivistisk- och teleologiskt retributivistisk straffteori. Här kommer Jeremy Bentham att representera den teleologiska kategorin, Immanuel Kant den retributivistiska och H. L. A. Hart den teleologiskt retributivistiska. Uppsatsen avslutas med en argumentation för åtminstone delar av innehållet hos en rimligen moraliskt rättfärdigad och intuitivt tillfredställande straffteori.

Thesis (M.S.)--Humboldt State University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-63). Also available via the Internet from Humboldt Digital Scholar.

This work aims to investigate the relationship between legality and morality in the view of the Law theorist Herbert L.A Hart. We analyze the claims which arouse as a reaction against the polemical Report of the Wolfenden Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution from 1957. This report addresses the decriminalization of male homosexual conduct and prostitution based on the argument that there should be a field of private morality and immorality which did not belong to the legal scope. First, we analyze the works by Hart which deal with the relationship between law and morals. Then, we investigate the Harm Principle or Principle of Civil Liberties, supported by John Stuart Mill in his work On Liberty , and which served as a support for the conclusions of the Report. Finally, we analyze the claims made by Hart on behalf of a mitigated form of Mill‟s Principle, as well as the impact of these claims among theorists such as Patrick Devlin, Peter Cane and Neil Mac Cormick. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo investigar a relação entre legalidade e moralidade na concepção do teórico do Direito Herbert L. A. Hart. Analisamos os argumentos que surgiram como reação ao polêmico Relatório do Comitê Departamental de Crimes Homossexuais e Prostituição, de 1957. Esse relatório versa sobre a descriminalização de condutas homossexuais masculinas e da prostituição, apoiando-se no argumento de que haveria um campo de moralidade e imoralidade privadas que não pertenceria à seara legal. Inicialmente, analisamos as obras de Hart que tratam da relação entre Direito e Moral. Depois, investigamos o Princípio do Dano, ou Princípio da Liberdade Civil, defendido por John Stuart Mill na obra On Liberty, e que serviu de suporte argumentativo para as conclusões do Relatório. Finalmente, analisamos os argumentos lançados por Hart em defesa de uma forma mitigada do Princípio de Mill, bem como a repercussão desses argumentos entre teóricos como Patrick Devlin, Peter Cane e Neil Mac Cormick.

O objetivo desta pesquisa é apresentar o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Hart e o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Dworkin, assim como a crítica realizada por Dworkin em face do Conceito de Direito oferecido por Hart. O positivista, Herbert Hart, propõe que o direito é formado por um sistema de regras primárias e regras secundárias, sendo que uma regra de reconhecimento é responsável por identificar quais regras estão ou não incluídas em tal sistema. Caso seja apresentado um problema que não é resolvido por uma regra reconhecida pelo critério, deverá o julgador apelar para a discricionariedade. Dworkin, em um primeiro momento, criticará o conceito de Hart, alegando que o seu critério de demarcação entre o que é direito e o que não é direito é insatisfatório, por deixar de reconhecer vários elementos como jurídicos, uma vez que a regra de reconhecimento, sendo um teste de pedigree, não à capaz de captar princípios de direito não legislados e direitos e deveres controversos. Ademais, há um erro na teoria positivista de Hart, ao afirmar que os casos não claramente resolvidos por uma regra serão resolvidos a partir da arbitrariedade da autoridade estatal. Posteriormente, Dworkin oferecerá um modelo de direito que dê conta da realidade jurídica, em seu entendimento. Um modelo em que o jurista, a partir do equilíbrio reflexivo e do axioma da equidade poderá deduzir teorias possíveis para responder problemas do direito, identificando, dentre estas teorias, qual é a melhor resposta, sendo portanto a resposta exigível para a solução da lide concreta. / The objective of this research is to present the rational legal model presented by Hart and rational legal model presented by Dworkin as well as criticism made by Dworkin in the face of the Concept of Law offered by Hart. The positivist, Herbert Hart, proposes that the right is formed by a system of primary rules and secondary rules, and a rule of recognition is responsible for identifying what rules are or are not included in this system. If presented with a problem that is not resolved by a rule recognized by the criterion, the judge should resort to discretion. Dworkin, at first, criticize the concept of Hart, claiming that his criterion of demarcation between what is right and what is not right is unsatisfactory, for failing to recognize various elements such as legal, as a rule of recognition , being a test of pedigree, not able to capture the principles of law and not legislated rights and duties controversial. Furthermore, there is an error in the positivist theory of Hart, asserting that the cases do not clearly resolved by a rule will be resolved from the arbitrariness of state authority. Later, Dworkin offer a model law that embraces the legal reality in his mind. A model in which the lawyer from the reflective equilibrium and the axiom of justice may deduct possible theories to address problems of law, identifying, among these theories, what is the best answer, the answer is therefore required for the solution of the dispute concrete.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-05-27T18:50:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 estudo_sobre.pdf: 890455 bytes, checksum: ddd0fd2fa4dc8423b221300af41c5936 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-27T18:50:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 estudo_sobre.pdf: 890455 bytes, checksum: ddd0fd2fa4dc8423b221300af41c5936 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-05 / Nenhuma / Este trabalho tem por objetivo esclarecer como Kelsen dialoga com a tradição do Common Law. Para tanto, nos valemos das observações de dois autores: H. L. A. Hart e Michael King. A escolha Hart se deu, em primeiro lugar, porque muitas das questões discutidas por ele, foram primeiramente levantas e discutidas por Kelsen. Além disso, Hart, ao contrário de Kelsen, tende a preencher uma certa lacuna deixada pelo professor austríaco, pretendendo estabelecer o fundamento do Direito em regras sociais, e não em uma pressuposição transcendental desempenhada por uma norma hipotética. Ao lado dessa perspectiva tradicional de se observar o Direito, e que, de certa maneira, continua em voga na tradição analítica inglesa até os dias atuais, Michael King, que foi um dos primeiros professores ingleses a trabalhar com a teoria dos sistemas sociais autopoiéticos no Reino Unido, propõe uma alternativa para as abordagens tradicionais do sistema jurídico. Embora tal teoria ainda seja minoritária, consideramos que a sua rejeição sumária logo se apresenta um erro. Sendo assim, também consideramos igualmente relevante observar as observações de King sobre a teoria luhmanniana e sobre o normativismo kelseniano. Nesse sentido, o trabalho se ocupa com duas maneiras de se observar esse diálogo do normativismo kelseniano com o Common Law: uma pela perspectiva de Hart; a outra pela perspectiva de King. / This work has the objective to clarify how Kelsen dialogues with the Common Law tradition. Thus, we shared the observations of two authors: H.L.A. Hart and Michael king. The choice for Hart was due to, in first place, because many of the questions discussed by him were firstly raised by Kelsen. Besides, Hart, on the contrary of Kelsen, tend to complete the gap left by the Austrian Professor intending to establish th e Law Fundament in social rules, and not in a transcendental assumption performed by a hypothetical rule. Beside this traditional perspective of observing the Law, and that, somewhat, continues valid in today's English analytical tradition, Michael King, who was one of the first English Professors to work with the theory of the autopoietic social systems in the United Kingdom, proposes an alternative for the traditional approaches of the Legal System. Although such theory is still minority, we consider its immediate rejection as being a mistake. Thus, we also consider equally relevant observe the observations of King about the luhmanniana theory and about Kelsen’s normativism. This way, the work sees two ways of observing the dialogue of Kelsen’s normativism with the Common Law: one under Hart`s perspective; other by King`s perspective.

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

Project (D. Min.)--Iliff School of Theology, 2007. / Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-174).

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.