Th.--Anthropol. de l'éduc.--Paris 5, 1986.

This thesis aims at identifying and analysing the basic discourses constructed around Russian Islam by both the Kremlin and the three leading Muslim organisations. Starting out from the largely poststructuralist premise that identity and policy are ontologically co-constitutive, the link between the two is explored in relation to three basic discourses and their articulation into two specific policies. The Russian Muslim Self is revealed to be discursively embraced by the Kremlin as part of Russian identity by emphasising the multinational nature of the latter, the cooperation between state and Muslim organisations against the common threat of extremism and the need for religiously defined moral values to be conferred on the younger generations. The identity produced by these discourses both articulates and is legitimised by policy and points to a constant renegotiation of how Russian Islam fits into the broader identity of the Russian state.

Orientador: Suzeley Kalil Mathias / Banca: Hector Luís Saint-Pierre / Banca: Samuel Alves Soares / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A presente dissertação faz um estudo sobre as ações de Moscou em relação à Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte - OTAN - desde a concepção desta, em 1949, até o último governo de Vladimir Putin, findo em 2008. O trabalho pretende, além de identificar tais atitudes, apresentar as razões pelas quais a Rússia pode ser a favor ou contrária às ações da OTAN. Os materiais utilizados para a confecção desta dissertação compreendem livros e revistas especializados em Rússia, Eurásia, Geopolítica e Relações Internacionais, periódicos, documentos oficiais e não-oficiais e mapas, havendo, após sua coleta, uma análise histórica. / Abstract: The current dissertation carries out a study on Moscow's actions concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO - since its inception, in 1949, until Vladimir Putin's last administration, which ended in 2008. Besides identifying such behavior, this work seeks to present the reasons why Russia can be in favor or against NATO's actions. The making of this dissertation was based on books and journals specialized in Russia, Eurasia, Geopolitics and International Relations, periodicals, official and nonofficial documents and maps, all of these being followed by a historical analysis. / Mestre

本文的研究目的，企圖從地緣政治與克里姆林宮政治研究的角度，就俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則的形成因素作一研究與分析。 本論文發現俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則形成的主要動因有二： 一、地緣政治惡化是促使俄羅斯調整軍事準則的根本動因。 由於冷戰結束後全球戰略格局的變遷，俄羅斯在國際地位明顯下降，地緣政治環境日益惡化，傳統勢力範圍受到侵蝕，國力嚴重衰退，為續與美國保持低水準戰略平衡以及抗衡北約東擴，確保其國家利益和國際地位。另面對解決境內及獨立國協宗教、民族衝突所爆發局部戰爭及軍事衝突，在軍事上重新制定了俄羅斯聯邦軍事基本準則由單一注重外部威脅，轉為同時注重國內、外兩種威脅，重點由世界戰爭轉向地區性衝突。這說明了俄羅斯的新軍事準則在相當大程度上受到地緣戰略的影響。 二、俄羅斯軍方的態度及國內政治生態是促使軍事準則調整變化的另一因素。 隨著俄羅斯超級大國地位的喪失、地緣政治環境惡化、軍隊地位和待遇的不斷下降及士氣日益低落，軍隊對國家的安全和強烈不滿。強烈要求重樹大國地位、恢復軍隊實力。俄羅斯軍隊一些將領紛紛公開批評外交政策和軍事政策。同時，由於在1993年10月流血事件中，葉爾欽動用軍隊戰勝議會，增大了政府對軍隊的依賴，使俄羅斯軍隊在國家政治生活中的發言權和影響力日益增大。故葉爾欽在制定安全政策和軍事準則時不得不更多地考慮軍隊的利益和主張：如在制定新軍事準則中明確保障軍人及其家屬福利、增加軍費開支、放慢軍轉民步伐、以及在境外顯示軍事存在等方面，都採取了一系列迎合軍隊主張的措施和行動。而葉爾欽為贏得民心，鞏固地位，即開始了以恢復大國地位為中心的內外政策的大調整。在這種特定的政治氣氛中，新的俄羅斯軍事準則應運而生。可見，俄羅斯軍方的態度是促使俄羅斯軍隊準則調整與轉變的重要因素之一。 在此兩個主因中以俄羅斯國內政治生態互動，特別是葉爾欽與軍隊間關係影響最大，加上冷戰後美中俄戰略三角互動的架構的國際政治格局，在此條件下，形成了俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則。 / The purpose of the thesis is attempting to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the formation of the Russian Federation's military doctrine from the perspective of geopolitics and Kremlin politics. This thesis is taking the position that Russian Federation's military doctrine has been shaped by two main motives: First, the worsening geopolitical situation demands that Russia adjust its military doctrine. Due to the changes of global strategy after the end of the cold war, the decline of Russia's international prestige, worsening geopolitical situation and the severe threat to Russia's traditional sphere of interest, Russia takes important measures to adjust its military doctrine accordingly. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia's own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, new military thinking has to emphasize both internal and external threats. Second, the attitude of Russian army and domestic political struggle also force Russia to adjust its military doctrine. Owing to the loss of superpower status and the decline of army's status and wellbeing, leading generals of the Russian army became increasingly dissatisfied with government's foreign policy and military thinking. They demanded that Russia restore her great power status and restrengthen its army's forces. In the blooding event of October 1993, Yeltsin used army to defeat the parliament, for this reason Yeltsin had to depend more on army. Russian army has became more influential in politics. Yeltsin had to consider army's interests and opinions in draw up security policy and military doctrine. For example, new military thinking clearly ensures welfare of soldiers and their family, increases military expense, slows down the speed of conversion and other measures to satisfy army. Besides, in order to gain people's support and consolidate political power, Yeltsin started to adopt policy to restore status of great power. Among these two dynamics, domestic political struggle－the relationship between Yeltsin and army－plays more influential role. Russian Federation's military doctrine was thus formulated under Kremlin politics and the interaction of strategic triangle.

This study takes a qualitative approach to contextualizing and examining the communication of the so-called Kremlin trolls on Twitter, in relation to two major political processes that occurred in 2016, namely the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential election. Moreover, the study examines the news media of the two respective countries’ portrayal of the “Kremlin trolls”. The study assesses and problematizes mainstream application and contemporary usage of terminology in relation to two phenomena central to this thesis, namely: “Kremlin trolls”, and “fake news”. The study reconceptualizes the respective concepts into the “Kremlin meddlers” and “deceitful news”, as it was found those terms more accurately reflect both phenomena. Two sets of empirical data are examined in the thesis, one of which consists of 62 posts derived from 14 accounts of the Kremlin meddlers’ Twitter accounts. The other consistsof 30 articles stemming from 10 different news outlets, 5 of which were U.K. news outlets and 5 U.S. news sites, covering the political spectrum from one end to the other. The study applies one theoretical framework toexamine both sets of empiricaldata, namely Teun van Dijk’s Critical Discourse Analysis. The Kremlin meddlers’ Twitter accounts used two strategies to influence the electorates of both countries, one of which was to hide under the guise of pseudonyms impersonating actual citizens of the two nations. The other strategy employed by the meddlers was to maintain accounts that simulated news outlets, acting and appearing much like a legitimate news outlet would on the platform. The communication of the Kremlin meddlers was primarily aimed atsupporters of the ideological right by (re)producing discourse highly critical of the ideological left, this is particularly so for the Twitter accounts seeking to impersonate actual people. The pursuit of ideological polarization is centralin their communication.In the news media’s portrayal of the meddlers,differences are foundacross the ideological spectrum. The study identifies three themesin the discourse; one portraying the meddlers’ in a humanizing view, one creating a Them vs. Us categorization between Russia and the West, and the last focusing on the meddlers’ impacton democratic processes. Intrinsic to all of the themes is the (re)production of elite discourse, primarily seen through the selective use of voices from the symbolic elite to construct the social reality.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-11-25Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:56:59Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 nascimento_fal_me_mar.pdf: 1729879 bytes, checksum: 0c9764597bda9da0f73b88beca337bd8 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A presente dissertação faz um estudo sobre as ações de Moscou em relação à Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte – OTAN – desde a concepção desta, em 1949, até o último governo de Vladimir Putin, findo em 2008. O trabalho pretende, além de identificar tais atitudes, apresentar as razões pelas quais a Rússia pode ser a favor ou contrária às ações da OTAN. Os materiais utilizados para a confecção desta dissertação compreendem livros e revistas especializados em Rússia, Eurásia, Geopolítica e Relações Internacionais, periódicos, documentos oficiais e não-oficiais e mapas, havendo, após sua coleta, uma análise histórica. / The current dissertation carries out a study on Moscow’s actions concerning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO – since its inception, in 1949, until Vladimir Putin’s last administration, which ended in 2008. Besides identifying such behavior, this work seeks to present the reasons why Russia can be in favor or against NATO’s actions. The making of this dissertation was based on books and journals specialized in Russia, Eurasia, Geopolitics and International Relations, periodicals, official and nonofficial documents and maps, all of these being followed by a historical analysis.

This dissertation considers films to be double-sided mirrors that absorb political and cultural content from one side, with filmmakers filtering and elaborating the content between the two surfaces, and then transmitting the elaborated points to the audience. The elaboration of political content can be performed in an educational and propagandistic way, depicting and supporting specific political ideas. This dissertation analyses the first two programs of a Russian government program, Patriotic Education for Russian Federation Citizens (2001- 2005 and 2006-2010) (hereinafter, 'Patriotic Education'), and identifies six political priorities that can be observed and analysed in eleven Russian war movies. It will first be explained how the movies serve as propagandistic and educational tools in the context of Patriotic Education, projecting its political priorities to the audience. Second, it will be explained how a continuity with the Soviet past is displayed in the content of war films and the way they depict some of the elements promoted by Patriotic Education.

本論文旨試圖透過克里姆林宮政治暨嚇阻戰略研究途徑，剖析俄羅斯將獨立軍種「戰略火箭軍」裁併至空軍編制的原因。 本論文假設戰略火箭軍遭到裁併是基於下列兩項原因： 第一、俄羅斯武裝力量本身的態度與國內幾次重大政治鬥爭，導致俄羅斯必須修正軍事準則。 由於總統葉里欽在獨立初期，並沒有為俄羅斯的外交與國家安全政策領域構築一個法制化、有效率的決策系統，造成諸如國防部、外交部、總參謀部、聯邦安全會議、國防會議與國家軍事檢察署等相關機構，彼此間不斷爭奪軍事資源、議題詮釋權，政治鬥爭頻仍。另外，在某些政治危機中，例如1993年砲轟國會事件、第一次車臣戰爭以及1996年總統大選，葉里欽需要拉攏軍方支持以應付反對勢力，這就讓俄羅斯武裝力量有機會涉足克里姆林宮政治。結果是國家安全政策領域呈現各行其道、莫衷一是的混亂局面，並且有愈來愈多的政府官員對於在國家安全政策領域中攫取政治利益躍躍欲試。 其次，俄羅斯地緣政治環境的劇烈惡化導致龐大的反軍事改革勢力。 為了要在冷戰後與美國保持最低限度的戰略均勢狀態，好保障俄羅斯的國家利益及國際地位，並且順利解決因宗教或種族要素在俄羅斯或獨立國協境內所引發的區域戰爭或軍事衝突，有些官員諸如思科可夫、謝爾蓋耶夫等人主張俄羅斯應該繼續維持強大的戰略武力，特別是著名的戰略火箭軍。他們反對軍事改革以及裁減軍備。而由於當前國防預算困窘，葉里欽與普欽必須兩害相權取其輕，整肅拒絕裁軍的官員或是部隊。 在謝爾蓋耶夫與克瓦什寧激烈的政治鬥爭結束後，最後的贏家克瓦什寧終於如願以償，將戰略火箭軍予以裁併，由軍種單位降為兵種單位。不過俄羅斯的戰略武力仍然將在未來扮演極具影響力的角色。 / The purpose of the thesis is to attempt to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the reduction of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces(SMF) in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command from the perspective of Kremlin politics and Strategy of Deterrence. This thesis takes the position that the SMF has been reduced by two main motives: First, the attitude of the Russian army and domestic political struggle has forced the Russian government to adjust its military doctrine. Due to Yeltsin failing to set up a well-organized and efficient system for foreign and national security policy decision-making, so the struggle between the key ministries involved in foreign and security policy- the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, the National Security Council, the Defense Council, the State Military Inspectorate- was hard. And in some political crises, such as the bloody event of Oct. 1993, the presidential election in 1996, and the crisis in Chechnya, Yeltsin needed army to defeat the counterforces. The Russian army has became more influential in politics. As a result, the decision-making process has been chaotic and confused, and various bureaucratic players have often been able to impose their their own special interests on the security policy agenda. Second, the worsening geopolitical situation has brought about considerable resistance to the military reform. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia’s own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, some officials like Yuri Skokov and Igor Sergeyev advocated maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent force, especially the prominent role for the SMF. The president was likely to face considerable resistance to the reform. Owing to the current financial constraints on defense spending, Yeltsin and Putin carried out a purge of army officers who were against arms reduction. After the hard political struggle between Igor Sergeyev and Anatoliy Kvashnin, the winner- Kvashnin demanded the SMF must be reduced in status from a separate branch of service to a separate command. But the Russian strategic force will still play influential role in the near future.

本文旨在透過克里姆林宮政治研究途徑，來探討俄羅斯總統普欽對媒體政策之走向。本文認為普欽的媒體改革，為其鞏固政權的一環。 本文認為，1990年代俄羅斯媒體帝國崛起的主要驅動因素，乃是葉里欽企圖藉助於金融寡頭及其所掌控的媒體，以掃除蘇聯遺留下來的保守勢力，從而鞏固其政權；而普欽任內致力解構媒體帝國的主要驅動因素，則是普欽企圖以打擊經濟犯罪為名，打擊金融寡頭，藉以收攬人心，並從而解構葉里欽遺留下來的 「家族」集團勢力，建立以國家安全團隊為主幹的執政團隊，鞏固其政權基礎。 因此，本文認為： 一˙府會之爭導致「震盪療法」改革迅速失敗，繼之而起的執政團隊推動以大型企業為主軸的民營化改革導致金融工業集團應運而生。而官僚派系掠奪國家資產以擴張政治版圖，導致金融寡頭坐大進而建立媒體帝國。葉里欽為了鞏固政權競選連任與金融寡頭建立聯盟進而收編媒體帝國。 二˙普欽於2000年當選總統後，藉由剷除金融寡頭來收回國家資產以收攬人心；藉由剷除金融寡頭以鏟除葉里欽人馬所憑藉的權力堡壘；藉由剷除金融寡頭以接收媒體帝國從而鞏固政權。 / The main purpose of this study is to explore, through the Kremlin politics approach, the orientation of Russia’s policy on media under Vladimir Putin. In this study, the author argues that Putin’s media reforms constitute an indispensable link for the consolidation of his power. It is hypothesized in this study that the driving forces behind the rise and fall of Russia’s media empire are the efforts by Boris Yel’tsin and Vladimir Putin to consolidate their power respectively. Allying with the financial-industrial oligarchs, who had controlled Russian mess media, Yel’tsin strove for wiping out the conservative forces left by the Soviet regime in order to consolidate his power. On the contrary, Putin has sought to wipe out the oligarchs and restructure the media empire, in order to rally the popular support, to wipe out the “Family” forces left by Yel’tsin’s regime and replace them with a new ruling command of national security elite, and, consequently, to consolidate his own power. The above-mentioned hypothesized proposition can be further developed into the following logically consequential sub-propositions: First of all, in the wake of the “shock therapy” ruined by the conflict between the parliament and the Kremlin, the following privatization reforms orienting on the creation of big enterprises gave rise to the creation of financial-industrial groups. Consequently, the corruption committed by bureaucrats who preyed upon state-owned enterprises led to the expansion of oligarchs’ strength so as to establish influential enormous media empire. Thereafter, aiming at consolidating his power and winning the coming presidential election, Yel’tsin formed an alliance with the financial oligarchs and thus put the newly-established media empire on his orbit. Secondly, after Putin was elected president in 2000, he strove for wiping out the financial oligarchs in order to accomplish the following three tasks: to renationalize the state properties in order to rally popular support; to wipe out Yeltsin’s power base; and, to take over and restructure media empire in order to consolidate his regime. Key words: Kremlin politics approach, Oligarchy, Putin, Russia’s media

本論文之研究目的是企圖從前蘇聯文武關係研究途徑與克里姆林宮政治研究途徑來探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯軍方之政治參與範疇與背後之動機。 就軍方政治參與之範疇而言，蘇聯於1991年底解體後，俄羅斯軍方在政治舞台上扮演了重要的角色。首先，我們可以從軍方在1993年俄羅斯新軍事準則成型的過程中，其強硬主張佔了主導的地位。第二、軍方在「近鄰」與前南斯拉夫維和行動的政策即便與外交部意見相衝突仍獲得最後主導權。第三、軍方在1993年10月政爭中並未完全保持中立，而最後軍方是站在葉里欽總統一方結束了此一政治危機。第四、軍方試圖從俄羅斯獨立後歷屆國家杜馬選舉中，藉由其投票行為或是主動參與競選來表達其政治態度與影響有關軍事方面之政策。 本論文以為，蘇後俄羅斯軍方的政治參與背後動機之主要原因有二。其一是蘇聯解體以後俄羅斯軍方制度利益嚴重惡化：蘇聯解體以後，軍方在軍事改革上無法有效進展、軍事預算嚴重不足、軍中生活條件惡化以及國防工業轉產上面臨了嚴重的問題。這些皆使得軍方為了自救不得不試圖從政治層面來解決軍隊之問題。其二是受到克里姆林宮政治互動之影響：葉里欽為了鞏固政軍大權，運用高超的政治手腕以及「分而治之」的統御方式，引用軍方的力量來打擊政治對手，另一方面也運用政治危機分化軍隊之團結性，使其無法在政治上形成對統治者之威脅。 / The purpose of the thesis attempts to analyze the scope and motives of post-soviet Russian military’s political participation by using former Soviet civil-military relations approach and Kremlin politics approach. As far as the scope of military’s political participation is concerned, since the dissolution of USSR in 1991, the Russian military has been playing an important role in Russian politics. First of all, during the process of formulating Russian new military doctrine in 1993, Russian military’s hard-line position dominated this process and its opinion finally won out. Secondly, peacekeeping operation took by the Russian military in the “Near Abroad” and former Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, usually conflicted the peaceful option hold by the Ministry of Russian Foreign Affairs, but the Russian military still took control of the final policy initiative. Thirdly, in October 1993, the Russian military didn’t remain neutral in the political struggle between president and Congress of People’s Deputies. It sided with president and therefore ended this severe political crisis. Fourthly, in each Duma election hold after Russia’s independence, the Russian military tried to express its political inclination and exerted its influence by voting, even actively took part in the election. This thesis is taking the position that the political participation of post-soviet Russian military is driven by two motives. First and foremost is the institutional interest of Russian military suffered great damage since the breakup of the USSR：military reform hasn’t made much progress; military budget received hasn’t sufficed the need of military; military faced the growing acute social problems within itself; the conversion of defense industry encountered difficulties. These problems made the Russian military try to preserve itself by political means. The second motive is affected by Kremlin political interaction：in order to strengthen his control over politics and military, Yeltsin used brilliant political art and managed the military by means of “divide and rule”. He used the military to attack his political opponent, on the other hand, he made use of each political crisis to split the military and therefore the military couldn’t constitute a political threat to the ruler of Russian polity.