公司內部監控機制是影響公司營運成果的重要因素，我國公司內部監控設計包括股東會、監察人、董事會及經理階層等權責運作機制，其中，內部監控以往主要的模式係採監察人制度為主。監察人主要功能在於監督董事會等經營階層，並降低經營階層之代理成本問題。監察人應監督公司業務之執行，並得隨時調查公司業務及財務狀況，查核簿冊文件，並得請求董事會或經理人提出報告。因此，監察人功能發揮之良窳，往往對公司健全運作有深遠影響。 近年來，一些上市公司經營者的利益輸送、背信案件層出不窮，董事會濫權，監察功能不彰厥為主要原因。這些內部監控問題的產生，促使學界及實務界亟思提出改善之道，針對內部監控效能不彰，究其主要原因在於，監督者缺乏獨立性，監督者專業能力不足，大股東操弄董事會等問題無法有效解決。獨立董事制度，主要針對這些問題提出解決，在獨立董事制度引進且法制化之後，我國並未完全捨棄監察人制度，監察人制度及獨立董事，在公司法制上同時並存。獨立董事制度設置目的，在於制衡董事會中，代表控制股東利益之內部董事，發揮應有的監督功能，但是獨立董事及相關配套措施，在理論及實務上仍有許多問題存在，及不易克服之盲點。本文亦針對美、日、德等不同國家之公司內部監控模式提出比較研究，同時，對我國內部監控制度之改造，提出看法及建議。 / Internal corporate governance is an important factor affecting a company’s performance. The internal administrative structure in a company should be a system including the right restraint and the setting up of obligation among Shareholders' Meeting, Supervisors, Board of Directors and managers in Taiwan. The system of Supervisors is an important part of the corporation’s administrative structure, as well as a choice for corporation’s functional department to restrain the Board of Directors and to cut down the cost of agency. Supervisors shall supervise the execution of business operations of the company, and may at any time or from time to time investigate the business and financial conditions of the company, examine the accounting books and documents, and request the Board of Directors or managerial personnel to make reports thereon. The supervisory function will strongly affect the healthy development of the company. In recent years, several major problems have come into being in some of the public listed company, such as a director or managerial officer acting contrary to his duties or misappropriating company assets. These problems may result from abusing the power by Board of Directors or the director, and functionless Supervisors. A series of problems in corporation supervision urge us to try our best to resolve them, such as the lack of independent of Supervisors, lacking of supervisory ability, the main Shareholder’s controlling of Board of Directors etc. There are two Supervision system, the one-tire system and the two-tire system, in western stock company. After the Independent Director’s system has been introduced and legislated, the situation that two kind of supervision coexist has appeared in the structure of the company in Taiwan. It aims at using the independent status of the Independent Director to restrict inner directors who are for the holding shareholder’s benefits in Board of Directors. But the system of Independent Director still has many problems both in the theory and practice. This study also has comparative research on the corporation’s administrative structure in America, Japan and Germany. Meanwhile suggestions of how to improve the system of internal corporate governance are offered.

關係人交易向為我國上市公司常見之交易型態，關係人交易雖具內部交易利益，但交易對象存在特殊關係有助於「利益輸送」或「盈餘操縱」之操作，故有論者認為關係人交易乃控制股東侵佔其他股東財富之重要工具。而台灣獨特的家族型企業結構及其所衍生的不健全公司治理架構，可能是近年來我國資本市場關係人交易弊案頻傳的主因。 台灣證券交易所於2002年2月22日起，要求首次申請上市公司至少須設置二席獨立董事及一席獨立監察人，企望藉此改善上市公司之內部治理架構。儘管過去研究顯示，董事會獨立性是董事會功能能否發揮之重要因素，然各界對此制度仍有所疑慮。因此，本研究以多元迴歸分析及單變量檢定，探討獨立董監制度及關係人交易之關係，分析獨立董監制度對上市公司之實質效益。實證結論如下： 1.相較於未引進獨立董監制度公司，引進獨立董監制度公司在關係人進貨、關係人應付融資及關係人其他支出等可能具有內部利益之關係人交易型態，關係人交易比率較高，而這可能也是獨立董監制度積極監督之正面效應。 2.相對於未引進獨立董監制度公司，自願及非自願引進公司之關係人應收融資比率較高，代表獨立董事、獨立監察人對內部利益明顯的關係人應付融資交易，能扮演著積極推動並消弭歧見的角色。 3.相較於非自願引進獨立董監制度公司，自願引進公司具有較低之關係人背書保證比率。顯示自願引進公司藉獨立董監之監督，能有效減少不利公司績效之關係人背書保證交易。 4.適用獨立董監條款之新上市公司上市後第二年度關係人銷貨及關係人應收融資顯著低於上市前第二年度之水準，代表獨立董監制度的實質監督效果可能須經兩年以上時間才得以顯現。 基於上述結論，本研究對我國獨立董監制度提出下列建議：一、擴大獨立董監制度之適用範圍；二、考慮獨立董監實質效益之顯現時程，對其任期加以規範；三、積極建構完善的市場機制，迫使控制股東自發地強化公司治理機制。 / The related-party transaction is the general transaction mode in Taiwan. Although the related-party transaction brings internal transaction profit, the clients with special relationship could help earnings management or the interest conveyance so the related-party transaction is considered as the significant tool to keep the shareholders from invading other’s fortune. Besides, the malady of the related-party transaction happened frequently in the capital market in Taiwan, and this condition could be refer to the unique structure and the unsound governmence of the companies run by the family members. Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation(TSEC) claimed the qualification for the first time to apply to be the listed company that from Feb. 22, 2002, there should be at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor. By this way, TSEC hope to make an improvement on the governmance of the listed companies. The former research shows that the characteristic of independent directorate is the leading factor to decide if the directorate could be into full play, but we still doubt for this system. Therefore, this research adopts the Multiple Regression Analysis, T-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test to illustrate the relations between the system of independent directors and supervisors and the related-party transaction, and to analyze the real effect which the system of independent directors and supervisors makes on the listed companies. The results are as follows, 1. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies with the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of related-party transaction because the related- party have the internal transaction profit on merchandise, payables and other expenses. This condition could express that the system makes the positive effect on supervising. 2. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily or involuntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess higher ratio of the payables. This situation means that the independent directors and independent supervisors play the significant role on promoting the transactions and eliminating the diversities when the related-parties make payables transaction. 3. Compared with the companies without the system of independent directors and supervisors, the companies voluntarily using the system of independent directors and supervisors possess the lower ratio of the assurance of related- party. This condition illustrates that the system of independent directors and supervisors could reduce the adverse transaction of assurance. 4. The second year of the IPO companies which adopt the system of independent directors and supervisors have lower related-party sales and payables than before being listed companies in their second year. This fact tells us the real effect might take more than two years to carry out. In conclusion, this research offers the suggestions of the systems of independent directors and supervisors in Taiwan as below. First, the qualification of the system of independent directors and supervisors should be broadened. Second, the terms of the directors and supervisors should be made the reasonable consideration because the real effect might take time to carry out. Finally, the market mechanism should be more complete to force the blockholder to enhance the governmace of the company.

Submitted by Marina Oehling Gelman (marinaogelman@gmail.com) on 2013-01-22T17:03:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gelman_Marina dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 1994212 bytes, checksum: 32599808f56a09ecc60348d87f9fc45c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2013-01-22T17:28:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Gelman_Marina dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 1994212 bytes, checksum: 32599808f56a09ecc60348d87f9fc45c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-01-22T17:51:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gelman_Marina dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 1994212 bytes, checksum: 32599808f56a09ecc60348d87f9fc45c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-11-28 / In the last two decades Corporate Governance has gained the deserved relevance. The Board of Directors is considered a central mechanism for good corporate governance practices, considering its role of mitigating agency conflicts through monitoring the agents, either managers or controlling shareholders. The complete development of such monitoring role depends on Directors acting professionally, technically, regardless any interest and influence of third parties, therefore, independently. Considering its importance, the Independent Director is at the center of good corporate governance practices debates. Literature involving the issue has multiplied and focuses almost exclusively on the effects of the independent director in certain aspects of the companies, such as, performance, share value, management monitoring, refraining to discuss the concept of independence. The mandatory requirement for independent director became a rule in Brazil in 2006, when BM&FBOVESPA reformed the special listing segments regulations. Since that reform, Novo Mercado and Level 2 requires that the companies’ board have at least 20% of independent directors. The regulations of the special listing segments provides for a concept of independent director. However, the definition is weak for not considering two relevant aspects: (i) the election and dismissal, at any time, of the independent director by the controlling group; and (ii) the existence of shareholder agreements binding the vote of the directors elected by the controlling group. We argue that there is a contradiction on the current definition of Novo Mercado and Level 2 which intent to disaffiliate the Independent Director and the Controlling Shareholder, however, it does not specify which relations between them should be avoided, nor considers the power that the controlling group has to dismiss the director elected by it regardless any reason, neither takes into account the existence of shareholders’ agreements, that intrinsically establish a new kind of relation with the controlling shareholder. The lack of such regulation allows situations where the independent directors are closely related to the controlling group and often bound to a shareholders’ agreement among the controlling shareholders, losing its individual capacity and his/her independence. 11 It is important to study the concept of independent director to adapt it to Brazilian reality. Only understanding the role of the independent director makes it possible to frame an appropriate concept that may incentive effects of independence aspired. This research identifies the percentage of independent directors according to the current definition and what would be the percentage of independent directors considering the new proposed definition and compares such results. The paper ultimate confirms the hypothesis that the percentage of independent Board members that the companies has been electing, when compared to the Directors considered independent in accordance to the new proposed definition, decreases. By highlighting the fragility of the Brazilian concept of independent director, the work contributes to the literature on the development of Brazilian capital markets, proposing a new definition of independent director necessary to enhance independent management and to promote the rights of all shareholders in accordance to the law, to BM&FBOVESPA’s special listing segments rules and international standards. / Nas duas últimas décadas o assunto Governança Corporativa tem ganhado merecida relevância. O Conselho de Administração tem sido considerado um mecanismo central para a boa prática de governança corporativa, tendo em vista sua função de mitigar os conflitos entre representantes e representados, através da fiscalização dos atos dos representantes, quer sejam eles a Diretoria, quer sejam os acionistas controladores. Entende-se que o pleno desenvolvimento deste monitoramento depende de uma conduta por parte do Conselheiro que possa ser profissional, técnica, desvinculada de interesses e influências de terceiros, portanto, independente. Diante de sua importância para o tema, a figura do Conselheiro Independente ocupa o centro das discussões sobre boas práticas de governança corporativa. A literatura sobre o assunto se multiplicou e vem se concentrando quase que exclusivamente na discussão dos efeitos do Conselheiro Independente em determinados aspectos das companhias, tais como em seu desempenho, no valor de suas ações, no monitoramento da administração, abstendo-se de discutir o conceito de independência. A figura do membro independente no Conselho de Administração surgiu como regra no Brasil em 2006, quando da reforma dos regulamentos dos segmentos especiais de listagem da BM&FBOVESPA. A partir desta reforma foi criada a exigência, no Novo Mercado e no Nível 2 de Governança Corporativa, da presença de pelo menos 20% de Conselheiros Independentes. Os próprios regulamentos destes segmentos especiais trazem o conceito de independente. Contudo, a definição vigente é incipiente por não levar em consideração pelos menos dois aspectos: (i) a eleição e destituição, a qualquer tempo, de membros independentes pelo grupo de controle; e (ii) a existência de acordos de acionistas que vinculam o voto dos Conselheiros eleitos pelos acionistas controladores. O trabalho argumenta que existe uma contradição na definição vigente no Novo Mercado e Nível 2 que, por um lado objetiva desvincular a figura do Conselheiro Independente do Acionista Controlador, mas por outro nem especifica quais os tipos de vínculos que devem ser proibidos entre eles, nem considerada o poder do grupo controlador de destituir imotivadamente o conselheiro por ele eleito e nem trata da existência de acordos de acionistas, que intrinsecamente estabelecem um novo tipo de vínculo jurídico com o acionista controlador. Tal falta de regulação permite situações em que os Conselheiros Independentes sejam pessoas estreitamente relacionadas aos controladores e muitas vezes vinculadas a um acordo de voto do grupo de controle, perdendo seu poder de ação individual e sua independência. É relevante que o conceito de Conselheiro Independente seja estudado e adequado à realidade brasileira. E é apenas a partir da compreensão do seu papel que se torna possível desenhar um conceito apropriado para que se incentive a produção de efeitos de independência desejáveis na prática. No campo empírico o trabalho identifica como a definição de independência atualmente vigente nos segmentos especiais da BM&FBOVESPA é refletida na composição dos Conselhos de Administração, conforme indicado pelas próprias companhias por ocasião do preenchimento do formulário de referência, para então aplicar a nova definição proposta ao quadro atual de conselheiros e comparar os resultados quantitativos encontrados com a realidade vigente. O trabalho conclui com a confirmação da hipótese de que o percentual de membros independentes que as companhias têm elegido, quando comparados aos Conselheiros que podem ser considerados independentes, de acordo com a nova definição proposta no estudo teórico, é menor em relação à definição vigente. Ao destacar a fragilidade da regra atualmente vigente o trabalho procura contribuir para a literatura relacionada a desenvolvimento e fortalecimento do mercado de capitais brasileiro, propondo uma definição de Conselheiro Independente necessária ao exercício de uma gestão mais independente, de modo a promover os direitos de todos os acionistas, em observância à Lei das S.A., aos regulamentos dos segmentos especiais da BM&FBOVESPA e de acordo com padrões internacionais.

中文摘要 公司治理的強化已成為世界各國所共同重視的議題，我國亦不落其後自1997年起逐步推動各項公司治理政策，若仔細觀察其發展過程，主管機關應是甚為期盼公司治理能正本清源的從董事、監察人獨立性的強化這個源頭紮實做起。 惟自民國94年起引進了董監候選人提名制度，特別是上市櫃公司的獨立董事，更強制採候選人提名制度，然近幾年我國上市櫃公司掏空、內線交易、不正當利益輸送、背信、董事自肥、財報不實等案件仍時有所聞，究竟我國引進董監候選人提名制度是改進公司治理的有效解決方案嗎?即是本文探討的主題。 首先，本文先研究公司治理與董監選任制度的關聯程度，分析公司治理的意義、目標、監督機制、架構以及董監選任於公司治理的重要性。隨後簡介美國及日本的董監選任制度，希望能對我國的現行董監選任制度有所借鏡。 接著，分析我國現行董監選任制度的主要問題，包括第192-1條第1項限制股東應就董事候選人名單中選任之，係對股東權的限制而非強化；允許股東選任自己認定的理想人選與董監候選人提名制度並不衝突，在現行制度下，所當選之董監較公司法第192條之選任方式更不具獨立性，對公司治理的提升並無助益，故實無限制之必要。第192-1條第3項對於無表決權之股份，為避免計算基礎過度膨脹，保障真正少數股東之權利，應限縮解釋。第216-1條監察人選舉準用第192-1條之規定，監察人之候選人可由董事會提名，將違反公司治理精神，恐造成監察人成為董事會之附屬而無法執行監督義務。而上市櫃公司依公開發行公司獨立董事設置及應遵循事項辦法第5條強制採候選人提名制度選任獨立董事，依新近大法官釋字第733號精神涵攝，關於選舉方式之強制，恐有限制團體內部組織與事務之自主決定已逾必要程度，而有違反憲法第二十三條所定比例原則及侵害基於結社自由所含的自治精神之嫌。另現行主管機關發佈董事、監察人提名委員會組織章程參考範例，也可能因獨立性不足、權限劃分不明等原因而形同聊備一格。同時，本文亦將現行公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則(以下簡稱委託書規則)其與董監候選人提名制度法律條文進行比較，發現主要差別除持股比例之要求外，委託書規則對董監資格限制可謂更為嚴謹。此外，委託書規則遇有股東會董監選舉徵求時，被選舉人資格審查無須經董事會或提名委員會審議，亦無強制公司股東僅能就委託書徵求人本人或所擬支持之候選人名單選任，但反而強制將候選人經營理念予以公開，故本文以為委託書規則不僅有董監候選人提名制度之實，又不失為一種更直接訴諸「股東民主」的制度，同時也是對股東行動主義正面回應的一種機制。 最後，本文認為，董監選任應回歸公司法第192條規定，使董監選任更具獨立性， 也無違反大法官第733號解釋之虞。若希望對散戶股東進行董監選舉時能有參考依據而堅持採董監候選人提名制度之精神，亦無需疊床架屋，另立新法條，只需放寬或廢除徵求門檻及上限，回歸現行委託書規則即可。否則，至少現行制度應針對董事會等審查機關若違法濫權等，授權審理法院得在股東會召開前或召開後，視情況採取緊急保全處分，以保障股東提名權。同時對獨立董事形式或實質獨立要件亦宜擴大認定，並可考慮拉長獨立董事的冷卻期間，來淡化利害關係並強化獨立董事之獨立性。