Plato's late works contain an unexpectedly consistent treatment of the physics and metaphysics of souls. In the course of showing this, I argue that: (1) the middle period dialogues Phaedo and Republic assume, but do not mention, a Form of Soul; (2) the Timaeus contains a physical theory according to which all changes of every kind are forms of spatial motion; (3) Plato's view of souls as self-movers is identifiable in more of his late dialogues than is usually recognized (namely, in the Statesman as well as in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws ); (9) in the definition of souls as self-movers, "motion" should be read as "spatial motion" rather than "change" in general, and (5) neither the Phaedrus nor the Timaeus contains the claim that human souls are immortal, while both dialogues contain a concept of "soul-stuff;" a material from which individual souls are manufactured.

This submission falls into two sections: a thesis and a screenplay. My thesis presents an original approach to screenwriting using storytelling dynamics found in film editing; I call this “writing-for-the-cut”. This section also contains my software experiments that hold the promise of innovative digital tools for screenwriters. In the second section I apply both my editing strategy and my software experiments in the production of an original screenplay called Rush the Sky. In the history of the screenplay, the advent of the master scene format, which gained fairly wide circulation from the early 1950s (Price 11), marked a moment of separation of the screenwriter from the film production process. Up to this point most screenwriters worked closely with studios and were steeped in the contiguous crafts of filming and editing. But the master scene format freed the script from all references to the ‘factory’ and in so doing fundamentally transformed film writing culture; now a new generation of largely non-specialists were writing for the big screen. To fill the ‘film school’ void occasioned by the loss of studio apprenticeships and mentoring, a lively market in guru screenwriting manuals emerged, particularly from around the 1970s. Taking their cue from the ‘no camera angles’ injunction on screenplays, the manual-writers tended to delineate the territory of screenwriting as a craft detached from production; in this way manual-readers have been discouraged from any serious consideration of the follow-on crafts (filming and editing) as potential modifiers of the screenplay. The perhaps unintended consequence has been that ‘manual culture’ has come to foster a view of film as a finished, projected product: we are ‘writing for cinema’. I propose an alternative strategy: the edit suite, not the cinema, is the real destination for our screenplay. This is a view of film as a constructed product: we are ‘writing for the cut’. This idea finds its roots in the lively theories and debates advanced by the early Soviet filmmakers such as Lev Kuleshov and Sergei Eisenstein in the 1910s and 1920s. For them, as Pudovkin declared “The foundation of film art is editing” (Pudovkin xiii). They viewed editing as a juxtapositional dynamic, one that engaged the inductive capacities of the audience to ‘discover’ the story. From this Hegelian notion of juxtaposition to its more nuanced application today, I identify three kinds of editorial juxtaposition that are essential to cinematic storytelling: poetry, puzzle, and kinesis. I suggest that these juxtapositions are interrelated and on axes of intensity: Poetry to Prose, Puzzle to Exposition, and Kinesis to Stasis. Finally, I identify how each of these editing terms can be adapted for use by screenwriters. In the second part of this submission, Rush the Sky is a demonstration of how the techniques of writing-for-the-cut can be applied in practice. This is a fast moving thriller in the style of British Indie films such as Trainspotting (wr: John Hodge dir: Danny Boyle1996), Sexy Beast (wrs: Louis Mellis, David Scinto dir: Johanthan Glazer 2000), and Dead Man’s Shoes (wrs: Paddy Considine, Shane Meadows dir: Shane Meadows 2004). Rush the Sky tells the story of two adrenaline-addicted lovers: Ella and Luke. Luke is a young base-jumper who has witnessed a gangland murder. Desperate to escape the mob and the police, he climbs a high mast and base-jumps into a storm cloud. Struck by lightning, he falls to earth in a coma. Ella joins forces with Luke’s feral brother Jared and together they ‘rescue’ Luke from hospital and attempt to wake him up. Rush the Sky is a non-linear story that interweaves a present-day road movie with a darkly euphoric backstory. Some of the specific editing figures I employ include parallel action, ‘split-edit’, non-linear shuffle, scene-scripted montage, and ellipsis. In the development of the treatment, I devised a hybrid writing-editing interface that allowed me to ‘mount’ and sequence the beats of my story. This is a kinetic environment where the beats are displayed as text, proxy images and film clips. In this way the familiar write/read/revise process of screenwriting moved closer to the play/watch/edit process of the cutting room. I strongly believe this approach could herald a fresh way of both composing a screenplay and ‘proving’ the cinema-worthiness of the story before filming commences.

I examine the relation between the action of producing a change (kinêsis) in something else and the action of exercising one’s nature or craft (energeia). I call for the distinction between kinêsis and energeia by arguing that in Metaphysics IX.1-5 change should be construed as a transformational change that is still characterized in accordance with the categories, whereas in Met. IX.6-9 the action of exercising of one’s nature or craft should be construed as the presence of a state or an action that exhibits one’s nature or craft, which is meant to be a way of characterizing that-which-is (to on) that goes beyond the categories. Instead of the conventional patient-centered account of change, I argue that Phys. III.3 and V.4 suggest a non-patient-centered account of change and that the agent’s acting-upon (poiêsis) should also be construed as a non-self-contained change, just as the patient’s being-acted-upon (pathêsis), and therefore cannot be conflated with exercising one’s nature or craft. I also point out that a genuine Aristotelian event cannot be composed of the agent’s acting-upon and the patient’s being-acted-upon. I argue that Phys. VII.3 suggests a two-way relation between the action of producing a change in something else and the action of exhibiting one’s own nature, based on which I outline a hylomorphic proposal that a genuine Aristotelian event is composed of the action of producing a change in something else as the material part of the event and the action of exhibiting one’s own nature as the formal part of the event. While the former provides the material necessitation force from the bottom up to the occurrence of the event, the latter provides the formal constraint force from the top down to the occurrence of the event. / text

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien. / The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’élucider l’intention, la pertinence et la cohérence de l’appropriation par Heidegger des concepts principaux de la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne dans ses premiers cours. Notre analyse portera principalement sur les notions clefs d’energeia et de phronēsis. La première section de la thèse est préparatoire : elle est consacrée à une analyse étroite des textes pertinents de l’Éthique à Nicomaque, mais aussi de la Métaphysique, en discussion avec d’autres commentateurs modernes. Cette analyse jette les fondations philologiques nécessaires en vue d’aborder les audacieuses interprétations de Heidegger sur une base plus ferme. La deuxième et principale section consiste en une discussion de l’appropriation ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque que Heidegger entreprend de 1922 à 1924, à partir des textes publiés jusqu’à ce jour et en portant une attention spéciale à Métaphysique IX. Le résultat principal de la première section est un aperçu du caractère central de l’energeia pour le projet d’Aristote dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque et, plus spécifiquement, pour sa compréhension de la praxis, qui dans son sens original s’avère être un mode d’être des êtres humains. Notre analyse reconnaît trois traits essentiels de l’energeia et de la praxis, deux desquels provenant de l’élucidation aristotélicienne de l’energeia dans Métaphysique IX 6, à savoir son immédiateté et sa continuité : energeia exprime l’être comme un « accomplissement immédiat mais inachevé ». L’irréductibilité, troisième trait de l’energeia et de la praxis, résulte pour sa part de l’application de la structure de l’energeia à la caractérisation de la praxis dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, et du contraste de la praxis avec la poiēsis et la theōria. Ces trois caractéristiques impliquent que la vérité pratique ― la vérité de la praxis, ce qui est l’ « objet » de la phronēsis ― ne peut être à proprement parler possédée et ainsi transmise : plus qu’un savoir, elle se révèle surtout comme quelque chose que nous sommes. C’est ce caractère unique de la vérité pratique qui a attiré Heidegger vers Aristote au début des années 1920. La deuxième section, consacrée aux textes de Heidegger, commence par la reconstruction de quelques-uns des pas qui l’ont conduit jusqu’à Aristote pour le développement de son propre projet philosophique, pour sa part caractérisé par une profonde, bien qu’énigmatique combinaison d’ontologie et de phénoménologie. La légitimité et la faisabilité de l’appropriation clairement ontologique de l’Éthique à Nicomaque par Heidegger est aussi traitée, sur la base des résultats de la première section. L’analyse de ces textes met en lumière la pénétrante opposition établie par Heidegger entre la phronēsis et l’energeia dans son programmatique Natorp Bericht en 1922, une perspective qui diverge fortement des résultats de notre lecture philologique d’Aristote dans la première section. Cette opposition est maintenue dans nos deux sources principales ― le cours du semestre d’hiver 1924-25 Platon: Sophistes, et le cours du semestre d’été 1924 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Le commentaire que Heidegger fait du texte d’Aristote est suivi de près dans cette section: des concepts tels que energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis ou hexis ― qui trouvent leur caractérisation ontologique dans la Métaphysique ou la Physique ― doivent être examinés afin de suivre l’argument de Heidegger et d’en évaluer la solidité. L’hypothèse de Heidegger depuis 1922 ― à savoir que l’ontologie aristotélicienne n’est pas à la hauteur des aperçus de ses plus pénétrantes descriptions phénoménologiques ― résulte en un conflit opposant phronēsis et sophia qui divise l’être en deux sphères irréconciliables qui auraient pour effet selon Heidegger de plonger les efforts ontologiques aristotéliciens dans une impasse. Or, cette conclusion de Heidegger est construite à partir d’une interprétation particulière de l’energeia qui laisse de côté d’une manière décisive son aspect performatif, pourtant l’un des traits essentiels de l’energeia telle qu’Aristote l’a conçue. Le fait que dans les années 1930 Heidegger ait lui-même retrouvé cet aspect de l’energeia nous fournit des raisons plus fortes de mettre en doute le supposé conflit entre ontologie et phénoménologie chez Aristote, ce qui peut aboutir à une nouvelle formulation du projet heideggérien. / The purpose of this thesis is to sort out the intent, the philosophical relevance and the consistency of Heidegger’s appropriation of the basic tenets of Aristotle’s practical philosophy in his early lecture courses. Our analysis will focus mainly on the key notions of energeia and phronēsis. The first preparatory section of the thesis is devoted to a close analysis of Aristotle’s relevant texts of the Nicomachean Ethics, but also of the Metaphysics, in discussion with other modern commentators. This lays the philological groundwork which will enable us to engage Heidegger’s challenging interpretations on a more secure footing. The second and main section discusses Heidegger’s ontological appropriation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics from 1922 to 1924 on the basis of the texts so far published, and with a special attention to Metaphysics IX. The main result of section I is an insight into the central character of energeia for Aristotle’s project in the Nicomachean Ethics and, more specifically, for his understanding of praxis, which in its genuinely original sense turns out to be a way of being of human beings. Our analysis recognizes three essential traits to energeia and praxis, two of which stemming from the analysis of Aristotle’s own elucidation of energeia in Metaphysics IX 6, namely immediacy and continuity: energeia expresses being as an ‘immediate unfinished fulfillment’. Irreducibility, the third trait of energeia and praxis, results from applying the structure of energeia to the characterization of praxis in the Nicomachean Ethics, and from contrasting it with poiēsis and theōria. These three features entail that practical truth―the truth of praxis, the ‘object’ of phronēsis―cannot be properly possessed and thus transferred: more than something we know, it is something we are. It is this special character of practical truth that primarily attracted Heidegger to Aristotle in the early 1920s. Section II, devoted to Heidegger’s texts, starts by reconstructing some of the intellectual steps that led him to resort to Aristotle for the development of his own philosophical project, characterized by a profound, yet intriguing intermingling of ontology and phenomenology. The legitimacy and feasibility of Heidegger’s pointedly ontological appropriation of the Nicomachean Ethics is also discussed, on the basis of the results of section I. The analysis of these texts is characterized by the sharp opposition set by Heidegger between phronēsis and energeia in his 1922 programmatic Natorp Bericht, a perspective that strongly diverges from the results of our philological reading of Aristotle in section I. The assessment of this opposition is maintained throughout the discussion of the two main sources―the 1924-25 winter course Platon: Sophistes, and the 1924 summer course Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Heidegger’s direct commentary of Aristotle’s text is followed closely in this section: concepts such as energeia, entelecheia, telos, physis and hexis―which find their ontological characterization in the Metaphysics or Physics―need to be scrutinized in order to follow Heidegger’s argument and to assess its soundness. Heidegger’s hypothesis from 1922―namely, that Aristotle’s ontology does not fit the insights of his more penetrating phenomenological descriptions―eventually culminates in a clash between phronēsis and sophia which divides being into two irreconcilable spheres and brings Aristotle’s ontological efforts to a dead end. Yet, this conclusion of Heidegger is built upon a specific interpretation of energeia that critically leaves in the shade its performative side, one of its essential traits as Aristotle conceived it. The fact that in the 30s Heidegger himself comes to see this side of energeia provides us with stronger grounds to question the supposed conflict between ontology and phenomenology in Aristotle, which can result in a new formulation of the Heideggerian project.

在「有」與「意見」對立的傳統背景下，那些「萬有」如何與「意見」區別？如果「萬有」涉及了「多」和「差異」，那麼「多」和「差異」要結合成同一個，並且當失去了這個結合後，同一個不會再是自己。以這種關於「結合而成為一」或「結合而是」的問題，就涉及到以「生成」為主的變動的處理：所有「結合而是」的東西通過「進入存有」或「生成」的過程，成為它自己，那麼，要通過如何的觀照、要如何地把在「進入存有」或「生成」的過程中表現出來的許多差異的內容，把它們關連到作為「有」的「萬有」上，而不是作為「意見」的「萬有」上？ 這些萬有若要被帶入認知，則「自然」將被談論為這些變動的原因。此即是亞理斯多德的《自然學》卷前三章所面對的問題，亦即第二哲學作為「知識」而被建立的問題。 亞理斯多德從「physis」這個字的多重意涵著手，開始了把「生成」關連到「有」的策略：「physis」在傳統上所帶的「生長」（das Wachstum）和「本質」（das Wesen）的意義下，他把「自然」標舉為對於生長之「驅力」的擁有，使得擁有這種驅力的東西被看作它們既是生成的、又是自己有能力生成的，並且這種能力被包含在這些東西之作為它們自己的本質裡。據此，對運動變化的內容的觀照，得到了一條途徑可以通往「自然」，「自然」則作為一種活動的能力在本質上，就是本質自己的實現。亞理斯多德轉而把運動變化視為自然或本質自己對自己的某種揭露，並且能把整個觀照轉向到對擁有活動之能力的本質的掌握。隨後他設立一種「目的的視野」而以「相」來觀看如此之本質：他一方面通過對數學家之觀看的評論，批評了柏拉圖學院對的設定，亦即他們不觀看生成，卻分離地設定了生成之能力的實現；另一方面則藉助了與技術的類比而論證了「目的的觀看」——正如在技術的活動裡，質料和相結合地被帶到「為了目的」的瞭解上，在自然的活動裡，本質之能力的活動的結構也完整地在這樣的視野中，以「為了目的」的觀看而被掌握。因此，「目的」就作為某某之活動能力的「界定」，作為其活動能力之展現的諸差異的「共同擁有者」，由此成立「必然」的意義。最後亞理斯多德將「相」作為本質之存有的以及能力的結構，從中分解出原因的途徑，並透過這些而與變動的內容關連起來。如此一來完成了將生成帶入對本質掌握裡，進而把這些結合而是的萬有以如此的觀看步驟關連到「有」而排除了與「意見」的關連。根據上述步驟，第二哲學以「看起來的善」而非「自身善」為條件成立了其限定的知識，據此界線而與第一哲學劃分。 本論文帶著一個仔細分解上述所有步驟的意圖，針對這段文獻進行逐句解釋的工作，最後期望在一個完整的意義上建立亞理斯多德之談論的論理程序。

This study investigates movement as a phenomenon of constituting directedness in the Canadian writer Rudy Wiebe’s Mennonite novels. In Peace Shall Destroy Many (1962), in The Blue Mountains of China (1970), and in Sweeter Than All the World (2001), the phenomenon of movement is complexly at work as a decisive factor on numerous levels of constitution. Employing the concept of phenomenological directedness, the study elucidates phenomena central to the kinetic-kinaesthetic materiality of the three works. Focusing on textual nuances of kinaesthetic accentuation, the investigation highlights ways in which directedness shapes subjectivity rather than vice versa. Kinetic reality emerges as something torn between distance as a separating interval and distance as a remote intimacy manifesting an elision of the span between source-point and terminus. Such discrepancy shapes a sense of existential inconsecutiveness, in which an intriguing diminishment of feeling is a heightening of the affective life. This state of affairs is frequently aligned with faith as world-withdrawal. The wandering of persecuted believers is a theological process that at any given time can reduce itself to an external, purely geographic enterprise, thus becoming a substitute for faith. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of perpetual travel has the capacity to produce an overarching bonding-affect at the constituting heart of a community whose kinetic life is inseparable from the movement of regeneration.