In philosophical theories of knowledge (epistemology), justification is a desirable property that one's beliefs ought to have before they can be accepted as part of a rational discourse. Roughly, for internalists about justification, a belief is justified if the subject has or has available to him good reasons to believe it; while for externalists a belief is justified if there exist good reasons to believe it, regardless of whether the subject actually has or has access to those reasons. One such externalist view of justification is reliabilism, the position that a belief is justified if it has been produced by a properly functioning belief-forming mechanism (BFM). Some examples of BFMs available to human beings are sense perception, memory, and deduction. Epistemic circularity is a notorious problem for reliabilism. If a belief is only justified if it was produced reliably by a certain BFM, how can I ever know for sure that a certain BFM is itself reliable? For instance, take the meta-belief that "sense perception is a reliable BFM." This belief is produced, at least in part, through sense perception itself, for example by analyzing the track record of my past sense perceptions and finding it to be in good order. But if a BFM is thus allowed to vouch for its own trustworthiness, then we have no way to discriminate between reliable and unreliable BFMs. After all, when trying to ascertain if a suspect in a murder case is sincere, it is quite irresponsible to ask the suspect himself. Thus, internalist critics complain, reliabilism is plagued by epistemic circularity and loses sight of the normative goal of epistemology. Reliabilist responses to this serious charge have been of two kinds: (1) to show that epistemically circular arguments can be justificatory, and thus that BFMs can vouch for their own re-liability; or (2) to concede that epistemically circular arguments cannot be justificatory, but then to also insist that some higher-level circularity must be allowed in one's justificatory practices, or no beliefs at all can ever be justified. Here I argue that the first strategy fails and the second succeeds. Internalists are correct that epistemically circular arguments cannot be justificatory in the way that some reliabilists expect them to be, but they are incorrect that all circularity must be banished before our justificatory practices can be virtuous. To always allow circularity makes knowledge reprehensibly easy, but to never let it in at all is a kind of epistemic suicide. / Master of Arts

In this paper, I call into question the thesis known as judgment internalism about moral motivation. Broadly construed, this thesis holds that there is a non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. The difficulty for judgment internalism arises because of amoral agents: when an agent both knows the right and yet fails to be motivated to act on this knowledge. Specifically, I cite John Milton's Satan from Paradise Lost. This is a problem because it calls into question the non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. I argue that in order for judgment internalism to be viable in reconciling judgment internalism and amoralism, it must provide plausible accounts of both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility. While crude versions of the thesis fail to do this, I provide a revised thesis which I call Narrative Internalism, which assumes a narrative theory of the self. This thesis has the dual strength that it can account for both why one would typically be motivated to Φ upon judging that it is right to Φ and also the conditions that might obtain such that one would fail to be motivated. This account of moral psychology explains both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility by giving an account of plausible defeasibility conditions. I conclude that unless there are more plausible accounts of judgment internalism in the offing, which doesn't seem apparent to me, we should adopt Narrative Internalism. / Master of Arts

What is the relationship between judging something as good and being motivated to acton this judgment? Motivational internalism is the thesis that there is a necessaryconnection between moral judgments and motivation. Externalists typically believe that ajudgment-independent desire is needed for the moral judgment to be motivating. Tobridge the gap between internalism and externalism, a few philosophers have appealed totheories of identification-based moral judgments. This implies that although moraljudgments may not be necessarily motivating in general, it could be possible to define acertain kind of identification-based moral judgment that is necessarily motivating. HereinI will examine the role identification plays for moral motivation. I will first analyse anargument that uses an identification-incompatible moral judgment to show thatinternalism is false. I will argue that this argument is unconvincing and that identificationdoes not preclude identification-incompatible moral judgments from being motivating.The identification-based argument hence does not support that internalism is false.Second, I will argue that identification can provide the motivational force needed to makecertain identity-based moral judgments necessarily motivating. This identification-basedaccount does however, I will argue, not support internalism. Despite presenting a kind ofmoral judgment that is necessarily motivating, it is an externalist account of theconnection between moral judgments and motivation since a judgment-independentdesire is a necessary source of its motivational force.

I den här uppsatsen diskuterar jag, med utgångspunkt i Simon Blackburns kvasirealistiska metaetik, den moraliska motivationen. Jag redogör alltså dels för kvasirealis-men som helhetlig teori, dels för den aktuella motivationsteoretiska argumentationen. De centrala frågeställningarana rör i detta fall det sätt varpå våra värderingar motiverar oss att handla. Har de över huvud taget någon normativ kraft, eller består de enbart i kognitiva till-stånd? Utifrån dessa grundvalar bedömer jag sedan å ena sidan hur Blackburns teori funge-rar på det metaetiska planet, och å den andra för hur den svarar mot våra intuitioner om mo-ralföreställningarnas betydelse för vår handlingskraft. På det hela taget är jag emellertid ne-gativt inställd till teorins praktiska användbarhet. / This paper concerns on the one hand Simon Blackburn’s enterprise of quasi-realism, and on the other the problem of moral motivation. The main question in this second case treats the way whereupon our moral propositions motivate us to act. Do they own any normative force at all, or are they only to be seen as cognitive states? From the starting point of this discussion, I have investigated how the quasi-realist theory could work on the meta-ethical level. I have also tried to decide whether or not it corresponds to our intuitions about the real meaning of our moral judgements. The conclusive position of mine is that the fundamental problems of the theory eliminate its practical applicability.

I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism which I call belief internalism. The constitutive claim of any version of cognitivist motivational internalism is that moral belief entails motivation. But, while this internalist thesis captures the practical nature of morality, it is in tension with the dominantly held Humean theory of motivation. The constitutive claim of the Humean thesis is that no belief could entail motivation. In defence of this internalist it is tempting to argue either that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus. But, while succumbing to the first temptation places one under an ultimately insurmountable burden to justify the motivational exceptionality of moral beliefs, succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practical nature of morality. I avoid the temptation to defend this thesis in either of these flawed ways by defending a more radical departure from the Humean theory of motivation. I avoid the first temptation by arguing for a motivationally efficacious conception of belief. I start the defence by demonstrating that it is conceptually coherent for belief to entail motivation. I then argue that all beliefs have behavioural dispositional properties that are not predicated on desire; in particular, all beliefs can motivate assent without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. I then develop a unified and inclusive account of cognitive motivation, according to which unqualified normative cognition—which includes moral cognition—motivates normative actions without the assistance of such a desire. Beliefs of the form ‘I ought to ф’, in other words, motivate the believer to ф. I avoid the second temptation by arguing that moral belief motivates simpliciter as opposed to ceteris paribus. There are, however, both commonsense and scientifically informed counterexamples which prima facie demonstrate that it is possible to both fully believe and fully understand one’s first person cognitive moral judgement and yet not motivated by that judgement. I argue that the commonsense prima facie counterexamples are not decisive; and I argue that the scientifically informed prima facie counterexamples misinterpret the empirical research on salient psychological conditions.

I defend a version of cognitivist motivational internalism which I call belief internalism. The constitutive claim of any version of cognitivist motivational internalism is that moral belief entails motivation. But, while this internalist thesis captures the practical nature of morality, it is in tension with the dominantly held Humean theory of motivation. The constitutive claim of the Humean thesis is that no belief could entail motivation. In defence of this internalist it is tempting to argue either that the Humean constraint only applies to non-moral beliefs or that moral beliefs only motivate ceteris paribus. But, while succumbing to the first temptation places one under an ultimately insurmountable burden to justify the motivational exceptionality of moral beliefs, succumbing to the second temptation saddles one with a thesis that fails to do justice to the practical nature of morality. I avoid the temptation to defend this thesis in either of these flawed ways by defending a more radical departure from the Humean theory of motivation. I avoid the first temptation by arguing for a motivationally efficacious conception of belief. I start the defence by demonstrating that it is conceptually coherent for belief to entail motivation. I then argue that all beliefs have behavioural dispositional properties that are not predicated on desire; in particular, all beliefs can motivate assent without the assistance of a conceptually independent desire. I then develop a unified and inclusive account of cognitive motivation, according to which unqualified normative cognition—which includes moral cognition—motivates normative actions without the assistance of such a desire. Beliefs of the form ‘I ought to ф’, in other words, motivate the believer to ф. I avoid the second temptation by arguing that moral belief motivates simpliciter as opposed to ceteris paribus. There are, however, both commonsense and scientifically informed counterexamples which prima facie demonstrate that it is possible to both fully believe and fully understand one’s first person cognitive moral judgement and yet not motivated by that judgement. I argue that the commonsense prima facie counterexamples are not decisive; and I argue that the scientifically informed prima facie counterexamples misinterpret the empirical research on salient psychological conditions.

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:23:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2002-10-23Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:09:01Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 santos_jls_me_mar.pdf: 262276 bytes, checksum: 93d60345dc900d1ac4bddebf047709c7 (MD5) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / Neste trabalho propomos a análise da natureza dos estados mentais, um tema central nos estudos em Filosofia da Mente. Para isso, sugerimos um percurso investigativo que começa com a análise da noção cartesiana de dualismo substancial definido por postular uma mente distinta do corpo e responsável pela produção de estados mentais. Em seguida, procuramos problematizar a concepção cartesiana tendo como base as críticas que Ryle dirige à por ele denominada 'doutrina oficial'. Com esse propósito, é considerado, em especial, o conceito de disposição sugerido por Ryle (2000) para combater o que ele denomina concepções intelectualistas de mente. Por fim, analisamos algumas das principais teses externalistas, iniciadas com o trabalho de Putnam (1975), sobretudo a perspectiva representacional concebida por Dretske (1997) a respeito da relação do indivíduo com o meio ambiente. Procuramos mostrar que o conceito de disposição sugerido por Ryle fornece subsídios para uma teorização externalista dos estados mentais, servindo como base para uma concepção externalista de indivíduo muito diversa da cartesiana. / In this dissertation we propose the analysis of the nature of the mental states that is a very main issue in the studies of Philosophy of Mind. In order to this, we suggested doing a research which begins with the analysis of the cartesian notion of the substantial dualism, defined by postulating a distinct mind from the body and responsible for producing mental states. Afterwards we tried to argue about the cartesian conception based on the criticisms whose Ryle refers himself as being designated official doctrine. With this purpose, it is considered, in special, the concept of disposition, suggested by Ryle (2000) in opposition to what he designates as intellectual conceptions. Finally, we analysed some of the main externalists theses which were started with Putnam (1975), above all the representational perspective conceived by Dretske (1997) as far as the relationship between the person and the environment is concerned. All things considered we tried to show that the concept of disposition suggested by Ryle supports an externalist theorisation of the mental states, considering itself as the basis for an externalist conception of the person which is very different from the cartesian conception.

This dissertation is structured in such a way as to gradually home in on the true theory of welfare. I start with the whole field of possible theories of welfare and then proceed by narrowing down the options in a series of steps. The first step, undertaken in chapter 2, is to argue that the true theory of welfare must be what I call a partly response independent theory. First I reject the entirely response independent theories because there are widely-shared intuitions suggesting that some psychological responses are indeed relevant to welfare. Then I reject the entirely response dependent theories because there are other central intuitions suggesting that our welfare is not determined solely by our psychological responses. Thus I reach the preliminary conclusion that welfare must involve some response independent (or objective) component. The next step is to consider the most promising theories in the partly response independent category. In particular, I formulate, refine and ultimately reject what seem to be the main monistic theories that have been proposed in this category. In chapter 4, I reject the Adjusted-Enjoyment Theories of Welfare because they cannot account for the claim that a life containing no pleasure or pain can still contain a positive amount of welfare (e.g. if it’s a particularly successful life). Then in chapters 5-7, I discuss Desire Satisfaction theories of welfare. I argue that even the most promising of these theories – e.g. Worthiness Adjusted Desire Satisfactionism – are problematic because they cannot accommodate the claim that a life containing no success with respect to worthwhile projects can still contain a positive amount of welfare (e.g. if it’s a particularly pleasant life). Finally, I suggest that in order to accommodate the intuitions that led to the rejection of all these other theories of welfare, what is needed is a multi-component theory. In the final chapter, I formulate a multi-component theory that is particularly promising. Not only does it avoid the problems of the monistic theories discussed earlier, but, by incorporating a number of novel mathematical devices, it avoids problems that undermine several other initially promising multi-component theories of welfare.