Many theorists have discussed the question of the fundamental principles of warfare. But the importance of the principle of concentration of force for warfare is controversial and the theories about the principle are too general to say something about the reality. So what is required to achieve success with a concentration of force? In order to answer this question, this essay deals with the basic principle of warfare on the concentration of force from recognized theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, Sir B.H. Liddell Hart, John M. Collins and Milan Vego, in the context of submarine attacks. The study has a deductible theoretical research effort and the purpose is to identify and describe which variables that contribute to success in implementing a concentration of force and how they affect submarine attacks. To create a coherent image of the principle, the principle is measurable by identifying variables to achieve success with concentration of force. From the theories, the author identifies five variables: aggregate strength, spread, opponent knowledge, mobility and misleading. To investigate the principle, the variables are tested against two submarine attacks during World War II, which are known to be cases where the concentration of force was used. The result shows that during the two attacks only two variables, combined strength and spread were identified. During the attack on the HX 229/SC 122 convoys, which from the attacking party are considered a successful concentration of force, all variables were identified. However, the attack on the SC 130 convoy was considered as a failed concentration of force, since only two variables were identified.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos.

A presente dissertação investiga os limites do Direito, em seus sentidos normativo e descritivo, segundo a Filosofia do Direito de Herbert Hart,com foco nos conceitos de derrotabilidade, vagueza e textura aberta. Mostra que o Direito é permeado por uma indeterminação relativa, resultante da indeterminação da linguagem ordinária e dos limites da cognição humana, temas que estão implicados no problema filosófico clássico da adequação das regras gerais a casos particulares. Objetiva mostrar que o quadro conceitual desenvolvido por Hart dá conta de explicar, adequadamente, a relação entre o Direito, a linguagem e as exceções às regras e ao raciocínio jurídico, esclarecendo a atividade judicial de aplicação do Direito. Conclui que esta indeterminação não é um problema para o positivismo jurídico hartiano, tampouco é incompatível com o ideal do Estado de Direito, dada sua concepção de poder discricionário, restrito aos casos de penumbra e constrangido pelo significado dos termos gerais, que é extraído do contexto da comunidade lingüística relevante, dos objetivos sociais do ordenamento jurídico, bem como da finalidade das regras e das consequências de sua aplicação. / This dissertation investigates the limits of law, in its normative and descriptive sense, according to Herbert Hart’s Philosophy of Law, focusing on his concepts of defeasibility, vagueness and open texture. It shows that law is permeated by a relative indeterminacy, due to ordinary language indeterminacy and to the limits of human cognition, issues implicated in the problem of the adequacy of general rules to particular cases. It aims to show that the conceptual framework developed by Hart is able to correctly explain the relation between law, language and the exceptions to legal rules and legal reasoning, turning light into judicial adjudication. It concludes that legal indeterminacy is not a problem to Hart’s legal positivism, neither incompatible to the ideal of the Rule of Law, given his conception of discretion, restricted to penumbral cases and constrained by the meaning of general terms, extracted from the context of the relevant linguistic community, by the social aims of the legal system and by the purpose of the rules and the consequences of their application.

Cette thèse s'intéresse aux rapports entre la règle et l'exception dans le domaine juridique. On assiste ces dernières années à un débat croissant en théorie du droit sur la « défaisabilité » et sur la question de savoir si cette dernière est un trait essentiel du droit. Cet essai se donne pour but d'évaluer les diverses positions de ce débat tant pour elles-mêmes qu'à la lumière de leurs présupposés conceptuels et théoriques. De fait, le terme « défaisabilité » est ambigu, et la plus grande partie de ce travail est dédiée à clarifier ce concept davantage qu'à en proposer une théorie originale. En effet, on trouve typiquement deux sortes de théories de la « défaisabilité du droit ». D'un côté on a des théories qui font de la défaisabilité un attribut du raisonnement juridique. Elle désigne alors le rôle que les exceptions jouent au sein du raisonnement. Ce rôle est de nous permettre d'effectuer des inférences par défaut dans les cas normaux sans avoir à établirt qu'aucune des exceptions n'est présente. De l'autre côté, on a des théories qui discutent de la défaisabilité comme d'un attribut des règles juridiques. Dire d'une règle qu'elle est défaisable, c'est dire qu'elle est sujette à des exceptions non spécifiées (ni spécifiables) à l'avance. Non seulement ces exceptions viennent bloquer l'inférence, comme c'est le cas dans les théories du premier type, mais elles provoquent la défaite de la règle. Les règles juridiques sont-elles ainsi défaisables ? Naturellement, la réponse à cette question n'est pas affaire d'enquête empirique ; elle dépend des présupposée conceptuels et théoriques que l'on a au sujet de la fonction des règles et de la nature du droit. / In this dissertation, I purport to study the relations between rules and exceptions in the legal domain. There has been an ongoing debate in legal theory on whether defeasibility is an intrinsic feature of law. This essay purports to assess the various claims made within this debate, both on their face and in the light of their conceptual or theoretical background. In fact, « defeasibility » is an ambiguous term. Most of this work is devoted to clarifying this concept, rather than proposing an original theory of it. Indeed, there are typically two sorts of claims that « law is defeasible » which are to be found in the literature. On the one hand, defeasibility is discussed as an attribute of legal reasoning. It refers to the way exceptions « behave ». They allow us to draw default inferences in normal cases, without having to ascertain that no exceptions are present. On the other hand, defeasibility is discussed as an attribute of legal rules. The defeasibility of a rule amounts to its being subject to exceptions not specified (nor specifiable) in advance. Not only those exceptions defeat the inference from the rule – as in the first account – but they defeat the rule itself. Are legal rules defeasible ? Obviously, answering this question is not a matter or empirical inquiry ; it depends on one's conceptual and theoretical commitments about the function of rules ans the nature of law.

La guerre est un double processus social. D’une part, l’efficience du fonctionnement interne de chaque partie engagée définit ce que l’on peut nommer, par extension d’une notion du sens commun, la « force » d’une armée. D’autre part, le combat et l’affrontement eux-mêmes connaissent une logique sociale, celui de l’agôn et de l’opposition violente en vue de l’obtention de buts politiques. Si le premier aspect a été largement été traité par la sociologie, le second n’a pas reçu l’attention qu’il méritait. Selon l’hypothèse fondamentale que nous déroulons dans ce travail, l’engagement des forces créées en amont par les groupes sociaux belligérants ne s’opose mécaniquement, comme le feraient deux forces naturelles. Fondée sur le découpage de l’art militaire selon une triple dichotomie (Offensive/Défensive, Stratégique/Tactique, Manœuvre Directe/Manœuvre Indirecte), ce travail entreprend d’établir une grammaire de l’action militaire, détachée de toute considérations diplomatiques et politiques. Son but est de comprendre quelles sont les fins concrètes du combat guerrier, fins en vue desquelles le politique doit construire des moyens de sa puissance. / War is twice a social process. On the one hand, the efficiency of the inner workings of each group involved defines what can be called, by extending a common sense word, the "strength" of an army. On the other hand, struggle and confrontation follow a social logic, the agon and violent opposition one, to achieving political goals. If the first aspect has been extensively treated by contemporary sociology, the second has not received the attention it deserved. According to the fundamental hypothesis that we unwind in this work, the opposition of forces created upstream by belligerent groups is not a mechanical opposition, as the opposition of two natural forces. To understand the military confrontation, we must add the logic of ruse (or artifice) to the logic of strength. Based on the division of the military activity as a triple dichotomy (Offensive/Defensive, Strategy/Tactic, Direct Approach/Indirect Approach), this work aims to establish a grammar of military action, detached from all political and diplomatic considerations. Its purpose is to understand what are the real ends of the military confrontation, ends for which the policy must build the means of its power.

Criminology and legal philosophy still have much to gain from the exchange of ideas. However, attention must be paid to how this exchange is being made and what is being transferred. This project attempts to examine a currently unacknowledged exchange between the disciplines; that of an historicist, logos-centric method of knowledge production. Specifically, using a refashioned dialectic method, the debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller will be compared and contrasted with Robert Agnew’s representation of criminology. This will give some clarity to the different ways by which the disciplines (re)produce knowledge. Importantly, the process of (re)production detailed here is characterized by a (dis)unity between how the disciplines rhetorically justify their methodology and the actual analyses being produced. To give this process colour, it will be examined in relation to criminology’s crisis. Ultimately, the analysis presented here raises doubts about the truthfulness of legal philosophical and criminological knowledge produced in this way.

In this essay, I examine the correlation between time and politics in Martin Hägglunds philosophical project. By examining the view of time and politics in the works of the theologian David Bentley Hart, I establish a discussion that exposes different metaphysical standings and raises new questions. I conduct this examination in the light of the ongoing discussion about theology and political emancipation in the field of political theology. One of the main conclusions of the essay is that an important division appear between an ontological and a Christian eschatological concept about the relationship between time and eternity. I also conclude that the belief in a transcendental sphere that intervene in history can bring forth different types of political implications, which all tend to lean towards a concept about this world as a second to last. Throughout this essay, I deepen my discussion concerning the supposed emancipatory or totalizing political consequences of this cosmology, which, in this essay, is represented mainly by Hägglund and Hart.

Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales) / Esta tesis presenta una reflexión metateórica de la historia de la filosofía del derecho de los siglos XX y XXI al interior de la tradición analítica. Para dicho propósito se divide en tres ejes argumentativos. El primero presenta la elucidación de la noción de tradición analítica en filosofía, a partir de la distinción entre “tradiciones y concepciones filosóficas” propuesta por M. E. Orellana Benado, con el fin de dar cuenta de sus orígenes, rasgos distintivos y discusiones más relevantes. El segundo ofrece una comprensión iusfilosófica de la tradición analítica en el siglo XX. Sobre la base de: la Teoría Pura del Derecho (1934) de Hans Kelsen y El Concepto de Derecho (1961) de H. L. A. Hart. Analizando las dos aproximaciones metodológicas de este último (al derecho como sociología descriptiva y como teoría jurídica analítica) y sus puntos centrales. Finalmente, revisa las consecuencias que trajo la publicación de la segunda edición de El Concepto de Derecho (1994) con el Postscript, añadido por sus editores, texto en el que Hart responde a sus críticos. El tercer eje argumentativo muestra en dos partes el desarrollo de la filosofía jurídica analítica de los tres primeros lustros del siglo XXI. Una de ellas considera la importancia y actualidad de los proyectos de Kelsen y Hart, mientras que la otra indagará en el surgimiento de nuevas concepciones iusfilosóficas como el naturalismo jurídico, el pragmatismo jurídico, el Law & Economics y los estudios críticos del derecho

Performance Artist Catron Booker and Filmmaker Shara K. Lange drew on co-creation strategies to engage documentary film students around the story of the Taylor-Hart Farm in Jonesborough, Tennessee. This paper presents outcomes from this co-created, curricular, and creative experiment and examines the extent to which the co-creation framework made productive contributions to the work.

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