[pt] A coercitividade é sem dúvidas um dos elementos mais salientes do direito. Não só o direito ordena a realização de condutas, mas também faz ameaças e autoriza o uso da força para fazer cumprir as suas ordens. Impostos, taxas, sequestro de bens, cassação de direitos e o encarceramento são práticas presentes em todos sistemas jurídicos paradigmáticos. Apesar da saliência da coerção nos sistemas jurídicos, a grande maioria dos filósofos do direito contemporâneos pensa que a coercitividade não é uma propriedade essencial do direito, isto é, não é uma propriedade que está presente em todas as circunstâncias nas quais o direito existe. O argumento geralmente utilizado por esses filósofos é o de que é possível haver direito sem coerção, pois é possível haver uma circunstância na qual haja somente indivíduos cooperativos. Nessa circunstância a introdução da coerção se torna desnecessária, pois tais indivíduos seguem o direito a despeito da coerção. Neste trabalho defendo que uma versão do argumento normalmente utilizado para defender essa tese - o argumento dos homens perplexos - não funciona. As objeções apresentadas pretendem mostrar que há coerção em uma circunstância na qual só existem homens perplexos e também que a instituição existente nessa circunstância não é uma instância genuína de direito. No curso deste trabalho esclareço o que é o homem perplexo e também faço algumas considerações sobre a coerção visando a dispersar algumas confusões. / [en] Coerciveness is doubtlessly one of law s most salient elements. Law not only orders the performance of conducts, but also makes threats and authorizes the use of force to enforce its orders. Taxes, fees, restraint of assets, revocation of rights and imprisonment are existing practices in all paradigmatic legal systems. Despite the salience of coercion in all legal systems, the great majority of contemporary legal philosophers think that coerciveness is not an essential property of law, that is, it is not a property present in all circumstances in which law exists. The argument normally used by those philosophers is that it is possible to have law without coercion, because it is possible to have a circumstance composed solely by cooperative subjects. In this circumstance, the introduction of coercion becomes unnecessary, for such subjects follow the law regardless of coercion. In this work, I argue that one version of the argument normally used by those philosophers to defend this thesis - the puzzled men argument - does not work. The objections presented aim to show that there is coercion in a circumstance composed solely by puzzled men, and that the existing institution in this circumstance is not a genuine instance of law. During this work, I clarify what the puzzled man is and make some considerations about coercion aiming to dispel some confusions.

The thesis explores and takes a stand with respect to the differences between the religious epistemologies of Alvin Plantinga and Hendrik Hart. For Plantinga, direct rational knowledge of God "in Himself" is possible because it is grounded in the experience of our rational faculties. For Hart, direct rational knowledge of God's nature is impossible because God transcends the created order and, therefore, the limits of rational understanding. Our knowledge of God, as a consequence, can only be faith knowledge that is decidedly indirect and metaphoric in nature. Plantinga believes that such views are Kantian in inspiration and that they turn our knowledge of God into nothing more than rationally incoherent "disguised nonsense." The thesis shows that Plantinga's own philosophical theology fails to meet the rational standards he sets for religious knowledge, his critique of Kantian religious epistemologies fails to apply to Hart's position, and that he himself allows for indirect knowledge of God in certain instances. The thesis concludes by noting if our knowledge of God can be indirect in some instances without also being rationally incoherent disguised nonsense, then perhaps Hart is not wrong for regarding it to be indirect in all instances.

This study focuses on the relation between the picareque genre and the way in which guilt is processed in literature. André Brink’s Inteendeel (On the contrary) was used in this examination and also, for a wider perspective than merely the South African situation, Arthur Japin’s De zwarte met het witte hart (The two hearts of Aquasi Boachi). The possibilities offerd by the picaresque in order to investigate the manifestation of guilt in literary texts were explored with the theories of, inter alia, Wicks, Ricoeur and Todorov. Tracing the origins of the picaresque reveals that this type of text exhibits specific characteristics, e.g. an unethical attitude that is usually imposed on the individual by a society in crisis – “guilt” and a confessional tone are therefore intrinsically part of the picaresque. Using Wicks’s modal-generic approach, the two novels are examined with the purpose of determining their degree of “picaresqueness” to test the validity of the hypothesis, i.e. that the more a text displays picaresque characteristics, the more the issue of guilt would be a central theme to that text. In the two novels relevant to this study, colonial guilt is the main form of guilt examined. / Prof. W. Burger

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos.

劉傑雄. / 手稿本及手稿本複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Shou gao ben ji shou gao ben fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves [13]-[16] / Liu Jiexiong. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 哈特對法律道德關係的看法 --- p.14 / Chapter （甲） --- 社會律則的一般分析 --- p.14 / Chapter （一） --- 社會律則的意義 --- p.14 / Chapter （二） --- 社會律則兩方面的陳述 --- p.16 / Chapter （三） --- 義務 --- p.18 / Chapter （乙） --- 道德 --- p.21 / Chapter （一） --- 道德的意義 --- p.21 / Chapter （二） --- 道德的基本成份 --- p.22 / Chapter （三） --- 道德的特質　 --- p.30 / Chapter （丙） --- 法律 --- p.36 / Chapter （一） --- 基始律則──義務律 --- p.36 / Chapter （二） --- 從屬律則──轉變律、審裁律和認可律 --- p.37 / Chapter （三） --- 法律的成份 --- p.47 / Chapter （丁） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.48 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 狄奧堅對哈特的批評 --- p.61 / Chapter （甲） --- 一個基本的概念──原則 --- p.62 / Chapter （一） --- 原則的意思 --- p.62 / Chapter （二） --- 原則和律則 --- p.67 / Chapter （三） --- 原則的來源 --- p.70 / Chapter （乙） --- 對哈特法律理論的批評 --- p.72 / Chapter （一） --- 哈特的兩個選擇 --- p.73 / Chapter （二） --- 第一個選擇──至少有些原則具有法律的約束力 --- p.76 / Chapter （三） --- 第三個選擇──任何原則不具有法律的約束力 --- p.76 / Chapter （四） --- 哈特法律理論的兩難 --- p.88 / Chapter （五） --- 認可律的漏洞 --- p.90 / Chapter （丙） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.100 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之評估 --- p.103 / Chapter （一） --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之論題 --- p.103 / Chapter （二） --- 爭辯的爭論點 --- p.103 / Chapter （三） --- 第一個爭論點 --- p.106 / Chapter （四） --- 第二個爭論點　 --- p.116 / Chapter （五） --- 狄奧堅理論的毛病 --- p.124 / 結語 --- p.131

The purpose of this study is to propose for Hart County a school system that will come nearer meeting the standards of a good educational system than the one now in use. It is by no means expected that this proposed system will be perfect and the writer fully realizes that oftentimes a scheme on paper will not work out so well when actually put into practice. However, being acquainted with the amount of money available, the geographic and economic conditions, and the roads of the county it is believed that this is the best that can be done under existing circumstances.

In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.

Scott Shapiro, an exclusive legal positivist, argues that inclusive legal positivism is inconsistent with the view that legal norms must conceptually provide reasons for agents of a legal system to act in specified ways. I defend inclusive legal positivism from Shapiro's charge of inconsistency.

In the postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L. A. Hart describes the on-going debate inspired by his book, focusing on the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin. In this essay, I will discuss Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart, as well as Hart’s responses, showing that while Hart responds adequately to some criticisms, he fails to respond adequately to others. I will also reconstruct and evaluate the arguments given for and against the separation thesis by Dworkin and Hart. Finally, I will argue that the debate about the separation thesis – the thesis that morality and law are separable – is misguided, conflating as it does two distinct questions. These are the questions of what the positive law is, that is, the law that is posited in a specific time and place, and of what the natural law is, that is, the law that (if it exists) is universal and timeless. Once we distinguish these questions, we will see that the answer to the question of whether law is separable from morality depends on which sense of ‘law’ is relevant, and that there are two different answers corresponding to the two senses of positive law and natural law. Positive law is separable from morality while natural law is not. / text

In examining the role of the �legal rule� in Indonesian law, and in particular environmental law related to water quality management, this thesis questions the often expressed view that laws in Indonesia are sound, they merely fail to be implemented. It proposes that this appraisal of the situation does not take a sufficiently deep assessment and that a cause for non-implementation lies within the drafting of the laws themselves. It is argued that the ineffective system for environmental protection in Indonesia can be related to a failure to recognise the role of the �legal rule� in environmental law. A proposition presented in this thesis is that the arrangements for environmental law making in Indonesia lacks a strong rule foundation and, for this reason, it is not capable of producing shared understandings by lawmakers about producing and reproducing environmental law as legal sub-system. Another central proposition is that Indonesian environmental law has a form and style, which negates the role of the legal rule in environmental management and control. Despite the changes brought by reformasi, the central position of the legal rule in environmental law and, indeed, the necessary rule foundation to the development of the legal system, has yet to achieve full recognition. If this situation is related to the system of water quality management and pollution control in Indonesia, it can be seen that environmental improvement will not be achieved until underlying issues concerning the structure, form and style of environmental law making are addressed.